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1.1 The study background 
Most of the people in developing countries live in rural areas and depend on subsistence farming. 
Otherwise fertile areas are not able to feed the population because of century old farming techniques and 
technology. The small industry existing is basically on light industries based on simple labour intensive 
technologies that are unable to compete internationally in terms of quality and price. The productivity of 
labour is very low because of low level of skills. Illiteracy is a major problem. As a result, many developing 
countries are in a very poor economic shape. They have tried to follow in the footstep of the industrialised 
countries to ameliorate their situation without avail. If you see the African continent the view is depressing. 
The legacy of colonisation, political instability and civil wars, corrupt and inefficient governments as well as 
the unfavourable trade of primary goods in the international market and the failed industrialisation following 
their political independence with rising national debts are at the root of their human tragedy, African 
countries' problems can be seen as the result of manpower training that is not effectively utilised in 
achieving the expected results in the application of appropriate industrial technology. Research institutions 
whose result remain at the prototype level; and state and private enterprises that depend more on foreign 
inputs than indigenous ones. This state of affairs has been partially responsible for Africans economic plight 
and perpetuates the current dismal state of a large segment of the human race, which has been forced to 
tolerate poverty, sickness and illiteracy as the normal way of life (ECA, 1991). Eritrea, being the newest 
nation in Africa and among the least developed countries in the world, is part and parcel of this vicious 
circle of technological backwardness and underdevelopment. It is trapped between the low level of 
scientific and technological capability that is not able to meet the growing demand of its people and the lack 
of purchasing power to buy and absorb science and technology from the advanced countries. It is true that 
industrialisation can only be based on the development of an adequate technological base through an 
appropriate application of Science and Technology (S&T) with a view to ensuring an integrated 
development process with strong inter-sector linkages. And an adequate technological base can only be 
developed if a country gives due recognition to S&T as an important sector of the national economy (ibid. 
p.t-3). To get out of the vicious circle, Eritrea should start making a conscious effort to develop appropriate 
technology policy that clearly shows a nation's leadership desire to enhance the contribution of scientific 
and technological capabilities for national development. It should increase the diffusion and efficient 
utilisation of technology, first, and reduce the dependency on foreign technology later. The problem, 
therefore, is the inability to take advantage of S&T as latecomer advantage and progressively break the 
vicious circle of absolute dependency.  
In Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), many countries immediately after independence embarked on aggressive 
industrialisation process by incurring huge development-related debt. They Introduction and Theoretical 
Framework transplanted modern plants from the West. But later it became evident that technology transfer 
does not occur only by buying modern machinery. It rather resulted in costly 'white elephants' that drained 
the meagre resources and produced nothing in return. Hence, the heavy debts on the shoulders of many 





African countries that today are almost living on international aid. The obsession of rapid industrialisation is 
also evident in Eritrea but at the same time the 'fear of debt' to avoid the costly mistakes of other African 
countries is very much felt. This is a country that from mid 1930s to mid 1960s had experienced a 
tremendous growth in industrialisation, by developing countries' standard. But at the same time during the 
3O-years of war of liberation (1961-1991), it went through the opposite road of underdevelopment. 
Now, in the case of Eritrea, the task of 'rapid industrialisation' is daunting given the absence of the large 
Italian skilled manpower and capital that was at the basis of the rapid industrialisation of the 1930s, 1940s 
and 1950s. Even the large Eritrean skilled workforce generated at that time was dispersed or sacrificed 
during the war of liberation, Besides, the world economy has completely changed particularly S&T. IT has 
become the driving force of progress and development. Now, the world is witnessing a new technological 
revolution: the information revolution. This revolution is much more than a communication revolution and 
should not be perceived in a narrow sector sense. It is the merging of two separate fields: computer 
science and telecommunications (Valaskakis, 1982: 96). 
The information revolution is as much a process as a product revolution. Although there are hundreds of 
new communication products being developed at a very fast rate every year the process of conventional 
production is also changing as are life styles and values (ibid. p. 97). The most important of the process 
changes are robotics, office information systems, and ecommerce that is emerging based on the fast 
expansion of Internet. Factory-automation and office-automation are substantially reducing production 
costs and reaping comparative advantages for those who adopt them. The micro-electronic revolution is 
transforming the mode of production in a manner at least as profound as the steam engine two centuries 
ago. In both cases we have a -industrial process of automation but with a difference. Whereas in earlier 
phases, energy capital was replacing labour, in the contemporary phase, information capital in the form of 
computers is replacing human labour. 
Any technology has a definite life cycle: discovery, invention, innovation, national dissemination, decline, 
and obsolescence. A careful study of leading technological countries in the contemporary period does show 
that their leadership comes from the successful mastery and control of the technology cycle and in 
particular the use of the "leapfrog" principle. This means either skipping a stage within a technology 
generation or skipping an entire generation to arrive on the ground floor of the next one before anyone else 
(ibid.p.98). Therefore, an understanding of the determinants of technical change may therefore have a 
good deal to gain from a more careful study of organisations and their modes of operation and change 
(Fransman, 1986: 123). 
The potential of information technology (IT) is enormous not just in the communication field but throughout 
the economy and it is very important that countries adapt their technology strategic orientation accordingly. 
Ultimately, the leapfrog principle inherent in micro-electric technology presents the single most potent 
source of hope for the weak of this world because information cannot be hoarded by information-capitalists 
and used to subjugate others. The leapfrog 'principle' takes care of that (Valaskakii, 1982: 100). But it 
assumes higher user capacity to select, use and store for future use from the huge information available in 
our modern world. 
The weak in science and technology are the least developed countries like Eritrea. Particularly, the 
manufacturing industries of these countries are extremely weak. Most of the developing countries have 
failed in the process of industrialisation. Eritrea, a new nation of Africa born in 1993, must not repeat the 
mistakes of other African countries. The world is full of success and failure stories. This country must 
capitalise on such wealth of experiences. Besides, the development information flow is easier than ever 





before thanks to the revolution in information technology. In this respect and in the process of 
industrialisation, if there is a possibility of cutting the corners, that can only be achieved by tapping all the 
potential of information technology. In this endeavour a good technology policy is of great help. 
It is time for a conscious effort to establish appropriate technology policy-making bodies within the 
government structure. These government bodies are missing in most SSA countries. The foundation of 
S&T has been left to chance factors and is directed indirectly by government macroeconomic and industrial 
policies as well as the influence of donor countries. Given that the least developed countries have very 
small markets and industrial base, to expect the private sector to lead in the development of S&T is 
illogical. The government should play its leading role. But again this can be done if there are only qualified 
and experienced people to make and implement such policies. Obviously these policies should also be 
designed to properly co-ordinate activities in education and training to that of industry. Education is 
supposed to provide all the necessary skilled manpower required to developing and sustaining a 
competitive industry. Industry, in its turn, should provide goods and services that are internationally 
competitive to be able to generate enough foreign currency to sustain the development. The development 
of these institutional infrastructures is going to take a lot of energy, money, and time. 
Eritrea, as a new comer, is starting to build its public services structure. It should immediately start to 
integrate S&T into all of its socio-economic policies. How? This is the study question of this research paper. 
This research wants to explore the S&T activities in developing countries in order to understand the 
stumbling blocks that other developing countries have been experiencing in the past and for Eritrea to learn 
from successes and failures documented in these countries. The main question of this research, therefore, 
is how Eritrea can transfer S&T, particularly IT, for a successful transformation of its economy and its 
society and avoid being at the fringe of the new global economy. Obviously the success we have in mind is 
one possible to measure in terms of the capability to produce internationally competitive goods and 
services. This, we think, can be achieved by acquiring and assimilating new technologies. And in this policy 
research, under the title of information technology policy and management in developing countries', we 
want to contribute on how to best achieve this. The title should not be mistaken for a research on 
'management information systems' at firm level. Rather it is S&T study, where II has a prominent place as a 
pervasive technology, including, of course, computer information systems at micro-level but keeping the 
unit of analysis at the country-level. 
1.2 Statement of the problem 
The problem is the scientific and technological backwardness in developing countries. Eritrea is no 
exception to it. It is, in fact, more pronounced in the case of Eritrea for the simple reason that it has recently 
emerged from the 3O-year war of liberation, the industrial base left Introduction and Theoretical Framework 
in Eritrea by the Italians was very promising. In the early 1970s it accounted for about 40% of the industrial 
output of Ethiopia. But the 1952 UN resolution to federate Eritrea with Ethiopia led, first, to the deliberate 
policies of "slow down and dismantle" of the industrial base of Eritrea. Next, the protracted war of liberation 
killed any possibility of industrial growth and economic development. In fact, the reverse is true. We have 
witnessed a process of de-industrialisation. 
Today those few industrial enterprises that managed to survive almost three decades of stagnation and 
decline are on the verge of complete bankruptcy because of the old and obsolete technology, lack of skilled 
manpower, managerial capabilities, and financial difficulties. Therefore, it is not possible to talk in terms of 
an industrial technology base of the country. If we look to the government of Eritrea as an institution, let 





alone the establishment of S&T policy making body, even the major ministries have not yet got a complete 
shape themselves. The government as a whole is in the process of formation. 
Any way Eritrea is like "tabula rasa" that can take the shape its leadership is able to give it. It is possible to 
say that there is no past commitment that hinder a new direction and a new commitment for a long-term 
industrial technology development. This is, in fact, what makes at this point in time very crucial to design 
carefully an industrial technology policy that can enable the country to progressively build on S&T base for 
a strong economy in the coming decades. We believe that the mastery of IT is going to play a determinant 
role in this process. 
The Eritrean government in its Macro Policy has clearly stated that Eritrea is going to be a service-hub in 
the region, that is, the service industry is going to play the dominant role in the development of the country. 
Financial institutions and other services are definitely going to be the major protagonists. In an era of 
"electronic fund transfer" it is not possible to have banking or insurance services not based on IT and be of 
international standard. Therefore, S&T policy should determine all the priorities and prepare the framework 
within which all relevant internal and external institutions can work to develop a sustainable industrial 
technology. Particularly the IT policy would be of great relevance to the financial institutions, trade, tourism 
and other social services because it would make networking possible and easier. Moreover, it could 
enhance the global connectivity of the country through Internet. 
Governments in the developing countries have been always tempted to buy every new technology, which is 
produced in the developed countries. But most of the technology developed in these countries has little 
direct relevance to the problems confronting many developing countries. In fact, "Research on problems 
directly relevant to the third world probably accounts for little more than one percent of the total research 
expenditures of the industrialised countries" (United Nations, 1981: 3-46). This is an additional reason why 
developing countries should look into developing their S&T infrastructures. 
The present Eritrean government, since the years of liberation war, has been following and is still 
committed to the policy of self-reliance. There are quite a number of successful attempts to adapt and 
make effective use of technology in the history of the Eritrean people. Those lessons must not be forgotten 
but should be systematically studied in order to develop right strategies and policies for the future.  
At a time when every good and service has a considerable content of information and knowledge, 
developing countries cannot continue to assume it is still safe to work on the old paradigm on which the 
classical economics is based. The world has completely changed and is rapidly changing. In the new global 
economy, only the countries taut are capable to produce and sell information and knowledge intensive 
goods and services will in the long-run survive. The tool to do this is S&T and innovations. Developing 
countries are at disadvantage at this particular time because their S&T as well as innovation capability is 
very low (or backward). How to redress this unfavourable situation? This is mainly the objective of this 
research. 
The main question of this research, therefore, is how Eritrea can transfer the relevant S&T in particular II, 
for a successful transformation of its economy and its society and avoid being at the fringe of the new 
global economy. By 'transfer of relevant S&T' we mean the acquisition of mature science and technology, 
the assimilation of it and possible adaptation and improvements. This is based on Kim's model and is 
expanded in chapter 2. This main question has been divided into two sub-questions:  





1. What is the state of S&T policy in developing countries and, in particular, how are the developing 
countries managing their IT to avoid future costly dependencies? 
2. How can Eritrea exploit the opportunities offered by IT to strengthen its economy based on the 
experiences of other developing countries? 
Note that we have chosen an integrated approach rather than studying IT alone. We believe that in the 
case of Eritrea addressing the broader issues of S&T are very central on how to best place IT vis a vis the 
other technologies. After all IT is only a subset of S&T. 
1.3 Objectives of the research 
The major objectives of this research are: 
1. To understand the difficulties encountered by developing countries in the process of economic 
development in limiting their technological dependence. 
2. To develop a model of an effective S&T base development for Eritrea based on the above 
understanding.  
3. To develop a plan for a sustainable IT base for Eritrea. 
1.4 Organisation of the study 
This research is organised into three parts and 14 chapters. The first three chapters consist of the 
introduction dealing with the study background, statement of the problem, objectives of the research, and 
the organisation of the study, the theoretical background and research framework and research 
methodology. 
Part I deals with S&T at the forefront of developing countries, the Newly Industrialised Economies (NIEs). It 
goes over the experiences of the NIEs in Southeast Asia and Latin America to capture their experience and 
learn from them. This part is considered to be very important in a research like this because some of these 
countries have almost achieved their dream of catching up the developed world, at least in per capita 
income. How this achievement was possible is a very important link that will be needed at the solution 
stage for the Eritrean case" It discusses the broad S&T development of Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, 
Hong Kong, Brazil and India first; and then focuses on IT development and use in only Singapore, Brazil 
and India. It ends with conclusions and lessons learned from these NIEs. 
Part II focuses on the Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries in general to come closer to home. Following 
the same structure of Part I, it tries to give the common major traits of SSA countries in their effort to master 
S&T in general and IT in particular. This part ends also with the major lessons learned from SSA countries. 
And finally, Part m deals with the case of Eritrea in the same fashion. The first part and the second are 
inter-linked in the sense that Eritrea is trying to learn from the success and failure that has been 
experienced in the whole world of the developing countries. Since there is not much achievement made by 
the SSA countries in terms of S&T for development, Part I tries to give the missing link by turning to 
countries that where at the same level, more or less, four decades ago but achieved a tremendous 
progress. All of these will form the groundwork and the context on which all the analysis of the study of 'IT 
in Eritrea' will be based. And from the best practice, a framework for S&T policy and management for 
Eritrea has been developed. Within this framework, a model of IT Plan as an infrastructure for the Eritrean 
socio-economy development is constructed. 
To a casual observer, the discussion of S&T policy and management seems to be out of place or less 
relevant to a research on IT. But in the case of Eritrea, where previous experience on S&T policy making 





and management is absent, it would automatically become a deficiency that may create some gaps later 
on. On the one hand, IT is a sub-set of S&T in general. On the other hand, without good S&T infrastructure 
it would become more difficult or even impossible to develop II in isolation from other technologies 
important in any process of development. Therefore, in each part the first chapter deals with issues relevant 
to S&T development including that of IT. 
Part I and II explore the literature in order to choose an appropriate model for S&T policy in the developing 
countries. The structure followed is that of the top-down approach. This is because governments have 
always played, directly or indirectly, a central role in S&T development in the developed countries, 
particularly Japan and in the newly industrialised economies, South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore. 
Similarly, governments' direct intervention in the economies of -insignificant the SSA countries are 
pronounced. But it was most of the times with success. Government willingness to commit appropriate 
budget for the development of infrastructures, models of inter-sector co-operation, and appropriate 
technology transfer mechanisms is a determining factor to strengthen the industrial technological base. In 
the case of Eritre4 the government has started to play a leading role in the economic development and it is 
expected to continue in the foreseeable future. 
Therefore, the whole structure of the research revolves around a general exploration of the socio-political 
and economic environmental context and then moves to the discussion of S&T policies and management 
followed by human resource development and institutional capability issues. Side by side IT has been 
separately treated because it is the research focus. We have also tried to focus on Singapore, Brazil, and 
India to make an in-depth study of IT. Singapore is selected because it is considered the closest possible 
model for Eritrea. While Brazil and India are selected because they can give a different picture, which can 
enrich our understanding of IT in developing countries, including the big countries in Latin America and 
Asia. It can more or less be considered like a continuum between small and large countries and between 
open market and relatively closed ones. Therefore, in the whole research the technology of focus is IT, At 
the end, the answer will be given on how Eritrea can leapfrog using II as an infrastructure to a new socio-
economic structure in catching up in S&T and get out of the margin of the global economy. 
In the concluding chapter, the research paper proposes a model for the establishment of S&T policy-
making body and in particular suggests a viable IT policy for Eritrea. The policy implications that follow from 
the study can help the country to progressively reduce the dependency on foreign technology and 
expertise. A plan that deals with the setting up of technological priorities and building up of indigenous 
technological capability is suggested. S&T policy instruments, from planning to evaluation of performance 
by various institutions, and their integration to the objectives of the national development plans will be the 
yardstick throughout. The gradual build up of the national potential in IT to support the Eritrean financial 
sector, transport and communications, trade, tourism and social services will be elaborated.  
 






2. Theoretical Basis and Research Framework 
2.1 Introduction 
To develop theories that consistently explain the different phenomena of our world is the main activity of 
our scientists. Economists do this kind of work to explain the optimal use of scarce resources in the wealth 
creation of nations and its distribution. 
If we try to make sense of the different theories and models of economic growth, we learn quickly that we 
are in a big jungle and one can easily be lost. One of the main difficulties encountered by social scientists 
is, for the sake of objectivity and precision for example, they invariable go to the world of mathematics for 
help. But this has its own problems. The mathematical language is very concise and precise, but 
expressing the social and economic life of mankind in mathematical terms is not always possible. It goes 
without saying that models are always a simplified representation of reality. They want to represent only the 
most salient characteristics of the subject of study. To start with, the major variables that explain a 
particular phenomenon have to be determined by the researcher before the mathematical relationship is 
expressed, each researcher has his specific angle of observation of the given phenomenon. A number of 
things have to be assumed, hence, the proliferation of models and as a result a „jungle of theories‟ that 
want to explain the same phenomenon. The same can be said of all the other research methodologies and 
models. Some of the theories are complementary while others seem to be mutually exclusive.  
Let us use an analogy to explain this. Let us say you are in a valley. What you can observe will be confined 
to the valley itself, which is limited by the surrounding hills and mountains. If you go higher on the top of a 
hill, you can see a bigger area, may be, a number of other nearby valleys. If you go up on the top of the 
mountain, you can see a very vast panorama with a number of hills, plains, rivers and valleys. If you higher 
in a plane, you can see a whole region. Try to be with the astronauts out on the orbit. You see the whole of 
the earth like a smooth small ball. Assume you still go further. You could see the whole solar system. 
The interesting point here is that when you were in the valley you could observe every detail: the running 
streams, the trees with their beautiful green shining leaves, the singing birds on the trees of different size 
and colour, the grazing sheep, the singing shepherded, etc. When you went up to the mountain top the 
beautiful sight you had in the valley disappeared. Now you have a completely different sight. The furthest 
point you could see is green and brown patches, the white dots on the hill‟s side that you recognize as the 
sheep, waterfalls like cotton white etc. From the plane everything is gone except smooth shaped mountains 
and valleys. At the same time new scenery is emerging, that of a region. You see a number of villages and 
towns some deep down in the valley others at the top of the hills or the side of the mountains. The one you 
see when you are out in the orbit: out earth looks like a small ball and together with the other planets going 
around the sun, is also another breathtaking sight. 
Similarly, the theories we have are many because some are the result of different angle of observation and 
others are the result of different interpretations of the same phenomenon from the same angle of 
observation. The first group is complementary to each other and enriching but the latter at times are 
confusing. It is enough to observe the literature with regard the success of the East Asian NIEs. Some 
attribute it to free market economy system they have followed, others to the careful intervention of 





governments to guide the economy, and still others try to find explanations in the culture of the people and 
their work ethics. When you come to the failure of the SSA countries some look to the colonial legacy for 
explanation others to political instability and corruption of governments and still others to changes in the 
world economy and the debt burden. There is not a general consensus. Different authors coming from 
different economic thought give opposite interpretations of the situation and conclude with different policy 
prescriptions. 
Coming to economic growth (technological change) theories, great contribution has been made from all 
sides, neo-classical or neo-Schumpeterian. We have a better understanding of many things thanks to these 
studies. But we don't still understand why few enjoy excessive wealth while the majority are still afflicted by 
extreme poverty, ignorance and diseases in this world where, at least theoretically, we are all equally 
created and all the earth's resources are of all of us.  
This research and its framework have been influenced particularly by the neo-Schumpeterians we can 
clearly see from the following sections. 
2.2 Theories on technology and economic growth 
Let us start from the definition of the key words. The words 'science and technology' are among the most 
widely used, revered and idolised of our modern times. They seem to have promised mankind everything: 
to master his environment and his destiny. Only when you ask yourself whether science and technology 
deliver such promises, then, it becomes clear the complexity of the subject. 
These two words usually go together and it is hard to define their respective boundaries. But one thing is 
immediately clear, that there is a lot of semantic confusion around them. This research does not want to 
embark on such a task, but it is only fair to start by making clear from the beginning what the word 'science' 
and 'technology' stands for, at least, in the context of the present research. 
The word 'science' is frequently used to mean 'objective' or 'exact' or 'rational'. For example, if someone 
tells you 'this is science', you understand that he/she means that it is something observed carefully, 
experimented, and replicated and found true. In other words, it is objectively so. It is not a subjective 
judgement based on intuition or feeling. Webster's New World Dictionary defines science as "systematised 
knowledge derived from observation, study, and experimentation carried on in order to determine the 
nature or principles of what is being studied". Therefore, science tries to explain the natural and social 
phenomena. The scientist studies the different social and natural phenomena to explain them. Any study to 
qualify as scientific must satisfy the so called scientific criteria: (1) careful observation of phenomenon, (2) 
formulation of a hypothesis to explain the observed phenomenon, (3) making of sufficient number of 
experiments to study the phenomenon, and (4) reporting the finding possibly with systematic explanatory 
theories. The methodology is highly emphasised for reasons of replication. Once a finding has been 
replicated enough times and found to be sound it is included in the body of scientific knowledge. This is in 
short how the scientific knowledge is created. 
Coming to technology it is variously defined such as 'science of industrial art' (Concise Oxford Dictionary). 
This definition leaves one with more questions than answers. Stuart MacDonald (1983) said that people 
think that 'technology' is something to do with machines. The more complex the machine the higher the 
technology associated with it. It is difficult for people to think of technology without machines. But he argues 
that it is quite possible for technology to involve no machines at all. He gives the example of crop rotation 
as a technology, and he continues that it was probably more significant in Europe during the eighteenth and 





nineteenth centuries than any other scientific discovery. By the same token, he goes further to view change 
in administrative or managerial practices as technological changes. 
It is an interesting argument, but why not go beyond the machines? After all a machine is only a tool. The 
skills of the people that designed and manufactured it as well as the skills of those who operate it are very 
crucial. The co-ordination and direction of hundreds of such skilled individuals and machines also is far 
more important to get the benefits of any technology. Therefore, why keep the machines in and the skills of 
the creators and operators of machines and the skill of managers out? Today, we have the software 
technology, which is the fastest growing sector in the IT industry. It is a revolutionising technology without 
machines. Since we are focusing on II, we will give the definition that we attribute to it from this research 
point of view after we finish the general definition of technology. 
Let us take some more definitions. 'Technology is a method for doing something. Using a method requires 
three elements: information about the method, the means of carrying out, and some understanding of it' 
(Dahlman & Westphal, 1983). This means that a machine by itself is not a technology neither the 
information of how the machine works without the machine and someone that understands it. There is no 
technology without machines, information and people that understand it. The definition given by Laseur 
(1991) is more suited to manufacturing industry. Technology is the knowledge and skill necessary for the 
conversion of raw materials and semi-manufactured goods into products of which the value is _greater than 
of the basic materials. There are three carriers of knowledge and skills called: (1) hardware (machinery, 
materials), (2) paperware (manuals, prescriptions, computer programs), and (3) humanware (knowledge 
and skills in the brains and hands of people). These carriers are not always present in the same proportion. 
They are only present in a ratio, which depends on the specific technology at hand. 
Therefore, it is possible to give a broad or narrow definition of technology. Here we will use it both ways to 
explore the firm or country level technological capacity development. Thus, together with many other 
authors, we say that 'Technology is the application of scientific knowledge and skills to the setting up, 
operating, improving and expanding of productive facilities. However, it can be narrowly defined to cover 
the technical aspects of such applications, or broadly to include managerial, organisational and other 
aspects' (see Dahlman & Westphal, 1982; Fransman's introduction to Fransman and King, 1984; Teitel 
1981, 1984). But it is not meant to imply that technology is always the result of systematic scientific activity. 
We acknowledge that we can have technology independent of science. In this paper, because we are 
dealing particularly with information technology, we think this definition is the proper one. With MacDonald 
(1983) we can say that ,technology can be regarded simply as the way things are done, and technological 
change as the adoption of what are thought to be better ways of doing things'. 'The way things are done' 
includes machines, materials, information, know-how, skills, management etc. If this is so, it goes without 
saying that the success of any technological change will depend very much on how well balanced and 
integrated all the parts of the technological package are. And this role is one for management. 
When we come to science in relation to development, we can see it from different approaches. One of 
these approaches is known as 'science/technology push model' (Bush, 1945). Bush sees basic research as 
the engine to innovation. He said that "New manufacturing industries can be started and many older 
industries greatly strengthened and expanded if we continue to study nature's law and apply new 
knowledge to practical purpose. But to achieve these objectives - to secure a high level of employment, to 
maintain a position of world leadership - the flow of new scientific knowledge must be both continuous and 
substantial." At the same time, in his view, "Scientific progress on a broad front results from the free play of 





free intellects, working on subjects of their own choice, in the manner dictated by their curiosity for 
exploitation of the unknown." 
Another model of innovation is the Market Pull Model. This is based on the idea that innovations are an 
outcome of interactions between market needs and basic research; the steps in between i.e., applied 
research, technology development, and implementation fills in the gap (Bhalla, 1987). It is the reverse of 
the Science/Technology Push Model. 
Given that scientific and technology development activities depend on the work of people, the challenge is 
to motivate scientists and technologists. This can be best accomplished by providing realistic challenge, 
direction, and an open environment with strong technology leadership. CEOs should show the same zeal 
for technology as they do for financial performance and be willing to take on the task themselves rather 
than delegate it (p. 85). 
Technology, therefore, operates parallel to science and functions both as contributor to scientific 
development and as beneficiaries of scientific accomplishment. But technology itself can be broadly divided 
into two parts, technology development and technology implementation. The first is a stream of knowledge 
translated into physical "hardware/software", which will eventually meet with some human use. The second, 
technology implementation, is a much more general form of combined activity in which the ideas of science 
and the hardware/software of technology are actually put to some use in the socio-economic world 
environment (Allen, 1977). 
This century saw the emergence of science and technology as an institution. This is to mean that huge 
number of research institutes, public and private, are established everywhere to produce science and 
technology. This is because the idea that science is the foundation of any innovation, Bush's idea, was 
widely accepted. But when the question of whether or not every dollar spent on basic research is 
generating the expected number of innovations, the result is at best mixed. One thing is sure. Research 
expenditure is not directly correlated to the number of innovations because innovations are not the direct 
result of science but of its creative use. For that matter, even technology is not necessarily the direct result 
of science. Sometimes technology precedes science. We discover new techniques before we could explain 
it why it works. Then, science is called upon to find out the underlying principles. Therefore, it is not 
necessary to keep an absolutist stance for one way or another. May be it is productive to keep balance 
between the two extreme positions of seeking science for the sake of pushing the frontier of knowledge 
only and the other of looking for immediate solutions to social and economic problems without 
understanding the long term effects of our actions. 
Today, it seems that stressing the function of science for national competitiveness and allocating resources 
to university-industry collaborations and critical technologies is the dominant trend (Slaughter and 
Rhoades, 1996). The 'free play of free intellect' concept that has dominated in the past is increasingly 
questioned. In science policy debates, a lot has been written for and against the two trends. But in practice 
the two intertwine and make up the fabric of institutional structures, of frameworks of rules, procedures and 
arrangements, to prepare, implement and perform policies (Braun, 1993; Balmer, 1996; Kleinman, 1994; 
Van der Meulen, 1998). 
Studies about the origin and diffusion of new technologies are very important to understand how they affect 
economic growth. Schumpeter calls them 'the gale of creative destruction' and considers them as the 
essential ingredient of capitalist economic development (Schumpeter, 1943). Entrepreneurs and innovators 
are incompatible with equilibrium, but the disturbance represented by the intrusion of innovations into the 





economic system gives a new impetus to economic development. Coombs et al (1987) tell us that in 
Schumpeter ideas there are the seeds of three of the four central questions or hypotheses about the origin 
of innovation. First, whether the central character is the entrepreneur or the large firm, it is only by 
introducing radically new ideas into economic life that the whole new industrial sectors can be generated. 
Technology, whether generated outside the economic system or in the large R&D laboratories of a 
monopolistic competitor, is the leading engine of growth. Therefore the 'technology push' hypothesis of the 
origin of innovations finds a natural place in Schumpeter's ideas. The second question is if whether more 
and better innovations produced by many entrepreneurs or by few large oligopolists? Or, in other words, 
what is the ideal market structure to stimulate innovation? The third question, for which Galbraith should be 
perhaps be credited more than Schumpeter (Kamien, Schwartz, 1982), is related to firm size: what is the 
best firm size to stimulate innovation? The fourth hypothesis is generally attributed to Schmookler (1966), 
fluctuations in investment could be better explained by external events than by the course of invention and 
that, on the contrary, upswings in inventive activity responded to upswings in demand. Because of this 
Schmookler has always -been referred as the exponent of a demand-led theory of innovation. Even though, 
he was trying to correct the opposite imbalance according to which it was only the exogenous flow of 
inventions which could generate new investments and new economic activities. 
In the immediate post War II period the belief that only pure science could generate a self-sustaining 
economic growth was expressed by many policy-makers, for example Bush, 1947, which was challenged 
during late 1960s and early 1970s. Neither technology-push nor demand-pull is found to predominate 
systematically but each one of them can lead the other at different stages in the development of the 
industry. If any generalisations can be made, technology-push tends to be relatively more important in the 
early stages of the development of the industry while demand-pull tends to increase in relative importance 
in the mature stages of the product cycle (Freeman et al 1982). Therefore, neither the idea of Schumpeter 
nor that of Schmookler is adequate alone. A combination of these ideas seems to explain better the 
development of these industries. Furthermore, Burton (1999) suggests that the neo-Schumpeterian 
economists have not been able to clearly articulate how firms search and innovate, or provide any guidance 
on the organisational processes involved. He suggests a post-Schumpeterian framework with crucial four 
elements: (i) knowledge creation within the firm, (ii) knowledge protection by the firm, (iii) collaborative 
business arrangements for knowledge creation, and (iv) the notion of diffused entrepreneurship. 
In this research, there is one particular idea of Schumpeter and his followers in which we are interested. It 
is the idea that clusters of innovations do occur. In particular the very process of diffusion of an initial 
innovation, if it was of sufficient importance, would generate further related innovations because the 'retinue 
of imitators' would tend to improve upon the first innovation and to create other innovations in related 
products, processes, technologies and organisational structures (Schumpeter, 1964). The view of exactly 
what is meant by a „cluster‟ of innovations has been developed to a greater degree of clarity by Rosenberg 
(1976, 1983) and Freeman (1984). 
An alternative account which is centred on the concept of 'New Technology Systems' (NTS) has been given 
by the followers of Schumpeter (Freeman, Clark and Soete, 1982). There are two essential features of the 
NTS ideas, which differentiate it from a cluster of basic innovations. Firstly, it consists of technologies that 
are very widely applicable in many products and processes in many industries, thus generating a range of 
related innovations. Secondly it is argued that it is the clustering of diffusion processes for these 
innovations rather than clustering of the dates of the innovation themselves which is both the appropriate 
interpretation of Schumpeter's position and the most important stimulus to the long wave upswing. For the 
post war boom of the 1950s and 1960, these authors presented substantial case study material to support 





the view that this role is played by two such technologies: synthetic materials and electronics. These satisfy 
also the technically related clusters (T-clusters) and the non-technically related clusters (M-clusters) 
requirements laid down by Rosenberg and Frischtak (1983). 
Economists have pointed to the importance of 'technological trajectories' (Nelson and Winter, 1977) and of 
'constellations of innovations' (Keirstead, 1948), which are both technically and economically interrelated. 
Several have also extended Kuhn's (1961) notion of scientific paradigms to the concept of 'technological 
paradigms' (Dosi, 1982). Nelson and Winter (1977) also suggested that some trajectories could be so 
powerful and influential that they could be regarded as 'generalised natural trajectories' (electricity). 
However, Carlotta Perez (1983) was the first to take these scattered ideas and comments and relate them 
not just to a particular branch of industry but to the broad tendencies in the economy as a whole. Her theory 
may be described as a 'meta-paradigm' or a 'pervasive technology' theory. In this way she gave some real 
content to the notion of 'successive industrial revolution'. 
A change of techno-economic paradigm or 'technological style' brings with it a whole range of new products 
and processes and many others which are redesigned to take advantage of the new technical and 
economic possibilities. Perez suggests that underlying this paradigm change is not just a range of new 
products but a change in the dynamics of the relative cost structure of all possible inputs into production. 
She maintains that microelectronics has clearly perceived low and rapidly falling relative cost, almost 
unlimited availability of supply over long periods, and clear potential for the use or incorporation of the new 
key factor or factors in many products and processes throughout the economic system. Few would deny 
this. It held until recently for oil, which underlay the post-war boom. The new key factor does not appear as 
an isolated input, but rather at the core of a rapidly growing system of technical, social and managerial 
innovations some related to the production of the key factor itself and others to its utilisation. Gradually the 
new model of innovation affects all sectors of the economy (example the chemical industry, Freeman 
1990). It embodies three main features (Perez, 1985) in the case of new information technology paradigms: 
l. Information-intensity rather than energy-intensity in products and processes. In the case of Japan this 
shift has been studied and confirmed by a number of researchers (Freeman, 1987). 
2. Flexibility in process investment and in product mix rather than the dedicated capital equipment and 
standardised products range characteristic of the 'Fordist' mass-production system. 
3. 'Systemation' not just 'automation'. Fordist production systems already used automated production 
equipment and process plant. The new paradigm uses information technology and communication 
technology to integrate the production plant with the design, marketing and administration functions within 
the firms. 
In the same vein, Freeman (1988) gives us an analysis of change in labour productivity and in capital 
productivity over the past 20 years at a sufficiently desegregated levels which bear witness to the 
tremendous impact made by microelectronics in most sectors of the economy (see Appendix 1). It again 
clearly transpires that IT is a very pervasive and revolutionary technology. Moreover, the promotion of 
generic technologies, especially information technology, has become a regular feature of technological 
policy and industrial policy in almost every member country of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) in the course of the 1970s and 1980s. The extent to which such efforts are 
successful will depend not simply on the scale of resource, which is committed in the public and private 
sectors of the economy, but also on the 'national system of innovation'. 





Given that our research is a country case study, a theory that can integrate all the major factors to scientific 
and technological innovations is of great help. Besides, in developing countries the major systems essential 
for the development of local technological capability exist in virtually all of them, but a coherent system of 
relations among these systems, which would have the effect of making them complementary to one 
another, is what missing (UNESCO, 1988, p48) is. The closest to this is the concept of 'national innovation 
system'. 
This was articulated initially by Lundvall (1985, 1986, 1992) and Nelson (1993), and more -recently by 
Edquist (1997). It reflects the perception that government, firms, universities, research laboratories, the 
financial system, and a host of institutions take part in the process of knowledge accumulation, particularly 
as it is reflected in producing innovations. The actions of these key institutional players and the interaction 
between them determine the impact of innovation, and more generally of knowledge, and the well being of 
nations. The national innovation system perspective acknowledges the specificity of each country, 
defending country- and time-specific policies to harness the benefits of knowledge to economic growth. 
Nelson suggests that the use of institutionalist frameworks such as the one proposed famously by North 
(1990) might be valuable in gathering the amount of diversity inherent to an approach that tries to account 
for the diversity in national innovation systems. In line with this, our research can be viewed as a research 
that acknowledges the specificity of each country and is looking for country- and time-specific policies for 
Eritrea in search of knowledge for socio-economic development. 
We believe together with Freeman (1987) and many others that 'catching up' cannot be assumed as an 
easy and almost castles process because new technology is considered to be equally and freely available 
to all comers (assumption made by perfect competition theory). The findings of empirical research on the 
dynamics of technological competition are virtually unanimous in pointing to availability of skilled 
manpower, of institutional capability to support development, of infrastructure investment and of work 
culture and networking as the basis for technological development and innovations. For example, Freeman 
(1987) believes that Britain in the first industrial revolution, United States and Germany in the late 
nineteenth and in the twentieth century, and Japan in the second half of the twentieth century succeeded 
because of major institutional changes in the national system of innovation. This is based on the new ways 
of organising the processional education of engineers and scientists and of organising research and 
development activities as specialised departments within firms, and employing the graduate engineers and 
scientists. Freeman thinks that the Japanese system seems particularly well adapted to take advantage of 
the enormous potential of this new paradigm (microelectronics revolution), for several reasons: the systems 
approach to process and product design; the flexibility of the industrial structure; the capacity to identify 
crucial areas of future technological advance at national and enterprise level; the capacity to mobilise very 
large resources of technology and capital in pursuit of strategic priorities.  
The latest economic miracle of the NIEs of South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, and Hong Kong basically is a 
replication of the Japanese success. Each of these countries followed a country specific strategy of 
technology transfer. For example South Korea heavily depended on the Chaebols, large business 
conglomerates, while Taiwan depended on small and medium sized firms, and Singapore on DFI of the 
multinationals. They did it through technological learning and export marketing. Hobday (1995) says that 
the technological role of exports is to progressively pull the learning of latecomer firms forward by 
stimulating technological change. He explains, through sub-contracting and other channels, export clients 
and export demand act as a focusing device for technological investments. Exports force the pace of 
technological progress and enable latecomers to overcome their distance from the demand markets from 
the West. And local competition stimulates the process as followers imitate export leaders. 





At last, we need to explicitly acknowledge that learning is a must to transform developing countries. 
Technological learning is the process by which firms acquire technology. Learning is central to master 
science and technology and to productivity growth and different types of product and process improvement 
(Malerba, 1992). Technological learning is a dynamic, difficult and costly process. It involves substantial 
and deliberate effort and investment on the part of the firms. Learning enables firms to build up their 
knowledge about products and manufacturing processes, and to develop, deploy and improve the skills of 
their workforces (Dodgson, 1991). Learning usually involves both knowledge and experience, 
encompassing formal methods such as training and informal mechanisms such as imitation. 
All these technological learning and catching up is important to developing countries. As Castells (1996, 
p.7) puts it beautifully: "If society does not determine technology, it can, mainly through the state, suffocate 
its development or it can embark on an accelerated process of technological modernisation able to change 
the fate of economies, military power, and social wellbeing in a few years. There are particular 
technologies, as we have seen above, that are strategically decisive in each historical period as the 
shapers (like microelectronics revolution of today) of the destiny of those society that have the ability to 
master technology". Without accepting technological determinism, Castells concludes that technology 
embodies the capacity of societies to transform themselves, as well as the uses to which societies, always 
in a conflictive process, decide to put their technological potential. Otherwise, countries remain at the 
margin of the global economy as is happening for SSA countries. 
Before concluding this section, let us give the definition of IT from the perspective of this research. IT is 
variously defined by different people. Zorkoczy and Heap (1995) say that the word 'information technology' 
is a relatively recent and perhaps not particularly well chosen addition to the English language. There are 
other similar words such as information and communication technology, informatics, telematics etc. It is 
very import to pay attention to the context in which different people use each of these words to properly 
understand the writers' mind. For the sake of clarity, we hereby define IT as comprising the computer 
technologies (hardware and software), the communication technologies (hardware and software), and the 
semi-conductor technology. These industries are increasingly having blurred boundaries (Freeman, 1987; 
Kobayashi, 1988). These technologies are blended in various ways to give different products and services 
based on the digital character code. The only factor that keep them together is that they serve one major 
function that of collecting data, generating, storing, and disseminating information (in digital form) in various 
ways: text, graphic image, voice, or video information wherever it is applicable. It can be at the office, in the 
factory, or in the agriculture sector, or any type of service industry to simply inform or do a job. What makes 
this technology revolutionary is the fact that it is processing and communicating information on a real-time. 
It enables the communication of people-to-people, people-to-machine, or machine-to-machine. It comprises 
the stand-alone computer or workstation, a local area network, or the wide area network like Internet that 
make up our information system. Since we are studying IT from a country's perspective, we are applying it 
in general terms from the office automation, the design and manufacturing of goods, in the process of 
giving services, and in research and education wherever applicable. 
The researcher believes that Eritrea does have a window of opportunity as a new comer and a new nation. 
It doesn't have tied up huge investments made in older technologies (for example old analogue 
telecommunications infrastructure). It doesn't have the chronic debt problem of many SSA countries. It can 
systematically build digital IT infrastructure as a base for its socio-economic development. This can enable 
the country to leapfrog considerably and get out of the dependency of primary product export as the main 
source of foreign exchange, which is one of the major problems in SSA countries. Tourism, trade and other 
services could -be the first to benefit from this move and serve as a basis for further industrialisation. 





Therefore, it is the desire of this research to contribute on how Eritrea can build, based on the experience 
of other countries that were in the same position some three-four decades and have succeeded, and IT 
infrastructure on which its socio-economic structure could be based. This is based on the assumption, as 
we have argued above, that information technology is a „sine qua non’ tool in every sector in the future. 
2.3 The issue of 'appropriate technology' 
It is very important to raise the question of whether or not 'information technology' is too advanced for the 
developing countries to contemplate in investing in it. Even if they embark on it, will there be any significant 
contribution to the development of their economies and the solution of their social problems? 
At one time there was a lot of 'appropriate technology' debate in the literature. Many have suggested that 
developing countries need a technology that is labour intensive. The argument goes, since new advanced 
technology is capital intensive, it is not appropriate technology for the developing countries. By the same 
token, we could say the same for information technology and exclude it from the technologies to be chosen. 
But we are not nether eliminating the long-term technological dependence of developing countries nor the 
danger of exclusion from the global economy by promoting appropriate technology which is mainly 
designed to improve life of the rural people. 
The logic of the appropriate technology debate was particularly based on the fact that developing countries 
are rich in unskilled cheap labour and they lack the capital for investment. Going for 'appropriate 
technology' or 'intermediate technology' which is simple to use and maintain, and at the same time creating 
more employment, would be more advantageous, But it fails to answer how these countries will graduate 
from being 'underdeveloped' to the status of the developed nations, which is their aspiration? How can the 
goods and services the developing countries would produce with this 'intermediate technology' be 
competitive enough to be exported to allow them to make the foreign exchange for their imports? Or else, 
the economy will be introvert and closed and lead to more isolation from the international trade and thus 
stagnation of the economy. 
On the other hand, how do we evaluate technological appropriateness? Do we mean only labour intensive? 
Do we mean only to the technology that uses the available low skills and local materials for local use? If we 
see the appropriate technology ideas (Schumacher, 1973; Weaver and Jameson, 1981; Dunn, 1978), it is 
not difficult to observe that it was focusing on the rural economy. The possible advantages sought were, 
first, to create employment in rural areas where most of the people live; to use local skills, materials, and 
financial resources, thus leading to lesser dependence on external sources. Second, it wanted to maximise 
use of renewable resources, to be compatible with local cultures and practices and to satisfy local needs 
and wishes. These ideas can help in the short-term but cannot serve the long-term interest of a developing 
country. Even the rural communities for which these appropriate technologies were designed have to be 
educated to liberate them from all their social and economic ills in the long-term. With the necessary 
investments in education, the need of these appropriate technologies decreases as education increases 
the skilled manpower poof. These educated people could not be happy with the quality of life offered by the 
rural communities (or the slums in big urban areas). There is no reason why with skilled manpower modern 
technologies cannot be used. It is the only way of integrating the urban economy and the rural as well as to 
the global economy. Of course, a careful balance need be maintained between investment in new 
technologies and their sustainability. 
In the case of Eritrea, for example, 70% of the population lives on subsistence agricultural economy. 
Drought, poor crops and famine have repeatedly hit the country. There is no way that small improvement 





can change the life of the farmers waiting for erratic seasonal rains. A breakthrough is required with a 
modern farming technology. A progressive transformation is required. This entails scientific water and soil 
conservation systems, irrigation systems based on underground water and a network of small dams and 
drip-irrigation systems for water is scarce in Eritrea, etc. All of these to work need institutional support in 
diffusing and supporting the new technologies and access to markets. At a time when the subsistence 
farming is no more sustainable because of deforestation, soil erosion, expansion of deserts and population 
explosion, small intermediate technology that exploited local knowledge, resources, and techniques are 
clearly inadequate. But till the time people are educated and trained for the required transformation to occur 
(intermediate period), useful ideas of intermediate technology can always be employed where ever 
applicable. 
Together with Peter Loh et al. (1998) we believe that the assumptions that low-tech, labour intensive 
operations are always the most appropriate is incorrect. It may be correct for some developing economies 
and some production sectors, but wrong for others. It would be foolish to employ a particular level of 
technology across the board in all sectors of the economy. Developing countries, therefore, have the 
opportunities of blending local traditional methods with modern science and technology. Particularly 
information technology has a tremendous power of multiplying expertise and pushing upwards the 
productivity of people of intermediate skills and thus could be easily blended with the traditional way of life 
in developing countries. 
2.4 Leapfrogging Possibilities 
Now developing countries are mainly dependent on the export of primary products for their foreign 
exchange earnings. But this earning is decreasing with every passing year. This is due to the decreasing 
trend in prices of primary products in the international trade. The international trade is biased towards the 
high value-added products. It is clear that these countries cannot depend any more only on these primary 
goods export. Therefore, industrialisation based on science and technology seems the only left way out. To 
compete on equal footing with the advanced countries in the international market, you need the same or 
comparable technology that they have. It is like the strategies followed by the NIEs. How do you go about 
it? 
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Kim (1980), departing from the patterns of industrial innovation of Abernathy and Utterback (1978), gave a 
three-stage model of technological trajectory in developing countries based on the experience of South 
Korea: acquisition-assimilation-improvement. 
Developing countries are trying to catching-up by first acquiring mature foreign technologies. These 
technologies are quickly diffused within the country at a second stage. And at the third stage, these 
acquired and assimilated technologies are improved through local R&D to adapt them to different product 
lines. Jinjoo Lee et al. (1988) have proposed an integrated model of Utterback and Kim and postulated that 
the three-stage technology trajectory in developing countries takes place not only in mature technology in 
the specific stage, but also in growing and emerging technologies in the transition and fluid stages. 
Kim and Dahlman (1992) went beyond the two technological trajectories to suggest the integrative 
framework, which adds the market mechanism dimension to it. This framework is comprehensive and 
complex at the same time but it tries to capture reality closely more than other models. Therefore, 
developing countries can be viewed as struggling in the process of catching up the advanced countries as 
presented in the Figure 2.1 above. It is a moving target. Those who will have the determination to mobilise 
and effectively manage their skilled manpower, imported technology assimilation and diffusion with the co-
operation of government and market forces, there is hope in the coming decades for them to see the light 
at last. 
Today the production of goods and services is increasingly using information technology. It is playing a 
major role as industrial infrastructure and as an industry. Therefore, it goes without saying that the least 
developed countries, like Eritrea need to pay attention to it. Otherwise 'catching up' will be not only difficult 
but also impossible. Woherem (1993) says that information and knowledge and their effective use lead to 
high standards of science and technology, which in turn lead to economic, industrial, political and military 
power and to exploitative and competitive power over other nations. In his view, developing countries 
cannot afford to let 'the train of the IT revolution pass them by'. There is a correlation between the 
possession of the ability to control and exploit the environment for economic goods and for other purposes, 
and the standard of living and general level of economic development of a society. Mostly science and 
technology provide this ability for the control and exploitation of the environment. Information technology is 
increasing the pace of scientific and technological development. It follows, therefore, that the countries that 
have mastered information technology, the advanced and the NIEs will have higher capability to develop 
science and technology. This will increase the existing gap in science and technology between the 
developed and the least developed countries making the dream of catching up impossible. 
Some authors have argued that information technology is a good opportunity for the developing countries 
to 'leapfrog' some of the stages of industrialisation. Antonelli (1991) says that the debate on international 
diffusion of innovations has undergone a transformation since the appearance in the 1980s of a  
"macroeconomic" theory of diffusion. Japan and Italy's example of catching up with and leapfrogging older 
industrialised countries like the United Kingdom has pushed many economists to re-examine traditional 
views of economic growth and technology diffusion. Growing empirical evidence shows that for many new 
technologies diffusion in fast-growing imitating countries has been quicker than in innovating ones' A path 
breaking study by Soete called attention to the role of investment and the age structure of existing capital 
goods (Soete, 1985). In his perspective, late-industrialising countries with low amounts of past investment 
and high level of present investment have a good chance to leapfrog technological leaders, both users and 
producers, to adopt innovations. As Soete recalls, such a process was at the heart of rapid expansion of 





the Japanese and Italian economies whose eventual leadership in the sectors of steel, automobiles, 
electronics and numerically controlled machine tools grew chiefly from imported technology. 
Catching up, says Antonelli, can lead to leapfrogging, particularly when the new capital goods incorporating 
the technological innovation cannot be added piecemeal to existing ones, but require the scrapping of all 
pre-existing capital stock, regardless of its age structure. This implies that imitating countries can adopt 
innovations earlier and faster than innovating countries, owing to the better investment opportunities and 
profit potential inherent in the young age of their capital stock. Consequently leapfrogging possibilities are 
especially important for countries that start out with significant amounts of capital goods and they are 
obliged to "start from scratch". 
According to Antonelli (1991) advanced telecommunications is also typical in its leapfrogging potential for 
less advanced countries and the ripple effect it produces within a country's economy. The rapid 
modernisation of such strategic infrastructures as telecommunications has enormous advantages for the 
manufacturing and service industries. In fact a wave of technological and organisational innovations that 
enhance economic growth and set the stage for a variety of information and communication technologies is 
expected to enter countries equipped to receive it. Increasing empirical evidence shows that innovations 
based on "complex" technologies display diffusion patterns quite different from those within simpler, "self-
contained" frameworks (Frankel, 1955). Innovations in elaborate systems like the new information 
technologies, with interconnections between telecommunications, computers, software, etc., and which 
demand "learning by doing" and "learning by using", tend to be adopted only after the entire technological 
network, each innovated component in place, has been assembled and evaluated (Antonelli, 1986). These 
cumulative technologies are viewed with a "wait and see" attitude and are rarely adopted before the 
formation of "critical mass". Once followers decide to go ahead, they can start from scratch and side step 
the problem of an older, depreciating technical system. 
Opportunities for technology blending are strong particularly for developing countries, which often have 
small-scale production by small firms in traditional "low-tech" industries (Antonelli, 1991). The building of an 
advanced telecommunications infrastructure, which can provide modern telecommunications services and 
induce organisational innovations, is therefore a powerful factor in the economic growth of all countries, 
both developing and industrialised ones. The reasons for this are the following (ibid.): 
1. It will activate learning processes in the use and adaptation of advanced software, and this will 
create valuable "spill-over" effects of skills accumulation and tacit knowledge. 
2. The installation of a universal, switching system will provide basic communications standards and 
protocols common to all potential users, and this will solve major compatibility problems that stem 
from "lock-in" effects. Lock-ins arises from the use of specialised networks based on leased lines 
and prevents or delay adoption of advanced communication systems by smaller firms. 
3. The generalised supply of advanced telecommunications services - because of economies of scale 
in production - will drastically reduce production costs and consequently customers' prices. This will 
encourage adoption by small firms and less advanced users like rural communities, retailers, and 
cottage industries. 
4. Extensive use of advanced telecommunications services helps form "critical mass", which radically 
improves the "user-value' of all communications services and thus the profitability of adoption. Not 
only do services become less costly, but also more importantly, the complementary hardware (from 
fax machines to updated electronic systems used in manufacturing and businesses) become 
cheaper. 





The diffusion of information and communication technologies through a modernized infrastructure can have 
powerful effects on the entire economic system. Large-scale use of these technologies directly influences 
productivity, cost effectiveness and competitiveness in industries with high levels of product differentiation 
and low levels of unit prices. In these industries, prompt availability of information about demand trends can 
boost competitive advantage. This is especially true in the textile, clothing, furniture, shoe and leather 
industries. Growing evidence suggests that the international competitiveness of the textile, garment, toy 
and consumer electronics industries in Taiwan and the Philippines relies increasingly on advanced 
telecommunications services, which allow tight links to form between commercial distribution on American 
and European markets and local production. 
Moreover, information technology appears to offer opportunities for "technology blending" (Antonelli, ibid.) 
to advanced telecommunications system users through capital-saving and organisational innovations as in 
the case of users taking advantage of: more access to mufti-sourcing to compare prices and services (as 
with the French Minitel system); global scope of procurement of products and services; enhanced 
customisation of large-scale production; increased flexibility of production processes - more products can 
be made with the same equipment; reduction of stocks of intermediate products because of 'lust-in-time" 
methods of manufacturing, which allow production to take place upon the placement of the order; reduction 
of stocks of final product; reduced delivery time; less working capital; less invoicing delay; telephonic 
franchising and retailing. 
These organisational innovations, as explained by Antonelli, have the following characteristics: 
1. Once diffusion has taken place, the fixed costs of equipment necessary to use the 
telecommunications network are very low. They can be as small as the price of a minicomputer 
that - as is usually the case - incorporates a modem. 
2. These low cost reduce adaptation barriers especially to small firms, provided the supply of the 
telecommunications network is available to everyone (centrally produced and distributed) and a 
critical mass of users of new services have already been reached. 
3. Manufacturing and service industries can take advantage of organisational innovations while 
making little or no charges in existing equipment.  
An advanced telecommunications system is also very important to service industries like banking, retailing, 
transportation, maintenance and insurance, where information and real-time communication are vital to the 
production process. A reduction in the costs of these services will indirectly enhance international 
competitiveness within the entire economic system, since lower market costs means lower costs for 
manufacturing firms exposed to international trade. The extraordinary efficiency of the Hong Kong and 
Singapore financial markets is more and more based on the extensive use of such advanced 
telecommunication services. Moreover, the integration of these countries' local tourist industries into 
international tourism depends increasingly on the "capillary" availability of these telecommunications 
services for real-time airline and hotel reservations. 
Last but not least, as the growing empirical evidence confirms, the availability of advanced reliable 
telecommunications infrastructure are becoming important factors in affecting the decision of locations of 
new plants and offices by multinational global corporations. The quality, reliability and costs of 
telecommunications services are in fact becoming a major competitive factor for a growing number of 
manufacturing and services activities operated by multinational global corporations, located in a large 
variety of countries. The timely modernisation of the telecommunications infrastructure is thus likely to help 
sustain high rates of economic growth also by means of augmented inflows of foreign direct investments, 





and consequently, increase levels of output, employment, labour productivity and, most important spill-over 
of training and learning opportunities. A very good example of this is Singapore. 
The modernisation of a telecommunications infrastructure is an enormous task that can be accomplished 
only with intensive capital investment and technical skills. For example, replacing an electromechanical 
telecommunication infrastructure with a modern digital one demand extraordinary level of investment. 
Consequently full blocks of the infrastructure have to be replaced at one time. Investment levels in 
electromechanical telecommunications infrastructure represent, in normal conditions, a significant chunk of 
gross fixed capital of a country, from 3 to 5 per cent, and from 0.5 to I per cent of GNP (ibid.). The financial 
effort to modernise can quickly become oppressive, particularly in countries that have fully established 
infrastructure. That is why they tend to delay modernisation while those countries without previous 
investment commitments, the late comers, jump into it to exploit the new opportunities before the advanced 
countries. 
Leapfrogging is consistent with Schumpeter's idea of 'gales of creative destruction' which we have seen 
above, and the work of others, particularly that of Freeman, Perez, Dosi , Soete and Antonelli. But it has 
been criticised by ArehambauIT (1992) as being based only on theory than empirical research. Hobday 
(1995) seems to be inclined to conclude from his -studies on the four East Asian NIEs, particularly that of 
Singapore, that there is no Ieapfrogging. Hobday (ibid.) does not deny that in the area of 
telecommunications infrastructure many developing countries have indeed adopted digital, electronics-
based systems more rapidly than advanced countries. Previously, he (Hobday, 1990, p.65) admitted at 
least the possibility of leapfrogging of technological infrastructure. In addition did not deny the fact that new 
firms may leapfrog some of the stages of accumulation gone through by the older-established firms. But he 
argues (1995) that digital systems are less expensive, more robust and flexible than older technologies and 
that older systems are out of production, therefore, developing countries had little choice in the matter. He 
refutes the leapfrogging hypothesis simply because technology was accumulated in gradual and 
painstaking manner and firms tended to enter at the mature, well established phase of the product life 
cycle, rather than at the early stage. 
Here it is in place to clarify the meaning of leapfrog principle to avoid further misunderstanding. The 
"leapfrog" principle means either skipping a stage within a technology generation or skipping an entire 
generation of a particular technology life-cycle: discovery, invention, innovation, national dissemination, 
decline, and obsolescence, to arrive on the ground floor of the next one before anyone else. If we are 
looking for science and technology with innovation at international frontiers, we don't find much in the 
developing world. What we could find is adaptation and diffusion of the conventional science and 
technologies for the betterment of their societies. One of the commonest causes of confusion is that many 
economists associate technological 'effort', 'development', or 'capability' with innovation at international 
frontiers. In developing countries, at any rate, technological development generally denotes the introduction 
of a new product or superior process of production. This is certainly one important form of technological 
change. But it is only in a highly simplified neo-classical world that a change of the 'frontier' signifies 
technical progress (Lall, 1987:l). 
For one reason, major technological innovations are not the only, perhaps not even the main, sources of 
productivity and improvement (David, 1975, and Rosenberg, 1976). From the view point of individual 
enterprise, the distinction between technological innovation (a movement of the frontier) and adaptation (a 
movement along the frontier) is largely meaningless (Nelson and Winter, 1977, Nelson, 1980). To shift to a 
different existing technology with which they are not familiar would require the same kind of technical effort 





as developing a new technique of their own. It is characteristic of developed and developing countries, 
individual firms show considerable dispersion in their distance from the frontier. Any effort to move towards 
a „given‟ frontier to achieve a major innovative breakthrough or minor adaptation is all variations on the 
same thing - conscious technological effort. Firms are not operating on anything resembling a neo-classical 
production function, with perfect knowledge of all techniques along that function between which they can 
costlessly shift as factor prices change, because in reality they pay a price for any technological change. 
No technology is applied in a completely 'given' form and changes are always necessary to suit local 
scales, materials, climate, skills and market needs (Lall, op.cit.). 
By blending together the ideas and the conventional definition of leapfrog principle given above, we attempt 
to give a revised definition of leapfrogging to bring it in line with the situation in developing countries. 
Therefore, the leapfrog we are talking about in developing countries should be understood to mean 
skipping some technological development level and grow in capability and competitiveness - regardless of 
whether or not the enterprise is at world technological frontiers. The process is considered to be 
progressive, as learning implies, and the path is that of acquisition-assimilation-transformation starting from 
the mature technologies, first, and then go to consolidation and the fluid states. When the developing 
countries will have reached the stage of joining international competition at the fluid state, then, it means 
that they have graduated and catching up is done. 
No doubt that information technology more than other technologies is the driving force behind the scientific 
and technological revolution that is taking place and the consequent rapid social and economic 
development in the world. It is helpful, therefore, the leapfrogging idea be given a special focus as the tool 
to scientific and technological and the consequent social and economic development. We think *rat 
Hobday's conclusion that no "leapfrogging" has taken place in the East Asian NIEs is due to semantic 
problem as he takes a narrow definition. He himself acknowledges that all the dragons have moved much 
more rapidly than European countries to develop their telecommunication infrastructure and related 
services and to expand their manufacture of a widening variety of electronic consumer and capital goods. 
2.5 Policies in the models of technological change 
It is possible to consider technological capability as the result of these fundamental components: the 
individual, the institutions and the common purpose (Enos, 1991). Individuals come with the skills. The 
institutions permit all individual technical skills and knowledge to be assembled and applied. While the 
common purpose acts as glue to keep together the individuals and the institutions to be able to pull in the 
same direction. 
Everybody agrees about the higher skill requirement for technological development to occur. With regard to 
institutions, many authors have even gone as far as thinking of 'national innovative systems' as an 
important requisite for a country to catching up or even leapfrog technologically advanced countries. 
Common purpose at micro or macro level is taken as a fact but when it comes to national policies, opinions 
divide. Free market advocates don't want government interventions to disturb the market forces, which are 
considered to be by far more efficient than the government. On the other hand, there are advocates of state 
intervention because of market imperfections. The reality is that even in countries where free market is fully 
professed, governments are strong and they do intervene directly and indirectly in the development of their 
national economies. These government interventions are usually done through policy instruments. We have 
plenty of examples from the OECD countries of Science, technology, and innovation policies. It is now 
accepted that most East Asian governments intervened widely and in different ways in their markets but 





debate still continues on the nature and effects of these interventions and market failures affecting 
development. 
Policies are instruments used by governments, corporations, and enterprises to direct their efforts towards 
desirable goals. In technology development and increasing industrial competitiveness, developing countries 
governments have tried different policies such as selective intervention by picking the 'national champions'. 
There is a talk of economically justifiable policies for technology development as market-stimulating 
technology policies (MSTPs) (Lall and Teubal, 1998). This framework is based upon evolutionary 
approaches to technology and goes beyond the current industrial policy debate of functional versus 
selective policies and proposes three sets of polices: functional, horizontal, and vertical. MSTPs may 
involve strong interventions in free markets for extended periods, and in some circumstances may involve 
doing without markets altogether. But policies do not always work the way their -designers expect them. 
This is because the elements affected by these policies react to it and the result may be positive or 
negative or mixed. The assumption that policy makers know what is best may be farfetched. But if the 
policy-making mechanism is part of the interacting elements and not a detached or far away from it, there is 
a possibility of constantly improving it in a dynamic environment where learning and feedback from the 
affected parties are the input for the next iteration. Mistakes are inevitable and the government has to have 
its own learning adjustment (Teubal, 1996). 
In absence of explicit policies, with time, implicit policies may emerge as a tradition or a norm that the 
interacting elements take as a reference point. Some people call this as 'laissez-faire' policy. The 
assumption is that everybody is free to do what she/he thinks right or maximises his or her interests 
(benefits). These can be equated to the free market mechanism. Free market system does also fail. They 
tend to under-invest whenever the return from investment is not immediate. World Bank (1993) has 
advocated for market -friendly policies where governments are encouraged to follow neutral policies to 
make markets function better. Lall and Teubal (1998) criticise it for assuming, in the area of technology 
development, that there are no externalities in or missing markets for technological activity, no risky or 
prolonged learning sequences, no co-ordination problems between investments in different activities, and 
no externalities or collective learning phenomena. They argue that there is a role for both horizontal and 
targeted policies to promote the undertaking of technological activity and maximising their economic 
benefits. 
Given this research is all about national S&T policy analysis and management, we have found the MSTP 
idea of Lall and Teubal (ibid.) very interesting. We will elaborate it further in the following paragraphs. 
MSTP tries to achieve and it does include three major categories of policy: 
1.  Priorities (category 1): Setting national priorities for industrial and technological development in the 
broader context of economic and social objectives. 
2. Incentives (category 2): Providing signals to economic agents for industrial or technological activity 
where markets fail to do so adequately. 
3. Institutions (category 3); Generating non-market mechanisms, institutions and organisations 
including policy mechanisms, to underpin the previous two categories. 
The first category or what are called priorities, deals with technology policy-making, strategic priority 
setting, involves general objectives of national and economic and industrial development and, within these, 
priorities are given to activities in innovation, technology and industrial development. National priorities set 
the parameters within which all other allocation decisions are made. These choices may be left implicit - for 





instance, leaving all choices to free markets (though this is not possible for several broad social and 
economic allocations decisions) is one way of assigning priorities - or they may be explicit, involving targets 
and plans. In the technology sphere, priority setting generally involves shifting the economy from a low to a 
high technology growth path: taking on more complex industrial activities, increasing the local content of 
production and design, increasing local innovative capabilities, and so on. In most cases, this involves 
identifying activities, or group of activities with significant technological potential that can generate 
beneficial externalities for other activities. Once activities and clusters are identified, the next task is to set 
technological priorities between competing uses, taking into account feedback and inter-linkages. 
The second category (or incentives) involves the formulation and implementation of technology policies at 
the program level. These comprise the enhancement of technology infrastructure (functional level), the 
design of new programs to subsidise industrial training or research (horizontal level), and the promotion of 
enterprises to enter chosen technologically demanding areas by means of protection or targeted credit 
(vertical level) (ibid.). 
Institution building or the third category does refer to generating appropriate policy mechanisms and 
capabilities for priority setting and implementation, and to setting up new institutions and organisations, in 
the public or private sector, to support, interact with and link up market agents. Examples in the public 
sector are technology institutions providing public goods such as basic research, extension services, 
standards and methodology. In the private sector fostering large conglomerates (as in Japan and Korea) to 
internalise deficient market for capital, skills, information and entrepreneurship, or setting up industry 
associations to undertake technological services for their members. Some of these institutions may concern 
the 'rules of the game' for technological and industrial activity such as competition policy, intellectual 
property protection or corporate governance provisions (ibid.). 
The researcher, based on the approach of Enos (1991) and that of Lall and Teubal (1998), has taken 
policy-making (common purpose or priorities), human resource development (individuals), and institutional 
capability (incentives or institutions) as important variables in the process of technological development of 
developing countries. Competent governments are vitally significant for economic development in the 
developing countries. It is the most important explanatory variable (Reynolds, 1983). Therefore, the 
interactions among all types of organisations in a given economy are considered important, hence, it should 
be explicitly recognised in the research framework. After all, the networking and the work culture they 
create are usually country specific and may lead to the building of 'comparative advantage' of the country. 
This can also be linked to the concept of 'national innovative system' (Nelson, 1993). Continuous learning 
has been recognised in the framework. All of these are interlinked in an open system within the 
international environment. Now it is time to use the different theoretical analyses made above to build a 
framework for the purpose of this research. 
2.6 The Research Framework 
This research and the research framework, on which it is based, therefore, stand on the following major 
points: 
1. Science and technology and the consequent innovations are at the basis of internationally 
competitive economies and enterprises in today's world. Developing countries need to connect to 
the new global economy by trying to catching-up fast, or otherwise they will remain at the margin 
as they are today. 





2. At a given historic time, some technologies are more important than others in terms of greatest 
impact on the whole economic and social development of a given country are. Today and in the 
coming decades, information technology is such a technology. Therefore, developing countries 
need to give it the due attention. 
3. Developing countries are not a closed system rather they are an open system within the 
international dynamic environment. They have also their own internal dynamics. This is a threat 
and it is, at the same time, an opportunity. Learning to adapt to this continuously changing 
environment is a must. Therefore, the models of economic and social development they adopt 
should be based on a culture of continuous learning in order to exploit opportunities offered by this 
complex dynamic environment. 
4. For catching-up, developing countries need to have clear vision, realistic long-term objectives, and 
adequate strategies to start with. To do this a determined and committed leadership is required. Of 
course, this leadership has to be also legitimate and free from corruption. 
5. The tacit and explicit skills of its people need to grow to be up to the challenge. 
6. Institutions are the melting pot where all the individual skills are mixed to create effective and highly 
productive teams, organisations, and industries that are networked to mutually complement each 
other and form a real 'national innovation system' to enable the country to gain some competitive 
advantage in the international markets. 
Therefore, based on the literature discussed above we have made the following assumption: 
A developing country can leapfrog by using the reverse process of acquisition-assimilation improvement 
(generation) of technologies to create internationally competitive economies though an integrated approach 
where macroeconomics policies, S&T policies, human capital and institutions work in line in a dynamic 
process of continuous learning' IT is pervasive and. as such is the technology of priority, which can 
increase the knowledge generation of developing countries and connect them to the global economy and 
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To be able to take the above assumption as a point of departure of our study, an attempt has been made to 
develop a suitable framework. This framework wants to capture the basic factors that determine the 
development of the technological capability of a country and it is going to be used in this case study of 
Eritrea. The diagnosis made at the three levels is based on the framework given below in Figure 2.2. First 
of all, technological capability of a given country depends on a number of variables. These are the 
economic and social policies (objectives and priorities) of the country, the science and technology policies 
at the macro level (country or region within the country) and policies and implementation management at 
the micro-level (industry and firm level) which are based on the macro level' Second, it depends on the 
institutional capability it has been able to develop. Third, the quality of its human resources should be 
capable to support the desired change. 
When we talk of 'policies' we refer to the sense of purpose and long-term objectives, and the strategies 
employed to achieve them. The ability of having a sense of direction and consistent long-term objectives in 
turn depends very much on the quality of human resources (the quality of leadership, their skill and 
experience, and their ethical standard, and the skill of its work force). Of course, institutional capability is 
very crucial to sustain the sense of purpose and highly skilled manpower development. The three of them 
need each other to be complete. But these things depend in turn on the political, legal, economic, 
technological, and social environment that exists in the country. We can have different approaches within a 
continuum from a free market to planned economy system, which each country develops based on its past 
and present socio-political systems. This stage in the framework has been labelled as 'Macro-level' 
because we are looking at it from the country level. 
Second, what we could not see at the macro-level but nonetheless are very determinant elements in the 
development of technological capabilities such as the different government institutions/departments, public 
enterprises, private enterprises, and other social institutions are explicitly recognised by this framework in 
their dynamic interaction. This is not all; the dark background in which these elements interact creates a 
network which will determine the particular work and business culture of that country. Of course, the bigger 
the country we could have more of such networks at district, or state level. It is these unique industrial 
networks and business cultures that create the 'comparative advantage' of countries and increase their 
international competitiveness. It is this network that enables the diffusion of new technologies and the best 
business practice. But this network and linkage should by no means be limited to the country, it should go 
beyond it. It should become part of the international network. In fact, the sophistication and ability of a given 
country to be linked to international science and technology network, to the international marketing 
networks, and to international financial networks can give us indications on how matured is that country's 
economic development. This is also at the basis of the institutional capability development as given by 
North (1990). 
Third what we have seen so far both at the macro-level and micro-level is not a closed system but it does 
interact with the rest of the world. It takes from and gives back to the international community. This taking 
and giving will take place within the context of the international relations, international trade, regional 
scientific and technological as well as economic co-operations, regional markets, the extent of 
globalisation, and legal system that exist. It can benefit from the poof of science and technology available in 
the world through different technology transfer mechanisms. 
Fourth, no country was born with scientific and technological maturity. Each country had to learn it. The 
less developed countries acquire science and technology in different form from the advanced ones. Usually 
they learn, first, how to acquire new technology (or science) and slowly assimilate it and adapt it to their 





own needs; and finally start to innovate and invent. Learning occurs at every stage and it is continuous. 
Therefore, the framework proposed explicitly recognises learning as an important variable in the process of 
development. 
Finally, if the country has properly mastered the know-how, first, and the know-why, later, as the basis for 
its innovations, it means it has reached the stage where it will have developed an internationally 
competitive economy in every sense. It means that it is getting a fair share of the international wealth and 
its people can enjoy a decent living standard. At the same time, the country will start contributing in science 
and technology development of the international community. And all re-starts again. 
This framework is based on some important assumptions as well. When it says 'Science & Technology' it is 
always assuming that at the heart of it is information technology as a pervasive and enabling technology. 
Every time that it uses the word 'policy' it wants to mean the clear sense of purpose and how to achieve it 
whether it is at country level or at organisational level. 
Another assumption is the dynamic nature of the framework. The policies of a country must always be 
revised to keep into account the changing international and local environments. The human resource 
planning and development should reflect that dynamic character by trying to recognise the changing skill 
needs and train people accordingly. The type of institution in place has to restructure to give all the 
necessary support for the right scientific and technological development and diffusion for industrial 
innovations. This should be repeated at the micro-level as well. 
Some people may be tempted to see in the above framework a top-down approach to technological 
capability development with the government determining everything. Our assumption with this regard, 
therefore, must be made clear from the outset. We think that the role of governments, whether in less 
developed countries or developed countries, has been always important regardless of whether the country 
is a planned economy or a free market economy. But given the immature market systems that we have in 
less developed economies, the role of governments as active economic agents, beside that of regulators, is 
more pronounced. Therefore, our assumption is that all the active players in the economy determine the 
S&T policies of a country, even when we speak of national policies and plans. The government plays the 
role of a leader and co-ordinator of the economic agents and creates the right environment for development 
of technological capability. 
In the case of Eritrea, the government has made it clear that Eritrea will be an "open, private sector led, free 
market economy". The role of the public sector being limited to "normal regulatory roles". But "at the same 
time, in view of the present dearth of a capable entrepreneurial business community in Eritre4 there is a 
clear need for a pioneering and catalytic role to be played by the government. However, in such cases, the 
terms of government participation will be on a strictly competitive basis and will be guided by principles of 
the market. The overall impact on the economy should be the encouragement of competition in the market 
and the stimulation of private investment activity. Thus public sector participation in productive economic 
activities should be seen in this light. The ultimate objective of the government is to withdraw completely 
from such areas and leave them to the private sector" (Macro-Policy, 1994: l5). 
2.7 Conclusion 
This research, following the line of thinking exposed above, would like to study the best way of developing 
the national system of innovation for a quick transformation of the Eritrean economy and society. It wants to 
focus particularly on information technology as an enabling infrastructure to become truly networked society 
with time and get connected to the new global economy. Of course, this is only possible in a 30-40 year 





time frame. But the question now is whether the experience in the advanced countries and the NIEs can be 
replicated in the least developed countries like Eritrea. 
The power of information, communications and transport technologies has reduced the world into a big 
village where the different cultures are blending together. Differences in the way economies and trade are 
conducted, the way we run governments, the way we organise the education system etc. are ever shrinking 
and similarities are increasing. Even historical evidences can show us that scientific and technological 
development was not monopolised by a particular ethnic group or geographical region. Therefore, we can 
safely conclude that people learn new ways of doing things, in any society and culture, if they see the 
benefit. By the same token, the weakly structured, organised and managed national system of innovation in 
the developing countries can learn and change with capable hands and committed minds. A very good 
example of these is the spectacular development and the catching up made by the Four Tigers of 
Southeast Asia of Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Korea in the second half of the 20'n century. 
If given the necessary skills, tools and properly organised and motivated, there is no reason why 
developing countries don't become productive and competitive like the rest. If the experience of the 
Southeast Asian Tigers is considered as exception, Eritrea is determined to be among these exceptions, 
but why be pessimistic? This should be the norm and every developing country should be able in catching 
up. 
  












3. Research Methodology 
3.1 introduction 
This research is based on secondary and primary data. The secondary data search consisted of literature 
review on Science and technology policy, technology management, technology transfer, information 
technology, economics and technological change, and innovation systems. 
The first task was to understand the state of technology policy and management in developing countries, in 
particular the Sub-Saharan countries of Africa. A lot has been said and done with regard to the economic 
development of African countries. What has been achieved is very negligible. To be exact many African 
countries are poorer than they were at the time of independence thirty-forty years ago. Some are virtually 
economically bankrupt with enormous foreign debt. Where has the euphoria of the time of independence 
gone? Western technology seemed to promise everything. What went wrong? What can technology do now 
for the Africans? These are all legitimate questions. We need to understand the past to be better prepared 
for the future. 
Eritrea is a new country. It got its independence in 1993. It has to learn from the success and mistakes of 
other developing countries. It is from this perspective that this literature review is done. Role of 
governments in the industrial technology development must be properly understood, the role of the private 
sector, the role of donor countries, the role of industrial networks, and the role of government-universities-
industry relationships.  
Technology transfer literature search is the second task. It is very important to understand the different 
technology transfer methods to properly exploit them. The most cost effective and more sustainable 
technology transfer methods should be chosen and that is why a search of literature to learn from the 
experience of others becomes crucial at this stage. It is possible to learn from the technology transfer 
between companies as well as technology transfer between North-South, and technology transfer between 
South-South. 
The third task is to understand the role of information technology in the economic development of a 
developing country like Eritrea. An attempt has been made to see if the model of other countries can be 
used in the case of Eritrea. For example, Singapore has been used as a model in a number of ways without 
leaving aside the successful experience of other developing countries as well. It is well understood that any 
model chosen, unless internalised and made one's own, cannot succeed. This means that Eritrea should 
develop the capability of learning from others and adapting things to its own situation. This introduces at 
this point the concept of whether a given social and cultural profile of a given country is suited or not to 
such successful learning. But based on past Eritrean experience it is safe to make the assumption that 
Eritrea has a track record of fast learning. One clear example is the reconstruction of national road 
networks and the resurrection of the railroad (which was built by the Italians and completely destroyed 
during the war of liberation) all being done by Eritreans that is taking place now. 
The field research was looking into science and technology policies and management of Eritrea. The 
current diffusion of information technology in the country has been assessed. The following sections 
elaborate on this. Based on the above understandings and the objective realities of Eritrea, we will attempt 





to develop an alternative way to the appropriate development of the national innovation system of Eritrea. 
The development of IT will be given a particular attention as a very pervasive technology of today. 
3.2 The research problem in perspective 
This research is about information technology policy and management of Eritrea. It focuses on the civil 
services and the service industry, since the macro Policy of Eritrea puts service industry in a central place. 
When we say service industry we are referring to financial sector, trade, transport and communications, 
and tourism. This research has departed from the assumption that the major players in the financial sector 
in particular the Bank of Eritrea (BE), the Commercial Bank of Eritrea (CBE), and the National insurance 
Corporation of Eritrea (NICE) can play a leading role in the use and diffusion of information technology. But 
later on, during the field research, it became clear that even the financial sector was only at the initial stage 
in the use of information technology. Therefore, an adjustment on the original thinking was made. Without 
leaving the three cases from the financial sector, the researcher has included other cases from civil 
services and twelve of the major computer business firms. 
At the same time it studied the state of S&T in Eritrea in general so that to put information technology in its 
appropriate context. Therefore, besides the case studies mentioned above, the research did conduct in-
depth interviews with higher government officials to understand on how the implicit and explicit policies with 
regard to S&T, in general, and information technology in particular are made and implemented. This has 
been supplemented by a survey on the implementation of policies and diffusion of information technology in 
the country. 
The focus has been on a particular variable of the economic development paradigm: -technology. It is the 
thesis of this research that information technology can play a very significant role in the economic 
development of Eritrea. Information technology is a pervasive technology in the sense that it is not 
particular to any industrial sector and it is completely reshaping the face of the service industry and it will 
continue to do so in the foreseeable future. Therefore, Eritrea has a good opportunity to leapfrogging by 
quickly mastering the use of information technology in its service industry in the whole process of its 
economic development. In other words, Eritrea to develop a good financial sector base of international 
standard should invest obviously in information technology. This can be the spin-off of the whole service 
industry of the country and definitely have a spill over effect to the other industries as well. 
As we have already seen at the beginning, the main question of this research is how Eritrea can transfer 
science and technology, particularly information technology, for a successful transformation of its economy 
and its society and avoid the marginalisation threat from the new global economy. This main question has 
been divided into two sub-questions: 
1.  What is the state of science and technology policy in developing countries and, in particular, how 
are the developing countries managing their information technologies to avoid future costly 
dependencies? 
2. How can Eritrea exploit the opportunities offered by information technologies to strengthen its 
economy based on the experiences of other developing countries? 
It is very clear that the research is deliberately focusing on 'information technology'. This may be interpreted 
by some readers as if the research is taking from the outset that information technology is cure for all 
economic ills of the country. Not at all! It wants only to be a study from the perspective of technology. But 
no matter how important it is 'technology' is only one of the many variables that determine the economic 
performance of a given country. But lately, science and technology have become a 'sine qua non' in every 





sector of human life and development. Particularly the micro-electronic revolution is an enabling technology 
as well. 
3.3 The case study design 
This case study is of the type known as 'single-case-embedded' design (Yin, 1994, p.38-45). This is 
because it is based on multiple units of analysis. It is single-case because it deals with the information 
technology and economic development of Eritrea, which could also be generalised to other developing 
countries like Eritrea as well. It is embedded with multiple units of analysis because it takes various 
organisations from the banking and insurance sector, and other sectors of Eritrea to make a detailed study 
which will serve to give deeper insight into the subject matter. Therefore, the multiple units of analysis used 
are information technology in Eritrea, as the main unit of analysis; and the sub-units are II in the financial 
sector, in agricultural sector, in the industrial sector, in trade and services sector, and in the civil services. 
Besides, the very nature of IT is pervasive to all industries. Lessons learned in one industry can be easily 
transferred to the others. Furthermore, IT in the financial sector in particular has become a 'sine qua non' 
competitive weapon. 
In-depth interviews were made with higher government officials on how the science and technology policies 
and IT policies are made and implemented. Finally, the understanding of IT use and diffusion in the 
administration of the civil services and public and private enterprises will enable us to have a reasonably 
comprehensive view of how the country is doing in IT. Based on this knowledge and the experiences of the 
other developing countries we have explored in the first part of the research we would be in a position to 
say how best Eritrea can exploit IT in the future. Lastly, the case study strategy has been selected because 
every country is a unique subject of study. 
Five components of a research design are especially important: (l) a study's questions, (2) its propositions, 
if any, (3) its unit(s) of analysis, (4) the logic linking the data to the propositions, and, (5) the criteria for 
interpreting the findings (Yin, 1994). This case study is based on the five components. 
3.3.1 Study questions 
This case study wants to answer the following two basic questions: 
1. What is the state of S&T policy and management in developing countries including Eritrea? What is 
the state of IT in these countries? 
2. How can Eritrea exploit best the opportunities offered by IT for its economic and social 
development based on the experience of other developing countries (in particular that of NIEs )? 
These study questions are of the form of 'what', 'How' and 'Why'. All types of questions that require 
explanations of present situations in Eritrea and how to bring change in the future. Therefore, the case 
study strategy is considered viable. But when you go into the first two questions at some point of the study 
it becomes necessary to ask also detailed questions such as: what, who, where, and how many. This 
means that the case study needs to be supplemented by a survey study, which is conducted for IT diffusion 
in Eritrea. 
3.3.2 Study objectives 
The objectives of this research are the following: 
1. To understand the difficulties encountered by developing countries in the process of economic 
development in limiting their technological dependence. 





2. To develop a model of an effective Science & technology base development for Eritrea based on 
the above understanding. 
3. To develop a plan for sustainable information technology base for Eritrea. 
The thesis of this research is the following: 
Eritrea can exploit the leapfrogging principle using the information technology in the development of its 
economy, in particular the trade and service industry. The development of a good financial sector of 
international standard which is based and led by information technology can act as the spin-off of the whole 
service industry of the country and will have a spill-over effect to the other industries as well leading to a 
healthy economic development. 
3.3.3 Unit of Analysis 
The unit of analysis of this case study is the use of information technology for Eritrean economic 
development. All the literature review about Science and technology management & policy in developing 
countries are the context of case study. While the state of science and - technology management & policy 
of Eritrea, the present state of information technology development in Eritrean economy are all the 
immediate topics of the case study. In other words 'information technology in Eritrea' is the central unit of 
analysis while the different sector studies are sub-units of analysis. They are not the ends in themselves 
but only the means to the central question of this study. 
3.3.4 Linking Data to Propositions 
In the study of the success and failure of developing countries in their struggle of economic emancipation, 
we would be talking about their experience as the testing ground of the different technology economic 
growth theories and models of economic development. This is very important to this case study because 
this new country need not re-invent the wheel. But since there are too many theories and models a careful 
study is required to select the right model that matches the economic context of the country. Therefore, this 
part of the study is considered very relevant to bypass. 
From the financial sector, the study of BE, CBE, and NICE in terms of information technology infrastructure, 
managerial capability, skilled manpower availability, and the information technology strategies and their 
implementation was expected to be revealing about the situation of Eritrea as a whole which was not the 
case. As a result, during the fieldwork, a change has been made to capture information technology transfer 
and development in all sectors where some learning was taking place. But the in-depth study of the three 
financial institutions may lead to concrete suggestions of possible future plans of how to best transfer and 
use information technology to create internationally competitive financial sector. Based on all fieldwork 
study some policy suggestions have been derived for the policy makers. In short the data collected are 
relevant for the research to achieve its objectives. At the end, this study does have policy implications to 
other developing countries as well. 
3.3.5 Criteria for interpreting the findings 
Any finding of the case study is interpreted against the framework we have developed based on the 
literature research on information technology and economic growth, in general, and the experience of the 
most successful developing countries. Therefore, in line with the research framework developed in chapter 
2, the criteria for interpreting the findings were based on the following major criteria: 
l. Policy issues: Each explicit or implicit policy decision on S&T issues in Eritrea were examined against (l) 
'consistency', Q 'adaptability', and (3) 'implimentability'. 'Consistency' refers to whether the policy is 





consistent with the long-term socio-economic development objectives of the country. Whether it is 
consistent with the 'export-oriented open and free market led by the private sector', or whether it is 
consistent with the country specific social and cultural environment, or whether it is consistent with existing 
policies. When we say 'adaptability' we refer to the possibilities of policy to evolve and change in response 
to changes in domestic and international factors. When we say 'implementability' we are looking on whether 
it is easy to put the policy into action given the resources available to the country at a given time. 
2. Human resource issues: One of the cornerstones of technological capability development is skilled 
manpower. The Eritrean skilled manpower resources has been assessed against the demand that each 
policy on S&T does make, compare it with the existing educational system capacity to supply those skills, 
and determine the gap that exists between demand and supply. At the end recommend on how to fill the 
gap. Criteria of assessment used were the number and experience of skilled professionals and scientists in 
the country. 
3. Institutional issues: Developing industrial technological capability requires a lot of institutional support. To 
what extent the institutional capability is developed in Eritrea is determined from the field research and 
assessed the institutional gap critical for the industrial technology development. That is, educational and 
training institutions, research institutes, universities, funding institutions, and the private sector and their 
interrelationships and co-operation was assessed to find a solution to fill the possible gaps. The major 
criterion on which institutional capability was assessed is the degree of trust and co-operation among 
government and private institutions and the industrial networking that is emerging in the country. 
4. Science and technology diffusion: But given the country wants to catch up, the strategic importance of 
S&T in general and information technology in particular for service sector is very central in the future of 
economic development of Eritrea. Therefore, the following criteria for evaluating S&T and IT development 
in Eritrea will be used: sustainability, flexibility & transferability, quality, priority and result or international 
competitiveness. The technology chosen for transfer should be sustainable in terms of financial investment 
at the beginning or during its operational lifetime, in terms of local skills to operate and maintain it, and in 
terms of upgrading and improving it in the future. In a world where change is continuous and innovations 
continue without stop flexibility to adapt to new changes and the transfer of skills and knowledge from one 
sector to another as well as from the first generation of technology to the next becomes necessary. A good 
management of technology needs to consider it and we will take it as another way of measuring the 
performance of S&T development. Demanding customers want quality of goods and services and to satisfy 
it quality standards in the industry need be high. This comes only if a culture of quality has been nurtured. 
We will take it as other evaluative criteria. Technologies are not equally important. Given the particular 
circumstances of the country some technologies are more important than others are. We feel that IT as a 
pervasive technology is very important and as such need be given priority for the multiple uses it has. 
Finally, the expected result from S&T investment is higher socio-economic development, which we will try 
to measure by the degree of international competitiveness achieved. 
3.4 Field Research 
The researcher himself did all the in-depth interviews, which were mainly unstructured interviews (Appendix 
l0). While the survey was done with the help of research assistants which was mainly structured interviews 
(Appendix 9). 
A careful preparation has been made for the unstructured interviews. A checklist of questions for each 
variable that is central to the research was prepared in order to make sure that only -the relevant questions 
are asked. Of course the researcher was flexible and adaptive during the course of the interview to allow 





the natural flow of events. If an analogy is possible here, it is like in mining. You dig deeper and deeper by 
following the track of the precious metal you are looking for. You cannot follow a pre-determined course 
regardless of the clues and evidence you get as you dig. This means also that you don't allow 
preconceived notions to dictate your research. The confidence of being able to flexibly move can only come 
from a deep understanding of the subject matter being studied. This is another important reason why the 
researcher did make a thorough literature review on the subject matter. Lastly, to be able to follow the track 
properly, the researcher's mind should constantly be on what the interviewee is trying to say, possibly, take 
it with the whole context in which it is being said. This means the spirit of observation is a great asset. The 
researcher has no the illusion that he has mastered all these skills but he did his best to use the field 
research as a training arena. 
About forty in-depth interviews have been conducted with government officials at ministerial level that have 
to do with science and technology management and policy issues, with the BE, CBE, and NICE executives, 
and managers from the private enterprises. 
The survey was made of a sample of 2M organisations taken from the civil services, international 
organisations and private enterprises, It was meant to capture the extent and pattern of information 
technology diffusion in the country, They consisted of 62 government organisations, 22 public enterprises, 
113 from the private enterprises, and 7 international organisations. This sample was taken from a 
population of 'organisations most likely to have computers'. Based on the in-depth interview and the 
observation made, the civil services was one of the biggest users of computers in the country, every effort 
has been made to include all the government departments and agencies. All public enterprises have been 
included because they are among the large enterprises. From the private sector, all the large enterprises, 
all computer service businesses, a random sample from the travel agencies, a random sample from 
consulting firms, three each from photographic services, hotels, and private clinics and laboratories, the big 
five from printing press, and almost all the international organisations. 
In this case study all possible sources of evidence were used. Besides the interviews, direct observation, 
documents, records, and open-ended interviews with key informants was used. Each in-depth interview 
was written immediately after interview and passed to the interviewee to check for accuracy. A report of the 
personal observations of the cases with regard to computer hardware and software has been made. 
Besides, copies of documents and records where ever possible were made for the case study database. 
Data were collected pertaining science and technology policy and management, information technology 
policy and management, skilled manpower availability, information technology professionals training, 
information technology networks, information technology in the financial sector, and investments in 
information technology infrastructure development. Data collected in Eritrea was analysed using the 
framework that we have discussed earlier. 
The analysis did identify the critical variables for Eritrean information technology base development and it 
spells out what resources are required and how possibly to get them and how to implement it in the 
shortest possible time frame. 
All the analysis was guided by the following criteria: simplicity, relevancy and accuracy. In other words, the 
general model considered, by studying Singapore, was adapted to the specific socio-economic situation of 
Eritrea. A simple adapted model that could be relevant and at the same time with all the necessary 
elements to make it an accurate representation of the technological development for economic growth in 
Eritrea. 






The field research was planned to focus particularly on the financial institutions. But when it became 
evident to the researcher that information technology use in the three case studies (BE, CBE, and NICE) 
were at the initial stage, the research plan had to be reassessed and changed to accommodate the reality 
of the country. The logic of focusing on the financial institutions was that they are bigger relative to the rest 
of enterprises in the country and that they have the money to invest in information technology. Besides, the 
trends in international financial institutions is that of heavy informatisation and digitisation of information and 
services, therefore, that was expected to pressurise the Eritrean financial institutions to follow suit for the 
very reason of getting connected to the rest of the world. Therefore, the change made was to look for 
enterprises of organisations with significant experience in information technology use to see if anything can 
be learned from their experience as well. 
It is very important to make few remarks on the limitations of this research. The biggest limitation is the fact 
that SSA countries are the least researched countries particularly with regard to S&T. In the literature, there 
are only scanty country-based S&T studies. 
Information technology, as a very recent phenomenon in Africa, is again worse. Therefore, whatever has 
been said should be taken with this poverty of information prevalent on SSA countries in mind. The other 
limiting factor is the breadth of the study itself. The research from the outset has made a deliberate choice 
of studying the subject from broader perspective father than from narrow perspective that focuses on few 
variables. An attempt has been made to capture the complex reality of S&T in relation to innovation to 
benefit a given national economy. The insight gained from breadth point of view has been made at the 
expense of in-depth treatment of the subject matter. But the trade-off has been made because the aim was 
to give as complete picture as possible to assist policy makers to understand the complexity of the subject 
at hand. It is hoped the balance between what is desirable from the academic point of view and that of the 

















S&T in Newly Industrialised Economies 
A glimmer of hope for the developing countries has come from the newly industrialised countries. 
Catching –up is a possibility. 
 
 
Part I will enable us to deal with our first study question: What is the state of S&T policy and management 
in developing country? What is the state of IT in these countries? Since we have classified the developing 
countries into three parts: NlEs, SSA countries, and Eritrea, this part will deal with the first group of 
countries. 
These countries have had a significant success in their socio-economic development in the last four 
decades. Eritrea as a new country does have a limited past experience on science and technology policies 
and management, IT can learn from other developing countries, in this case from the NlEs in Asia and Latin 
America, because in these countries many different policies have been tried with different degree of 
success and sometimes failure as well. There is a vast literature that analyses the reasons of success and 
failure. Even though sometimes the researchers themselves do not agree, these studies give us valuable 
insights. At the end of the day a country learns by doing. 
The assumption is that all developing countries, wherever they are, have similar problems like shortage of 
skilled manpower, lack of institutional capability, lack of infrastructure for science and technology 
development, lack of necessary capital, etc. Based on these similarities we think that Africa can find a lot to 
learn from the experience of NlEs in Asia and Latin American. Notwithstanding the socio-political 
differences that exist among them, it is possible to identify the common major factors that have helped or 
hindered the scientific and technological development in these countries. But we are not assuming that 
projects that have succeeded elsewhere can be directly applied in Africa. Even today in times of increased 
globalisation, countries have their unique characteristics that need always be taken into consideration in 
policy analysis of this nature. But there is always possibility of learning from one another without losing 
one's identity. For example, the Japanese are cited as a good case in their ability to acquire their 
technologies from the West and retain at the same time their cultural identity. What they did was to learn 
the technology and effectively use it within the framework of their own cultural context. By the same token, 
African countries, in this case Eritrea can learn from the experience of the successful Asian and Latin 
American countries. The learning that we think is readily transferable is those technical, organisational and 
the dynamics of technological development itself. 
The sections and sub-sections are organised following the framework presented in chapter two: the 
environmental context, science and technology policy and management, institutional capacity development, 
human resource development, the 'melting pot' where we discuss the link of S&T to economic 
development, and lessons learned as concluding remarks. The same pattern will be maintained also in the 
following parts of this research. 












4. S&T in Newly Industrialised Economies 
4.1 introduction 
In this chapter we do discuss about the experience of the NIEs of South and East Asia and Latin America, 
specifically of Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Brazil and India. Why have these countries 
been selected? This is a judgement sampling. The four tigers of Southeast Asia are included because they 
are the ones that have made a successful and fast economic and technological change in the last four 
decades. Only in the beginning of the 1960s they had all the typical traits of least developed economies. 
Their rapid development has been possible through industrialisation. They are like the laboratory for what 
we are looking for. Brazil, in its own way, has a similar rich experience, even though less successful than 
the Southeast Asian countries. India, on the other hand, has both the traits of least developing and 
industrialising countries. Some authors do not include it among the NIEs. But it has been able to develop 
an impressive broad-ranged scientific and technological capacity, which makes it a country with latent 
capacity and a great potential of fast economic growth and development. In fact, India is a good case to 
look into for it has failed to exploit its scientific and technological achievements for economic development, 
as the counterpart countries of Southeast Asia did. 
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Brazil 164 773.4        8 4,720       34 2.8    3.1 2.8       3.9 2.0       2.5 3.6       3.7 7.5       6.0 4.0 
Hong 
Kong 
7 164.4       26 25,280     13 6.9    5.3 -            - -           - -           - 14.4   11.1 11.1 
India 961 373.9       15     390    102 5.8    5.9 3.1       3.0 7.1      7.1 6.7       7.5 5.9     13.7 8.9 
S. Korea 46 485.2       11 10,550     25 9.5    7.2 2.8       2.1 12.1    7.5 9.0       7.8 12.0   15.7 6.3 
Singapore 3 101.8       34 32,940       4 6.6    8.5 -6.2     1.8 5.4      9.1 7.5       8.4 10.8   13.3 9.8 
Taiwan* 20 n.a 17,720 8.3 n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a 
Source: World Bank, World Development Report, 1998/99 *Economist March 7, 1998 (per capita at purchasing 
power parity and GDP growth is the avenge of 1970-96) 
In the last four decades these countries, each in its own way, tried to make a remarkable technological 
catching up. Economically, the least successful of the group has been India. Brazil had its own successes 
during the 60s and 70s but it was not sustainable because of the huge debt burden, which was exposed 
during the oil shocks of the 70s. The other four Tigers were all a success story till the recent Asian financial 
crisis of 199617. During the 1980-1997 period, Brazil managed to keep an economic growth around the 3% 
per year, India slightly below 6%, while Korea, Taiwan and Singapore grew at 7 or more percent with Hong 
Kong slightly below the other three at around 6.5% (see table 4.1). During the 1980s, export in Brazil grew 
by 7.5% per year, in India 5.9%, Hong Kong 14.4%, Korea 12%, Singapore 10.8% and data for Taiwan was 
not available. While during the 1990-97 period, the export growth of Brazil and Hong Kong declined by 6% 
and 11.1% per annum respectively, that of India, Korea, and Singapore increased to 13.7%, 15.7%, and 





13.3% per annum respectively. The export growth shown particularly by the four tigers was a sign of 
greater international competitiveness. 
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Brazil 3.6            - 80             90 14             19 165 18 2,757 23,040 
Hong Kong -              2.8 95             91 61             71 - 27 23 1,938 
India 2.8           3.5 -                - -                - 151 10 1,545 5,021 
S. Korea 3.7           3.7 100           99 70             96 2,636 39 59,249 37,308 
Singapore 2.8           3.0 99              - -                - 2,512 71 10 11,871 
Taiwan n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a 
Source: World Bank, World Development Report, 1998/99 
If we study the high technology exports, we see that Singapore and Korea stands out of the group. The 
high technology exports as a per cent of manufacturing exports in 1996 was 71% for Singapore, followed 
by 39% for Korea, Hong Kong 27%, Brazil 18% and the least India 10%. Both Singapore and Korea have 
the highest number of scientists and engineers in R&D 2,512 and 2,636 pet million respectively. But when 
we look at the number of patent applications filed, Korea alone seems to have the upper hand with 96,557 
of which 6l.4% are patents filed by residents. Singapore has a total of 11,881 almost all by non-residents. 
Brazil has 25,797 with 10.7% by residents while India has 6,566 with 23.5% by residents. It is clear that the 
Korean economy is highly indigenised while that of Singapore is dominated by the Multinationals. Foreign 
companies also seem to have dominated Brazil's patents. 
Public expenditure on education as percent of GNP in all the countries in our sample is similar, which is 
around the 3 percent. The highest spender is South Korea at 3.7 percent, which seems to be kept at that 
high level for quite a long time. The net enrolment ratio as percent of relevant age group at the primary 
level is high in all the countries except India. At the secondary level Brazil and India do not match the 
Southeast Asian countries. There is a huge gap. For example, Brazil has 19 percent secondary enrolment 
ratio while that of Southeast Asian countries is above 70 percent. Many writers have attributed the high 
enrolment ratios at primary and secondary levels of the Southeast Asian countries to the Confucian culture. 
Table 4.3: Structure of the economy of NIEs 
 
Country 
Structure of output of economy: Value added as of GDP 
Agriculture 
1980                         
1997 
Industry 
1980                        1997 
Manufacturing 
1980                         
1997 
Services 
1980                        1997 
Brazil 11                              14 44                              36 33                              23 45                              50 
Hong Kong 1                                 0 32                              15 24                                7 67                              84 
India 38                              27 26                              30 18                              19 36                              43 
S. Korea 15                               6 40                              43 28                              26 45                              51 
Singapore 1                                 6 38                              36 29                              26 61                              64 
Taiwan     
Source: World Bank, World Development Report 1998/99. 
The structure of these economies (table 4.3) shows that in 1997 India's agriculture and industry contribution 
to GDP was 57% almost in equal proportion while that of Brazil 50% and Korea 49%, the contribution of 
agriculture being 14% for Brazil and only 6% for Korea. Hong Kong and Singapore had totally different 





structure. These two economies depend only on industry and services, particularly that of services. In 1997 
Hong Kong and Singapore had 84% and 64% of service contribution to their GDP respectively while the 
difference coming from industry. The economic structure of Korea seems to have more similarity to that of 
advanced countries while that of Brazil and India is less so, particularly that of India is typical developing 
economy structure. The structure of Singapore and Hong Kong is typically that of a post-industrial society, 
may be the result of them being city-states. 
These six countries' production of electronic data processing and office equipment as a percentage of the 
world production grew from 4.7% in 1985 to li.lvo in 1992 (see table 4.4). It was three times more than a 
decade earlier, and of these 15.1%. Only Singapore and Taiwan contributed 61%... In 1985 Singapore, 
Brazil and Taiwan were contributing about the same amount while Korea and Hong Kong were contributing 
only about half of that. India was contributing only one 10th of Taiwan. In 1992, Korea and India grew 
almost by the average growth of the six (growth of 3.2 times that of 1985), Brazil and Hong Kong grew 
below average 2.18 and 1.86 times respectively, while Singapore and Taiwan grew above average by 4.33 
and 4.0 times respectively. 
Table 4.4: NIEs production of electronic data processing and office equipment (percentage) 
Country Year 
 1985 1988 1991 1992 
Brazil 1.1 1.7 2.6 2.4 
Hong Kong 0.7 0.9 1.2 1.3 
India 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.3 
S. Korea 0.6 1.5 1.9 1.9 
Singapore 1.2 2.7 4.1 5.2 
Taiwan 1.0 2.7 3.1 4.0 
OECD-18 94.8 89.6 85. 82.3 
S. Africa 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Source: OECD (1995) 
The point is that the NIEs have succeeded to catch up the advanced countries in many respects, 
particularly the four tigers of Southeast Asia. This ability to succeed in the global markets is a sign of 
greater innovativeness, which is the direct result from the ability to reverse the industrialisation process of 
acquisition-assimilation-generation of new technologies. It is not difficult to notice that countries like Korea 
that heavily invested in science and technology are the ones that have succeeded to reduce foreign 
technology dependency. 
In the coming two chapters, we will argue that NIEs have been able to break the vicious circle in which 
developing countries are usually found by investing more in science and technology through human capital 
formation and institutional capacity development all integrated within their socio-economic development 
plans. We will argue that the less successful, on the contrary, have neglected the balanced growth of the 
human capital - formation and institutional capacities to support their socio-economic development. 
4.2 Environmental context 
Until around forty years ago, the developing countries had almost no industrial capacity. The severe 
deficiencies in their social and physical infrastructure made building such capacity difficult, and their lack of 
experience in economic management exacerbated their problem. In the manufacturing sector, they lacked 
capital, technical skills, and, above all, entrepreneurial and managerial capacity. Yet in the span of a 
generation, some of the developing countries have built up a fully industrialised structure (Hughes, 1980). 





Hughes was correct to point out that it was widely believed until the 1960s that developing countries would 
not be able to compete in international markets. But from 1960 to 1975 such export grew at about l5% a 
year compared with a record 10% a year growth for manufactured exports from industrialised countries, 
The most rapidly growing developing countries have been those that, without neglecting other sectors, 
have achieved the most efficient and rapid growth in manufacturing industries, These are the countries in 
Southeast Asia like Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan and South Korea. 
Industrialisation has been the key to catching up to the high living standards and political stature of 
industrialised countries. The development of a manufacturing sector has been seen to depend on access to 
modern technology, with its concomitant high productivity. It was argued that spill over effects on the rest of 
the economy would result from the production to sophisticated intermediate inputs and capital goods. 
Industrialisation has thus been seen as an instrument that would also transform agriculture, construction, 
transport, and other service industries into highly productive sectors. A strategy of promoting 
industrialisation by protecting infant industries was considered inevitable by all developing countries 
because of trade barriers in the international trade and the imperfect internal market structure of the 
developing countries themselves. Hong Kong and Singapore are considered an exception to the rule for 
being less interventionist and protectionist. But Singapore is well known for its different type of government 
intervention of the so-called 'entrepreneurial-state' type, which we will discuss later on. 
It is also interesting to note the difference in approach. Hughes (ibid.) calls "basic industries" approach the 
one followed by some countries, in particular India that sought to industrialise around an indigenous core of 
such industries as heavy metals, chemicals, and capital goods. This strategy tended to be very costly in its 
use of capital as a result of long periods of gestation. The other is 'consumption industries' approach which 
is followed by more market oriented countries like the four Southeast Asian Tigers. These industries 
focused on mainly assembly of imported materials and gradually worked backward toward basic industries. 
The trick was to progressively accumulate the capital required for the development of the latter so the 
industrialisation tended to demand less capital than in the first approach. Some industries such as textiles, 
footwear, furniture, domestic utensils, building materials, and food processing were common to both 
strategies. 
It is very important to understand the context in which developing countries were working to emancipate 
themselves politically and economically. With the exception of Brazil, which gained its independence from 
Portugd in 1822, all the other NIEs and India got their independence after the World War II. The anti 
colonial sentiments were fresh. Development economics was getting inspiration from the socialist 
movements because of a concern with poverty and the bias against the capitalist system of labour 
exploitation and, thus, alleviation of poverty has been a central theme of industrialisation from the 1940s. 
Major aid donors in the West and their market-oriented economists severely criticised, for more than a 
decade, countries attempting to introduce socially oriented development policies. They were so 
preoccupied with growth that they tended to neglect its underlying objectives, i.e. alleviation of poverty and 
just income redistribution. It is somewhat ironic to find developing countries under attack, now, for ignoring 
social objectives. This is without doubt the effect of 'cold war' where the two camps, capitalist and socialist, 
were fighting for zones of influence. Of course, industrialisation and alleviation of poverty are 
complementary. But government taxation and investment policies should be appropriate, and should 
provide the choice of techniques that take account of availability of capital and labour for industrial 
development can have a direct impact on employment and standards of living even in the short run 
(Hughes, ibid.). 





The idea of industry-led growth in Brazil began to be laid down during the first three decades of the 20th 
century. The spread of railroads brought with it the need for increased capabilities in civil engineering and 
greater technological sophistication in production and use of steel such as foundry, forging, and machining 
operations, and steam power. But the economy of Brazil went into depression with the economic crash of 
1929 and exports of primary products collapsed, although domestic production of cement, chemicals, 
paper, metals, and textiles were stimulated. By the end of World War II, the country's manufacturing sector 
had become quite diversified though not very competitive by world standards (Dahlman and Frischtak, 
1993). 
During the period 1947-1964 one of the key elements of the industrial development strategy was to attract 
foreign firms to set up manufacturing facilities in Brazil by protecting the local market via subsidies and 
special treatment. By 1960, foreign subsidiaries accounted more than 50% of the capital goods producers, 
70% of chemicals (except pharmaceuticals), 90% of pharmaceuticals, and l00%o of the nascent automobile 
industry, in 1951, the National Research Council (CNPq) was established to promote research in all areas. 
Especially harnessing atomic energy was perceived to be the key to military power and crucial for 
accelerating the process of economic development. It is no wonder that this choice has come at a time 
when the international relations were characterised by post war polarisation, competition, and conflict 
among countries. 
During the 1964-1985, the military period, Brazil's efforts were directed toward planning for development 
and increased resources were allocated to science and technology. Particularly the First National 
Development Plan (1972-1974) was meant to achieve sustained industrial and economic growth based on 
the expansion of exports and domestic market. As part of a strategy of increasing national power, new 
areas such as nuclear energy, electronics, and space research, were expected to have rapid development. 
During the Second National Development Plan (1975-1979) the country entered a period of 'debt-led 
growth'. Brazil was determined to adjust to the oil-shock of the 1970s by deepening the process of import 
substitution and moving the country toward energy self-sufficiency. But even though the country managed 
to maintain relatively high rates of economic growth in the 1970s, it did so at the cost of growing 
macroeconomics imbalances for its foreign debt reached $100 billion by the end of 1985, the highest in the 
world. Ever since, the country is trying to correct the 'macroeconomic imbalances. The Cardoso 
government, in 1994, embarked on stabilisation plan. The Real Plan was undertaken as anti-inflationary 
measure, the economy is opened to competition, privatisation of public enterprises has been undertaken, 
and deregulation and import liberalisation have replaced the old import-substitution policies. 
India started its rapid industrialisation project immediately after independence from the British colonial rule 
(1818-1947). But it has to be remembered that India had indigenous private entrepreneurship in trade, 
lending, textile and jute manufacturing even before the British period. That is why East India Company 
fought hard against other English merchants and other rival European merchants to control the monopoly 
of trade with India. During the colonial rule, Indian textile manufacturing lost their competitiveness because 
the des favoured British manufacturers at the same time that the industrial revolution was pushing the 
technological frontier. Therefore, India sought import substitutions strategies to accelerate industrialisation 
soon after independence. It even pushed it farther by giving priority to the 'heavy industry' as opposed to 
the 'light industry' because its leaders were influenced by the Marxian ideology.  
In 1946, the textiles, sugar, vegetable oils, iron and steel, and general engineering industries dominated the 
industrial structure of India. These made 83.71 percent of total value added and 85.57 per cent of total 
employment (Bhagwati and Desai, 1970). To change this dominance of light industry and make India a real 





industrial power, the capital goods industry had to be established. The government had to own the means 
of production of these basic industries and as a result a new era of planned development started. The two 
major government organs in this endeavour were the National Development Council (NDC) and the 
Planning Commission (PC). The NDC consisted of the Prime Minister and the Chief Ministers of the States 
and the members of PC. The PC presented the NDC with lengthy and carefully drafted memoranda, which 
usually asked it to decide between alternative lines of policy. The commission had on these occasions 
come to its own conclusions, which pressed vigorously and for the most part successfully. Discussions did 
reveal just how much the states were prepared to stand for, and how far they were prepared to go in 
carrying out centrally determined priorities. It is possible to say that it was a forum where plans undergo 
adjustment in the light of the needs, pressures, prejudices, and capacities of the states (ibid.). 
Therefore, the now mostly criticised bias towards the heavy industry was the product of these central-
planning bodies. During the first four five-year plans (1951-1974) a consensus emerged on the 
nationalisation of defence industries and the ownership of public utilities while no divisions were obvious 
with regard to other key industries and the financial institutions, In fact, the Industrial Policy Resolution 
assigned monopoly by the state of atomic energy, arms, ammunitions, railways, iron and steel, 
shipbuilding, mineral oils, coal, aircraft production, and telecommunications equipment. The rest of 
industrial investments were opened to both public and private. The administration and control of such a 
planned economy proved to be very difficult and inefficiencies resulted in Indian poor industrial 
performance. 
Towards the end of 1980s India was seeking a new approach with an increased emphasis on productivity 
and efficiency. The new path considered is the liberalisation of industrial Incensing, the import of capital 
goods and other commodities. The new policy favours freer growth of consumption goods as opposed to 
capital goods to redress the bias of earlier policies. Ghosh (1992) criticises the Indian development 
strategies for not paying adequate attention to the Schumpeterian concept of innovations' as the prime 
mover of industrial growth. The neglect of the private initiative and entrepreneurship, which is at the centre 
of innovation, was a major stabling block because India failed to establish conditions that would promote an 
atmosphere conducive to innovations and innovative enterprise. 
The case of Taiwan is special. It was under the colonisation of Japan from 1895 till the end of World War II. 
After that it became part of China but soon was engulfed in the civil war. The nationalist party was fighting 
against the Communists to keep power but lost and retreated to Taiwan. It had to continue to strengthen 
the armed forces in order to defend itself from the mainland's China communists. It was on the verge of 
economic collapse by the mid-1950s. It was only to the American military and economic assistance, starting 
in 1954, that saved the country (Woronoff, 1992).The US acted in its strategic interest of controlling the 
spread of communism in Asia. But it is important to note here also the influx of refugees fleeing the 
advance of the Communists in the Mainland China. They were about 2 million people, It was a blessing in 
disguise for among them were a lot of highly skilled people: industrialists, bankers, doctors, administrators, 
professors, professionals, artists, and even chefs (Taiwan Survey, The Economist, November 7, 1998) that 
made a great contribution to the development of the island. 
South Korea was under the colony of Japan from 1905 to 1945 which left some industrial base mostly in 
the northern part of the country. Between 1945-1953 a bitter civil war devastated the country's economy 
and the country has divided into two: North and South Korea. It is possible to see in this war the influences 
and the confrontation of capitalist and socialist camps. After the war, South Korea virtually had no domestic 
savings, and about 70% of all reconstruction projects had to be financed by foreign aid. American economic 





assistance averaged about 10% of Korean GM between 1953 and 1960, enabling the country to recover 
back to the pre-war period. By the time the aid was completely phased out, Korea launched its economic 
development program in the early 1960s (Kim, 1993 in Nelson ed.) 
Singapore became a British colony in 1824 around the same time of that of India. It was part of the British 
colony called 'the Straits Settlements' together with the ports of Penang and Melaka. In 1946, Penang and 
Melaka joined the Malayan Union and Singapore became a crown colony. After a brief federation with 
Malaysia, 1963-1961 became an independent republic on its own. It is member of the Commonwealth. 
Soon after independence in 1965, Singapore was turned into an 'enclave' for the export of products 
manufactured by multinational firms and into an international financial centre, which controlled slowly the 
regional economy. 
Hong Kong became British colony in 1848 and joined back China in 1997 under the arrangement of 'one 
country two systems'. Initially Hong Kong developed as a trading centre, providing an entry-point to China 
till 1950. Afterwards, after the communist victory in China, the US and Britain imposed a boycott on trade 
with China. This time signs the beginning of Hong Kong's rapid development of light manufacturing 
industries in textiles, garments, plastics and electronic products. In Early 1980s, Hong Kong trade with 
China resumed becoming the main gate to China again. It is also one of the largest financial centres in the 
world. 
South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong are known also as the 'Four Tigers' for - their exceptional 
economic growth shown in last three and half decades. In terms of per capita income, Singapore is fourth in 
the world and Hong Kong thirteenth, and the country to join the OECD countries is Korea. 
Now that we have given brief country profile of the sample countries, we can proceed to see in brief the 
international relations of the cold-war era and the impact to the economic and technological development of 
these countries. 
After the World War II practically the world was divided into two blocks: the capitalist block led by America 
and the socialist block led by the Soviet Union and China. The result was the 'cold war' which lasted until 
the collapse of the Soviet Union and its allays, the Eastern European socialist countries, in 1989. The 
period mentioned is very much known for the peculiar international relations that created. The whole 
international trade was shaped around it. Foreign investment and technology transfer followed the same 
pattern. Being member of either block was a prerequisite for access to capital and technology of that 
particular group. It is in this environment that developing countries had to work in the past decades. 
Allegiances were frequently changed with detrimental effects to socio-economic stability. It is possible to 
say that changes in government ideologies were immediately affecting the international relations, 
international trade, and access to capital and technology because everything was assessed in terms of 
security of a given group of the two blocks. At times you could say that countries had little room to 
manoeuvre their economic policies for fear of displeasing the group to which they belong. 
The situation of India illustrates the effect of cold war to developing countries. The impact of the 
international relations during the cold war had an important contributing factor to explain the poor economic 
performance of India (Bhagwati, 1993). In the minds of the American intellectuals and elite, if China 
succeeded and India not would have meant a profound impact on the leadership of the developing 
countries pushing them ever more into the Soviet orbit of influence. This new threat posed by the Soviet 
Union had to be stopped, thus, it was considered in the American and its Western allies' interest to help the 
successful economic development of India. As a result India got support during the 1950s through the mid-





1960s. But after the Sino-Soviet split and the Nixon-Chou summit's 'Shanghai Communiqué' in 1972 calling 
for the development of trade and cultural ties, 'normalisation' of Sino-US relations moved into high gear. To 
this was added the Indo-Pakistani conflict of 1971, in which the US favoured Pakistan. These new 
developments ushered in an era where the Chinese economy would be viewed with indulgence whereas 
India's was perceived critically. The Chinese economic reforms of 1978 have greatly reinforced the 
predisposition to a favourable view of China's economic performance. But the collapse of the Soviet Union 
in 1989 and China's internal political reform that ended with the Tiananmen Square Massacre of June 1989 
set the Chinese image back to what had been during the worst excesses of the Red Guards under 
Chairman Mao and the Gang of Four. But India was moving in the right direction in internal economic 
reform. This shows us that during the 'cold war' things could move to either direction depending on what 
was viewed as security threat to the capitalist or socialist camp. 
Here, it is possible to cite SAST Report on India (1991) to corroborate the impact of cold war political 
relations to scientific co-operation and technology transfer arrangements. The report says that 'U.S. - Indian 
political relations have always been subject to tensions that have sometimes spilled over into commercial 
technology arena but have not until very recently affected scientific collaboration. A recent example is that 
in the early 1980s, Indian-US private sector co-operation and technology transfer arrangements came 
under the shadow of US Export Administration Regulations. During that period, the US imposed restrictions 
on the transfer to India (and 14 other countries) of an ever-widening range of "dual-purpose" technologies 
that they feared would find their way to the USSR, India's 12 year attempt to acquire a $12 million Cray 
XMP 14 supercomputer for meteorological, hearth, agriculture and physics research purposes got tangled 
up in this impasse. While a good deal of suspicious and unwanted attention was paid by the US to India's 
nuclear and space programmes for the same reason.' 
On the other hand, it is possible to some extent say that some of the Southeast and Eastern Asian 
countries have benefited from it. To control the expansion of the Soviet Union and China, the West 
practically helped the Japanese economy and that of South Korea and Taiwan. The presence of the British 
in Hong Kong made very easy for the capital access and technology to this part of the world. The military 
presence of America in this region had in general influenced the favourable trade policies toward these 
countries by the West.  
Compared to the above picture the experience of the Latin American countries is not all rosy. The heat of 
socialist political movement had caught many countries in this region. It was very hard for the United States 
to swallow. The classical example is Cuba at odds with the United States till the present days. Today the 
US is not only continuing the economic embargo but is pressurising even other western countries to do the 
same through policies and legislation. Now the 'cold war' is over. It seems that a real globalisation is taking 
place, National boundaries seem to be less relevant. The international trade is much more liberalised than 
any other time in human history. Even though developing countries cannot truly and fully participate in it 
because they cannot compete due to underdeveloped capacity, at least potentially the door is open to 
them. Now they have to learn and develop their scientific and technological capability in order to participate 
as equals in the already at hand global markets' Within this perspective, science and technology policy and 
management has to rise to its rightful place within the developing countries. There is no time to waste. 
4.3 Science & technology policy 
Let us now turn to the S&T policies and their role in the economic development policies. Besides, we will 
also consider the relationship of S&T policy, the institutional and human resource development. After that, 
implementation plans and management issues are considered within the major factors of the environmental 





context in which these countries were operating in order to have an integrated view. The 'melting pot' 
analogy has been introduced. This is the economic performance that results from the macroeconomic 
policies, S&T policies as carried out by the different enterprises and institutions (government or private) and 
the individual skills and entrepreneurial skills. Each of these elements may work together, confront each 
other, co-operate or pull in different directions depending on the situation'. The improved living standards 
and higher international economic competitiveness can measure the end result. 
Vision and goals 
Sometimes the expectation of mankind from science and technology is so general and unspecified that it 
looks as though societies merely replaced 'god' by 'science' in their prayer for plenty. This uncritical attitude 
may push the common man to be content to leave the solution of his problems to the new 'priesthood' of 
scientists and technologists without perceiving any participative role for himself (M.S. Gore and Suma 
Chitnis, 1979). Nehru had said that 'it is science and science alone that can solve the problem of hunger 
and poverty, of sanitation and illiteracy, of superstition and deadening custom and tradition, of vast 
resources, running to waste, of a rich country inhabited by starving people. Who indeed can afford to ignore 
science today? At every turn, we have to seek it and the future belongs to science and those who make 
friends with science' (Ibid.). It may be said that this statement by Nehru captures well the perception found 
among the political leaders in the third world, particularly at the times of political independence of these 
countries. 
Gore and Chitnis (ibid.) have, basing their argument on statements of scientists and scientific advisors, 
arrived at a list of six objectives of science which we also agree that these can be taken as, basically, the 
objectives of any developing country. They are the following: 
1. I ' the eradication of poverty and fulfilment of the basic minimum needs of food, clothing and shelter 
for all; 
2. industrialisation and economic development - the problem being visualised not only in terms of an 
increase in per capita income but also in terms of a reduction in unemployment, visible 
improvements in the standards of living, adequate provision of services for hearth and education, 
etc.; 
3. self-sufficiency in the matter of scientific and technological know-how and a capacity for basic 
scientific research and technological innovation; 
4. self-sufficiency in the matter of national security; 
5. development of the capacity to make prudent use of the resources in the country - including the 
capacity to conserve these resources and to protect them from the ravages of the elements and 
from ruthless human exploitation; and 
6. inculcation and dissemination of the scientific spirit and a rational temper. 
In short, all of these countries want to 'catching-up' in terms of S&T development for economic 
development with the industrialised countries and to provide a good living standard to their people. This 
particularly meant mastering the scientific and technological know-how in order to use it to solve the myriad 
problems of their societies. Policy instruments were used to achieve these objectives. This is because 
markets work incrementally and all the required responses to price signals in terms of shifts in resources 
take time. If large changes have to be brought about in a short time, the system cannot be left to market 
forces. One of the reasons why the state is so eager to intervene in developing economy, as was the case 
in NIEs, is that there is a pressing need for rapid growth (Das, 1992, p.la4). Therefore, looking into policy 





making and implementation does help us to see the dynamics of state intervention and market forces. 
Balancing the two seems to have worked in the rapid development of NIEs. 
Science & Technology policy. 
Hicks (1981, p.28) argued that the mainspring of economic progress is invention, invention that works 
through the rate of profit. Each invention gives an impulse to the economy. The chain of causation is from 
investment to final output, from final output to wages, from wages to the rate of profit on new investment, 
and then back on investment itself - the latter step in the substitution of capital for labour (ibid. p.127). In 
this section, we are studying this chain of causation of invention to innovation and to the economic progress 
that is exhibited by the NIEs. We are looking to policies and implementation performance of S&T in relation 
the economic development support made by these countries. 
If we see the Latin American countries experience there is a marked difference from the experience in the 
Southeast Asian countries. Brazil and other Latin American countries have used 'explicit' policies (see 
Appendix 2), during the last two decades, to raise awareness of S&T and have led to the adoption of some 
useful instruments. But the essential relationship between technology policy and the general macro-
economic environment has often been neglected (Correa, 1995). If the general environment for innovation 
is not adequate, there is practically no 'explicit' technological policy able to redress the situation. The 
scientific capabilities, created to different extent in various Latin American countries, have not contributed 
much to the building up of innovative capabilities (ibid.). Although some countries have even legislated for 
the creation of a 'scientific and technological system', as in the case of Brazil, in most cases reality showed 
uncoordinated actions by various innovative agents, if not markedly contradictory aims and strategies. 
Governments were unable to provide appropriate funding for R&D activities and also failed in establishing 
an effective system of co-ordination and planning. 
With regard to the purchasing power of state-owned enterprises and public institutions to promote 
industrialisation and innovation, which has frequently been stressed by all countries and some countries 
(e.g. Argentina, Venezuela) have adopted specific legislation on the matter, has not been effectively used. 
But there are some outstanding experiences (for instance, by the commission Nacional de Energia Atomica 
in Argentina, PETROVEN in Venezuela etc.). 
According to Etzkowitz and Brisofla (1999), Brazil has had three basic plans for S&T development. The first 
(I PBDCT) covered the period 1973:74 programmed an increase in the volume of resources for S&T. The 
second basic plan (1975-79, II PBDCT) set some priorities including the development of new technologies 
in unconventional sources of energy, space and oceanography. Emphasis was also put on the 
development of human resources through the stimulation of new graduate programs in universities to 
strengthen the relative weakness of its universities. The third basic plan (III PBDCT, 1980-85) aimed at 
supplying S&T resources and reinforcing technological capabilities of national firms. Some sectors were 
selected as priority areas such as telecommunications, petrochemicals and chemicals (ibid.). But these 
attempts were fragmented and limited to few sectors, which the Brazilian financial crisis has brought almost 
to halt. The example of CODETEC (Company for Development of Technology) shows that. CODETEC was 
established by the State University of Campinas as incubator facility, technology transfer office and venture 
capital firm out of research conducted on the campus. 
CODETEC had to change its strategy with the financial crisis in 1979 and could not continue as incubator. 
It changed to become a niche producer in the Brazilian chemical and pharmaceutical industry because the 
Brazilian S&T policies supported domestic industries in areas of medicines and tariff walls were raised to 





encourage substitution of local products for foreign imports. It got a large contract with the State Medicine 
Centre (CEME). Its main task -was reverse engineering and it established an information-gathering arm to 
draw upon the world scientific and patent literature, collating information to support its reverse engineering 
activities. But after 1986 with the coming of the civil government in Brazil and the open economy system 
that followed, CODETEC could not survive in the open unprotected market environment. Once again 
CODETEC had to change its strategy. It decided to develop and market fine chemical products and 
pharmaceuticals itself. But the sudden death of two of its key leaders left it without strong leadership at a 
critical time and began to slide into bankruptcy (ibid.). This shows the lack of integration of the various 
elements in the national innovative system of Brazil. 
Latin American countries lack more comprehensive schemes to promote the diffusion of technologies, 
particularly in the case of pervasive technologies such as IT. Policies have generally focused on the supply 
side, and have neglected the extremely important aspects of dissemination of technologies that can 
increase productivity and global efficiency (Correa, ibid.). 
Both Brazil and India, the large countries, showed heavy intervention in their industrial and technology 
policies. Brazil promoted several large public research organisations, and its giant public enterprises 
invested in research and development. It intervened in technology imports to support the development of 
local capabilities in the selected industries (the best-known case being minicomputers). Despite its heavy 
investments and major successes in some specifically targeted areas (aircraft, minicomputers, special 
steels, armaments), however, Brazilian strategy in technology development was to a large extent ineffective 
in achieving competitiveness for large parts of industry Dahlman and Frischtak, 1990). Mexico also pursued 
policies to build up domestic industry behind import protection, but did not adapt Brazilian-style 
interventions to develop specific technologies; it also lagged in the development of local capital goods. As a 
result Mexican technological prowess is generally considered to be behind Brazil's. 
India's S&T policy is based on the concept of self-sufficiency and elimination of foreign technology 
dependence. For this reason, it went for a broad-based science and technology development. It led to the 
establishment of a large number of S&T institutions. At the same time selective excellence has been 
pursued. 
At the beginning, the Indian strategy was based on the 'free play of the intellect' type of S&T development. 
It was not based on making India's economy more competitive internationally. The effort was focused on 
the establishment of broad-based S&T infrastructure in education, research and supporting facilities. 
Considerable energy of Indian scientists was spent in basic research rather than on research for immediate 
industrial applications. After 1970s, the policy shifted towards linkage between research infrastructure and 
economic progress. The National Committee on Science and Technology was established in 1973 and the 
first science and technology plan was prepared and integrated with the five-year economic plan of the 
country. On the industrial front, several policy changes were made with regard to the import of technology, 
the exclusion of foreign investment from certain sectors and the use of patents that influenced the utilisation 
of domestic R&D capabilities. As a result research focused on import-substitution and to promote in-house 
R&D in the industry, several fiscal incentives were introduced. This continued till mid-1980s. Afterwards, 
the increased dissatisfaction of the result of the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) labs in 
developing and transferring technology for use to Indian industry led to a number of restructuring and 
change in financing methods of such labs. But in general the liberalisation of the economy of the 1980s was 
a great help to the scientific community as well by way of greater competition, external co-operation and 
greater accountability. 





India of the late 1980s and 1990s is still committed to increased investment in advanced technology, in 
solving its major socio-economic problems using its S&T capability, and in providing substantial boost to 
the private sector R&D capabilities. But during the last period, a number of 'technology missions' were 
launched and despite the promising start little has been heard of them; and the massively funded defence 
and space related research was unable to meet many of the technological development targets set for 
them. All of these are posing enormously difficult challenges for the Indian science policy to overcome. 
The paradox is that India excels in certain S&T fields. The country has established expertise in space 
technology, oceanography, in wind testing and model building capabilities, in chemistry, in pure and 
theoretical science fields such as astrophysics and particle physics, pure and applied mathematics, surface 
studies and fast kinetics, and even superconductivity. It is to be noted also the country's growing 
capabilities in software and biotechnology. In all of these fields, if not a world leader, it is internationally 
competitive in basic and applied research. But due to a weak industrial capability, India could not exploit the 
full potential of its scientific capability for commercial purposes and, thus, contribute towards economic 
development of the country. Once again S&T supply side was growing while the demand side remained 
behind creating a mismatch, which is the main cause of ineffectiveness of the national innovation system of 
India. 
Unlike India, South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore built their S&T institutions to strengthen their industrial 
production for international markets. Particularly Singapore, and to a lesser degree Taiwan, used foreign 
investments to develop their industrial technology base. Korea‟s strategy favoured technology based on 
domestic investment rather than on DFI. But all the three countries were focused on selected science and 
technology to build their international industrial competitiveness. At the beginning the three of them focused 
on labour intensive technologies to create their light industries in the 1960s, but during the late 1970s 
deliberately changed their strategies, in line with their changing comparative advantage in the international 
market, by moving towards the high-tech and knowledge-intensive industries. These three countries 
distinguished themselves as the best users of science and technology in a planned development of their 
economies. Hong Kong relied, on the other hand, more on the market forces and less interventionist 
approach to science and technology development. But comparatively is behind the other three in terms of 
scientific and industrial technology development. 
Korea has adopted a dual approach of creating and rearing necessary S&T in parallel to the economic 
development of the country (Lee, 1988). S&T were developed by identifying the appropriate technologies to 
support industrial growth through direct and indirect government interventions. Up to 1985, the government 
was the main investor in science and technology development, while after that, the private sector took the 
lead in R&D investments. Now the policy is for the Government to take active part in the area of generic 
technology leaving the proprietary technology in the competitive hands of the private sector. However, the 
government retains and continues to strengthen inducement policy measures. 
To give a brief evolution of S&T policy in Korea, before the highly advanced national (HAN) project in 1992 
the country was following the 'bottom-up approach' while after that went for the new 'top-down approach'. In 
the past, national programmes designed and implemented by the Ministry of Science and technology 
(MOST) were usually run by government sponsored research institutes (GSRIs). Each researcher has to 
monitor technology trends in his or her field and submit research proposals, usually evaluated by peer-
review method. Therefore, the choice of research problems was coming from below or the researchers 
themselves, which is called 'bottom-up approach.' But, since the researchers tended to pay attention to 
what is more fashionable in their fields than to research relevant to industrial development, national 





investment on S&T was not getting expected results. For example, according to Shin and Kim (1994), the 
Korean government made an R&D investment of US $207 million over the period 1982-1990 on 2,400 
projects which were mainly proposed and carried out by GSRIs. While 30.9% of the projects jointly funded 
by the government and private firms were successfully commercialised, only 4.1% of government funded 
projects went to market successfully. As a result a better approach had to be found and the HAN project 
was launched. This is based on 'top-down approach' because before individual researchers submit their 
research proposals, as before, a national committee proposes both product-oriented technologies and 
basic technologies as priority for the country. After that MOST, Science and technology policy Institute 
(STEPI) of KIST, calls for research proposals. Proposals are reviewed by the specialist panel in each area 
and projects are selected. This ends with control and evaluation of R&D performance.  
Taiwan, similar to that of Korea, focused on S&T of relevance to the development of a competitive industry. 
The programme is called 'Science and Technology Projects' (STP) to which the Ministry of Economic 
Affairs (MOEA) spends about 500 million US dollars every year. The five major parties involved in STP 
operation are government agent (especially MOEA), research institutions, industry, legislative Yuan, and 
academia. Government agent provides the resources. The legislative Yuan approves and audits budget. 
Research institutions execute STP. The firms cooperate in the developments of STP with research 
institutions or transfer the newly developed technology from those institutions. Academia plays the advising 
roles of planning, schedule monitoring, and result evaluation (Yang et al., 1997). 
Given that Taiwan's industry is dominated by SMEs, industrial research was very weak. To redress this, the 
government established Industrial Technology Research Institute (ITRI) in 1973.The Institute for the 
Information Industry (III) was established in 1979. Its mission was to introduce and develop software 
technology, assist government agencies and public enterprises in their computerisation projects, train and 
educate information professionals, supply market and technology information related to the information 
industry, and promotes the development and usage of computer related technologies (Hou and Gee, 1993). 
Hsinchu Science-based Industrial Park (HSIP) followed in 1980. This policy of heavy government 
intervention in the development of S&T in Taiwan was considered imperative to sustain the future industrial 
development of the country. This is because as recently as 1989 about 95% of the SMEs in manufacturing 
industry did not conduct any R&D at all. Even the large manufacturing firms R&D started late, in 1987 were 
13.5% and in 1989 39.3% (Xue, 1997). 
The strategy of simple labour-intensive processing technologies that were dominant and successful during 
the 1960s and 1970s could not continue to be viable as the comparative advantage of lower wages were 
eroded. Taiwan saw this threat, as its direct competitor countries like Korea and Singapore did, have to 
move on to high-tech industries. The tradition of building industrial parks, Taiwan had built 71 between 
1960 and 1990, was considered insufficient and HSIP was the answer. This science-based park is 
considered to be very successful experience and was from the outset firmly based on a strong and well-
integrated relationship among universities, industrial research institutes and the industry. 
To understand the current zeal and focus on information technology that we see in Singapore today, we 
need first understand the whole logic of economic development strategy that Singapore is following. Based 
on the past 30-years or so of economic development experience of Singapore, some authors have 
proposed a 'technopreneurial national development model'. The word 'technopreneurial' stands for 
technological and entrepreneurial. They argue that the government of Singapore has played the 
entrepreneurial role in leading successfully the country in developing its economy (H.K. Tang and K.T. Yeo, 
1995). Singapore's development since independence has many similarities with an entrepreneurial firm. 





The government shows the following common traits of entrepreneurs: opportunity pursuer, determination, 
dare, and innovativeness (see Table 4.5). 
According to Tang and Yeo (1995) what Singapore did was to: build up its infrastructures, develop its 
human resources, and attract and gain confidence of investors with innovative and pragmatic policies. 
Depending on the opportunities available the government did invest selectively its limited resources in 
industries, which are strategic to the nation private since the local sector-is unlikely to contribute 
significantly due to fact of technological competence. During the 1980s, Singapore invested heavily in 
highly skilled manpower development and as a result the number of engineers and technicians graduating 
from universities and polytechnics increased substantially and has enabled the industry upgrading and 
R&D activities' Government target is to hive 20% of every year's cohort going to universities, half to 
polytechnics and the remainder receiving skills training in the institutes of technical education. 
Table  4.5: Summary of strategic move by the Singapore 
 
 
During the last decade, the government of Singapore established nine research institutes and centres. 
These specialise in electronics, information technology and biotechnology, which are considered to be the 
technologies for future economic growth. Their mission is to provide specialised training, develop. pre-
competitive technologies, provide services to companies, and transfer technologies to industry. in 1991, 
Singapore Science Council was upgraded to the National science and technology Board (NSTII), and 
National technology plan was published' on the other hand, the government of Singapore gives various 
types of incentives to attract investments into growth industries and promote automation, training and 
productivity' Moreover, offers new incentives to encourage companies to locate their upstream activities 
such as R&D, product planning and design to Singapore; and to strengthen the linkages among companies 
(both local and foreign) to form competitive industrial clusters.  
Hong Kong followed the laissez-faire approach to technological development (Hobday, 1995). It is behind 
the other three tigers in S&T development in general. While the other three were busy upgrading their R&D 





Opportunities / problems 
 
Response 
2nd half of 1960s Excess of low-skilled labour, lack of industrial 
heritage, political uncertainty in Hong Kong and 
Taiwan over China 
Draw in MNCs which were searching for 
labour - intensive operation bases 
 
Late 1960s Pull-out of British military bases, boom in 
shipping passing Singapore, start of oil 
exploration in South East Asia 
Established shipyards, and defence 
industry. attracted petroleum related 
companies 
Late 1970s Acute labour shortage, low productivity and low 
value-added 
I0-year economic upgrading plan, rapid 
expansion of technical tertiary education 
 
Early 1980s World-recession, non-competitive factories 
closing down or shifting out 
Pulled in MNCs in new growth industries 
1986 to now Other NIEs catching up in industrialisation and 
technological development, China India. 
Vietnam opening up, economic boom in Asia 
Encourage entrepreneurship, overseas 
ventures and MNCs to use Singapore 
as regional hub. push for R&D and 
innovation Economic alliances to 
capitalise on the boom in Asia 





industry into China to exploit the low wage advantage based on the old system of labour-intensive simple 
technologies. But at the same time it was able to build financial and trade institutions of international class.  
Both, Brazil and India, have worked under the import-substitution strategy in the development of their S&T. 
On the contrary, the Southeast Asian countries have basically worked under the export-led strategy. This 
allowed the presence of foreign competitors and has produced an additional pressure for enterprises to 
learn faster the required technologies and use them more efficiently and effectively, which was absent in 
the former situation.  
Therefore, if we are looking for the best policies the answer is 'there is no a single best policy'. The 
experience of these countries clearly shows that countries have a number of possible policy choices. They 
should be able to identify the policies that suit their particular socio-economic, political, and natural 
endowments. A pragmatic solution to the dilemma of whether to go for a free market system or allow the 
state intervention is to go for both of them. When markets work, leave them alone. But if they don't 
intervene is as close as possible to the best strategy. The two are complementary and not necessarily 
mutually exclusive. But state intervention should be coherent with the market character, profit (including the 
social benefits) being its basic motive. We do have plenty of empirical examples from the NIEs where the 
state determined some sectors or industries are more important for the future growth of the economy than 
others and diverted resources to them with success. 
In section 4.6, we will further discuss the S&T policies in relation to the economic policies and the result 
these countries have achieved. 
4.4 Institutional capacity 
In S&T development, institutions are very central. Institutions can be 'market institutions' and 'non-market 
institutions'. Market institutions are naturally created by the market mechanism itself. They are institutions 
established to give services with profit motives. The non-market institutions are created by the intervention 
of the government or other interested associations to achieve specific social or economic objectives.  
Since markets are imperfect they cannot create spontaneously all necessary institutions required in a given 
environment. Thus governments intervene to create them. This same intervention is required, particularly in 
developing countries, to help the scientific and technological development of their countries. Usually 
governments create universities, research institutes, and training institutes because skilled manpower is 
considered as public good. Governments do establish sometimes 'special institutes' to promote the 
diffusion of science and technology (like science parks); funding institutions to provide finance the small 
and medium enterprise etc. Governments, through their macro-policy incentives, may encourage the 
creation of institutions for inter-sector co-operations between universities, research institutes, and private 
enterprises. 
Table 4.6: Higher Education and Research Institutions in NIEs. 
Country Learned Societies, Research 
Institutes and Academies 
Universities Polytechnics and colleges 
Brazil 135 74 59 
Hong Kong 230 158 17 
India n.a n.a n.a 
S. Korea 31 39 2 
Singapore 28 2 4 
Taiwan 68 18 9 
Source: The world of learning 1995, 45h edition, Europe publication Limited, London, 1995. 





Exploring the NIEs, we find a tremendous institutional capability created by these countries particularly in 
the past four decades. We will see how the NIEs have structured and organised their national economy in 
relation to the development of science and technology. In other words, we will try to see the various S&T 
institutions, economic institutions, and the government institutions of these countries to understand their 
interactions and determine the overall institutional capability created. In other words, we are trying to see 
the fit between all these various institutions created and the adequacy of the institutional infrastructure to 
enable the socio-economic development based on science and technology,  
Based on the World of learning 1995, we can make a crude comparison of the extent of institutional 
capacity development in higher learning and research institutions in NIEs. But not all colleges and research 
institutions are listed. Particularly those that are designed for -local purposes usually choose not to be 
listed. The number of colleges in India and Korea, in particular, are underrepresented. The number of 
universities given is closer to reality because they want international recognition and make sure to be in the 
list. The same can be said of learned societies, research institutions and academies. If we see the number 
of university per million of population, we get 1: 6.08 million in India, 1: 2.22 million in Brazil, 1:1.5 million in 
Singapore, 1:1.18 million in Korea and 1:1.11 million in Taiwan. Again the advantage is of the four tigers. 
India has the lowest number of universities per population followed by Brazil. Roughly, where India has 1, 
approximately Brazil has 3 and the Southeast Asian countries have 6 universities for the same number of 
population. In absolute terms no country matches the number of universities in India. But number of 
institutions established cannot tell the strength and quality of such institutions. If we look to number of 
scientists, engineers and technicians engaged in research and experimental development, data are 
inadequate to make a real comparative analysis (Table 4.7). Anyway, the output of such institutions is what 
matters. One measure of S&T output usually considered is the number of patent applications filed (Table 
4.2). The speed of diffusion of a technology and the exploitation of all its potential is also very crucial. This 
goes hand in hand with marketing and managerial skills as well. It is a very complex issue. What we will try 
to do next is to have some basic ideas of how the S&T institutions have evolved in the NIEs and what they 
are trying to achieve. 
Table 4.7: Number of scientists, engineers and technicians engaged in research and experimental 
development in NIEs (full-time equivalent) 
Country Year Total Scientists % Engineers Technicians 
   Total %F Total %F 
Brazil 1995 36,081 26,754 - 9,327 - 
India 1990 224,773 128,036 6.0 96,737 6.3 
Hong Kong - - - - - - 
S. Korea 1994 131,587 117,486 8.1 14,141 - 
Singapore 1994 11,384 7,086 - 4,298 - 
Taiwan - - - - - - 
Source: United Nations, Statistical Yearbook, 42nd issue, 1997 
In Latin America, the region has created an institutional infrastructure on S&T and has deployed a set of 
policies in various fields with varying but in general limited success. Scientific and technological policies 
applied have often lacked the necessary differentiation between the promotion of science on one side, and 
of technology on the other (Correa, 1995). These institutions were conceived in most cases on the basis of 
a deliberate State intervention. But the inability of governments to sustain the funding of such institutions, 
particularly after the economic recession that hit Latin American countries after the oil shocks of the 1970s, 
made them less effective. Brazil did invest considerable amount of money in institutions to support the 
development and diffusion of S&T but the result was not satisfactory because these institutions either did 





not have enough power to make the desired change, or did not have enough resources to sustain the 
desired change. 
These institutions were fragmented and could not be effective in solving problems beyond their individual 
capabilities and their conflict of interest could not bring them together. This indicates that the national 
innovation system of Brazil was not well integrated to create some kind of comparative advantage for the 
country, hence, the poor performance in the international market. Here, we should not or cannot 
disassociate the scientific and technological institutions from the macroeconomic management of the 
country. This is the context within which they are supposed to operate. In fact, in Brazil's case, it is the huge 
debt that sustained in the three decades of economic growth before the 1980s to cause the abrupt 
economic austerity measures that followed to kill the potential effectiveness of many scientific and 
technological institutions. Of course, the bias towards the basic sciences as opposed to the applied 
technologies and over-protection of industries from international competition are also the other major 
culprits. 
At present, a new scenario is emerging in Latin America with tariff reduction and market liberalisation, 
together with a change in the role of the State both as regulator of the general economic activity and as 
supplier of services and goods. The premises that underpinned the scientific and technological policies of 
the last two decades are substantially altered. These trends, in association with a possibly strengthened 
system for intellectual property, are creating a new framework for innovative activities in the region (Correa, 
ibid.). This is considered like a fresh air long overdue. It is hoped that a more competitive environment 
would promote innovation. But there is a need to bring human resources in line with the actual demand to 
support a more market-oriented R&D effort. The right incentives for innovators and users must be there 
without creating problems to the long-term scientific development, which is the challenge to regulatory body 
where its institutional maturity will be tested. 
We do have examples were Brazil has developed different lines to support local innovation, including 
almost all stages from product development to the setting up of quality control systems, the adaptation and 
acquisition of foreign technologies etc. It also supports national consulting firms. Currently Brazil is 
experiencing a serious crisis resulting from the drastic reduction in international financing and in the 
investment and maintenance programs of public enterprises. 
With regard to Linkages between research institutions and enterprises, a range of instruments have also 
been established in order to strengthen the traditionally weak linkages between research institutions 
(particularly in universities) and the productive sector. To achieve this many Latin American countries, 
including Brazil, have taken a number of measures. Peru has included a special contribution (2% of net 
income) of industrial enterprises, Mexico and Colombia have created 'innovation' centres (sponsored by the 
Universidad Autonoma de Mexico) and (supported by COFCIENCIAS). Similarly Brazil has established a 
vast number of foundations and other entities, including enterprises such as CODETEC in Campinas 
associated to universities. Another interesting development in Brazil is the establishment of 'technology 
parks' or 'poles', often with significant support of the local states, aimed at creating scientific and industrial 
complexes. BIORIO, for instance, foresees the installation of about 70 biotechnological firms and a total 
investment of around US$100 million (Correa 1995). 
In Latin America, in part taking advantage of the potential of information technologies, some efforts have 
been made in the region to facilitate the diffusion of scientific and technological information. One example is 
the database on patents operated by the Institito Nacional de Propriedade Industrial, which supplied almost 
300,000 copies of documents in 1988, mainly through the 'Program of Automatic Supply of Technological 





Information'. But during the 1980s, in Brazil, government expenditures for scientific and technological 
infrastructure diminished as a consequence of short-run stabilisation measures. The three main sources of 
funding public science and technology institutions (the National Fund for Science and Technology 
Development of FINEP and the budgets for basic research of CNPq and CAPES) suffered sharp 
decreases. In 1985 they were allocated only 40 per cent of 1979 amount. The same trend has been 
observed also in Argentina, Mexico, Venezuela, Peru and Chile (Bielchowsky, 1985; Sagasti and Cook, 
1987; and Schmitz and Cassiofato,1992). 
Here it is in place to look into the industrial technology development in Brazil. The structure for directing 
and promoting industrialisation in Brazil was first attempted by the establishment of National Development 
Council in 1956, with the initial purpose of acting as a central planning agency but later fragmented into 
several sectoral agencies called 'executive groups'. During this time we have the 'Targets Plan' that was a 
collection of five-year targets for output and investment in infrastructure, heavy industry, food and 
education. Particularly the import substitution policies of 1956-64 period favoured the development of the 
heavy industry sector mainly in the hands of the State Enterprises. But the local private firms were at a 
disadvantage in financial access. This state of situation was slightly changed, during the 1964-73 period, 
and improved financial facilities for the local private firms was provided. A new period of exceptional growth 
followed but became unsustainable because of macroeconomics imbalances resulting in heavy debt. It was 
during this period that Brazil established, to be exact in 1964, the Industrial Development Council (CDD. It 
was made up of representatives of the main economic agencies and was responsible for the co-ordination 
and establishment of criteria for the concession of fiscal and credit incentives to the manufacturing sector. 
CDI incentives were distributed at random, without any clear criteria, but to increase investments. Besides, 
CDI did not have much control over a dozen regional and sector-specific government institutions conceding 
similar incentives. A National System of Scientific and Technological Development (SNDCT) was set up to 
co-ordinate the existing S&T institutions, formulate S&T development plans and the funds came from the 
Fund for Scientific and Technological Development (FNDCT). Anew agency, the National Institute of 
Industrial Property Rights (INPI) was established in 1971 to screen technology imports to reduce the cost of 
technology imports and to facilitate its absorption. A new emphasis on higher education was also made 
(see Moreira, 1995,p.96-124). 
Coming to the microelectronics industry, the policy of reserving the mini- and microcomputer industry for 
the Brazilian private capital have their origin in the Commission for the Co-ordination of Electronic 
Processing Activities (CAPRE) which was created in 1972 and had a regulatory role over information 
technology. Control over computer imports began in 1975, at which time a number of complementary policy 
measures were also set in motion (Piragibe 1985, 1988a; Tigre 1983). The beginning of the market reserve 
dates from 1977, when the mini- and microcomputers were reserved for the Brazilian private capital and the 
production of minicomputers was put to tender for national firms (Frischtak 1986:6). In 1979, CAPRE was 
transformed into Special Secretariat for Informatics (SEI) with a wider mandate. The protected market for 
national firms under SEI's guidance gradually spread to other areas, such as industrial automation 
equipment, micro-electronic components, digital instruments, super-minicomputers and others. In 1984, the 
market reserve and complementary measures were enshrined in the 'Informatics law' (Piragibe, 1988a; 
Meyer-Stamer, 1988). The main policy instruments used by SEI are quantitative import restrictions and the 
concession of manufacturing licenses to national firms. Foreign firms were limited to the production of 
mainframe computers. They were also controlled by SEI to the extent that the granting and withholding of 
import licenses can force these firms to have increasing indices of nationally produced inputs in their final 
products and also to show positive export balances (Piragibe, 1985). But starting from the early 1990s, 
Brazil has embarked on the road to deregulation and open market system. 





The other big country among our sample NIEs countries is India. There is hardly any other developing 
country, and only a few developed countries that can rival India in the scale and spread of its scientific and 
educational institutional set up, writes Hoffman (1991). Since independence, the institutional structure for 
education and scientific research expanded enormously to more than 1000 research institutions, 157 
universities and 5500 colleges. The number of in-house R&D units, both in public and private sector is 
about 1000, and that of consulting firms about 150. Out of a stock of nearly 3 million trained people, about 
275,000 S&T personnel are economically active in S&T and by l99l some 90,000+ were directly engaged in 
R&D activities in various public and private sector R&D institutions (ibid.). 
In India, the Prime Minister (PM) is the official head of S&T. There is a Science Advisory Council to PM, as 
well as scientific advisor and technology mission advisor to the PM. A Ministry of Science and Technology 
was created in 1985 with three major S&T departments: Department of Science and Technology (DSID, 
Department of Scientific and Industrial Research (DSIR), and the Department of Biotechnology (DBT). DST 
has the responsibility from formulating policy guidelines in S&T, the promotion of new areas of S&T, S&T 
entrepreneurship development and international scientific and technical affairs, including international S&T 
collaboration outside agriculture. The DSIR promotes innovative and R&D activity in industry. Under DSIR 
there is the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) whose network of forty laboratories 
constituted the core group of industry oriented R&D centres in India. Even though criticised for not being 
effective, they have created some outstanding human and institutional scientific capabilities that have not 
only contributed to Indian development but have also provided the basis for a wide ranging set of 
international collaborations with more than 40 countries. Moreover, there is conceivably a wealth of 
commercially valuable but still under exploited knowledge available in CSIR labs (Hoffman, l99l). 
Councils similar to CSIR run research institutions under the control of other ministries such as the Indian 
Council of Agricultural Research (ICAR). This has a chain of 40 labs in agricultural and animal husbandry 
research, the Indian Council of Medical Research (ICMR) that formulates co-ordinates and promotes 
biomedical research, has 18 R&D institutions under its control. The Defence Research & Development 
Organ is responsible of all defence related research activities and controls and directs over 40 laboratories. 
Other departments with a strong S&T component to their activities who also support R&D laboratories are _ 
atomic energy, electronics, space, environment, non-conventional energy sources, ocean - development 
and education. In all the Indian central government, through its various ministries and departments, 
provides support to 1000 laboratories while the state governments support another 300 laboratories. In 
1986, 55 percent of total S&T related expenditure went to the scientific departments while the S&T 
component of the socioeconomic ministries accounted for 45 per cent of the outlay (see Hoffman, 1991, 
Sast Project I Report on India, pp.57-9). 
The founding fathers of independent India like Nehru have laid down the foundation of a vast number of 
science and technology institutions, which were expected to turn the country into just and prosperous 
society. The building of such scientific and technical infrastructure has grown to such immense proportions 
that India can claim the world's third largest workforce of scientists and technicians (Mahajan and 
Sudarshan, 1989), But the result was disappointingly small because high quality research is almost non-
existent and overall quality of research has actually been on the decline during the 1980s, major 
discoveries and inventions have simply passed India by and even minor achievements have been few and 
far between (ibid.). The major criticism of Indian S&T institutions is the control of these by few who are 
extremely powerful and never held accountable people. The environment created was not conducive and 
attractive to curious, independent minded, fearless and dedicated young researchers. The existing 
separation of research institutes from the universities is another problem. The research institutes attract the 





best people due to better research facilities and rewards while the universities are left for the second rate 
people. As a consequence, the universities' quality of education is increasingly falling in all universities with 
few exceptions. To reverse this trend 'the best of the current scientists should teach, train, and inspire the 
next generation' (ibid.). Of course, the biggest single problem of India is brain drain to foreign countries, 
particularly the USA and needs a quick solution. May be the answer lies in the ability of India to expand the 
industrial research of the private sector as opposed to that of the public sector and government. As 
increased international competitiveness of Indian companies would create job opportunities for young and 
promising scientists and engineers and the reverse of brain drain could occur. As for now, Indian industrial 
innovation lags behind that of Southeast Asian countries. 
In the case of Korea, a number of organisations played a major role in the accelerated economic 
development in the last four decades. Among which are the S&T institutions. The government of Korea is a 
major player as well. The president of the country and his staff are at the centre of economic and political 
power. The president was served by a small number of competent advisors, who were often more 
influential than high ranking officials, to provide detailed directions on policy making confined to basic policy 
direction without laying down the precise policy content (Das, 1992). At the next stage in the intervention 
mechanism come institutions like the Economics and Planning Board (EPB), the Ministry of Finance (MoF) 
and the Ministry of Commerce and Industries (MCD. The EPB not only acted as a national planning 
ministry but also controlled budget and administrated prices. It also decided on foreign loans, foreign 
investment and the transfer of foreign technology. The producers' associations worked also as government 
agents, that is, their consultations with the government were a two-way process. The MCI interacted with 
and kept surveillance over the operations of these associations (Michell, 1984). The producers associations 
prepared detailed plans and the MCI then gave them their final shape and monitored them. In all this 
process a close link between the executive and the machinery of economic policy was maintained (Das, 
ibid.). 
Parastatals also play a significant role in the Korean economy, in 1960s these parastatals were partly the 
legacy of Japanese colonialism but the Korean government created others itself. They controlled many of 
utilities, like electricity, oil and coal, and industries like tungsten, steel, fertiliser, shipbuilding, air transport 
and tourism. They were generally import substituting industries or dealt in non-tradable goods rather than in 
exportable. The number of these enterprises increased from 52 in 1963 to 108 in l972.The privatisation 
policy brought this number down to 90 in 1984. Their share in value-added also increased from seven per 
cent of the GDP to nine per cent during the 1963-72 period, and remained around nine per cent level in the 
1980s. Compared to the Korean private sector were less efficient but relatively efficient to the white 
elephant counterparts in other developing countries (Das, 1992, pp. 149-50). 
Chaebols is a system of large, family-owned and family-controlled industrial conglomerates typical to the 
Korean economy. They emerged as a result of government incentives given to entrepreneurs to invest in 
new ventures to establish companies that could produce with economies of scale and compete with large 
competitors in the international market. As a result, they dominated the export industries. The government 
gave them financial, technical and structural support. Chaebols relied on government controlled credit 
institutions and usually played a supportive or subordinate role to the government. In l98l the Monopoly 
Regulation and Fair Trade Law was enacted to curb the dominant position of the Chaebols in the domestic 
market. The ten largest Chaebols are Samsung, Hyundai, Lucky Goldstar, Daewoo, Sunkyong, 
Saangyong, Hysoung, Hanjin, Kia, and Korea Explosives (see Das, 1992, pp 159-52). Now Chaebols 
contribute the balk of the industrial scientific and technological research expenditure in the country. 





In the 1980s, the Korean government started directly funding the private R&D by establishing the National 
R&D Project (NRP). This was administered by ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) in 'new' 
technology areas focusing primarily on future problems, and the Industrial Base Technology Development 
Projects (IBTDP) administered by Ministry of Trade and industry (MTI) in 'existing' technology areas 
focusing primarily on current problems. Both institutions designate target technologies and offer direct R&D 
subsidy to R&D organisations. Tax incentives were also used as a major indirect funding mechanism for 
corporate R&D (Kim in Nelson ed.), 1993). 
In South Korea, research activities in universities have been relatively underdeveloped. Though university 
expenditures increased significantly from $ 1.5 million in 1971 to $250 million in 1987, they accounted for 
only 5.4Vo of the nation's total R&D expenditures in l97l and 10.5% in 1987. Universities accounted for 
33.1% of the nation's R&D manpower and 78.4% of its Ph.D. level R&D manpower in 1987. But to improve 
the situation, the government have designated five university R&D centres in 1989 that will receive 
increased financial assistance in order to strengthen their R&D capabilities (Kim in Nelson ed., 1993). The 
number of university students has increased from 131,354 to 931,884, with the proportion of high school 
graduates going to universities growing from 28.2 to 38.3 percent during the same period. This shows that 
these higher learning institutions are the backbone for the supply of highly skilled manpower in the country. 
In contrast to that of South Korea, Taiwanese industry is in prevalence of small and medium - size 
enterprises. For this reason the role of government in promoting science and technology development for 
industry has become increasingly crucial for economic growth and export competitiveness (Paul K. C. Liu, 
1992, in G. Ranis ed.). To respond to this need, the Executive Cabinet (Yuan) convened the First National 
Conference on Science and Technology Development, in 1978, and was attended by 400 top scientists, 
engineers, business leaders and government administrators to deliberate on the directions and strategies 
of science and technology development. Based on this conference in 1979, a Science and Technology 
Advisory Committee was established and the first Science and Technology Development Program was 
drafted, finalised and critically reviewed by the government agencies responsible for its implementation. 
Late on, this was integrated into the Eighth Four-Year Economic Plan (1982-1985). Conferences of this 
nature were held every four years to review and evaluate the performance of the economy and to make 
recommendations for future development. In 1982, second conference, the recommendations were to 
select eight strategic areas for technology development: energy, materials, automation, information, 
electro-optics, biotechnology, food and hepatitis control. The recommendations of the third conference, 
1984, led to the formulation of the Ten-year National Science and Technology Development Plan (1986-
1995) with a major goal of the improvement of general environment for science and technology 
development. The science and technology board is made up of distinguished scientists from both Taiwan 
and the USA and meets every year with relevant experts and officials to review and evaluate performance 
and perspectives.  
The central government agencies in Taiwan play a dominant role in developing basic and applied science 
and in promoting science and technology research, the implementation of which they delegate to industrial 
associations and research organisations in both public and private sectors (Liu, ibid., p 383-4). The R&D 
expenditure in Taiwan has increased from year to year but the government has reallocated resources to 
higher levels of research with the intention of leaving product development research to the private sector 
which lately increased in proportion to that of the government. Of the R&D manpower in the eight strategic 
priority areas, more than one-third was allocated to information science and about one-fifth to each of 
automation and materials science, while the rest was thinly spread among the other five strategic areas. In 
the information science, efforts are being concentrated on the development of micro and minicomputers, 





peripheral and interface devices, and software utilising Chinese language. Efforts towards automation are 
devoted to the development of CAD and CAM systems that can be adapted to Taiwan's industrial mode 
Paul K.C.Liu, 1992, in G.Ranis ed.). 
The experience of Singapore has its own peculiarities. The government played a very important role in the 
fast development of the countries' industrialisation. President Lee Kuanyew and his political part, Peoples 
Action Party, consolidated power and limited political opposition in 1967. With help of a small group of close 
economic advisors, including Go Keng-swee, Minister of Finance, the president of the country took direct 
responsibility for economic policy. The policy of import-substitutions followed in 1959 was officially 
abandoned in 1967 for export-promotion policies. Government agencies took a leading role in business 
through both direct and indirect means. For this reason some authors called Singapore 'administrative 
state' (Vogel, 1991, p.71), 'entrepreneurial state' (Sisodia, 1992), and 'corporate state' (Yuan and Low, 
1990). State-owned or controlled enterprises were set up in oil exploration, petroleum refining, 
petrochemicals, defence, shipbuilding and airline travel. In the high technology export sector, including 
electronics, the state left most decisions to private firms, providing incentives, manpower training and 
infrastructure to attract foreign companies to the economy. 
Singapore, to induce the TNCs, allowed a level of foreign control, which has not been acceptable in either 
South Korea or Taiwan. TNCs came to Singapore during the 1960s and 1970s to exploit the political 
stability, geographical location and efficient and constantly improving transportation and communications 
infrastructure (Hobday, 1995, p. 140). By 1990 more than 3,000 TNCs, among which 600 large firms, were 
operating in Singapore. In 1991 total manufacturing investment amounted to US$2.5 billion of which nearly 
US$1.2 billion (48 percent) was in electronics. By 1992 more than 250 electronics firms together sod in the 
region of US$19.4 billion in electronics. (Hobday, ibid., p. 141). 
Hong Kong is considered by many to be more liberal and less interventionist than the other three tigers. 
Within its laissez-faire approach there were some government bodies to provide technological support to 
local firms such as the Hong Kong Productivity Council (HKPC), the Vocational Training Council (WC), the 
Trade Development Council (TDC) and the Industry Department (ID). The VTC is a statutory organisation, 
which operates eight 0echnical institutes and two industrial training centres that provide craft and 
engineering courses in electronics and related industries. The courses are in machine shop and metal-
working, plastics, precision tooling, CAD/CAM and other subjects, whereas the TDC is responsible for 
promoting overseas trade. The TDC brings together industrialists, trade associations, senior administration 
officials and organises trade fairs. It also operates computerised trade inquiry service, providing product 
information by company for local and overseas buyers. The ID attempts to promote industrial investment by 
providing prospective investors with information on suitable industrial locations, labour searches, and other 
investment factors. Hong Kong educational institutes supply highly skilled manpower. The major ones are 
the University of Hong Kong, University of Science and Technology, and the Chinese University of Hong 
Kong (Hobday, 1995, p. 165-6). 
This section demonstrates that countries can have institutions that suit their unique needs and 
characteristics. It is not necessarily said that there is one single best way of creating institutions. But it is a 
must to have well integrated institutions to succeed. These need be complementary and capable to support 
each other. Balanced growth of these institutions avoids the undesirable effect of having isolated world 
class institutions incapable to contribute towards the socio-economic development of the country. 
Particularly S&T institutions do require a considerable time and money to nurture them before they could be 
of support to the industrial development, particularly in the new technologies. 





4.5 Human capital formation 
At the time we were defining 'technology' we said that it includes also 'skills' or 'know-how'. This is possible 
only through human resource development. This is why in any serious attempt of technological 
development, training of the human resource becomes very central. It is possible to say that the issue of 
technological development is very much correlated to the extent of human capital formation or the 
availability or not of highly skilled manpower in that given country. We will explore, therefore, in short the 
experience of the NIEs. We have already given facts and figures on public expenditures on education, 
enrolment ratios at - primary and secondary levels, scientists and engineers, number of patents filed, and 
number of higher education and research institutions Table 4.2, 4.5, 4.6). Therefore, we need only continue 
to elaborate on other important aspects that were not brought forward before. 
The human capital formation of a country is usually measured by the number scientists and engineers, 
professionals and technicians, and the institutional capability to produce such skilled manpower, which is 
captured by enrolments in educational and training institutions. Enrolment figures for education by 
themselves may be misleading. The true impact on technological capability development also depends on 
the dropout rate, the technical orientation of the students, and the quality of teaching. The dropout rate is 
exceptionally low in East Asian NIEs (Oshima, 1988; Kim. 1988). 
Table 4.8: Indicators on human resource development in NlE's 
Indicators S. Korea Taiwan H. Kong Singapore India Brazil 
 Edu. Expressed as a %household 
consumption (1980-85) 
6 n.a 5 12 4 5 
Public expenditure % GNP (year) 4.9 (1985) 5.1 (1986) 2.7 (1978) 2.9 (1980) 3.7 (1985) 2.9 (1984) 
Gov‟t exp. on education % of total gov‟t exp. 
(1986) 
18.1 20.4 n.a 21.6 2.1 3.0 
% Age group enrolled (1985/95*)       
     Primary 96/99 100/- 105/91 115/- 92/- 104/90 
     Secondary 94/96 91/- 69/71 71/- 35/- 35/19 
     Tertiary education 32 13 13 12 9 11 
Vocational Edu. Enrolment  (1984) in „000 815 405 32 9 398 1,481 
      As % population working age 3.06 3.24 0.86 0.5 0.07 1.83 
No. Of tertiary level students       
Science / engineering fields („000) 585 207 36 22 1,443 535 
% population 1.39 1.06 0.67 0.89 0.21 0.40 
year (1987) (1984) (1984) (1984) (1980) 91983) 
Engineering („000) 228 129 21 15 397 165 
% population 0.54 0.68 0.41 0.61 0.06 0.13 
Source: Adopter from Lall (1992) Table 2.  
Note: Years of data available are given in brackets, otherwise they are of 1992.  
  *Added data taken Aon World Bank, World Development Report, 1998/99. 
 
Getting data from the literature to make a comparative analysis in human resource development achieved 
by our sample countries is very difficult. The closest we could manage to get is that prepared by Lall (1997, 
Table 4.8). In 1992, the proportion of each country's population enrolled in science and engineering is led 
by South Korea (1.39), followed by Taiwan (1.06), Singapore (0.89), Hong Kong (0.67), Brazil (0.4) and 
India (0.21). In 1986, government expenditure on education as a per cent of total government expenditure 
was highest in Singapore (21.6%) followed by Taiwan (20.4%) and Korea (18.1%). For Hong Kong data 
was not available while that of Brazil and India was way down 3% and 2.1% respectively. With regard to 
per cent of age group enrolled in primary in 1985 all were above the 90% with India at the lower end (92%) 





and Singapore at the upper end (115%). But in 1995 of the three countries for which data is available, we 
see improvement in Korea from 96 to 99% while both Hong Kong and Brazil show a decline of exactly 10% 
from 105% and 104% respectively. Secondary enrolment in Korea increased from 94 to 96%, in Hong Kong 
increased from 69 to 71% while that of Brazil decreased from 35 to l9%. For the others data for 1995 is not 
available, but in 1985 Taiwan had reached the level of 91%, Singapore and India way down 35% (the same 
as that of Brazil). When we come to the tertiary, in 1985, Korea had exceptionally high enrolment of 35% 
while all the rest are in the range of 9-13% with India at the lower end. But this shows that India and Brazil 
have higher proportions of secondary schools graduates joining colleges and universities than that of the 
Tigers. Vocational education enrolment as Vo of working age population in 1984 was highest in Taiwan 
(3.24%) and Korea (3.06%) followed by Brazil (1.83%), Hong Kong (0.86%), Singapore (0.5%) and again 
India way down (0.07%). 
The technical competence of an industrial workforce is improved by education imparted by various formal 
training systems and by in-firm training. While the precise nature of the benefits of vocational as opposed to 
general training, and pre-employment as opposed to post-employment training, is still the subject of debate 
Dougherty, 1989), it is indisputable that the speed of technical change in modem industry necessitates 
increasing inputs of training and retraining. Therefore, the flexibility and ability to quickly adjust and adapt to 
changing demands of skills a given country has becomes very crucial in maintaining the human capital 
stock.  
The East Asian NIEs have the largest stock of human capital in a broad sense (formal education at 
secondary and tertiary levels) followed by Brazil and India clearly at the bottom. In training, South Korea 
and Taiwan are clear leaders (with South Korea lulling ahead at a generally high level, and Taiwan ahead 
in engineering education), with Singapore close behind. Hong Kong comes next, followed by Brazil with 
India again lagging well behind. In terms of the quality of education, patchy evidence suggests that the East 
Asian NIEs, with their strong cultural emphasis on education, are ahead of the others. In firm level training, 
South Korea is likely to be the leader while Singapore leads in employee training provided externally. 
These figures are in relation to the countries respective population size and not in the absolute sense. 
While the most successful countries have the largest investments in human capital formation, preceding 
and accompanying their industrial growth, South Korea and Taiwan are in a different class from Hong Kong 
and Singapore. South Korea and Taiwan's larger relative -technical skill endowments explain their greater 
ability to tackle more complex and demanding industrial technologies. Hong Kong is distinctly behind 
Singapore, which confirms to the observed differences in their industrial structures and technological 
prowess. Interestingly, Singapore's heavy reliance on foreign investors in its high-technology industries 
does not relieve it of the need to provide educated and trained technical labour. Multinational corporations 
are able to set up such industries there only because of the availability of highly skilled personnel. 
Singapore is widely regarded as having one of the 'World's best employee-training systems. 
India's substantial lag in human resources may appear surprising because of the general aura it has of a 
country with an oversupply of technical and educated labour. There is certainly a large absolute supply 
(although of highly variable quality), and graduate unemployment and emigration are real problems. In 
relation to the size of the economy, however, the stock is poor', and what seems to be concentrated in the 
larger establishments. The apparent oversupply is more a reflection of the economy's poor performance 
than anything else, wrong policies have held back even the absorption and effective utilisation of its meagre 
human resources (Lall, ibid.). 





The empirical evidence and common sense are in agreement that without skilled manpower there is no 
technological development. And skilled manpower is the result of considerable investment and long time 
commitment and not something that happens by pure chance. Assuming even that you have limitless 
money, you can buy all kind of machinery, equipment, and blue prints immediately but you cannot change 
your unskilled labour into skilled manpower as quickly as that. People take time to learn skills. If we see 
countries oil rich like Saudi Arabia, they could buy any sophisticated machinery, equipment, entire plants, 
build entire new cities etc., but they had to heavily depend on expatriate experts and skilled labourers. Even 
today, after years of investment on their own people, they are still dependent on foreigners. Therefore, 
technological development depends very much on the degree of your ability to develop your human 
resources and takes time to mature. 
4.6 The Melting Pot: Technology management and economic development 
Good policies by themselves cannot help developing countries achieve their objectives. This is only the 
beginning. Therefore, good S&T policies must be matched by good science and technology management 
capability. But good policies and S&T management capability are the function of highly skilled manpower 
and institutional maturity. In this section, our main aim is to see the interaction of economic policies and 
plans, S&T policies, institutions and skilled manpower in the development of an internationally competitive 
economy. 
Now, let us see the experience of our sample NIEs in the management of technologies. In the context of 
developing countries, S&T should primarily serve the economic and social development objectives; hence, 
they need to be carefully linked so that scientific and technological knowledge is used for innovation to 
make the economy more internationally competitive. But since innovativeness is based on 
entrepreneurship, this must be cultivated by creating an environment conducive for the entrepreneurs. 
Developing countries try to use a number of institutions, government and private, to support each other in 
the process of learning to catch up the advanced countries which should hopefully end up in an enhanced 
international competitiveness. In this section, therefore, we will particularly see how the organisation, 
networking, learning, are managed to result in greater competitiveness. 
Organisation can be applied to countries. When we say 'organisation' we are referring to how a given 
country organises its resources (human, capital, natural endowments, and the institutions) to enable create 
a conducive environment for the creation of goods and services of value to customers in or outside the 
country. Our assumption is that the process of organising resources happens through the initiative of the 
government, the market or both, in line with the main objective of this research, the focus will continue to be 
on S&T in relation to socio-economic development. Practically, the creation of organisations for the supply 
of goods and services leads to the institutionalisation of activities. The two overlap in many respects. This is 
why we have given an account of the major organisations, such the government and S&T, under the 
previous section on 'institutional capability' (section 4.3). Therefore, we will proceed to give brief account for 
each country in our sample NIEs if there is a more or less integrated system of national innovation. In the 
process, we will be able to say if a particular way of organising the national resources allows the 
achievement of best results. 
The balk of S&T effort in Brazil has been at the initiative of the government because up to recently the big 
institutions and enterprises were in the hand of the government. Despite a growing awareness of the 
importance of S&T for development, innovation and technology transfer overall expenditures in Latin 
America in general are modest (Correa, 1995). Public expenditures on R&D fell abruptly in some countries, 
like Mexico and Chile while in Brazil in 1985 the three main financing institutions for R&D received funds 





equivalent to around 40% of the 1979 budget. Nonetheless, Brazil accounts for 53% of the R&D 
expenditure made in the region, and, together with Mexico and Argentina accounts for 807o of the total. In 
addition, such expenditures are mostly concentrated on 'research' rather than on 'development' and are 
mainly made by the public sector in relation to agriculture and hearth. The linkage of such R&D activities 
with productive needs is currently weak. A low patent activity and the scarcity of scientific and engineering 
personnel devoted to R&D also characterise the prevailing situation. The 'import-substitution model' that 
characterised the industrialisation process in Latin America has, in particular, promoted 'minor' innovation 
based on adaptations and improvement of imported technology, rather than on endogenous R&D efforts. 
Transfer of technology continues to be an important channel for technological innovation. 
Brazil has made significant efforts, both in the public and private sectors, to incorporate S&T as a tool for 
growth and progress. In terms of percentage of GNP, Brazil presents the highest investment in the region, 
about 0.9% of the GNP (ibid,). If we look to the structure and organisation of S&T institutions in Brazil, we 
find that the public enterprises have been among the most active entities. For example, the six big public 
enterprises - Petrobras, Cia Vale do Rio Doce, Electrobras, Siderbras, Telebras and Nucleobras - 
concentrate around 80% of the R&D expenditures made by about 500 State-owned companies (ibid.). This 
kind of national resource organisation is particularly identified with the military government period from 
1965-1985, which was a period of strong nationalist thinking among the ruling class. This is the reverse of 
the structure observed in Brazil after the World War II, which was characterised by the strategy of attracting 
foreign investment while at the same time subsidies and special treatment were used to protect local 
markets. But now after 1986, a more liberal thinking is leading the country towards the market friendly 
structure with - increasing privatisation and reform of the public sector. This trend is expected to see the 
shift of R&D activities from the public institutions to the private enterprises, though government 
expenditures on R&D will continue in the foreseeable future. 
The case of India is another very interesting situation. Indian S&T development is mainly established, 
managed and controlled by the government. The private sector does not play any significant role. But this 
country that has been able to develop world class institute of technologies and R&D institutes has not been 
able to tap all the scientific and techno Logical outputs for commercial development and international 
competitiveness with the exception in a limited software market. The Industrial Research Institutes (IRIs) 
have been established to promote indigenous technological know-how and helping enterprises introduce 
new processes and products. But many IRIs have had only limited success in developing technologies of 
interest to potential user enterprises, i.e. their technologies have no or only a limited commercial use 
(Katrak, 1997). One of the reasons why the IRIs failed is explained by the fact that IRIs personnel are said 
to have been more interested in experimental efforts that are mainly of interest to academic peer groups 
rather than to producer enterprises (Katrak, 1994). This is because they were more interested in getting 
recognition from the scientific community through publications. This hides also the lack of proper 
organisation and control as well as motivation of personnel in the IRIs to avoid the conflict of interest. But 
IRIs have shown some improvements in recent years because of the general macroeconomic changes in 
the country liberalisation of industrial licensing and foreign trade restrictions) and the way IRIs are funded 
by the government. Now the government of India requires that the IRIs cover part of their expenditures from 
their earned revenues (Katrak, 1998). 
The fact that India, with a world class scientists and engineers, have not been able to grow fast 
economically as the four tigers have puzzled many economists. One possible explanation is because of 
India's multiple controls of its macroeconomic policies that resulted in large price distortions and led to 
inefficient use of resources. These controls have led to microeconomic inefficiency that made it easier to 





attain macroeconomic balance creating a micro-economically inefficient and macro-economically perverse 
economy (Joshi and Little, 1994). On the other hand, it is possible to blame the government for the poor 
performance because of patronage and spoils. In the government there is much confusion about what 
constituted a reform, what needed to be done, what was progress and what regress that one can easily 
conclude that the 'killer machine in India is the government bureaucracy' and red tape (Desai, 1993). This is 
showing again and again that science and technology development should be an integral part of the 
country's micro-economic management.  
In Korea, government institutions, such as the policy-making bodies and other economic units like the 
commercial banks, together with the Chaebols have been able to create a unique institutional environment 
for the creation of the economy of scale in mature technologies. In turn, this institutional arrangement has 
enabled Korea to develop 'strategic industries' for an export led internationally competitive economy. The 
arrangement was that the Korean government sold all Japanese colonial properties and state owned 
enterprises to selected local entrepreneurs (the Chaebols) with a favourable long-term instalment payment 
and allocating scarce foreign exchange and preferential financing at the official ratios, half the real market 
rate (Kim, 1993, quoting Jung, 1989). Besides, the government gave them large import substitution projects 
(government purchasing power) and guaranteed their foreign loans, which were used to finance the 
imported production technologies on turnkey basis of the Chaebols (Kim, ibid.). But the Korean government 
was rewarding only good performers and penalising poor performers. The government was also using its 
commercial banks to punish poorly managed firms by freezing bank credits. When the time was ripe for 
new technology product development, the government through its various science and technology 
institutions and universities together with in-house R&D of the Chaebols gave the necessary push to make 
the risky leap to enter competition at the technological frontier. The best example is the semiconductor 
industry where they made leapfrog into the top ranks of dynamic random access-memory DRAM) 
producers (Cho, Kim, and Rhee, 1998). 
This unique symbiosis in Korea has affected the structure of the industry and market, which is dominated 
by oligopoly (the Chaebols). Some rethinking is going to be necessary. Recently the Economist called 
South Korea 'East Asia's most controlled and distorted economy, dominated by the bloated Chaebols'. That 
made Korea less flexible for change at such times of difficulty, so its economy is likely to have a tough time 
over the next few years (The Economist March 7, 1998). This shows us that the Korean economy structure 
needs a rethink so that big and small businesses could co-exist in mutual support with no price distortions 
to serve the interest of a particular group at the expense of the others. Parallel to the fast industrialisation 
policy and the unique oligopolistic industrial structure that resulted, S&T institutions to support the industrial 
development of the country were also flourishing. Korean Institute of Science and Technology (KIST) was 
established in 1966 and the Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) followed a year later in 1967. 
Under MOST the national innovative system of Korea grew tremendously. In l97l Korean Advanced 
Institute of Science and Technology (KAIST) was established with the mission of developing highly skilled 
manpower for the anticipated growth in demand for R&D scientific personnel in the country. Korean 
Scientific and Technical Information Centre (KORSTIC) was restructured in 19'12 to function as information 
clearinghouse by collecting, processing, and disseminating scientific and technical information for 
international transfer of knowledge to both industry and research organisations. The national Council for 
Science and Technology under the chairmanship of the Prime Minister was established in 1973, which later 
was replaced by the National technology Promotion Conference and Technology promotion council in 
1982. The conference is chaired by the President of the Republic and carries the weight of utmost national 
importance. It includes about 200 people from the cabinet members, industrialists, and scientists and 





engineers. The Technology Promotion Council is composed of vice ministers and relevant agencies and 
appointed civilians representing concerned organisations, deals with more practical policy issues. MOST 
serves as its secretariat, and its minister often presides over the Council on behalf of the President when 
he himself does not. The Korea Science and engineering Foundation was established in 1977 as a funding 
agency to support university basic and applied research. Daeduck Science Town was developed in late 
1970s to accommodate most of KIST 'satellite institutes' designed to specialise in an area of high industrial 
priority such as shipbuilding, marine resource, electronics, telecommunications, energy conservation, 
machinery and metals, and chemicals together with central laboratories of private enterprises. The Korea 
Technology Development Corporation was created in 1981 to foster technology-based firms. A few more 
firms followed, some under complete private ownership. All the above and the over 400 private industry 
research institutes with the public sector institutes and universities complete the picture of the 'national 
innovative system' of the country. 
Looking into the Taiwanese economy and institutions that made the success possible, we can identify three 
important groups of players: The government agencies, the myriad of SMEs, and the TNCs (including joint 
ventures) and foreign buyers. The SMEs created a network of interdependence and formed a 
complementary character with TNCs and foreign buyers, and among themselves in a unique way of 
forward and backward linkages that distinguishes it from the other Tigers. The government of Taiwan 
promoted industry through direct intervention in the complex technological fields and intermediate goods 
and through financial support. But the light industry was left to the market forces.  
ITRI and III were used by the government to promote industrial technology research and specifically HSIP 
was meant to push the development of high-tech industries. HSIP was established to enjoy easy access to 
major cities, airports, and seaports; well known ITRI and two technically oriented research universities are 
in its immediate vicinity. It was designed to attract highly trained and experienced scientists and engineers, 
both within Taiwan and abroad, create a conducive environment for industrial R&D and the development of 
high-tech industries. By the end of 1992, the government invested us$461.5 million for HSIP. It is 
considered to be successful for high-tech firms grew from 7 in 1980 to 148 by November 1993. The annual 
aggregate output of HSIP in 1992 reached the level of US$3.35 billion (ibid.). In 1997, the target industries 
to be developed in HSIP were integrated circuits, computers and peripherals, telecommunications, opto-
electronics, precision machinery, and biotechnology. The success of the HSIP project is also attributed to 
government generous tax and financing policies, which are considered to be more attractive than that of 
Japan, Singapore or Korea (ibid.). ITRI is very active in the HSIP. With its l0 research laboratories and 
research centres and more than 5000 highly skilled technical professionals, in 1997 out of the 99 firms 
created by Taiwanese capital in HSIP 14 were ITRI spin-offs (Xue, 1997). Tax and financial incentives were 
also used to encourage R&D efforts by the firms. But the most effective way by which the government can 
promote technology development was considered to be educating more R&D people, co-ordination among 
firms to do joint research, technology transfer from abroad or government-sponsored research institutions, 
and helping firms establishing their own brand names (Hou and Gee, 1993 in Nelson ed. 1993). 
In a recent survey on Taiwan, the Economist, while explaining why this country is doing better than all the 
other East Asian countries in recession because of the Asian financial crisis, says that it is because of fear. 
Taiwan knows that it cannot afford to go bust. As a diplomatic pariah, it is banished from virtually all-
important international organisations, including the MF. If it goes bust, it cannot hope for a bail out. Indeed, 
it worries that in the event of a domestic economic crisis the mainland China might just do what has always 
wanted to do, to invade it (The Economist November 7, 1998).  





It is possible to say that this fear has moulded the Taiwanese institutions in a unique way. It has the world's 
third-largest foreign reserves and one of the world's lowest foreign debts. Its banks have the lowest bad 
loan ratios in Asia, and its companies have the lowest debt-to-equity ratios, It never fully abandoned 
currency controls (ibid,). It is in this macroeconomic environment context that the SMEs - that make to 
98.5%o of the country's companies, 75-80% of all employment and 4'l9o of the total economy - operate 
(ibid.). These 'army of ants', as they are called by Taiwanese government economists, are infinitely flexible. 
They can switch businesses as market conditions dictate. They specialise in niche markets and you see 
them collectively create a critical mass, or 'cluster economy', that makes up for the marketing inefficiencies 
of each undersized member in a way that local subcontractors can usually be found for everything a 
particular firm needs to produce its speciality. This has resulted in special web of business networks in 
various industries (ibid.). During the 1970s and 1980s the Taiwanese government provided technical 
support to industry through government owned R&D institutes and universities and also invested, 
selectively, in a small number of companies working in scale-intensive, high-technology upstream sectors 
such as semiconductors (Hobday, 1995, p.98). The country can be considered as a good example where 
the market forces and government intervention work hand in hand. 
Singapore has achieved a lot in the last four decades more than any country can dream because of the 
governmental vision, a partnership with multinationals, and an orientation toward the future based on 
technology management and the effective use of information technology (Sisodia, 1992). It is truly a 
corporate-government. The civil service personnel are highly trained for each year the top 3Vo of college 
graduates are targeted for recruitment and civil service is highly computerised. Not only the civil services 
recruits the best people but all government employees receive annual bonuses based on the performance 
of the Singaporean economy (ibid.) because they are the ones that influence the direction of it. The 
government of Singapore has even gone farther by recruiting professionals and scientists from all over the 
world. According to National Science and Technology Board, companies will need 2,000 additional 
scientists for the existing research and development activities over the period 1996-20ffi. The Economic 
Development Board (EDB) has set up programmes to help companies go overseas. In 1995, the EDB led 
seven recruitment missions to the US, Britain, India, and Australia for 50 Singapore-based companies. It 
facilitated the arrival of 2,127 scientists, researchers and entrepreneurs, and another 5,563 skilled workers, 
mainly from China and India (Far Eastern Economic Review, June 6, 1996). The government has been 
able to forge an excellent partnership with TNCs by providing world class infrastructures and skilled 
manpower. Over the years, the government has also been able to build local technological capability, which 
is now trying to achieve maturity by having their own design manufacturing capabilities. They have made 
considerable progress in the information technologies. Efficient government institutions and a well 
managed macroeconomic with TNCs partnership have made the country a model for many others in the 
world. 
Hong Kong government was known for being non-interventionist. The country has been able to build an 
internationally competitive manufacturing industry (light industry less technology intensive) during the 
1950s, 1960s and 1970s. After the Chinese economic reform and greater openness in 1978, Hong Kong 
restructured its industries to take advantage of new opportunities offered by China. Many manufacturing 
enterprises moved their plant to Mainland China to exploit cheaper factors of production such as labour and 
land. As a result in 1980, its manufacturing sector share of GDP declined to 9% from 25% while that of the 
services sector increased from 67% to 85% becoming increasingly service-based economy (Dodsworth 
and Mihaljek, 1991, MF). By 1997, over 500 banking institutions were present in Hong Kong, including 82 
of the 100 largest banks in the world. It is the fifth largest banking centre in the world, fifth in the world in 
terms of foreign exchange market turnover, and the seventh largest in the world and second largest in Asia 





in terms of market capitalisation (ibid.). The success, therefore, enjoyed by Hong Kong is the result of the 
institutions it has been able to create and sustain. It has a lean and efficient administration, sound and 
transparent legal system and free information flow. It has a simple and stable tax - system with low tax 
rates, a stable exchange rate with the Hong Kong dollar linked to that of US (though at this time of 
recession is giving it hard time), and financial sector with suitable institutional and regulatory framework left 
to the market (ibid.). But it has to redress its technological disadvantage in the manufacturing sector to 
match the competitiveness of the other Tigers. 
The success of some developing countries or firms shows that developing technological capabilities is 
possible but not necessarily inevitable. Emotional decisions may prompt developing countries to go for the 
latest technology. May be that makes them feel that they are on equal footing with developed countries. But 
buying a technology without understanding how or why it works does not lead far. They will enter a vicious 
circle of buying every time new expensive technology just to keep up without a real technological capacity 
development. Therefore, developing countries should first understand what technological capabilities they 
want to achieve in exact terms. Then, they should choose to acquire the right technological package, 
assimilate, improve and adapt it to their own needs, and at a later stage may go to final stage of generating 
new technologies to compete directly in the global markets like some Southeast Asian Tigers have started 
doing.  
More important than the differences in the methods (Appendix 3) of transferring technology is the 
manoeuvring possible within each method (Dahlman et al., 1987). The point is clear; the technological 
benefits to be gained from foreign technology depend less on the method selected for the transfer and 
more on how the method is implemented. The method determines the structure for the transfer, but the 
room for manoeuvring within the method suggests that developing countries should avoid blanket policies 
for or against various methods.  
The most important thing is to know how to get what is needed from each transfer, whatever the method of 
transfer. The idea is to use the transfer as a stepping stone to develop new technological possibilities. The 
main areas of manoeuvring relate less to technological means more to technological information and 
understanding. 
The environment in which firms operate in the developing countries should have appropriate incentives and 
penalties as well as specialised technological agents to encourage the national technological capability 
development. Governments' role is establishing an environment that stimulates firms and specialised 
technological agents to etl.ga1e in ongoing technological efforts and develop added technological 
capabilities. Governments can also intervene directly to induce choices of techniques that are socially most 
appropriate, foster imports of technology on the best possible terms, and stimulate the development of 
specialised technological agents (Dahlman et al., ibid.). For example Brazil and Mexico have set up 
technological information centres that charge private users only a small fee for access to their data banks. 
They have also agents that subsidise the costs of feasibility and engineering studies for projects. Those 
agencies also subsidise technical training and equipment purchases by the consulting firms that conduct 
these studies. 
Resource limitations do not allow countries to embark simultaneously on the development of technologies 
in every sector of their economy. It is a must, therefore, to be selective in the science and technology policy 
development. How to make such selection is often a very difficult question. Nonetheless, it should not be 
difficult based on the analysis of the strength and weakness of a given country to select the technologies 
with the most impact in the development of the economy in order to exploit opportunities available in its 





environment. But this is not all. The other government policies such as trade and industrial policies should 
support S&T policies and not militate against them. Therefore a great deal of synchronisation and co-
ordination effort from the government side is required among all the policy instruments in its hand. 
We can find good policies that have failed whether it is in developing or advanced countries. Good policies 
are not guarantees for success. But inappropriate policies, no matter how best you implement them, cannot 
get the expected result. 
Data on total R&D expenditures, R&D performed by enterprises and patents taken out by residents show 
that the Asian NIEs are better than Brazil, or India. The technological data broadly support the trends 
revealed by the figures on education. The Asian NIEs, in particular South Korea and Taiwan have invested 
not only in educating and training their populations, but also in technological innovation. This investment 
was primarily oriented to the commercial needs of productive enterprises, and has drawn upon a large poof 
of scientists and engineers. Combined with a highly skilled workforce these investments yielded the 
competitiveness and dynamism that revealed in growth and export performance. Export orientation played 
a permissive and stimulating role, and as such was necessary - but it was not sufficient. On the other hand, 
India's industrial strategy has remained highly interventionist within its import substitution orientation. The 
Indian government was suspicious of private enterprises in general, and large private firms and foreign 
investors in particular; and barriers to entry, exit, growth and diversification were rife. It set up a large 
network of science and technology (S&T) institutions, but these were divorced from manufacturing 
enterprises and excessively bureaucratic. The administration of Indian policies was slow, complex and 
prone to corruption. Recently, the Indian government is opening up its market to foreign competition 
cautiously. Brazil has set up large public enterprises and restricted foreign entry in certain sectors to protect 
indigenous learning. The heavy reliance of these countries on MNCs for a great deal of advanced 
technology may well have pre-empted indigenous capability development in the sectors concerned. India 
has had a very different experience, excluding MNCs in much of manufacturing, but also suffering 
technological lags and inefficiency as a result of its trade and industrial policies and poor labour 
productivity. 
In understanding the mainspring of economic growth in the Asian NIEs the role of innovation is also central 
(Fransman, 1984). However, in the case of these and other developing countries the innovative impulse 
comes primarily from outside, through technology imports. These imports are financed through foreign 
exchange earning of exports and in turn they enable further increases in productivity for both the domestic 
market and exports. Accordingly, exports influence economic growth, not only through direct dynamic 
effects, but also indirectly through the import of improved processes and products. However, it is now 
recognised that the successful import of technology is a far more complicated process than was believed. 
The experience of the successful Asian countries shows that in general it is the reverse process of what 
happens in the developed world. Instead of fluid-transition specific (Utterback and Abernathy, 1975), it 
becomes acquisition-assimilation-improvement (at a later stage, generation) (Kim, 1980, 1992,1998, Jinjoo 
et al., 1988). 
There is no doubt there are numerous ways of organising national resources and institutions to increase 
national science and technology capability to support industrial development and -gain international 
competitiveness. Each country in our sample is different given the 'difference in their historical and political 
economy thinking of their respective leadership. 
Organisations interact with each other to be able to create and consume goods and services. As a result 
complex web of interactions emerges, which we call networking. In the national innovation system of a 





country there is a network through which products move and sustain the whole system. In this section, we 
will focus on this specific aspect of our sample countries. 
In Korea the National R&D Projects (NRPs) and Industrial Base technology Development Projects 
(IBTDPs) were used to bring about public R&D institutes and industry co-operation with limited results. In 
some cases, large firms shied away from receiving public support in recent years in order to keep their 
R&D activities confidential. For this reason the programs, now, largely support small and medium-sized 
firms. Given the teaching orientation of almost all universities, there is fundamental lack of co-operation 
between the universities and the private sector. Korean universities suffer from insufficient facilities and 
their faculty members have neither the time nor the incentives to undertake serious research, as a result, 
universities have lost the confidence of the private sectors, drawing almost no research funds from 
business circles. The move by the government to open its NRPs to universities to promote university-
industry co-operation, it still remains insignificant. But informal collaborations in the form of consulting 
services provided by individual faculty members are quite prevalent. The government offers various tax 
incentives to promote industrial R&D cooperatives. It is a major form of inter-corporate R&D co-operation. 
By mid-1989, 46 industrial research co-operatives were founded involving 986 firms, 759 of which are small 
and medium-sized firms. NRPs and IBTDPs are used as instruments to bring about effective inter-
corporate R&D co-operation (see Kim, 1993). 
The Taiwanese electronic industry benefited considerably from TNC investments, joint ventures and foreign 
buyers. TNCs helped to foster the start-up of many of Taiwan's electronic makers as large numbers of local 
firms supplied them with goods and services, leading to a thriving sub-contracting and original equipment 
manufacture (OEM) system which was soon followed by own-design manufacture (ODM) and own-brand 
manufacture (OBM) (Hobday, 1995). The Taiwanese case shows how hundreds of tiny latecomer firms 
clustered together behind the electronics frontier to exploit market opportunities, indicating that the large-
scale, mass market approach followed by the Chaebols is not the only route to export success for 
developing countries (Hobday, ibid.). Hobday shows that in Taiwan a clustered network of small firms in 
electronics, sewing machines, footwear, bicycles and other fast-growing export industries made themselves 
indispensable to foreign buyers and TNCs and forged backward linkages to other industries, Taiwanese 
industry is made up of at least five strategic types of firms: Foreign TNCs and joint ventures, the major local 
manufacturing groups; high-technology start-ups; government-sponsored ventures; and the large number 
of traditional SMEs which clustered together to exploit market niches. 
Among the major TNCs and joint ventures are Philips, RCA, IBM, DEC, Sanyo, and Taiwan Semiconductor 
Manufacturing Company, a joint venture between Philips and the Taiwanese government. The best 
example we can find of government, universities and industry is the HSIP of Taiwan. This first science-
based industrial park was established in Hsinchu because it is home of two major technical universities, 
National Chiatung University and National Tsinghua University, and several researches facilities including 
the ITRI. These two universities have provided HSIP with a steady source of highly trained manpower and 
have worked closely with the park administration and ITRI to organise various kinds of training courses and 
seminars of relevance to the firms. An additional contribution of the two universities to HSIP is the 
technology transfer function through research contracts, faculty consulting, and licensing/patenting. For 
example, an average of US$180,000 worth of research contract is awarded to Tsinghua University by firms 
in HSIP each year (Xue, 1997). Similarly, ITRI is an active player in R&D activities in HSIP through the 10 
research laboratories and centres and more than 5000 highly skilled technical professionals. In fact, it is 
estimated that 80% of the firms in HSIP have various kinds of collaborations with ITRI and out of 99 firms 
created by Taiwanese capital in HSIP, 14 are ITRI spin-offs (ibid.) Moreover, other government national 





labs such as the Synchrotron Radiation Research Centre, Sub-Micron Device Research Laboratory, and 
National Super Computer Centre have contributed to improve the research environment by attracting more 
R&D support operations and other complementary research facilities to Hsinchu area. 
In Taiwan IC (integrated circuits) industry is a very good example of how the partnership of government, the 
industry, and the universities and research institutions can make a great difference. In 1989 under the co-
ordination of the Ministry of Economic Affairs, in order to facilitate the technology development process 
further, ITRI, major IC chip manufacturers and other companies in Taiwan formed a 'technology 
development alliance'. The aim was to develop 16M DRAM and 4M SRAM chip technology in five years 
time. The development plan called for an investment of US$ 192-231 million and over 200 engineers to 
work for the project. The venture is organised as a privately owned partnership and allows the company to 
be flexible and responsive to a dynamic market environment. The presence of the government serves to 
facilitate the start-up process and reduce the perceived risks by potential private investors. As a result, the 
IC industry has become the fastest growing industry in HSIP, which is still the home of all Taiwanese IC 
firms (ibid.). 
Singapore as the home of many MNCs indirectly has a very extensive network through each of them. 
Moreover, the government of Singapore has consistently tried to exploit the location advantage of the 
country to establish world class transportation and materials handling facilities. In financial and other 
service domains it did establish a sophisticated communications and information technology infrastructure, 
and continued to upgrade the skills of its people to be able to quickly absorb new relevant technologies. All 
of these require extensive networking abilities. The government institutions and industry have to constantly 
work together. Since the mid 1980s, the government has established a number of research institutes and 
centres particularly in electronics, information technology and biotechnology in order to maintain a highly 
skilled manpower, develop pre-competitive technologies, provide services to companies, and transfer new 
technology to industry. For example, The IT2000 master plan was formulated after a rigorous study led by 
the National Computer Board in partnership with more than 200 senior executives from 11 major economic 
sectors of Singapore. 
In Hong Kong, we find a good example of university-industry networking in Varitronix Company. In 1978 
eight scientists and engineers, six of whom were from the Chinese University of Hong Kong formed the 
new company. Varitronix supplies customised liquid crystal displays (LCDs) and LCD-based electronic 
systems. Since incorporation the firm grew by about 20-30 per cent per year. By 1993 employment had 
risen to around 800 with - sales of more than US$45 million and client numbers in excess of 1,000. The 
company operated three manufacturing facilities located in Hong Kong, China, and Malaysia. Benefiting 
from US training and Hong Kong 's university facilities and faculty, Varitronix very quickly began to innovate 
with new products. The firm grew up with the LCD industry and kept abreast of the technology by investing 
in R&D, which was around 6-10 per cent of its annual turnover (Hobday, ibid. p. 181-3), But, given the non-
interventionist government policy, this is more of an exception than a rule in Hong Kong in the development 
of new technologies. Nonetheless, Hong Kong has distinguished itself in its sophisticated financial 
institution networks, which has made it one of the big financial centres in the world. 
India has made remarkable achievements in the fields of agricultural research, oceanography and 
biotechnology, nuclear and space technology. While in areas of hearth and industry, with some exceptions, 
did fail to live up to the early expectations that it would act as the main source of industrial technology for 
Indian industry. This is because during the two decades following the independence, India established a 
broad-based S&T infrastructure in education, research and supporting facilities. But no demands were 





placed on the S&T establishment to contribute directly to economic progress as all effort was directed to 
creating institutional and human assets (Hoffman, 1991). Industry development took place through import 
of technology and scientific research went forward under the spirit of free enquiry and was undisturbed by 
economic successes and failures. This is a kind of classical divide between the scientific activity and 
technological development. The two worked apart of each other with not strong linkages, which is reflected 
in the poor economic performance and lagging in international competitiveness of India compared to NIEs. 
Even the IRIs (industrial research institutions) has not made much difference and is largely considered 
ineffective. Universities, research institutes and industry is poorly linked. In other words, the national 
innovation system of India is not well integrated. There is an enormous potential if properly reorganised and 
managed, the component elements are all there. 
In Brazil, the policies of import substitution, market reserves for local capital and the control of MNCs 
created an environment where the local private firms, state enterprises and MNCs could not freely interact 
and compete to form linkages and networks to improve the Brazilian industries vis a vis international 
competitors. The kind of linkages and networking typical of Brazil are those observed within the big public 
enterprises such as the Petrobras and Telebras, which have established a number of research and 
development centres. In general, universities, research institutions and industry are poorly linked and co-
ordinated. But the liberalisation that started in 1986 is progressively changing that and leaner and fitter 
corporations capable to compete in the international arena are slowly emerging. This external competitive 
pressure will definitely push the Brazilian national innovation system to be more systematic and integrated. 
Reaching a moving target requires a higher speed than that moving ahead. By the same token, catching-up 
by the developing countries requires a higher speed of learning, which may be considered an impossible 
objective. But since new technologies take time to mature, developing countries do have the opportunity of 
directly joining in the conventional technology, without passing through the previous technologies made 
obsolete by the present technologies, which by itself is a big jump forward. It is also the advantage of the 
late comer. It is very relevant to pose for a while to see the learning already achieved and the speed at 
which is happening. Below we will give examples of successful technological learning from each of the 
NIEs. 
Let us start from Korea. Kim (1998 b) studied the organisational learning in an imitative catching-up 
environment of the developing country's point of view. His case is the Hyundai Motor Company. He shows 
that Hyundai had to pass four stages of learning: 1) assimilation of assembly operations, 2) development of 
'Korean' car under license, 3) development of an advanced car under limited license, and 4) becoming 
independent. Kim shows us stage by stage how the company starting from acquisition of a production 
capability of Ford models (1968-1976); then, moved to the acquisition of engineering capability (1976-
1992); and after that the company moved to the development of its own cars. Now it is doing serious 
research to break through in its 'green' car project (R&D based generation stage). It is competing on equal 
bases against the leading car manufacturers in the world. It is now the largest automobile producer in a 
developing country and thirteenth largest in the world. Kim believes that crises constructed proactively by 
top managers improved greatly the organisational learning of Hyundai. 
Another example is that of Korean semiconductor industry virtually from scratch managed to leapfrog into 
the top ranks of dynamic random access memory DRAM) producers. Again, the top managers of the 
Korean companies exercised unique entrepreneurial leadership. Odd timing, time compression, and 
human-embodied technology transfer were essential elements of Korean entrepreneurs' highly spirited 
catch-up strategies (Dong-Sung Cho - Dong-Jae Kim - Dong Kee Rhee, 1998). 





ACER of Taiwan gives us another example of fast learning and catching up. ACER started with 11 
engineers in l976.By 1993 its sales had reached US$1.4 billion. Leading the local computer industry in the 
1980s, ACER constantly strove for own-brand recognition abroad. In 1984, ACER developed its own 
version of 4 bit microcomputer followed by 8, 16, and 32 bit PCs; in 1986, it Iaunched the world's second 
32bitPC, after Compaq but ahead of IBM. In 1988 it began developing supercomputer technology using the 
UNIX operating system and in 1989 produced its own semiconductor ASIC to compete with IBM's PS/2 
technology. In 1991 it formed a joint venture company with TI (and Taiwanese government) to make 
memory chips (DRAMs) in Taiwan and in 1992 formed alliances with Daimler Benz and Smith Corona to 
develop specialist microelectronics technology. In 1993 it produced a novel PC using a reduced instruction-
set (RISC) chip running Microsoft's Windows NT operating system. It licensed its own US-patented ChipUp 
technology to Intel (in return for royalties); and received royalties from National Semiconductor, TI, Unisys, 
NEC and other companies for licensing out its PC chipset design (for further details see Hobday, 1995). 
Singapore used education and training to increase its stock of human capital. These cheap and skilled 
labour coupled with the open policy it has given it a comparative advantage to attract the TNCs. By giving 
incentives, the government from 1970s onwards tried to attract more skill-intensive and higher value-added 
export industries. This led to Economic Development Board (EDB) organised apprenticeship and 
government-industry training centres with Japan, France and Germany. By 1991 the EDB operated five 
training institutes with an enrolment of 2,500 students: the French-Singapore Institute, the German-
Singapore Institute, the Japanese-Singapore Institute, the Precision Engineering Institute and the Philips-
Government Training Centre. These training institutes provided engineering, technology, and craft 
education for manufacturing industry. They provided also two and three year training courses in tool and 
'die and precision machining, plastics-technology, factory automation, mechatronics and industrial 
electronics. Programmes of re-training and continuous education operated to support manufacturing 
industry as well. (Hobday, ibid. p.141). Besides, the National University of Singapore, Nanyang 
Technological university, the polytechnics and training institutes together supply a large highly skilled 
manpower, for example in 1991 they produced 22,000 engineers and technicians per annum which is about 
38 per 100,000 population, one of highest levels in the world (ibid.). 
In Singapore among the TNCs subsidiaries various forms of catching up learning occurred over time. 
These ranged from the production to innovation learning, from elementary to advanced learning and from 
technological to non-technological learning. As learning by assembly and testing became more complex, 
tasks involved more in-house, formalised training. Learning from foreign engineers and managers was 
widespread and senior foreigners continued to oversee some operations, assisting in the installation of new 
capital equipment and so on. NEC, for instance, employed 29 senior Japanese staff in its plant of around 
700 employees (ibid.). One thing is clear though: Singapore depends mainly on the TNCs technologies in 
manufacturing. But it has showed great learning and innovation in the service sector particularly in the 
transport, communications and information services, which is based on the exploitation of opportunities 
offered by IT. 
Hong Kong lagged behind the other tigers in technological capability. Most firms still focused on consumer 
electronics and the industry had yet to make a substantial transition to industrial systems. In 1990 Hong 
Kong electronics exports were only one-half of that of Singapore. R&D spending was low on average, the 
largest firms were smaller than their counterparts in Taiwan and electronics had yet to catch up clothing as 
the largest export sector (Hobday, ibid. p. 184). But Hong Kong has caught up as a world financial and 
trading centre. 





The experience of a successful firm, Usiminas still producer of Brazil, shows that the best approach for 
developing countries is to reverse the usual sequence of developing technological capability, i.e. instead of 
innovation - investment - production, reverse it to production - investment - innovation (Dahlman, Bruce 
Ross-Larson, and Westphal, 1985). This is similar to the idea of L. Kim and Jinjoo Ire et al. 'acquisition-
assimilation improvement or generation' we have discussed in chapter two. The firm was established in the 
late 1950s. The country had neither the technology nor the experience for setting up and operating such a 
plant. Entering a joint venture with a consortium of thirty Japanese steel makers and steel equipment 
suppliers was the option chosen in order to gain extensive experience in steel production. Local engineers 
were involved from the design, equipment selection, installation, construction, start-up, and operation of the 
plant but the Japanese did the engineering and project management for establishing the plant. After three 
years of technical training and production experience under the Japanese, the operational responsibility of 
the firm was transferred to the Brazilian engineers. As the plant's specialised personnel gained more 
understanding of steel production, they continued to make minor adaptations of the equipment to obtain the 
maximum performance from the initial plant. Eight years after the pant's start-up, a research centre was 
created in the firm. This centre gradually moved into applied product and process research some of which 
led to the development of new products and processes patented locally and abroad. When the time of 
expansion came, the local engineers did about a third of the engineering for the intermediate expansion 
and all the engineering for the next expansion was done more cheaply than it had relied on foreigners. After 
this, the firm became well established and it could scan the world technological frontier and draw up its own 
specifications for what it wanted to purchase and equipment was bought from suppliers in many countries. 
It started to manufacture capital goods for the steel industry in Brazil, and helped by providing engineering 
and technical assistance services for the design and installation of new steel firms in the country as well 
exporting technical services to neighbouring countries. 
The present government of President Fernando Henrique Cardoso's anti-inflationary Real Plan of 1994 is 
pushing out the Brazilian firms into open. Many of them have learned the lesson. We have examples, in 
Sadia Concordia a food processing giant that had to lay off 5,000 workers and automate poultry processing 
and packaging, a $100 million project, and the result is that output per employee has increased by 25% and 
fixed costs are down 11% (Business Week, June 30, 1997). Textile and footwear makers are also fighting 
back the cheap Asian imports. Sneaker manufacturer Cambuci, for example, saw its sales drop from $199 
million in 1995 to $164 million in 1996. But at the end of 1996 have reduced labour by one third and moved 
their production plant from Sao Paulo state to Northeast Brazil, where labour cost are 20% lower and tax 
breaks are attractive. Similarly, T-shirt maker Wentex Textile is spending $140 million to complete 'one of 
the world's most advanced integrated knitting facilities' in the Northeast Brazil. It is undercutting Chinese 
imports with T-shirt selling for just $0.75 (Business Week, ibid.). Plane manufacturer Embraer, privatised in 
December 1994, focused on logistics to cut by nearly half the time it takes to build some aircraft. In mid-
June 1997, it announced contracts totalling more than $l billion to supply versions of its EMB-145 commuter 
jet to subsidiaries of American airlines Inc. and continental Airlines Inc. (Business Week, ibid.). 
India's learning for greater international competitiveness outside the software market is negligible. But 
India's ability to create world class Institutes of Technology is worth mentioning as an example of how 
developing countries can match the first world's much admired higher learning institutions. The stars of 
Indian Institutes of Technology are IIT-Delhi (physics and mechanical engineering), IIT-Kanpur (computer 
science), IIT-Guwatrati (First grads in 1999), IIT-Bombay (chemical engineering), IIT-Kharagpur 
(geophysics and rocket science), and IIT-Madras (computer science). 





India has created, out of limited resources, a class of executives and entrepreneurs who manage to 
combine technical brilliance with great management skills. And the Indian government has not tried to keep 
these first-class students at home. In many ways, the IIT grad is the hottest export India has ever produced 
(see Business Week, December 7, 1998). This shows how big the Indian brain drain problem is. 
Nonetheless, India has emerged as a serious contender in the international market of computer software, in 
particular the labour intensive lower end of custom-made programming services. 
Every country in the world invests in S&T in the hope of improving the socio-economic problems of their 
people, more so for the developing countries. These countries cannot afford to invest in S&T their scarce 
resources for the sake of pure knowledge. Therefore, they need to measure their S&T efforts in terms of 
concrete results. One of such crude measure or indicator of achievement is the improved international 
competitiveness. This is what we are trying to do next. 
Just 15 years ago, Korea had no substantial position in the electronics industry. By the early 1990s three of 
the local Chaebols ranked among the largest electronics producers in the world: Samsung Electronics, 
Goldstar Co. Ltd., and Daewoo Electronics. For example in 1992, Samsung's electronics operations sales 
were larger than most European and US firms except for IBM. Even though it was only a quarter of the size 
of Sony of Japan, its profits were almost half that of Sony. Anam Industrial is the largest chip packaging 
company in the world. It exported about US$1.8 billion in 1992. As a result of the strategies of the Chaebols 
and other fast growing local companies, production and exports of electronics outstripped steel, 
automobiles and most of other industries by a wide margin during the 1980s (Hobday, 1995). 
The effects on the economy of Taiwanese government effort to inject scientific and technical resources into 
the development of new technology can be seen in the rapid growth of the export value of technology-
intensive electronic and information products. This has surpassed that of labour-intensive textile products 
and garments to become the largest single industry by 1987. The export value of electronic and information 
products increased from US$3.1 billion in 1981 to US$ 12.5 billion in 1989, as against that of textile 
products and garments, which increased from US$ 4.8 billion to US$10.3 billion over the same period. This 
rapid development of electronic and information industries has had repercussions on many aspects of the 
economy. It has not only raised the productivity of all domestic industries but also affected the mode of life 
and work and, finally, the direction of science and technology development (Liu, ibid.) 
Manufacturing in Singapore grew from around 18 per cent of GDP in 1960 to 27 per cent in 1991, 
accounting more than 50 per cent of the country's foreign earnings. Within manufacturing, electronics was 
the largest sector in 1991, accounting 34 per cent of gross manufacturing value-added, which increased to 
40 per cent in 1992. After electronics, the next sector was chemicals and chemical products. The bulk of 
electronics production was carried by the large TNCs for export. The industry employed 124,000 people in 
1991. A small number of local firms grew to become medium-sized TNCs in their own right, including 
Singapore Technologies Industrial Corporation, Wearnes Technology (the big two), PCI Inc., Eltech 
Electronics and Goh Electronics. A combined sales of the top five was about US$0.7 billion in 1989 which 
is a small amount compared to that of the TNCs.  
Hong Kong has been able to build up a significant position in the world electronics industry relying on a 
mixture of foreign TNCs and small indigenous local firms. By 1990 the city exported in the region of US$7.5 
billion worth of electronics products (Fok, 1991, p.257). But in its technological capability is behind the other 
three tigers. 





India did lag behind the NIEs of Southeast Asia in the international competitiveness with the exception of 
the software market, which is increasingly recognised as world player. Indian engineers are among the best 
in the world in meeting complex programming needs Wall Street Journal, 6 January 1993). Many Indian 
companies have been awarded the ISO 9000 quality certificate and Motorola's Indian subsidiary is one of 
only two units world-wide to receive the Software Engineering Institute's Level 5 rating on their Capability 
Maturity Model. It is estimated that India also has about 11%o of the $5 billion global software outsourcing 
market (Asia Week 25 October 1996). With its 250 high-tech firms, including home-grown multinational 
software and networking giants Infosys and Wipro and other hundred software firms on the outskirts of the 
town, Bangalore is the Silicon Valley city of India (Newsweek, November 9, 1998). 
In Brazil, the technology policy regime has been characterised by objectives other than the acquisition of 
technological capabilities that would allow firms to become internationally competitive. Government 
interventions were designed to enable domestic firms to operate in new areas, design import substitutes 
with their own or acquired means, achieve a measure of technological 'autonomy', and displace 
multinational firms from certain key industrial segments (Dahlman and Frischtak, 1993). As a result, the 
country has failed to attract best practice technology via direct foreign investment or through arms length 
transactions. A combination of weak domestic technological efforts and restrictive access to the most 











5. Information Technology in NIEs 
5.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, we discussed S&T in relation to the economic development of the NIEs. In this 
chapter, we will focus on IT and its significance to the economy of the NIEs, in particular that of Singapore, 
India, and Brazil. This will allow us to deal in greater depth with each of them. These countries have 
exerted a lot of effort and money to master information technology with the aim of specifically 
"leapfrogging". It is a very rich experience, which is a clear message of the possibility of catching up in this 
new and pervasive technology. 
5.2 Environmental context 
Singapore, India and Brazil have joined the IT international market. The environment in which they have to 
compete is the same international market where competition is against the advanced countries. Therefore, 
it is relevant to start from a brief assessment of IT industry in general. 
One technology with potential for stimulating economic growth and productivity is information technology 
(Kraemer and Dedrick (1994). Some researchers make a specific argument for the value of investment in 
IT as a stimulus for economic development. These arguments for IT-led development are based on the 
notion that investments on IT can accelerate economic growth by enhancing worker productivity and 
increasing returns to - investment in other capital goods (APO, 1990; Mody and Dahlman, 1992; OECD, 
1988, 1993; Rahim and Pennings,1987). Brazil and Singapore have particularly singled out IT as the 
technology of the future and have heavily invested in it. India is also participating in it, particularly in the 
software market. Each of these countries is following a path of its own. 
IT is seen as a generic technology, such as semiconductors, computer systems and software, which are 
pervasive in their impacts on industrial and economic development. Unlike a new technology for steel or 
chemical production, IT can be applied in virtually every economic sector, from automobiles to insurance. 
Its application can make production more efficient, enhance existing products and create new products and 
services. II can reduce the cost to business by obtaining and processing information on markets, suppliers 
and competition, thus improving organisational efficiency and responsiveness. In addition, the IT industry 
itself can be a source of economic growth and jobs. For these reasons, investment in IT is believed to 
enhance national productivity and competitiveness, spurring economic growth. Several studies (Mody and 
Dahlman, 1992; Rahim and Pennings, 1987) suggest that IT development may have led or anticipated 
economic growth in the East Asian NIEs, particularly that of Singapore. 
Such conclusion runs contrary to empirical research about the "productivity paradox" (Baily, 1986; Baily 
and Gordon, 1988; Loveman, 1988; Roach, 1987 and 1988). Many have concluded that productivity gains 
in the aggregate economy from IT use have been limited, despite the rapid improvement in price-
performance ratio of computers and heavy investments in IT. This argument is based on the fact that the 
United States invested heavily in IT during the 1970s and 1980s, yet productivity growth slowed during that 
period compared to the earlier post-war years (Baily, 1986). Investments in IT have been large. IT often 
accounts for a quarter or more of a firm's capital stock (Roach, 1988), and accounted for 48% of all new 
private investment in equipment in 1988 and the proportion is still climbing (Attewell, 1991). IT investment 





in the service sector grew tremendously relative to IT investment in manufacturing, with 84% of the nation's 
muITi-billion dollar IT investment going into services. Productivity in manufacturing, however, increased 
during this period while productivity in the service sector remained stagnant. At the firm level some studies 
in output related to levels of investment in IT, in the manufacturing sector, found the productivity gains from 
IT to be insignificant (Loveman, 1988). 
The productivity paradox does not deny the possibility of productivity improvements from the use of IT. On 
the contrary, those authors who have written most about the paradox tend to stress the enormous potential 
gains. The efficient implementation of II is often hampered by many social and organisational barriers. 
Researchers have offered a variety of explanations for why the expected payoffs might not show up. The 
explanations fall into four broad groups: measurement errors, time lag for diffusion, management of IT, and 
redistribution (Attewell, 1991; Brynjoffsson, 1993). The first three explanations suggest that we need better 
data, a longer time frame and better technology management to identify productivity gains from IT 
investment. The fourth suggest that IT investments will not increase output, but only redistribute it. In a 
global economy, however, nations could benefit from IT investment just by making their firms more 
competitive against foreign firms. 
Roach (1987, 1992) had already said that with the exception of the telecommunication sector measured 
productivity gains have not substantially accelerated in the period 1960-1990 despite rapidly increasing 
investments in computers and other types of information technology. Newer studies attempt to deal with 
measurement errors and time lags by using larger samples over longer time frames. Such research has 
been finding evidence of significant payoffs from IT investment at the firm level (Brynjoffsson and Hitt, 
1993; Lichtenberg, 1993). In particular studies with much larger and more recent data sets have found 
positive returns to investments in information technology capital and labour Brynjoffsson and Hitt (1994a, 
1994b). Their results were robust with respect to different specifications of their production function, and 
have been replicated by Lichtenberg (1995). But there are people who still dismiss the computer 
productivity by saying that they provide only features without real value and make possible an increase in 
the scale of operations without improving economic productivity (Landauer, I 995). 
Studies of returns from II investment at the national level tried to measure relationships between IT 
investment and output by comparing data across countries over time, rather than relying on comparisons of 
data on only one country at different time periods. These findings provide preliminary evidence to challenge 
the notion of the productivity paradox (Kraemer and Dedrick, 1994). IT investment, especially in conjunction 
with investments in supporting infrastructure, has a positive impact on productivity and economic growth. 
But one thing is very clear IT requires a whole new social and economic structure to show its full 
productivity potential. Piece meal changes of replacing old methods within the old paradigm of organisation 
and management systems with the new technology won't bring the real revolution. New enterprises 
moulded by the new vision brought by the new paradigm of the microelectronics revolution will be required. 
'Automating' is part of the old paradigm and we need to change to 'informating'. Many pioneer firms are 
already showing the right path. 
If is very important at this point to distinguish the many facets of IT. Broadly, we can have three major 
areas: the hardware industry, the software industry, and the infrastructure. Today, all countries are users of 
IT in greater or lesser degree. But not all are producers of these s technologies. Developing countries fall 
among the users with the exception of NIEs that are joining now the big league in the supply of these 
technologies. When we use IT to enhance the productivity of other industries, then, we are using it as an 
infrastructure. Regardless of density, we have information and communications infrastructures in all 





countries. It is, therefore, very important to address the question facing policy makers of whether there is 
more value in developing_ an IT industry or in applying IT to other sectors of the economy, and whether 
promotion of one will be detrimental to the other. 
The benefits of IT use is great and the cost of policies which would depress demand for IT is high (Kraemer 
and Dedrick,1994). The use of IT can offer greater economic benefits than the production of IT (Flamm, 
1987). But the presence of sophisticated users is vital to developing production of IT, both to provide a 
market and to provide for the close interaction between producers and users that stimulates innovation and 
improvement (Schware, 1992). These points of view argue for policies favouring use, and if production is to 
be promoted, that it be done without trade barriers or other policy instruments, which protect domestic 
producers but discourage investment in use by increasing the cost of IT products. 
Software industry constitutes the fastest growing segment of the information technology market. With world 
sales exceeding US$ 100 billion annually, the software sector is targeted by hardware suppliers and 
specialised software firms alike. Though largely dominated by enterprises from the industrialised countries, 
software is still regarded as an opportunity in many developing countries (Correa, 1996). Software is both 
"embodied" when put into operation in a computer system, and "disembodied' when commercialised as a 
product. Given that software is skill-intensive and developing countries have a lower wage advantage, there 
is a possibility for them to become internationally competitive. Besides, it does not require huge 
investments as IT production. There are a number of reasons why the software industry is attractive for the 
developing countries (Correa, ibid.): 
1. Software development is skill-intensive.  
2. The technology for software development is largely available at universities and research 
institutions.  
3. Despite the high degree of normalisation of knowledge involved in software development, 
considerable room is left for creativity and ingenuity, and for tacit knowledge based upon 
experience. Software development is often described as still being an "amateurship, craft-base 
discipline', (Cane, 1992, p. 172). 
4. The components of technological packages applied may significantly vary in accordance with the 
products. Time and investment necessary to develop systems software are also generally higher 
than for application software. 
5. Though the use of quality standards is growing, at least in industrialised countries, quality controls 
and methodologies may greatly vary, affecting the quality of the final product. It is to be presumed 
that the implementation and diffusion of quality standards increases barriers to entry, and that the 
management of quality issues is likely to become a key competitive factor in the software field. The 
implementation, in particular, of the ISO 9000 standard is viewed as a necessary step to compete 
in a global market. 
6. Like in capital goods industry, software may be produced to meet a particular client's demand 
("custom") or as a standardised product ('package"). Most software firms in Latin America and India 
produce primarily "custom" software. 
7. An understanding of users' requirements is essential for software creation. It is of particular 
importance to devise strategies that are as far as possible try to incorporate users in the early 
creation/production of software. Developers that face unsophisticated users are unlikely to build up 
capabilities to compete in the international market. 





8. The rapid pace of technological change and short life-cycle of products force software companies 
to undertake research and development (R&D) and to invest in training for new technologies. The 
rate of failure in this sector is high.  
To give a brief analysis of the above listed reasons, the first three are suggesting that the technology for 
software development is already available at universities and research institutes since it is based on the 
skills and the creativity and experience of people in these institutions. The fact that it does not require 
capital investments such as in the microelectronics production, barrier to entry is low. Application software 
requires less time and investment to develop than the systems software, therefore, easier to join by 
developing countries. Quality factors alone can increase the barrier to entry and developing countries need 
to build based on the culture of quality, if they are really going to make a breakthrough in this market. It is 
easier to enter the 'custom' software market before entering the 'packaged' software for the latter require 
greater investment to meet quality and reliability standards. One of the greatest challenges to developing 
countries when entering the software market is the non-availability of sophisticated users in their home 
market or the few sophisticated users might look outside for reasons of quality and reliability. Involving as 
partners these sophisticated users in the production of software would be the easiest way out. For 
example, the Brazilian banks did it. Finally, the rapid technological change in software market is both a 
threat and an opportunity. It is a threat because if you do not undertake R&D you may become quickly 
irrelevant. It is an opportunity because the chance is open to creative entrepreneurs, which may be the new 
comer. But software exports from developing countries face a number of obstacles which some are internal 
and others external. The internal constraints are things like the lack of sufficiently large domestic market to 
provide a platform for complex products; the small size of the software firms and lack of financial resources 
and support; lack of stringent quality standards; the cost of management, administration and marketing is 
very significant; lack of highly qualified and experienced people; lack of appropriate infrastructure relevant 
to the development of software industry such as telecommunications and standardisation; and the lack of 
international marketing and distribution networks. 
Domestic markets in developing countries are very small. Even India and Brazil do not have sufficiently 
large market for complex products. For example, Indian software market depends on the US market and 
this is mainly routine the of labour intensive kind of programming works. Of course, it is a stepping stone to 
the next phase of entering more complex and demanding markets. But developing countries need to do 
more in providing financial support to creative entrepreneurs, help them upgrade their quality standards, 
minimise the brain drain problems, encourage partnership with international firms to gain marketing and 
distribution networks access, and providing them with appropriate infrastructure.  
In addition to internal constraints, there are a number of limitations emerging from the structures of the 
software supply and of the international market. The software market, probably the fastest growing market 
in the realm of information technologies, is highly competitive and internationalised. US firms control the 
largest part of the world market and have preserved an uncontested leadership in operating systems and 
packaged software. According to International Data Corporation (IDC) estimates, the United States holds 
about three-quarters of the world software market, compared with 20% of Europe and 4.3% of Japan 
(Fortune, 1994, p.48). The market is concentrated both at the high end of software products (dominated by 
IBM) and at the low end. Thus, around 60% of the market for PC software is accounted for by 10 firms and 
45% by four firms, among which Microsoft holds a dominant position. Software supply is divided between 
specialised software houses and computer manufacturers, competing in operating systems and application 
software and services. The top software vendors include both the former and the latter. Software packages 
are the main driving force of the market with a tangible trend toward an increasing sophistication and 





integration of products and the development of vertical markets. And the packaged software represents the 
largest proportion of traded software. 
Developing countries cannot head on compete with the advanced countries. Given the trends in 
globalisation, there are opportunities to gain access in areas where wage advantages are in favour of the 
developing countries. Having productive and skilled people by itself is the greatest competitive weapon and 
developing countries can use it to develop advantageous partnership with advanced countries. 
Therefore, it is within the above complex situation that the developing countries have to find a path that can 
lead them to join the world market and get a fair share of it. They can staff from the use of already tested 
information technologies to improve their productivity in every sector. The other is to carefully assess all 
opportunities in the progressive development of information technology industries particularly the software 
industry. 
When it comes to the hardware industry, developing countries have a long way to go. This is an industry 
not only driven by S&T at the technological frontier but also it requires a huge investment and large R&D 
capability, which is not readily available in the developing countries. In the next sections, we will learn a lot 
from the NIEs with this regard. 
5.3 IT Policy 
The first question we need to ask is whether NIEs have consciously or deliberately chosen particular 
strategies to introduce, diffuse, and master information technology in their respective countries; or it is 
something, which is evolving spontaneously without the intervention of governments. If so, which market 
forces are responsible for such developments? It is also possible to put the same question this other way 
round: What roles the governments and the market forces play in the development of information 
technology in such countries as Singapore, Brazil, India? We will explore the experiences of these 
countries and get an answer in the following sections. 
Recent trends in countries such as Brazil and India have been to remote restrictions on imports; technology 
transfer and foreign investment in order to gain access to low-cost IT products and advanced technologies. 
Such a trend seems an acknowledgement that previous policies to promote production were too costly to 
user industries in those countries. Countries which have been successful in IT production, such as 
Singapore, Taiwan and Korea have succeeded largely through attracting multinational computer companies 
to invest in production facilities or subcontract with local firms. Of these three countries, only Korea has 
used protectionism from 1982 to 1987 as a tool for promoting IT production, and Korea only did so for a 
limited period, banning imports of microcomputers (Kraemer and Dedrick, 1994). 
The importance of acquiring and applying microelectronics technology for national development paths and 
particularly industrialisation prospects has been recognised, by statement and action, by all the 
Governments of the countries studied. 
Even though we want to learn from all, Singapore merits a special attention for a number of reasons. First, 
Singapore is a small country like Eritrea- Population of Singapore is about 3 million people and that of 
Eritrea is 3.5 million. Singapore is a port-city-state and Eritrea is a country with km 1200 coastline and 
about 300 small islands all uninhabited but the big two. In the case of Eritrea, its territory is big compared to 
that of Singapore but the industrial zone is concentrated in a radius of about 100 km. around Asmara, the 
capital city of Eritrea. For that matter, Singapore industrial zone extends way beyond its territory into 
Malaysia and Indonesia in the "Johor-Singapore-Riau" Triangle, which is about 100x200 km. in size. The 





economy of Singapore is heavily dependent on trade and it is one of the trade centres and service-hubs in 
the Southeast Asian region. Eritrea in its Macro Policy (1994) is betting on trade and becoming a service-
hub in the Red Sea and East African region. These are the best of similarities that we can make of the two 
countries. 
The environment of these two countries is different. The social and cultural structures are also different. 
Now Singapore is in the middle of Southeast Asian countries, all booming economies. Eritrea is in the horn 
of Africa, which is a very unstable political environment. But at the same time is very near to the oil rich 
countries of the Arabian Peninsula and the Middle East. It is also not far away from the big European 
market. It is possible to say that it is half way through Europe and the Far East. Massawa and Assab, the 
two port city of Eritrea are found in the middle of the Red Sea. Eritrea, therefore, has a great potential to 
become a transiting and service centre in this important route of trade. 
Beside all the facts we have raised above, there is another thing worth mentioning. The Eritrean leadership 
is increasing looking to Singapore as a model of development. There was a lot of debate going on why and 
how Eritrea can successfully follow the steps of Singapore. In the view of the Eritrean leadership, all the 
factors that are said to be the reason for the success of Singapore are present in Eritrea. The major factors 
are a strong leadership, a clear strategy, stable government and peace (now afflicted by the border conflict 
with Ethiopia), hard working people, entrepreneurship, and an open market economic system. If we want 
for evidences that show the Eritrean leadership is serious about what it is saying, we can look to the visits 
many top Eritrean officials are paying to Singapore. Recently the Eritrean president paid a three-day visit to 
Singapore on April 8,1997 and it is reported that Singapore is to help Eritrea modernise its port of 
Massawa. "My government intends to enhance and upgrade our bilateral relations," Isayas Afewerki, the 
president of Eritrea said later at a dinner. "Your visit to Singapore has given a boost to bilateral relations," 
Goh said in reply. "Let us work together to advance our common interests" (Reuters, April 9, 1997). 
Therefore, there is more reason to believe that Singapore stands out as a model more than the other two, 
Brazil and India. Nonetheless, it is possible to enrich the learning from these other two as well. Whichever 
country is taken as a model, it is not possible to have a carbon copy of it, nor it is desirable. Therefore, we 
have chosen to include the other two to have a broader view. 
This section is organised around three key concepts: the vision and objectives, the policies, and the 
management and result of the information technology in the said countries. 
5.3.1 Vision and objectives 
5.3.1.1 Singapore 
Singapore's vision is to transform itself into an intelligent island. This vision has been formally established in 
its IT 2000 master plan of 1991. The National Computer Board (NCB) prepared this master plan in 
partnership with more than 200 senior executives from 11 major economic sectors of Singapore. These are 
Construction and Real Estate, Education and Training, Financial Services, Government, Healthcare, IT 
Industry, Manufacturing, Media, Publishing and Information Services, Retail, Wholesale and Distribution, 
Tourist and Leisure Services, and Transportation. The major Gaols of the IT 2000 are to develop Singapore 
into a global hub; boost the economic engine; enhance the potential of individuals; link communities locally 
and globally; and improve quality of life. 
All of this is prepared with the specific mission to drive Singapore to excel in the information age by 
exploiting IT extensively to enhance its economic competitiveness and quality of life. This bold step being 
taken by Singapore is to some extent linked to the results it got to the -efforts put in during the 1980s to 





single out information technology as a strategic move towards a technology driven economy. Singapore's 
policy on IT was initiated in 1980 when a ministerial committee, the Committee on National 
Computerisation (CNC), was formed to spearhead a new national strategic thrust based on IT (Wong Seng 
Hon, 1992). A new government agency, the NCB (National Computer Board), was established in 1981 to 
be the executive agency to accomplish three objectives set by the CNC: (i) to computerise the ministries 
and departments in the civil service to improve productivity and to "bootstrap" computerisation in the entire 
country; (ii) to train 8,000 software professionals by 1990 to meet the anticipated needs of the nation; and 
(iii) to encourage and support the expansion of the indigenous computer software and services industry. 
The twin objectives of the National IT Plan were to improve productivity and competitiveness in every 
sector of the economy, and to develop a strong export-oriented IT industry. Although the socio-political 
implications had been in the minds of the Singapore policy makers, nonetheless, these were not 
emphasised because of the predominantly economic concerns that have motivated the formulation of the 
National IT Plan. The country has been able to achieve satisfactorily these objectives. Now the country is 
coming close to achieving a new record, being the first country in the world with an advanced nation-wide 
information infrastructure which will allow computers in any parts of the country to be interconnected both to 
one another and to other computers located anywhere in the world. 
5.3.1.2 Brazil 
We don't find a vision driven development of information technology in Brazil like the one seen in 
Singapore. The reserve market concept was launched in 1975, at a time when nationalist feelings were 
high and science and technology were linked to military power and economic strength, and the import 
substitution models were popular in Latin America. It was simply based on the classical import-substitution 
model. It is possible to say that its major objectives were to create national capability in information 
technology, thus reduce technological dependence; to use information technology as an infrastructure to 
strengthen the national economy; and to achieve international competitiveness in the information 
technology industry. 
During the 1980s, because of the macroeconomics imbalances and economic austerity measures that 
followed, the electronics industry suffered, as a result, financial drought. The industry was diversified but 
fragmented. It could not emerge as a serious international contender like what we have witnessed in the 
Southeast Asian NIEs. Most probably, the lack of vision and focus has also harmed the industry together 
with other macroeconomics problems the country still up to now is suffering. 
5.3.1.3 India 
In early 1970s the Indian State established two permanent bodies, a policy making body (the Electronics 
Commission) and an executive body (the Department of Electronics). The underlying strategy for 
electronics, as in the case of other key industries, was to achieve an import-substituting, self-reliant, public-
sector led growth with very little role for monopoly houses and foreign companies. But in 1981 the 'New 
Economic Policy' a series of relatively liberal policies began to be introduced. The new policy measures 
emphasised the need to create an economically viable capacity to ensure international competitiveness 
(Joseph, 1992). Therefore, we can say that there is lack of a clear vision for the electronics industry but at 
the same time, reading from the general scientific and technological development trend of the country, the 
following objectives have been always there: to catch up in electronics R&D; to be self-sufficient for 
reasons of import-substitution; to promote the diffusion of computer systems, and (lately with the new 
liberalisation); and to innovate for greater competitiveness in local and foreign markets. 





Information Technology has a huge potential both to India and Brazil. Hanna and Boyson (1993) say that IT 
development could play four major roles in support of India's development strategy, which could be applied 
to other developing countries as well. It could, for example, enhance exports, particularly software exports - 
by facilitating logistics, increasing the productivity, quality, and flexibility of manufacturing, modernising the 
transport and telecommunication infrastructure, and attracting foreign investment. India's new policies for 
trade and industry make information and communication services a key need for both business and 
government. It could promote private sector development -- by modernising financial services, mobilising 
and disseminating public information, reducing information failures and transaction costs, improving access 
to legal and regulatory information and to industrial standards information, creating a dynamic IT industry, 
and modernising services and management systems. It could improve public sector management - by 
facilitating coordination and decentralisation, modernising information and communication systems, 
improving databases for policy analysis and monitoring systems, improving the planning and monitoring of 
public expenditure, introducing managerial innovations and decision support systems, and modernising 
large transaction systems, such as tax administration, land records, and the treasury. It could also alleviate 
poverty and accelerating learning and. Human resources development - perhaps by reducing the pervasive 
forms of information poverty, (Communication, Participation and Democracy, Society for International 
Development, l99O:2, and World Bank, l99l) improving the management and monitoring of poverty 
alleviation programs, improving agricuITural extension, improving learning in and out of schools, and 
extending hearth and educational services to remote and under-served areas. 
All developing countries, the NIEs in particular, are struggling to join the club of the developed countries. 
Increasingly the sign of economy maturity is measured by the degree of science and technology mastery 
and technological independence. This mastery and independence is measured by your international 
competitiveness. Therefore, the basic objective of information technology cannot be else than "catching up" 
and be part of the big league. 
5.3.2 Information technology policy 
In this section we continue to discuss of Singapore, Brazil and India separately to keep distinct the unique 
experiences that each country has had in the process of creating and developing IT industry and compete 
at the international markets. Without repeating what we have already discussed in the previous chapter, we 
will keep basically the same structure. Particularly when discussing IT management, we will deal with 
organisation, networking, learning, and competitiveness. In the previous chapter, we dealt with S&T policies 
in relation to economic policies, how the resources in those countries were organised and integrated, how 
learning was managed, and the competitiveness achieved. Similarly now, in more -focused manner, we will 
see how IT is organised and integrated into the economy, the industry networking, the learning and 
competitiveness achieved in the international markets. 
5.3.2.1 Singapore 
The increasing 'informatisation' of the global economy was a trend noted by the Singapore government in 
the early 1980s. IT, in particular software, was identified as the key enabling technology in the 
informatisation of the economy, and a technology particularly well suited for Singaporeans to excel in. It 
was deemed to have a significant role in restructuring of the economy toward higher value-adding activities, 
and the IT industry was itself regarded as an active niche for Singapore to develop (Wong Seng Hon, 
1992). 
The Economic Development Board (EDB), the National University of Singapore, Singapore Telecom and 
National Computer Board (NBE), in 1986, collaborated in the formulation of a new national IT strategic 





framework for Singapore - the National IT Plan (NITP). This pioneering multi-agency planning effort was 
motivated by the confluence of three independent developments. All three segments of the information 
industry telecommunication services, hardware manufacturing and software development – have 
undergone rapid growth. It was, therefore, timely to integrate government supported programs aimed at 
these different segments so as to drive new synergy. IT was increasingly seen as a key productivity tool in 
the restructuring of the economy. It became necessary to promote more linkages between the IT strategies 
and the economic development strategies. And the economic slowdown in 1985-86 started a search for 
new ways to sharpen Singapore's competitiveness in the global economic system. IT was seen as an 
important contributor to the generation of new competitive advantages for the nation (Wong Seng Hon, 
1992). 
A strategic framework, consisting of seven interlocking building blocks was formulated to encapsulate the 
strategies of the NITP. This framework is depicted in Figure l. The key strategic thrust was the following 
(ibid.): 
- IT application: leverage on the Civil Service Computerisation Program, the creation of new national 
information infrastructure, and a sector approach to induce organisations to exploit IT. 
- IT manpower: collaborate with the global technology leaders to develop a vital software 
engineering capability. 
- IT industry.' nurture a vibrant IT industry, with global orientation, by encouraging the participation of 
multinational IT companies and innovation by local IT companies. 
- IT culture.' engender a positive attitude toward IT among the population through an annual IT week 
and widely available educational programs. 
- Climate for creativity and. enterprise,' establish IT innovation centres within government agencies 
and educational institutions. 
- Information communication infrastructure: build national information structure based on the latest 
tested technology and provide services at globally competitive prices.  
- Co-ordination and collaboration' network across agencies in the public and private sectors, with the 
NIP as the common strategic framework and the NCB as the spearheading and co-ordinating 
agency. [Won Seng Hon (1992)]. 

























As the government is keen to seize opportunities effectively and quickly, it has pushed and pulled the 
private sector into the IT age, especially the smaller and the medium-sized local companies, along with the 
MNCs. 
The NCB is charged under its IT2000 project to identify strategic IT applications across each industry 
sector 'in Singapore, and it works closely with the EDB which is the key agency in investment promotion. 
The thrusts of IT2000 are in application-driven R&D, globalisation, supportive business infrastructure, 
communication and co-ordination infrastructure, and intensified manpower development. Clearly, 
Singapore aims to intensify its role as an information centre for its own competitiveness as well as linking it 
with development in both the region and the rest of the world. This IT focus is complemented and 
supplemented by other physical infrastructures as in the notion of an international transport and 
telecommunications centre - the concept of hubs and tele-ports. If done properly, Singapore can be a 
growth pole for the region using IT as the medium. If IT 2000 succeeds, Singapore will be transformed into 
an "intelligent" island city and will strengthen its competitive edge among nations as well as enhancing the 
quality of life of Singaporeans (Heng and Low, 1993). 
Many other agencies are also collaborating with the NCB to implement various IT programmes. Apart from 
MNCs and local enterprises, which are developing expertise, hardware and software products, the Civil 
Service Computerisation Programme has been extended to the private sector to evolve nation-wide 
information systems. National electronic data interchange (EDD networks include TradeNet, Medinet, 
Buildnet, Lawnet, among others. Thus, trade documentation has been greatly simplified and expedited in 
time just as the stock market has gone scriptless. The Small Enterprise Computerisation Programme helps 
smaller firms to join the IT age. The 'smart card' offers a new business opportunity on nation-wide, multi-
service, and multi-functional bases, which can be used for making purchases or assessing other financial 
services. Telecommuting would similarly become increasingly - feasible, and expert systems will change 
the way that banks service their customers. A wide array of IT training institutions is developing specialists 
in communications, integrated manufacturing, artificial intelligence and software engineering, as found in 
other new industrial and knowledge economies (ibid.). 
With effect from January 1991, the National Science and Technology Board (NSTB) have taken over from 
the Science council the task of promoting science and technology. There is greater focus on R&D under the 
new National Technology Plan (NTP) released in 1991.  
Singapore's continued importance and survival in the region, its leadership thinks, will greatly depend on 
how it can act as a technological node in assisting economies in the region to be 'informitised' and 
integrated into the new global production system. While competition is a means of ensuring efficiency, there 
is also a parallel need to collaborate and co-ordinate efforts in reaping the benefits of IT. At present, 
Singapore is clearly ahead of many of its ASEAN neighbours in the IT game. While others are seeking to 
become 'intelligent' states, Singapore's strategy is to try always to be a step ahead to reap the benefits as 
first comer. 
5.3.2.2 Brazil 
The core piece of the Brazilian experience in 'Informatics Policy' is the market reserve for national 
producers in a number of sub-sectors of the electronics complex. Thus it is classical case of infant-industry 
protection except that not only imports are kept out through quantitative controls but also foreign firms are 
not allowed to produce behind the protective barrier, the nationalist concerns and influence at its high. 





Until the late 1970s, Brazil's computer industry was in the hands of foreign firms which either imported 
finished products or carried out the final assembly of goods locally. By late 1980s, this situation had 
changed almost out of all recognition. By 1986, the number of firms operating in the nationally owned 
computer and peripherals market increased to 310 from four in 1977. Employment in these firms grew from 
just 4,000 in 1979 to over 50,000 in 1988. Total sales of national firms in 1988 were in the region of 
US$3,000 million, accounting for 66 per cent of the computer market (Schmitz and Hewitt, 1992). 
This rapid growth resulted from the creation of a reserved market. Foreign corporations were not excluded 
from the Brazilian computer market. Rather, they were limited to specific market segments. The mini- and 
microcomputers were reserved for the Brazilian private capital. This policy is carried out by the Special 
Secretariat for Informatics (SEI) which is specialised government agency working under the Ministry (later 
Secretariat) for science and technology. The main policy instruments used by SEI are quantitative import 
restrictions and the concession of manufacturing licences to national firms. Foreign firms are limited to the 
production of mainframe computers. They are also controlled by SEI to the extent that the granting and 
withholding of import licences can force these firms to have increasing indices of nationally produced inputs 
in their final products and also to show positive export balances (Piragibe, 1985). 
These policies have their origin in the Commission for the Co-ordination of Electronic Processing Activities 
(CAPRE) which was created 1n 1972 and had a regulatory role over information technology. Control over 
computer imports began in 19'15, at which time a number of complementary policy measures were also set 
in motion (Piragibe 1985, Tigre 1983). The beginning of the market reserve dates from 1977, when the 
production of minicomputers was put to tender for national firms (Frischtak 1986). 
In 1979, CAPRE was transformed into SEI with a wider mandate. The protected market for national firms 
under SEI's guidance gradually spread to other areas, such as industrial automation equipment, micro-
electronic components, digital instruments, superminicomputers and others. In 1984, the market reserve 
and complementary measures were enshrined in the 'Informatics law' (Meyer-Stamer, 1988). In practice, 
policy decisions rarely result from rational evaluation but from political and economic pressure. The IT 
policy is not an exception. In fact, Brazil's IT policy has been one of the most severely contested cases of 
recent industrial policy (Bastos, 1992). The policy was politically viable in spite of growing hostile forces. 
These included the US government threat to Brazil of trade war. Such pressures eroded the supportive 
internal alliance, but did not lead to a dismantling of the policy in the 1980s. Compromises were made but 
the policy essentially remained intact. Some link this achievement to the build-up of a negotiating capacity 
in government. It is possible to go a step further and argue that the heavy critique of the policy contributed 
to the learning, which occurred in both industry and government (Schmitz and Hewitt, 1992; and 
Cassiolato, Hewitt and Schmitz, 1992). 
In the case of the Brazilian electronics industry only the simple comparison of domestic and international 
prices has been carried out and has led neo-liberals to dismiss the infant-industry argument as a failure 
(Cline 1987). In spite of rapid cost reductions the prices of microcomputers, printers and digital control 
systems are approximately double the world market levels. However, in countries without import restrictions 
users also pay well above world market prices and the non-protected sub-sectors of the Brazilian electronic 
industry (in which foreign firms dominate) produce at above world market prices. Whether it is or not 
depends on the extent to which external economies are generated by the infant industry. The problem is 
that 'the concept of external economies is one of the most elusive in economic literature' (Scitovisky 1954: 
143). This is one reason why in evaluations of infant-industry protection their existence is acknowledged 
but rarely given due weight. The importance of such externalities has been underlined and they are more 





widely prevalent in developing countries than is generally acknowledged (Stewart and Ghani, 1991). In the 
Brazilian case, such externalities did occur in the electronics industry, though it was fragmented. 
Particularly, considerable human capital has been formed and the Brazilian Banking sector distinguished 
itself by developing banking systems of international standard. 
5.3.2.3 India 
The Indian government has been influencing the computer hardware industry since the 1960s. Government 
policy initially protected the industry from foreign competition through high tariffs and quantitative controls 
on imports. Coupled with industrial licensing requirements, which severely regulated entry and exit of firms, 
such protection measures, no doubt, affected the speed and nature of technological progress in this 
industry. In 1971, domestic production of computers was entrusted to a sole producer- ECIL, a public 
enterprise. Similarly, by setting up Computer Maintenance Corporation (CMC) in 1976, the maintenance of 
estimated 400 computer installations was "indigenised" following IBM's exit from India. However, due to 
stringent policies governing foreign collaboration with domestic computer firms, Indian firms had little 
access to international technology.  
Policy changes since the mid-1980s fostered domestic competition, opened avenues to -international and 
domestic technology sources, and encouraged the growth of efficient producers. On the whole, the growth 
performance of the entire hardware sector appears to be most impressive. The value of hardware 
production increased at an average annual rate of 19.8% between 1987 and 1991. Production of IT 
products - the largest segment of the hardware industry - increased from Rs. 20.7 billion in 1987 to Rs. 46.9 
billion in 1991, reflecting an average annual rate of nearly 23%. The production of computers - the core of 
information technology - also registered an impressive rate of 22% per year during 1987-91. This includes 
micros, minis, super-minis, and mainframes to engineering workstations, peripherals and so on. Moreover, 
the pace of innovation in the computer industry has increased, and the technology gap with international 
producers of computers has narrowed (Rastogi, 1992). 
Recognising that information technology (and electronics, in general) is a source of productivity 
improvement for the industrial and services sector, the government has singled out electronics for a series 
of policy reforms since 1985. This included gradual liberalisation of the restrictions on entry and exit. 
Flexibility to adjust both output mix and capacity in those sectors are still subject to licensing. The policy of 
reserving some products for small-scale-industry has been virtually eliminated. Access to imported goods 
assured through an open general license category. Since then, quantitative restrictions have been greatly 
reduced and import duty structure has been rationalised. More recently, since 1991, substantial reforms in 
trade and industrial policies have had significant impact on the orientation and competitiveness of the 
electronics sector. Many of these reforms have been particularly relevant to the software segment of this 
industry, which has been driven by a strong export orientation, while the electronics industry as a whole 
exported less than 6% of. Total production in 1991, the export of software is about 55Vo. A distinct change 
in the policy environment has also led to the recent interest of major IT multinationals to invest in India. 
Perhaps one of the most dramatic signals is the return of IBM for a joint venture with Tata Industries. 
India's new policies for trade and industry make information and communication services a key need for 
both business and Government. IT applications are a source of major productivity gains and quality 
improvements throughout finance, manufacturing, infrastructure - as well as in agriculture, education, 
hearth, and public administration. Exports increasingly depend on timely market information, on computer-
assisted product design, and on global electronic procurement and subcontracting. These practices are 
guiding foreign investment, technology transfer, and outsourcing. India is trying not to fall behind in 





adopting these business practices that have become essential to industrial competitiveness and economic 
modernisation. 
Another limiting factor is the bureaucratic culture of the public sector. Indian public administration is 
notorious for unnecessary paperwork, excessively hierarchical management, inflexible personnel policies, 
and limited attention to service. In some agencies, resistance to the use of information systems is 
compounded by staff (particularly those in banks) that fears that computerisation would lead to massive 
layoffs. Changing this culture calls for selective and strategic applications of the IT and for complementary 
investments in change management. It also presents opportunities for redesigning work processes, 
reducing managerial layers, enhancing accountability and performance monitoring, and improving the 
quality of working life. We will expand this part later on when discussing the melting pot. 
5.4 Institutional capability 
5.4,1 Singapore 
In the 1970s and the early 1980s, on-the-job training was the most common carrier path into the IT 
profession. Apart from the availability of computer science as an optional subject in the science curricula of 
the universities, there were no other formula training programs at the tertiary level. This situation prompted 
the CNC to focus on establishing new educational institutions specialising in the software aspects of IT. In 
specifying the requirements to be met by these new tertiary IT educational programs, the CNC emphasised 
two key themes. These were the adoption of business perspective in the planning and design of information 
systems and the inculcation of software engineering skills, based on state-of-the-art software technology, in 
order to deliver cost-effective and robust information systems (Hon, 1992). 
New educational institutions specifically for IT were established, mostly in the early 1980s (ibid.). There is 
no doubt that these institutions are at the basis of the strong human capital formation that busted the 
confidence of Singapore to transform itself into an intelligent island. A Department of Information Systems 
and Computer Science (DISCS) in the National University of Singapore was established first. Students in 
this three-year program have to choose either the information stream or the computer science stream after 
the first year. This streaming of students according to business or technical inclination, has been effective 
in preparing graduates more thoroughly for their chosen career paths in the IT industry. The Institute of 
Systems Science (ISS) in the National University of Singapore was established to convert non-IT graduates 
to system analysts through an intensive nine-month postgraduate diploma Program. The institute was set 
up with the assistance of IBM Corporation. The Centre for computer studies (CCS) at Ngee Ann 
Polytechnic and Japanese-Singapore Institute of Software technology (JSIST) at the Singapore Polytechnic 
were set up with the help of ICL and the Japanese government respectively, to train diploma-level software 
technologists and programmers. They expand the poof of manpower available for IT jobs by drawing on 
students who would not be going to university. 
Human capital alone cannot perform miracles of economic development. A host of institutions are required 
to support and sustain the efforts of it. When we specifically focus on IT, information and communications 
and R&D institutions become very relevant. Such a pivotal role in the microelectronics revolution in 
Singapore is being played by the Singapore Telecom. It is the sole provider of telecommunication services 
in Singapore. It has had the mandate to provide state-of-the-art telecommunication services at 
internationally competitive rates. Singapore direct dial and international leased circuit rates are among the 
lowest in the world. The range of services offered is also impressive. With push-button telephones in almost 
every home and office, and all telephone exchanges connected by optic fibre cables, Singapore Telecom is 





able to provide a comprehensive range of voice and data services. Its services include Integrated Services 
Digital Network (ISDN), the Televiews Videotext service, the DigiNet high-speed digital leased circuit 
service, Telebox electronic mailbox service and cellular telephone service. Through various submarine 
cable systems, radiating from Singapore, direct connections were made to the ASEAN countries, the 
Middle East, Eastern Europe, Australia, Hong Kong and Taiwan. To complement these links, the satellite 
communication infrastructure was expanded. Four INTELSAT antennae and two earth stations provide 
coverage of two-thirds of the world through the Pacific and Indian Ocean satellites. 
Singapore's telecommunication infrastructure is among the most modern in the world. In 1989 World 
Competitiveness Report, Singapore's telecommunication infrastructure was rated 98.06 out of a maximum 
of 100 points, ahead of the runners-up, the united states and Canada. The pervasive and world-class 
telecommunication infrastructure available in Singapore has spurred a rapid growth in telecommunication 
traffic. In financial year 1988/89, the number of telephone lines increased by 6% to over 930,000, or about 
35 telephone lines per 100 population, a very high ratio by international standard. The number of 
international direct dial (IDD) calls increased by 42% in the same period, to 45 million calls. At the rate of 17 
IDD calls per person, this is one of the highest of the world. During the same period, the number of 
facsimile machines in use increased. 49% to over 14,000. There are now more than 205,000 pagers in use, 
one every 13 Singaporeans. New international services launched recently by Singapore Telecom included 
the international toll free service, the home country direct dial service, and the videoconference service 
(Hon, ibid.). 
Although the telecommunications node for the Asia-Pacific area is clearly Japan, both Hong Kong and 
Singapore have been successful in attracting US and Western European TNCs' network hubs (Ken Ducatel 
and Ian Miles, 1992). Partly the success has been based upon low charge rates for international 
telecommunications traffic, at least in comparison to the Japanese KDD. For similar reasons, Britain is the 
hub for Western Europe, with most of the high-speed lines from the US terminating there. High-quality 
infrastructure and support are also important. Britain is in some cases the hub for Africa as Miami is used 
by many US TNCs operating in the Caribbean or Latin America. The poor linkage of US TNCs with Africa 
probably relates simply to the relative underdevelopment of infrastructure in African nations, with the 
exception of some North African and East African states. 
Clearly, communications traffic within the Southeast Asian area is an important aspect of regional trade and 
development. With Singapore's lead in creating integrated electronic data interchange systems, and Hong 
Kong's attempt to create regional level satellite services, and the growth rates of traffic within each 
individual economy there are significant opportunities for economic development strategy wining the region 
as well as beyond the regional boundaries. This can be seen in the balance of Indonesia's international 
traffic between inter regional destinations and extra regional destination. If Australia is included within the 
region, over 50% of total international calls go to major Pacific Rim countries: Singapore (25%); Japan 
(10.7%o); Hong Kong (8.8%); Australia (6.9%). The United States, the only other major destination 
accounted for a significant, but relatively small l9.l%o (Datapro, 1991). 
The latest technologies in telecommunications by itself do not make the economy more productive. It can 
do so only if there are conscious users capable to exploit the immense potential creatively. This is what 
Singapore tried to do and has already achieved a tremendous success. In December 1986 the NCB formed 
a project team to define the functional specifications of the TradeNet system, for Singapore is unique as a 
nation with an external trade volume of 3.5 times larger than its GDP. Together with the Singapore Trade 
Development Board, the Port of Singapore Authority and other government and private sector 





organisations, the team simplified trade documentation format and streamlined procedures for the 
declaration of imports and exports. It also specified the software requirements, carried out the system 
design, defined the EDI standards and selected the technical solution for the TradeNet system. Measures, 
which could improve the productivity of the trading sector, were, therefore, accorded high priority. TradeNet 
facilitates the electronic submission of trade documents by members of the trading community to the 
various government agencies and the transmission of responses from these agencies back to the sender. 
The government will also be able to interchange trade information and documents electronically to expedite 
the approval of imports or exports, port operations, cargo clearance and statistics compilation. TradeNet is 
the first electronic data interchange (EDII system in the world implemented on a national scale to link all 
parties involved in international trade (Hon, 1992). 
In conjunction with the TradeNet conceptualisation and design studies, a parallel and supporting project, 
which involved detailed studies of four trade-related sectors – importers and exporters, freight forwarders, 
cargo agents and shipping agents - was carried out by NCB in conjunction with their hade associations. 
The objective of these studies was to produce the generic software specifications for the companies in 
those sectors to computerise their internal operations and integrate these with the TradeNet system 
eventually. A new government-owned company, Singapore Network Services Pte Ltd. (SNS) was formed in 
March 1988 to develop and operate TradeNet services. This company is jointly owned by the four 
government agencies, which are most involved in international trade matters. The TradeNet system runs on 
an IBM mainframe. TradeNet conforms to the EDIFACT (Electronic Data Interchange for Administration, 
Commerce and Transport) international standard. To minimise development time, the company acquired 
and modified available EDI software for use in TradeNet. Several local software companies were 
commissioned to write software for companies to access TradeNet. These were developed in accordance 
with specifications laid down by Singapore Network Services. The system became operational in early 
1989 (ibid.). 
TradeNet simplifies the linkages and flow of information. Each TradeNet user needs to establish one link 
with the Trade net computer in order to communicate with all other users on the network. With TradeNet 
the preparation and submission of import and export declarations, and the cargo clearance process have 
been speeded up. Documents that used to take a day to process are now cleared in 13-30 minutes. Users 
are also freed from the restricted service hours for submission of declarations under the pre-TradeNet 
system. TradeNet has resulted in greater efficiency and competitiveness for the Singapore trading 
community. As of July 1990, 1,300 companies were linked to TradeNet andT1%o of trading transactions 
were being carried out on the network. By the end of 1991, it was expected that trade documentation in 
Singapore to be totally paperless (ibid.). 
Singapore government has taken a proactive position in the development and diffusion of IT by creating 
and investing in a number of institutions in education, telecommunications, and the hardware and software 
IT industry in an integrated manner. This was possible, may be, because of the small size of the country 
but also the strong, authoritarian and entrepreneurial - government has played a significant part as well. 
5.4.2 Brazil 
The process of institutionalising information technology in Brazil can be linked to the establishment of the 
Special Secretariat for Informatics (SEI) in 1979. Soon was followed by the 'informatics law' in 1984, which 
reserved the production of a comprehensive set of IT goods and services for local capital. This policy 
succeeded in establishing a locally owned professional electronics industry and the potential of the 
Brazilian market for electronic products and services became visible. Self-reliance in information 





technology was a central component of the nationalism that cemented different alliances between various 
social groups and mobilised internal support for the policy. 
The alliance that pushed-up of the IT policy in Brazil was made out of segments of the intelligentsia within 
and outside the state apparatus and some navy officers. Members of the intelligentsia within the state 
agencies, especially in the National Economic Development Bank (BNDE), the Studies and Projects 
Financing Agency (FINEP) and Co-ordinating Commission for Electronic Processing Activities (CAPRE), 
united with navy officers, concerned with national security, in common objective of local technological 
development, Backed by the Planning Minister, they provided the 'within the state' bunker of IT policy, a 
position they used to convince the relevant players inside the state apparatus of the strategic opportunity 
for establishing the policy. 
Outside the state, members of the science and technology community organised in the Brazilian Society for 
the Progress of Science (SBPC) were the focal point at the beginning. Later, in the Brazilian Computing 
Society (SBE) and the Association of Data Processing professionals (APPD) constituted a relatively small 
but highly mobilised force that pressed the government for consistency in IT policy. 
Brazil's government started to get involved in the development of telecommunications infrastructure for the 
country in 1962 with the approval of the Brazilian telecommunications code. That was the first time Brazil 
had a national policy for telecommunications. Until then, regulatory power was spread among local and 
state levels. As a result, Brazil had almost a thousand different telephone companies. Most of these were 
municipal, although some were private. In fact, it was the private Companhia Telephonica Brasileira who 
controlled most of Brazil‟s two million lines. The presence of more than 900 different operators with 
incompatible systems was a big problem (Bibson, 1997). To solve this problem, The Brazilian Federal 
Government through the Ministry of Telecommunications created the holding company Telebras. It was 
meant to protect and develop the telecommunications industry. All competitive threats to Telebras were 
eliminated by a wholesale buyout of the 900+ small operators. At the end three independent operators 
remained. The first two were municipally owned: Ceterp in Ribeirao Preto (SP), and Sercontel in Londrina 
(PR). The last was privately owned held by CTBE, which operated in the heartland. All three were 
conveniently barred from operating in the long-distance market (ibid.). But even Telebras's expansion 
project had suffered from the economic crisis of the country and increasingly faced shortage of funds to 
keep up with the growing demand for telecommunications services. At present Brazil has 9.6 telephone per 
100 people, which is very low compared to that of Southeast Asian countries. Hong Kong (54.7), Singapore 
(51.3), and Korea (43) have already caught up the advanced countries such as UK (52.8) or USA (64) 
(Word Bank, World Development Report, 1998199). 
Public sector borrowing was not allowed to increase (owing to pressure from, among others, the lMF and 
the World Bank). The resulting cuts in government expenditure hit disproportionately the availability of long-
term loans for investment in technological development of national firms. In Brazil the deficiencies of a long-
term credit market and the almost complete lack of organised access to venture capital are seen as one of 
the main problems private firms have when they are faced with prospective investments in general and 
investments in technological development in particular (Erber, 1981). Thus the existing financial system has 
inhibited the development of technological capabilities in Brazil. 
In the course of the 1980s, government expenditures for scientific and technological infrastructure 
diminished as a consequence of short-run stabilisation measures. The three main sources of funding public 
science and technology institutions (the National Fund for Science and Technology development of FINEP 
and the budgets for basic research of CNPq and CAPES) suffered sharp decrease. In 1985 they were 





allocated only 40 percent of the 1979 amount (Bielchowsky, 1985). The Brazilian situation was similar to 
that of Argentina, Mexico, Venezuela, Peru and Chile where stabilisation measures were introduced in the 
same period (Sagasti and Cook, 1987). 
Economic policy in Brazil in the 1980s consisted of successive rounds of crisis management. The need to 
manage the external and internal debt and to control inflation dominated the government agenda. Pressing 
needs for short-term stabilisation crowded out work on long-term economic strategy. Concern with 
industrial strategy and technology policy existed, but there was not enough space to sustain such work. 
The IT policy was an exception, but the escape was only partial. Policy for this sub-sector suffered from not 
plugging into a supportive general industrial policy. 
It seems that the early 1990s brought no relief. The instruments of market reserve were being dismantled 
and SEI, the institution that carried out the policy, has been demoted and marginalised and previous cadre 
of experts within government has been disbanded, and a process of unlearning was under way (Cassiolato, 
Hewitt, and Schmitz, 1992). Again, this has to be seen in the context of the severe economic crisis and the 
new government's desperate attempt to get this crisis under control. To be sure, there were forces in the 
government, which recognised that a new industrial strategy was part and parcel of overcoming the crisis 
and advocated a strategy to negotiate with national and foreign firms. In practice, however, such efforts 
were relegated to the margin, because the need to stabilise the economy took precedence. 
The Brazilian case exposes clearly that fragmentation of institutions, supposed to work together towards 
the same goal of enabling the country to catch up in scientific and technological development for economic 
and social progress. Their inability to do what they were established to achieve was the main reason of 
their failure. This fragmentation occurred because of national IT policies and the macroeconomics polices 
were not in line. As a result of government failures in economic policy and provision of basic services, large 
sections of society were 'tired of the state'. In such an anti-government climate it was hard to sustain the 
case for strategic intervention in the electronics complex, even if the performance of government and 
industry in some sub-sectors has been relatively favourable. The recent financial crisis of Brazil shows that 
the country is still facing a big problem of different parts pulling in different directions, as is the case of 
some States not willing to co-operate with the Central Government in the payment of debts. The Real was 
devalued and another financial crisis is at hand. The vicious circle seems to be repeating itself. 
5.4.3 India 
In India, policies concerning the information technology industry have been shaped by her overall industrial 
and technology strategy, which emphasised the development of scientific, technological and industrial 
capabilities. This strategy had mixed results, with the costs of inefficiency and slow application and diffusion 
of information technology outweighing the benefits of technological deepening. 
Based mostly on the work of Hanna (1994) we will give an overview of the institutions at work for the 
development and diffusion of IT in India. 
There is no single apex institution or focal point for formulating national policies and strategies for the IT 
sector, not surprising given the size and complexity of India's economy and the recent emergence of this 
sector. But the Secretary of Department of Electronics (DOE), committed to defining the role of information 
technology in meeting national priorities, has indicated his strong interest in formulating a national IT plan - 
with World Bank assistance. The DOE has also created a national commission for the computer and 
software industries, with broad representation from public and private agencies. 





India has made substantial investments in R&D for the hardware industry, and has developed impressive 
technological competencies in some areas such as advanced computing. Its Indian Institute of Science 
(IISC) has one of the most advanced artificial intelligence centres in developing countries. But it has few 
links or joint projects with local software companies. Most companies develop technologies internally, if at 
all. With few exceptions, software companies also have difficulty tracking trends and changes in software 
and hardware technologies developed abroad. Research institutions - typically more interested in 
technology development than technology capture or making existing technology work for India - are of little 
help. 
A few but a growing number of Indian software firms possess some advanced technical capabilities that 
rival international competitors. But so far technology transfer from the large and dominant software houses 
to the small and medium software firms has been limited – due to the unwillingness of these large firms to 
subcontract to other software houses. The benefits of increased links between large and small software 
house could be substantial. Consider the adoption of Computer-Aided Software Engineering (CASE). A 
large Indian software company is marketing a CASE package in the United States. This package was 
developed locally. It allows for substantial increases in the productivity of software engineers. Yet, the 
adoption of CASE tools in India is meagre. Developments in CASE and its increased use by US software 
companies are likely to increase the productivity (and quality) gap between US and Indian software 
engineers, undermining India‟s current comparative advantage in part of this market. May be the answer 
lies in its management thinking. The Indian firm is networked more with the US market than its home 
market because US markets are more lucrative than the Indian markets. But the failure of the Indian firm's 
managers is mainly the lack of understanding shown that the long term implication of their action is against 
their own growth where a weaker software industry will be a dragging force by making it less challenging 
and dynamic than it could be. 
With the exception of the software services, state enterprises have dominated the strategic or high-tech 
areas of the electronics sector, while private consumer electronics firms remained domestically oriented. In 
terms of structure of the electronics sector, India has one of the highest ratios of production in the 
consumer electronics and the lowest in electronics data processing and in components among the newly 
industrialising economies. On the other hand, it has built a diversified sector and broad technological 
capabilities. However, the impressive technological achievements, particularly in the production of 
computers and telecommunication equipment, and in the development of an extensive science and 
technology infrastructure, did not lead to fully competitive production or to wide use of these capabilities by 
user industries and services. 
Specialised marketing institutions and software publishers are missing from the Indian scene. Recent 
efforts to arrange delegations and seminars abroad and in India - by the DOE, the Electronics and 
Computer Software Export Promotion council, under the aegis of the Ministry of Commerce are evidence of 
it. Similarly, Indian financial institutions, lacking knowledge of the industry and its markets, have no reliable 
guidelines to give them assistance or confidence in evaluating software financing. Lending is based mainly 
on traditional manufacturing, where the means of production and outputs are tangible and the markets and 
technologies less volatile. It should be recognised that the Indian venture capital industry has started only 
recently, and has done well so far, and the long term prospects of the IT industry benefiting from such 
financial institutions are reasonably good. At present, however, India has few venture capital institutions, 
such as the Technology Development and Information Company of India (TDICD and Risk Capital and 
Technology Finance Corporation (RCTC). With few exceptions, venture capital financing has been 
inadequate, as measured by the share of funding used by Indian software firms. For example, in the USA, 





about 40 percent of venture capital has gone to the IT field, mainly software and related new services. In 
India, venture capital is estimated to have met only 1 percent of the capital requirements of the local 
software firms. Moreover, the availability of venture capital to software venture seems to be at an all time 
low in India in the last year or two. Hence, appropriate finance remains a critical and pressing issue at this 
stage of development for a dynamic and internationally competitive Indian software industry. 
Two recent developments are also encouraging. One is the growing foreign investment in India's software 
industry. Many successful Indian companies have been financed to some degree by an injection of external 
capital. The second is the recent spurt of software companies going for public issues. 
Telecommunication is a key part of the IT sector. It is driven by advances in software and microelectronics, 
and in turn, it enhances the benefits and helps diffuse information and information systems. India has 
extremely low availability of telecom services, less than what most competing countries have, 1.5 telephone 
lines per 100 inhabitant, compared with 7 for Thailand, 18.3 for Malaysia, and 18 for Pakistan (World Bank, 
World Development Report 1998/99). 
The set-up for data communications in India is rudimentary. Among the large public networks are NICNET 
and INDONET. The National Informatics Centre (NIC) runs NICNET with its own nation-wide satellite-
based network serving primarily government agencies in 450 cities. INDONET, run by CMC Limited, uses 
leased links from the Department of Telecommunications (DOT) and is operated mainly for computer time 
leasing. All in all there are eleven various network projects running, each with limited number of nodes, 
users, services and capabilities (Hanna, 1994). 
The software industry association, NASSCOM, was established in 1988 as a source of technical 
information, as a conduit for energising the private IT industry, and as a mechanism for self-policing. But 
lately the government of India established seven Software Technology Parks (STPs) where 230 units have 
already been approved at Bangalore, Pune, Bhubaneshwar, Thiruvananthpuram, Hyderabad, NOIDA (near 
Delhi) and Gandhinagar. These STPs act as export-oriented resource centres for the member computer 
software exporting units, by offering general infrastructure facilities such as utility power, ready-to-use build-
up space, centralised computing and high-speed data communication facilities (Correa, 1996). More need 
to be done to fully exploit the potential of IT industry and enhance the Indian competitiveness vis a vis that 
of NIEs of East Asia. 
In general, the institutional framework is underdeveloped for dealing with systemic problems of computer 
and software requirements, planning, procurement, co-ordination among agencies, and IT diffusion. The IT 
associations are still in an early phase of development. It is rare for diverse industry and government 
groups to exchange ideas, define needs and requirements, and reach consensus on mutually beneficial 
goals and objectives in the IT field.  
5.5 Human capital formation 
To discuss the demand for II personnel, it helps to distinguish those who produce and deliver IT and those 
who use and apply IT. The literature on IT usually narrows the focus to three categories: IT specialists, 
Communication specialists, software and computer specialists. People, who have been trained in 
information science and technology, including such specialised users as librarians, fall into the first 
category. The Communication specialists include people trained in the technical and business aspects of 
the various forms of communications such as satellite, telecommunications, and broadcasting. The 
software and computer specialists are people trained in computer hardware manufacturing and 





maintenance or in computer software and maintenance. Here, we use these three categories of those 
involved in the production of IT and its use in all sectors of the economy. 
Given the importance of a strong information infrastructure, governments can encourage IT use by 
investing in human resources and telecommunications networks. This should include broad-based 
investments such as support for general education and widespread provision of basic telephone service, 
both of which provide high economic and social returns in their own right. Development of a good 
information infrastructure, however, also requires investments in specialised human resources such 
electronics engineers, computer scientists, systems analysts and programmers, as well as specialised 
telecommunications services such as digital switching, high-speed data transmission and value-added 
networks. Such investments may be made in co-operation with the private sector, but experience shows 
that a government role is usually needed in building infrastructure, especially in developing and newly 
industrialising countries (Kraemer and Dedrick, 1994). The following section does focus on how the human 
capital development of scientists, engineers, and professionals in the IT area is being handled by the three 
countries: Singapore, Brazil, and India. 
5.5.1 Singapore 
Singapore has only its strategic location and its people as natural endowments on which to bet its future 
economic and social development. To exploit the location advantage of the island and make it the transit, 
service-hub, and trading centre of the region and the globe, Singapore had to heavily invest on human 
capital development. Singapore learns the latest in software engineering techniques from the global 
technology leaders. The professional IT manpower poof in Singapore has expanded from about 850 in 
1980 to over 10,000 in 1990. The numbers of IT professionals produced annually by these programs is 
about 1,200. This will be increased to 1,600 by 1993, with the commencement of the new computer 
engineering course at the Nanyang Technological University and an increase in intake in the other 
programs. This means that Singapore will have produced at least 15,000 additional IT manpower from 
1990 to year 2000. By then, every tertiary educational institution in Singapore will have a significant IT 
education capability. In addition there are a significant number of graduates trained in IT, returning from 
studies overseas (T.Mun Heng and L. Low, 1993). Even this does not seem to be enough because 
Singapore is looking the whole globe from where to get more scientists, engineers, and professionals, as 
we have already seen in the previous chapter. 
Dovetailing into tertiary IT education programs is the availability of computer science as an elective subject 
in all junior colleges. Students, eager to begin a career in IT, can have an early taste of the subject as an 
academic pursuit. Each junior college is provided with a computer laboratory equipped with a local area 
network linking over 20 workstations. At present there are two universities, four polytechnics and eleven 
institutes of technical education. The government's target is to have 20% of every year cohort going to 
universities, half to polytechnics and the remainder receiving skills training in the institutes of technical 
education (Tang and Yeo, 1995). 
It is possible to say that in Singapore an education revolution is taking place. Even kindergartens are using 
computers to teach small children, through music, sound, graphics and animation, certain skills in English, 
mathematics, and Mother Tongue (Wong, 1998). Computers are also used to improve the productivity of 
administrative work of schools, The Curriculum Development Institute of Singapore (CDIS) started, in early 
1990s, the Learning and Writing with Computers Project, the Annual National Software Writing Competition 
for secondary schools, and development of a series of computer-based materials for the school 





Mathematics curriculum (ibid.). The strategy is being shifted from computer literacy to computer as an 
information and educational tool at every level from kindergarten to the tertiary education. That means, 
learning will not be confined to only the class rooms because students will be involved in 'global learning' by 
using Internet from any place linked to the network system, 
In 1996, a project called 'Student Teacher Workbench (STW)' (ibid.) was tested in six secondary schools, 
The project is, undertaken jointly by NCB and Ministry of Education with the participation from various 
computer manufacturers and software developers, looking for integrated computer-based learning, and 
management system which has two primary components: the teacher and the student. The system allows 
the teachers to teach, assess, monitor, and communicate with their students in a flexible way using 
different approaches to learning such as resource-based learning, exploratory learning, or co-operative 
learning rather than the traditional didactic method of teaching. At the same time, the students are able to 
learn materials customised to their abilities and needs, to learn at their own pace and be able to 
communicate directly with their friends, parents and teachers. Students are able to communicate with their 
counterparts in other regions, read the latest news, and get access to the local and worldwide multimedia 
materials to prepare assignments as well. 
Singapore is doing all of these knowing that the future competitiveness of the country depends on highly 
trained manpower. This country has made a big leap forward in terms of IT skill development since the 
beginnings of the 1980s. 
5.5.2 Brazil 
In Brazil, implicit measures for IT training have been more significant than explicit ones. Implicit measures 
do not necessarily aim at human resources training as such. They consist of incentives (in particular trade, 
tax and monetary policy) which influence the production decisions of private firms. State investments in the 
education, training and research system are explicit measures. Brazil's own experience in the 1980s 
suggest that trade policy can be a very powerful instrument to bring about the training of human resources. 
The human resources issue is particularly pertinent in the electronics industry. As O'Connor (1985) has 
argued, "The computer industry is essentially a knowledge-intensive industry wherein skilled, highly trained 
scientific, engineering and technical labour power is probably the single most important asset." Thus, the 
industry is characterised by an enormous demand for skilled labour. The shortage of supply of such labour 
has been well documented for the advanced industrial countries, particularly for software and hardware 
skills but also in areas of management (Ernst 1985; Soete 1985; Kaplinsky 1988). This was the case of 
Brazil. The IT market reserve policy has indirectly busted the in-house IT training in the country. 
The 1980s decade there has been a substantial increase in the skill base of the electronics industry within 
the protected segments of computer production in Brazil (Hewitt, 1992). This increase is not only due to the 
expansion of the industry but also to the way that the industry has developed: generating in-house 
capabilities to both design and produce computers and peripherals for a range of market segments. While 
both the scarcity and the under-funding are real, it is not sufficiently recognised that a massive growth in 
human resources has taken place in spite of inadequate state provision. The bulk of the learning has not 
taken place in universities or technical colleges but in the computer firms themselves. But there are 
reservations when it comes to quality of training in such schools. For example of the 109 schools, public 
and private, in the state of 56o Paulo which offer courses for electronics technicians, only eleven were 
considered to be of adequate quality. Even though the number of trained electronics technicians far 





exceeds the number employed, 21,000 as against 3,200 in the period 1979183, there was still scarcity of 
technicians of adequate quality to match the needs of the electronic industry (ibid.). 
If w look to the supply of engineers, the situation is even worse because the supply was by far short of the 
industry demand. Because of lack of technical and financial resources there was an enormous lack in the 
training and development of human resources for IT in the country (Ministry of Science and Technology, 
1986 quoted in Hewitt, 1992). IT was in this situation where the public education and vocational training 
system cannot keep pace with the demand from and expanding industry, many firms have themselves 
taken on the task of training. In 1984, US$4.5 million was spent by the national computer and peripherals 
firms on the training of labour, with approximately 2 percent of total employment engaged in training 
activities (SEI, 1986 quoted in Hewitt, 1992). 
It would be wrong to conclude that public educational provision does not matter if the private sector can 
make it. Educational institutions and private industry complement each other. In the East Asian NIEs, the 
State set favourable incentives for the private electronics sector and invested heavily in technical 
education. The latter is difficult in most LDCs because of the shortage of adequate financial resources 
(O'Connor 1985). But the Brazilian experience, an implicit human resources policy, is particularly interesting 
to developing countries where fund was always in short supply. 
The essence of such an implicit policy is that the state structures earning opportunities in such a way those 
firms need to provide training in order to succeed. That structure was provided through the instruments of 
protection. This protection has not been without cost and some products have higher price than on the 
world market. To some extent this higher price can be seen as users paying for the training necessary for 
producers to be able to put these goods on the market. Given the difficulties of establishing an effective and 
equitable tax system in LDCs, this seems another way of recovering the cost of training. 
The formation of human capital is more widely acknowledged to be source of technological externalities. In 
the Brazilian case such externalities were indeed generated by the protected electronic infants. If we 
compare the utilisation of labour in the national computer industry with that in other sub-sectors, which are 
not protected, it is possible to see that, proportionally, the national industry involved more human resources 
to local research and development. The benefits were only partially captured by the firms, which trained 
such technicians and engineers (Hewitt, 1992). Even though no systematic tracer study exists, there is 
known to be a significant movement of such labour to competing producers or – less often - to users. 
Sometimes they leave to set up their own firms. Indeed, most of the new firms, especially those producing 
specialised equipment and inputs were 'spin-offs' of the first generation of Brazilian IT firms (Schmitz and 
Hewitt, 1992; and Cassiolato, Flewitt and Schmitz, 1992). 
As deregulation and open foreign competition becomes the norm in Brazil, then, firms will have to reduce 
their cost to meet competitors and as a result training budgets in the firms may become thinner and thinner. 
That is a call for the government to do more to keep up the competitiveness of Brazilian IT industry in the 
world market because it is related to higher skills and productivity of labour. 
5.5.3 India 
Software sector employment has expanded rapidly in many countries, including India, often during sluggish 
employment growth in the rest of the economy. Employment in the software industry increased faster in 
India than in most other similar countries. India has approximately 71,000 software and services 
professionals (Hanna, 1994: 48). The poof of scientists, engineers and related professionals in India is 





large, but only a relatively small number in that poof is trained for or employed in IT. Despite being small, 
the IT industry in India is diversified and complex, as in other countries, and it has many associated 
industries and services. 
The core of IT labour force is its software personnel. In India the demand for trained software personnel far 
outstrips the supply, and the shortage is a major constraint to the industry's expansion. It places a heavy 
training burden on firms, results in high staff turnovers, and reduces the quality and competitiveness of the 
industry. Why the shortage? One reason is the substantial attrition of engineering school graduates, 
particularly from the IITs, and of experienced software professionals as a result of body shopping practices. 
Others include the scarcity of teachers and trainers, particularly in public education institutes, the 
irrelevance and poor quality of public and private (proprietary) training programs, and the high cost of in-
house training (ibid.). 
In the public sector, the quality and relevance of the training programs is very low. Only 275 industrial 
training institutes, polytechnics, colleges, and universities are qualified (and receive support) to conduct 
computer training - programs. But most of even this small number face shortages of qualified teachers, 
adequate equipment, and software and books - and they have weak links with industry and users (despite a 
50 percent increase in the number of MCA graduates in 1991, only 5 percent were hired by software 
exporters). Because of the irrelevance of the training, employers prefer to recruit from only a few of these 
institutes, one large software house considers undergraduate and postgraduate students from only 30 
universities (ibid. p.5l). In the private sector, an estimated 1,000 proprietary organisations produce about 
80,000 trainees annually from courses ranging from two weeks to two years. Industry specialists estimate 
that 98 percent of the training organisations are below standard. Only about l0 to 14 percent of the larger 
organisations offer good quality programs. Between them they train roughly 40,000 trainees a year, with 
about 30,000 in basic two year programs to qualify for entry positions as programmers. The proprietary 
organisations also conduct executive training programs for computer and management personnel - mostly 
for large companies (ibid. p. 51). 
The government of India should do more to ensure quality of training. The Indian case is paradoxical in the 
fact that few centres of excellence produce world class scientists and engineers and the vast majority of 
training and educational institutes produce mediocre quality. 
5.6 The Melting Pot: IT management and economic development 
5.6.1 Singapore 
There are many key dimensions, which distinguish the knowledge economy from other phases of 
Singapore's development. One is having basic scientific knowledge and research as the economy's driving 
force, generating new technology, providing opportunities for innovation, creating new industries. Second, 
education increasingly plays a central role with the growth in knowledge services. Finally, new 
management approaches are developed and applied to organisations using computer technology and 
emphasising human resource management. In Singapore's experience, recruitment of foreign scientists 
and professionals is increasingly becoming important factor to enable the very ambitious vision of making 
the country competitive at the forefront of technology. 
By economic criteria such as the conventional GNP per capita yardstick, Singapore seemed to have 
crossed the developed economy threshold by the early 1970s. But Singapore resisted the graduation into 





the developed country category on the argument that its economy is too dependent on foreign investment 
and is externally vulnerable. The World Bank World Development Report in 1990 classified Singapore, 
together with other Asian NIEs, as being among the industrial countries, as did the OECD. The OECD has 
also made calls to all four Asian NIEs to join OECD, though none has taken up the offer except Korea. 
According to Hon (1992) by 1986, the NCB had made significant headway in achieving the objectives set at 
the beginning of the 1980s. The Civil Service Computerisation program (CSCP) was already having 
significant impact in almost every government department, with 23 computer installations, operating 50 mini 
and mainframe computers, and 370 information system professionals. 
In the 1990 National R&D Survey, R&D expenditure stood at S$571.7 million or 0.9% of GDP. In terms of 
R&D manpower, 7094 persons were engaged either full-time or part-time, and of these 61% were research 
scientists and engineers (RSE). The expenditure per RSE in 1990 was S$132,000 compared to S$111,000 
in 1987-88, reflecting the growing investment in R&D (Heng and Low, 1993.). 
Singapore's successful growth and development has been attributed largely to public-sector led strategies, 
These strategies have maximised Singapore's historical comparative advantage of location, itself enhanced 
over time with infrastructure facilities, trained and disciplined manpower, and conducive business and 
investment environment fortified with attractive fiscal and other incentives (Heng and Low, 1993; Sisodia, 
1992). The move to IT and advanced technologies, in general, by the Singapore's government was meant 
to avoid losing markets to cheap labour countries and exploit new opportunities. Changing comparative 
advantage indicated that greater gains were to be made from moving into high technology and high skilled 
activities. Another structural change is in terms of increasing 'servicization' of the economy into banking and 
finance, transport, communications and telecommunications, tourism and professional consulting services. 
In all these endeavours, efficient telecommunications, IT and related modern innovations clearly have 
important functions. In 1990, the service sector comprising commerce, transport and communications, 
financial and business services, and other services contributed 73.3Vo to total GDP and employed 6l.1% of 
the labour force (Heng and Low, ibid.). 
During the period 1980-89, foreign companies comprising wholly foreign-owned and majority foreign-owned 
companies formed 21-23% of all companies registered in Singapore. They owned between 34 and 40% of 
total equity capital invested, defined as amount of paid-up capital and services of a company during the 
period. The balance of foreign and local ownership has not changed much but the magnitude of investment 
has increased more than three-fold. Throughout of the 1980s, the five top foreign investors were the US 
(share of 19.6% in 1980 and 19.5% in 1989), Japan (10.9% and 18.3% respectively), the UK 26.4% and 
11.9%), Hong Kong (13.1% and 7.5%) and Malaysia (9.0% and 6.2%). However, their share of total foreign 
equity investment has fallen from 79.1% in 1980 to 63.4% in 1989, and only Japan's share has increased 
(ibid.). 
From being a 'basket case' in 1965 when it left Malaysia, Singapore was transformed into a newly 
industrialising economy, one that, unlike South Korea and Taiwan, did not have large domestic bases. It 
adopted an outward strategy, which is highly dependent on foreign investment and MNCs. Although there 
are high costs of dependence and vulnerability in markets and technology to be balanced against the 
benefits of accelerated industrialisation, Singapore seems to have forged a successful partnership. 
In short, when Singapore's labour surplus became labour deficit and the lower labour cost advantage 
disappeared, the logical step next was to upgrade labour skill and restructure the industry towards the high-
tech. That is exactly what Singapore did. It immediately recognised that information technology as an 





infrastructure and as an industry was very strategic to the island's economy and determined to venture into 
it. Now, it has one of the world's busiest seaports in terms of registered freight tonnage and the world's 
leading container port all computerised. It has an extraordinarily efficient financial market in the Pacific 
Asia. Even after the recent financial crisis in Asia, Singapore is still continuing with its goal of becoming a 
top Asian financial centre by restructuring its banks and its financial system. It has opened its banking 
sector with new bank licences for foreign banks and scrapping limits on foreign ownership in local banks 
(Reuters, Monday May 17, 1999). 
Singapore has been able to select IT as a pervasive technology and particularly suited to its economy, 
which is based on trade and services. In 1990, the World Competitiveness Report ranked it first in the world 
for the extent to which computer-based information technology is effectively used, and for the number of 
top managers understanding and using IT. Its IT policies and strategies were designed to serve the 
economy of the country. In this sense, we see a perfect match between S&T and economic policies. 
5.6.2 Brazil 
By the end of 1980s, Brazil had built up a significant platform in IT, particularly, in small computers, 
peripherals and various types of automation equipment for banks and industry due to the market reserve 
for national producers. Precisely because the policy was restrictive in the 1980s, the 1990s offer genuine 
policy choices about the degree of openness to imports and of collaboration with foreign firms (Schmitz and 
Hewitt, 1992; and Cassiolato, Hewitt and Schmitz, 1992). Relying on internally developed products was 
particularly efficient where strong user-producer relations were established as in banking automation 
(Cassiolato, 1992). 
Many aspects of innovation occur through transactions between firms that are partially or wholly outside the 
market. The importance of such interactions on user-producer relationships in banking automation has 
been crucial in Brazil. Brazil's banking system is technologically very advanced. It has developed and 
adopted technological solutions suitable to local needs and conditions and some of the locally developed 
systems are internationally competitive in price and quality made possible by the protection of the local IT 
policy (Cassiolato, 1992). The importance of learning by interaction between producers and users cannot 
be not ignored (Carvalho, 1992). The externalities required to justify protection are not as is the case of 
digital control producers In Brazil. Demanding users are equally important. The fragility of users - in the 
case petrochemical firms - led to the underutilisation of the new technology. A comparative build-up was 
not achieved in software. This is mainly because it never received effective protection. Hence internal 
producer-user loops, essential for application software, rarely developed (Gaio, 1992). 
The main defect of the Brazilian IT policy was that it did not feed into an overall industrial policy (Carvalho, 
1992; Cassiolato, Hewitt and Schmitz, 1992). Brazil's experience shows that even within the electronics 
complex, there were different and conflicting regimes for telecommunications and consumer electronics, 
contributions also to the relative failure in semiconductors. 
In spite of the enormous accumulation of know-how and skills, the achievements of 1980s remain fragile 
because of the country's economic crises. Studies of the differential impact which economic recession has 
for national and foreign firms' ability to produce computerised numerically controlled machine tools show 
that at the beginning of 1990s it is precisely the crisis which threatens to undermine the continued pursuit of 
long-run technological objectives (Porteous, 1992). Crisis management leaves little room for strategic 
industrial policy. The IT policy with all its limitations was an effective sub-sector strategy. It needed revising, 
but completely abandoning it may cause great damage to the whole process of technological learning. 





Learning by interaction is seen as essential for attaining competitiveness. Such learning rarely develops if 
equipment is imported from far away. Case studies carried out in the context of the Nordic countries 
confirm this. For instance, Denmark's specialisation in dairy machinery, Sweden's in metalworking and 
wood cutting technology and Norway's in fishery technology cannot be credited merely to their factor-
endowments. Closer interaction between producers and a competent and demanding user sector were 
essential in generating technological capabilities and in guaranteeing international competitiveness 
(Anderson et al. 1981). In other words, to place exclusive emphasis on either the production or use of new 
Technologies are to lose out on the dynamics of interaction. Brazil's case confirms such Nordic countries' 
experience. 
There is a strong case that country-specific user needs and a strong user-producer links shaped 
technological development in banking automation in Brazil. User designed their own automation systems 
and after failing to persuade MNC subsidiaries to produce machines that would fulfil their needs, they 
successfully developed and made systems in conjunction with domestic producers. Setting up user-
producer links has never been an explicit policy target. However, in emphasising local production by 
national firms the policy permitted user-producer links to emerge. A more effective utilisation of the new 
technology requires that producer develop user-specific solutions. To do so, close interaction between 
users and suppliers of both hardware and software has proved to be essential (Cassiolato, 1992; Calvalho, 
1992, Gaio, 1992). 
The first period of IT sector development in Brazil shows a pattern of excessive vertical integration. Some 
authors suggest that such a trend is responsible for the inefficiency of the sector (Frischtak,1992). In fact, it 
was necessary to verticalise production in the early stages of the industry in Brazil owing to scale and 
tolerance requirements for inputs. In other words, firms which supplied mechanical parts, plastics and other 
inputs to other industrial sectors, such as the auto industry, were not interested in supplying to the infant IT 
sector or could not attain their more demanding specification level. As a result, at the beginning, IT firms 
had to produce even plastic boxes and most mechanical parts of their computers and peripherals. This has 
changed substantially by the end of the 1980s. A recent survey of suppliers to the IT sector shows a 
network of approximately 2,000 specialised firms supplying parts and components to the IT firms. 
It should be pointed out that the foreign computer firms have contributed to the build-up of specialised 
suppliers. Not voluntarily, though, but because government policy forced them to buy locally. Thus the two 
bigger multinationals subsidiaries making mainframes in Brazil have around four hundred different internal 
suppliers of parts and components. 
Apart from Brazil, the developing countries, which have followed the most restrictive policies toward foreign 
capital in electronics, are South Korea and India. In South Korea there has been a close collaboration 
between national political and industrial interests in electronics, which gave a strong basis for restriction of 
foreign capital, As a result the Koreans have been able to 'negotiate much superior technology transfer 
deals' (Mody, 1987). Similarly in the early days of the IT industry, foreign capital was uninterested in 
collaborating with Brazilian capital. By the end of the 1980s both foreign firms that already had production 
facilities in Brazil and those wishing to enter the markets were more amenable to negotiate with Brazilian 
firms and the government over collaboration. In the intervening years, there appears to have been some 
pay-off to the policy of exclusion. Brazilian firms have built up a considerable technological capability not 
only in manufacturing but also in R&D (Cassiolato 1992; Hewitt 1988). They have also increased their 
bargaining strength with foreign capital. In the first international bid for licensed technology for 
microcomputers, in 1977, no leading foreign firm was interested in supplying technology to Brazil (Erber 





1990). In the second bid, for super-minicomputers in 1983, three large firms, DEC, Hewlett Packard and 
Data General, licensed technology to Brazilian firms. A recent survey of technological co-operation 
ventures between Brazilian IT firms and foreign suppliers listed 44 agreements involving 36 Brazilian and 
34 foreign firms. 
The Brazilian case does not fit in with stereotype views according to which locally produced hi-tech goods 
would not meet the technical standards of such firms. On the contrary the effective use of hi-tech is 
positively correlated with the establishment of local production and innovation capabilities. Furthermore, the 
behaviour of foreign firms both in producer and user sectors suggest that the key policy issue is not 
whether they should be permitted to play a role in industrial development. More important is the issue of 
how a developing country induces multinational firms and their subsidiaries to contribute to building up 
technologically dynamic industries. The IT policy in Brazil encountered increasing opposition in the course 
of the 1980s, from both outside and within the country. Indeed, internationally it has been one of the most 
heavily contested pieces of industrial policy. These pressures have contributed both to the relative success 
of this experience and to its limitations. 
Since the mid-1960s till the late 1980s, Brazil has strongly followed an inward-looking economic structure 
based on the import-substitution strategy. The 'market reserve' for the IT industry is an extreme example of 
it. This policy had mixed results but it forced the country to learn and absorb the technology and helped in 
laying the foundation of indigenous IT. But it is hard to speak of well-organised and integrated S&T and 
economic policies. Even within the IT industry itself, there was clear fragmentation and lack of integration 
among the various sectors. 
The Brazilian case shows that the absorption process of a new technology is a key determinant of the 
direction in which technologies evolve. In other words, the diffusion of technology and its development are 
simultaneously determined within any competitive market economy (Metcalfe, 1986). The environment 
shapes the pattern of technical evolution, which in turn redefines the environment. Different diffusion 
environments generate different patterns of technical advance (Georghiou et al., 1986). This means that 
there is country/region specificity in technological design. This is why the early stages of the development 
of a technology are so important for Third World economies according to neo-Schumpeterians (Freeman 
1982). The proximity of the users to the suppliers of an innovation plays an important role in the design and 
de-bugging of new products, especially hi-tech products. For this process to be successful, or even 
possible, the supplier needs ready access to a reasonably large constituency of potential users with the 
complete range of skills necessary to apply the innovation successfully or the expertise necessary to 
formulate problems for the innovator to solve (Walsh, 1988). As Katz (1987) pointed out, the empirical 
evidence shows that manufacturing firms in least developed countries make much less use of 
subcontracting than their counterparts in advanced countries. 
5.6.3 India 
The Indian experience is mixed. A study, which examines the Indian computer industry up to the late 
1970s, concluded that the policy of exclusion of foreign firms had opened up opportunities for local 
development of industry (Grieco, 1985). Similarly, Heeks (1991, 1998) argues that the restrictions on 
foreign capital in the 1970s helped to establish a local hardware industry with some internal capacity but he 
concedes also that many see the 1970s as something of a 'lost decade' for India in computing terms, In 
1984 the policy regime was liberalised in a number of ways including some removal of import restrictions 
and duties and opening up to foreign capital and India's image and activity as a global software player 





began to take off. This liberalisation seems to have had a two-fold effect. New firms established since then 
have relied mainly on screwdriver technology that is the assembly of copied products, often licensed from 
foreign firms. In contrast, those national firms established in the 1970s appear to have negotiated 
agreements with foreign firms, which further their internal technological capabilities. 
National spending on computer hardware and software in India was about 0.4 percent of GDP (1990), 
which was lower compared with software competitors - 0.6 for Mexico, 0.8 for Korea, 1.1 for h-eland, 1.3 for 
Singapore, and 1.4 for Israel. Most OECD countries spend between 3 and 5 percent of their GNP on 
hardware and software. India's information sector is also smaller than other Asian countries. Total value of 
output of information goods and services in India is estimated at 11% of GDP, compared to 26% for 
Singapore, 15% for S. Korea, and 14% for Malaysia (Kelkar, 1991). In terms of IT penetration into various 
sectors of the economy, such as manufacturing, transport, and finance, IT remains relatively marginal to 
corporate strategy and operations. Few small and medium-size enterprises use IT. 
As far as computer hardware is concerned, India has some way to go in order to become internationally 
competitive. The entire hardware industry for instance, including consumer electronics and electronics 
components, is predominantly domestic market-oriented. According to Hanna (1994) less than 6% of 
hardware production was exported in 1991. As with production, the exports of hardware witnessed a 
significant drop in 1991, largely due to reduced exports of IT products, which accounted for over 75% of 
total hardware exports in 1990. Similarly, computer exports dropped from a peak of Rs. 2.9 billion in 1990 
to Rs. 1.8 billion in 1991. The share of hardware revenue in total IT production has dropped from 44% in 
1990 to 37% in 1992, and profitability is under increasing pressure with the gradual liberalisation of IT 
imports. But the total domestic hardware market has increased dramatically in the last years. 
One of the main reasons for poor growth performance of domestically manufactured computer hardware 
and peripherals appears to be their excessively high prices, which have restrained effective demand for 
their use (e.g. microcomputer prices were twice higher than international prices). These high prices are, in 
turn, to a large extent, the results of high tariffs and other restrictions on both imported inputs as well as 
imported computers, indicating that policy changes have not gone far enough in enhancing competitiveness 
in this industry. 
The Indian software industry, although small by industrialised countries standards, has been growing at an 
exceptional compound annual rate of 21 percent between 1987 and 1991 in total, and 35 percent for 
exports. This growth is considerably faster than the 15 percent rate in the United States during the 1984-87 
boom period. However, when compared to the total industry performance of other competitor countries, 
India appears to be behind all of these countries except Israel (ibid. p.28). Indian software is in many 
respects still an "infant". Except for a few large firms that have become established as industry leaders, it 
consists of mostly small firms at a relatively early stage of professional organisation. The business know-
how and computer expertise of the Tata Group- Tata Consultancy Services and Tata Unisys Ltd. - and 
CMC, a public enterprise, have greatly contributed to early efforts to build the software industry. Over three- 
fourths of the companies have fewer than 25 professionals. The structure of the sector is highly 
concentrated with the top three vendors each selling more than US$10 million in software services and 
products. Approximately 95 percent of firms had software revenues of under US$100,000 per firm. A 
growing number of companies have exceeded $1 million in sales: from 15 companies in 1990 to 44 in 
1992; and 27 of them have exported over $l million each in 1992 (ibid. p.31). 
The export growth has come mainly from the provision of contract programmers to carry out low-level work 
("body-shopping" or "manpower contracts" in which the overseas buyer typically buys "hours" and not a 





total project or product with the associated management and high value-added technical services). Indian 
firms undertake mostly the routine tasks of coding and debugging - rather than higher skill tasks of design, 
analysis, and project management. These contracts are generally short in term, low in risk, low in value 
added, and low in investment, but they represent 70-80 percent of the country's export revenues. Typically, 
programmers are contracted out to work for a client at an agreed hourly or monthly rate for six to eighteen 
months. They perform data conversion or coding jobs, such as conversion from batch processing to on-line 
systems or conversion from source code to UND(-based systems. This has several undesirable aspects 
(ibid. p 32-33). 
Indian software services enjoy the lowest labour cost after China. It has one of the largest pools of labour 
supply, and has the advantage of Engli.sh speaking. But, compared with competitors, India has the 
disadvantage of poor telecommunications infrastructure, and is not above parity regarding the availability of 
specialised education and training and several other criteria. Moreover, it has yet to exploit the 'potential' 
competitive advantage of a large domestic market. This could help in acquiring experience in higher value-
added segments of software services and in tapping foreign expertise through joint ventures and direct 
foreign investment (InfoTech, 1 992). 
The software industry has been constrained by a number of factors such as underdeveloped domestic 
market, weak marketing, the inadequacy of finance mechanisms, the inadequacy of data communication 
infrastructure, the shortage of high quality software engineering education and training. Add to these the 
lack of policies concerning public procurement of software and software services, import restrictions on 
hardware and software, and lack of legal protection for software. Any strategy that wants to accelerate 
India's IT sectors and optimise the sector's performance will have to address these issues. 
India, as a big country, could use IT as an infrastructure to improve the productivity of other sectors. In fact, 
there are several large on-line transaction systems, including the railway‟s passenger ticket booking system 
and the Indian Airlines passenger reservations and departure control system. The railway's application, 
carried out by a local software company (CMC), provided a demonstrated effect of IT contributions to 
improved services for more than 11 million passengers a day, more than the total population of Belgium. It 
has reduced waiting time in the reservation queue from 80 minutes to five, and is reducing corruption as 
well. The Railways recently has proposed computerising freight and equipment trucking. But substantial 
improvements remain to be realised in the management of railways. 
India has been very slow in exploiting the full potential of IT to improve the government civil services, 
transport and communications, tourism, the financial sector, and trade in general. For example, 
computerisation of the Bombay Port and other major ports and customs is an imperative for expanding 
exports and attracting foreign investment. Moreover, national distribution systems for such basic inputs 
such as fertilisers and for basic foodstuffs could benefit substantially from improved databases and from 
computerised decision support and monitoring systems. The same could be done in the banking sector. 
The financial sector is one of the largest markets and earliest adopters of information technology, and in 
many countries financial applications have been a driving force for the development of a large local market 
for IT. In India, however, numerous constraints have retarded the adoption and productive use, among 
which is fear of labour redundancy, of modern information and communication systems by financial 
institutions and insurance companies. 
The government of India has always been criticised for red tape and inefficient bureaucracies. Politicians 
are increasingly looking to IT as a means to reform the public sector. The major aims are to increase 
efficiency, decentralisation of decision making, increase accountability, improve resource management, 





and marketisation (increase the use of market forces to cover the public sector where citizens and 
government are taken as customer-supplier). But India will take time to reform the public sector in a way 
that makes a difference for at present politicians either are ignoring it totally or idolising it as if the 
technology itself does the expected change. (Heeks, 1998).  
The general conclusion we make of India in terms of IT and economic policy integration is poor. The 
change in the IT industry is not well integrated. The few pockets of excellence are isolated ones. India 













6. Conclusions on NIEs 
Each of the NIEs represents different types of industrial development. Each country has a particular choice 
among strategic variables: the promotion of selected industries or of selected enterprises, fostering of 
particular types of industrial structure, reliance on domestic as opposed to foreign ownership of industry, 
and development of an indigenous base of technology and skills. Every choice requires different degrees 
and combinations of selective and functional interventions. It is not possible to talk in terms of one best 
long-term development strategy. The experience of the successful developing countries shows that 
different combination of incentives, capabilities and institutions, can lead to technological mastery. 
We need to recognise the limits and strengths of markets, as well as the strengths, and limits of 
government interventions aimed at correcting market failures (Stiglitz, 1989). Empirical studies have shown 
now and again that in developing countries markets do not function properly, hence, the need for 
government intervention. But at the same time the experience of developing countries is replete with 
instances of misguided intervention. Many of these failed interventions were neither economic nor truly 
selective. The relatively few cases of successful selective interventions that exist suggest that interventions 
are necessary in the widespread market failures. Consequently, improved methods of intervening are worth 
striving [or. Much depends on the competence, honesty and political strength of the policy makers: where 
governments are so weak or corrupt that selective interventions inevitably lead to the "hijacking" of policy 
by entrenched interests. Only then it is possible to say better to suffer market failure than pervasive 
"government failure" (Biggs and Levy, 1990). 
In this concluding chapter, we are going to evaluate and summarise all the experience of our sample NIEs 
based on the criteria developed in chapter 3 section 3.3.5. We have grouped them under S&T and 
economic policy integration, priority on IT as a pervasive technology, institutional capability, human capital 
formation, and technology and economic development. Besides, the lessons learned in terms of 
sustainability, flexibility and transferability, quality, priority and result have been given. We have kept the 
major lessons on IT separately at the end of the chapter. 
6.1 S&T and economic policies integration 
The experience of Brazil shows us that the neglect of essential relationships between technology policy and 
general macroeconomic environment could be very costly. In fact, in Brazil the scientific capability created 
did not contribute much to the building up of innovative capabilities. Thus, the economy did not benefit 
much in improving its international competitiveness. At least it remained behind that of the Southeast Asian 
countries. This is true with the exception of certain areas like the aircraft manufacturing, minicomputers, 
special steel, and armaments. 
Brazilian strategy, despite its heavy investments and major successes in some specifically targeted areas 
was to a large extent ineffective in achieving competitiveness for large parts of industry. It has set up large 
public enterprises and restricted foreign entry in certain sectors in an import-substitution framework. It did 
not effectively use the big government purchasing power to push technological development. It lacked a 
comprehensive scheme to promote the diffusion of technologies, particularly in the case of pervasive 





technologies like IT. On the .supply side, it did not sustain R&D activities by providing the necessary 
funding and establishing an effective system of co-ordination and planning. Its scientific institutions were 
more biased towards the natural sciences. 
India, on the other hand, from the outset followed the centrally planned and managed economic system, ala 
Soviet style in otherwise politically democratic society. It gave priority to the development of the heavy 
industry to be led by the public enterprises. Indian government was suspicious of private enterprise in 
general and large private firms and foreign investors in particular. Thus, barriers to entry, exit, growth and 
diversification were the pillars of the Indian strategy. Centrally planned prices and physical targets were the 
tools in the hand of government bureaucrats, which increased tremendously their power and led to 
corruption and inefficient administrative system. In all this process, India set up large network of S&T 
institutions, but these were divorced from manufacturing enterprises and were excessively bureaucratic 
organisations. 
Unlike that of Brazil and India, the other four Tigers did much well. They all invested heavily in technology 
innovation that was primarily oriented to commercial needs of productive enterprises and have in the 
process produced a large poof of scientists and engineers of high quality. Their policies were centred on 
the goal of creating internationally competitive industries. 
Hong Kong stuck to its light industry without pushing in the technological upgrading of its manufacturing 
industry and has built its economy on light industries based on simple technologies, lately increasingly 
investing in mainland China to exploit the available cheap labour'. Of course, is has continued to build world 
class financial institutions and as a trade centre. 
Korea went the indigenous technology development and its policies consistently followed the path of 
technological independence. Korea protected and promoted strategic industries, set up public enterprises, 
directed investment at the sector and often the firm level, and promoted exports by several direct 
measures. It did intervene in technology transfer agreements and technology development, restructured 
industries and enforced labour training. Even today a strong element of guidance remains in place. 
Particularly, it encouraged and facilitated the building of an industry capable of achieving economic of scale 
to improve international competitiveness through the Chaebols. Heavy investment in S&T research through 
the various private and public institutions were designed to enter the high-tech industry like the 
semiconductor, auto industry, and electronics industry in general. 
Taiwan also protected emerging industries, guided expansion along peculiar lines and had a very active 
technology development policy. It mainly differs from that of Korea in not going for big firms (Chaebols in 
Korea), but rather concentrated in providing support to small and medium-sized firms. This strategy proved 
to be more flexible and less risky than that of Korea. Of course, the more risky South Korean strategy 
permitted larger leaps into high technology activities. 
Taiwan and Singapore followed the path of partnership with TNCs to learn and master the foreign 
technologies and clearly pushing for high-tech industries. Singapore in contrast to South Korea and Taiwan 
relied entirely in technology generated elsewhere but intervened selectively to induce investors to move up 
the technological scale and provide a well-trained workforce. This might give a false impression that 
Singapore was less interventionist than the other two, not at all. In fact, Singapore has earned the name of 
'technopreneurial nation' to mean that the country is managed by an elite group, like you manage an 
enterprise. 





Generally speaking, Brazil and India are more advanced in science than the Tigers while these are more 
advanced in industrial technology (Reddy and Sigurdson, 1997). This is to mean that Brazil and India have 
advanced science base, which is working on conventional technology, while the tigers have low science 
base but working on advanced technology. The strategy followed by the tigers is more sustainable in that 
their industrial revenue is allowing them to invest more to advance their science base, what they are doing 
aggressively. The strategies of Brazil and India have shown difficulties in terms of sustainability because of 
their recurrent economic difficulties and they need to do more to keep the balance. 
6.2 Priority given to IT 
Singapore, like South Korea and Taiwan, has given priority to the IT industry and this has grown 
tremendously and its export value, in some cases, has even surpassed that of textiles. To a lesser degree 
this is true also of Hong Kong. But Singapore seems to emerge high above all the others in the IT 
infrastructure development. 
Singapore's vision and IT policies, all point into the direction that IT is a priority. While that of Brazil and 
India, IT policies are mainly the result of import-substitution strategies or as part of the broad S&T policies. 
Singapore is building its economy around IT. It all started in early 1980s with civil service computerisation 
and IT skill development to support the expansion of the indigenous computer software and service 
industry in general. A decade later', it jumped to a more ambitious plan, the IT 2000 master plan, to change 
the island into an intelligent global city. 
Singapore chose IT as a priority technology because of its pervasive nature and jumped into it to exploit the 
new opportunities of the first comer and retain its position as a trading and service-hub in the region. It was 
meant to improve the productivity and competitiveness in every sector of the country's economy and to 
continue to develop a strong export-oriented IT industry. This was to be achieved, as the usual trick of 
Singapore, by attracting and motivating the TNCs. Now IT infrastructure of Singapore is becoming the envy 
of many countries. Singapore is the first country in the world with an advanced nation-wide information 
infrastructure, which allows computers in any part of the country to be interconnected both to one another 
and to other computers located anywhere else in the wor1d. 
We don't find a vision driven IT development in Brazil. The 'microelectronics market reserve‟ concept 
launched in the mid-1970s was based on the classical import-substitution model. It was meant to create 
national capability in IT and reduce technological dependence as well as using IT as an infrastructure to 
strengthen the economy and its defence force. The idea of international competitiveness in IT 
manufacturing industry was remote. It did succeed partially because the whole IT policy was not well 
integrated and the economic crisis of the country made it difficult to sustain more investment in IT. 
India's strategy for electronics, in 1970s, was to achieve an import-substituting, self-reliant, public sector led 
growth with very little role of monopoly houses and foreign companies. While its software industry emerged 
in 1980s, more to globalisation trends rather than a conscious policy-led results, and Indian politicians were 
quick to link it to Indian public administration reform (increased efficiency, decentralisation, increased 
accountability, improved resource management and marketisation). This enabled it to get some attention 
from the politicians and more policies to help the diffusion of IT are likely to come. The slow liberalisation 
process started in the 1980s is going to help increase the international competitiveness of Indian IT industry 
as a whole, particularly that of IT manufacturing. 





6.3 Institutional capability 
Braz.il did invest considerable money for institutional development such as R&D institutions, higher 
education institutions, defence research and heavy industry. But it is hardly possible to say that Brazil has 
an integrated 'national innovation system'. Its S&T institutions in general in the past were fragmented and 
could not effectively solve problems beyond their individual capabilities and their conflict of interest could 
not bring them together. Besides, its institutions were frustrated by lack of adequate funds to sustain their 
growth. A bias towards the basic sciences as opposed to applied technologies was clear weakness that 
made sustainability difficult. Nonetheless, Brazil has been able to establish institutions to support local 
innovations such as providing quality control systems, help adaptations and acquisitions of foreign 
technologies, providing national consulting services and scientific and technological information centres. 
Since institutional maturity can only be measured by the result achieved in the international arena rather 
than by the number of institutions established, Brazilian institutions as a whole did not perform particularly 
well compared to the Southeast Asian countries as measured by international competitiveness. 
India on other hand has some traits similar to that of Brazil, but always in its own unique way. Both 
countries are similar in not been able to create S&T institutions well integrated into their economic systems. 
India is well known for its world class institutes of technologies and R&D institutes, but failed to tap all the 
scientific and technological outputs for commercial development and improve its international 
competitiveness. S&T institutions were build on the premise of the 'free play of intellect', which is at the root 
of divergence of interest between industry and the scientific institutions. These two sides could have been 
integrated by a well-thought macroeconomic policy that includes and defines the contribution of S&T 
institutions to the development of industry and society in general. This was absent in India. It was also true 
of Brazil to some extent. For example, the typical paradox of India can be shown in its excellent R&D 
institutions in IT hardware industry where some impressive technological competencies in advanced 
computing such as artificial intelligence have been achieved. But it did not properly create links or joint 
projects with local software companies to commercially exploit it. The institutional break between the S&T 
institutions and industry is made clear again, which retards the achievement of international 
competitiveness. Of course, India's case was more complicated by the huge number of administrative 
institutions because of the path of planned economic development. These multiple controls of its 
macroeconomic policies resulted in large price distortions and led to inefficient use of resources and the 
consequent lag in international competitiveness. 
The Southeast Asian countries are a different class from the above two, Brazil and India. They were 
particularly good at recognising early enough the importance of international competitiveness as the long-
term test for sustainable economic development. All their S&T effort was directed by this very idea. That is 
why Korea and Taiwan, like Japan did it before, were very keen in identifying key industries to nurture and 
lead to maturity with all the means available to their governments. Korean institutions were very busy 
creating and supporting big private conglomerates, the Chaebols. Korea has succeeded to enter into the 
international market in high-tech industry in big leaps. The price paid is a less flexible oligopolistic economic 
structure that emerged. Its particular weakness has been particularly evident in the recent financial crisis of 
East Asian countries. 
The intervention of the Taiwanese government, on the other hand, has succeeded following different path 
to that of Korea. Taiwanese government institutions, the myriad of small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs), and the TNCs and foreign buyers have been able to forge an integrated institutional framework 
beneficial to all parties. Globalisation trends and outsourcing in manufacturing opened an opportunity for 





the Taiwanese SMEs to specialise at the foot of TNCs in specific niche markets. But slowly and surely 
some Taiwanese firms are emerging to compete in the international arena on their own with their own 
brand names (example ACER). The government selectively intervenes, usually through joint ventures; in 
the development of strategic technologies that could enable Taiwanese companies remain competitive in 
the international markets (example IC industry). The typical Taiwanese economic structure dominated by 
the SMEs makes it more flexible and less risky to manage and adapt to changing global trends.  
Singapore's institutional capability is made evident by the world class infrastructure and institutional support 
to economic and social development of the country. The government, as an institution, is strong and 
efficient. Singapore politically has no diversity and is dominated by a single party where divergent political 
views are not encouraged. On the economic side, it is wide open and TNCs consider it the second home. 
Its education and training institutions are of very high standard. 
Educational and training institutions in Singapore are among the best in the world. The telecommunications 
infrastructure is among the most advanced in the world. The Port of Singapore is one of the best in the 
world. TradeNet of Singapore is the first electronic data interchange system in the world implemented on a 
national scale to link all parties involved in international trade. Its financial institutions are of international 
standard in direct competition to that of Hong Kong. It has class transport and communications and catering 
services. Most of all, these different institutions work together in perfect harmony in the knowledge that they 
are interdependent. 
Hong Kong is the least interventionist country from among the NIEs we are discussing. It has been able to 
create a lean and efficient administration, sound and transparent legal system, and free information flow. IT 
has been able to create a financial institutional capability of world class, fifth largest banking centre in the 
world. Its financial sector is considered very good with suitable institutional and regulatory framework left to 
the market. After 1997, Hong Kong is back under Chinese control. New institutions are created to make 
possible the 'one country and two systems' work in harmony. But its institutional capability to upgrade its 
manufacturing technology is lagging behind the other tigers.  
6.4 Human capital formation 
The East Asian NIEs have the largest stock of human capital relative to their size, in a broad sense, while 
Brazil comes next to them and India is at the bottom of all. India has the largest absolute supply, although 
of highly variable quality, and graduate unemployment and brain drain are real problems. The same pattern 
is again found with regard to training and engineering education and quality of education with the East 
Asian countries leading and Brazil and India following. 
South Korea and Taiwan are in a different class from Singapore and Hong Kong. They have larger relative 
technical skill endowment and they are capable to tackle more complex and demanding industrial 
technologies. Hong Kong is behind even Singapore. Reverse brain drain has been observed in Korea and 
Taiwan, while Singapore is aggressively recruiting from the international poof of skilled manpower, 
particularly scientists and highly skilled professionals. 
Coming to IT skills and comparing Singapore, Brazil and India, we find that Singapore has made a 
tremendous progress while Brazil and India did less. Singapore starting from a pool of only 850 IT 
professionals in 1980 has increased the poof to about 25,000 in 1999. On the other hand Brazil and India 
have not been able to keep up to the demand in IT skills, particularly quality wise. The growth of IT skills in 
Brazil was particularly attributed to the side effect of the 'market reserve'. Computer firms themselves were 





producing IT skills to meet their needs through the in-house training. In India the demand for trained 
software personnel is greater than supply, and the shortage is considered a major constraint to the 
expansion of the industry, given also to the acute problem of brain drain of the top skilled group. This is 
because the quality and relevance of training in the public sector is very low. Very few, between l0 to l4 per 
cent of the larger organisations offer good quality programs. 
6.5 The melting pot: technology management and economic development 
Policies, institutions and skills are always found together and they are inseparable. Policies and strategies 
show the path to the achievement of the national economic development goals. Institutions become the 
instruments to blend vision and objectives of the country to that of the firms and individuals to make sure 
that everybody is pulling in the same direction. S&T policies can be best tested on the ground if they are 
able to bring about the economic and social benefits to all the involved parties. Institutional capability 
matures when the individuals, with their talents and skills, feel fulfilled in the role given to them to play by 
the organisation in which they work. And the organisations, in turn, feel the same .in relation to the industry 
and the country in which they operate. When all these organisations work complementing one another and 
work in harmony in an atmosphere of continuous learning and improvement, then, one can hope the 
country is in the right track to develop the full potential of its institutions. But the final test remains the 
competition in international arena. When these institutions are capable to work better in some services or 
products relative to other competing institutions from other parts of the world, then, the wining relationship 
has been found and that leads to greater international competitiveness. 
Now and again it has been proved that in advanced technology, government intervention can work wonders 
if properly timed and managed. A classical case, of timely and selective intervention, is the Silicon Valley in 
Santa Clara county, California, where the semiconductor industry is based, was a „peaceful agricultural 
valley' in the 1940s (Saxenian, 1985). In the 1950s, a few firms moved to the county to take advantage of 
the science-park set up by Stanford University. By 1970 the region has gained international fame with 
highest concentration of high technology enterprises. The history of Silicon Valley presents an example of 
how an industry dependent on the science-park in turn generated substantial and significant externalities 
both within the industry and with rest of the economy. Government support was vital in nurturing the 
nascent silicon industry in the early 1960s. Prior to WW II, the US electronics industry was less developed 
than the British or the German. But Europe lags behind the United States in this industry now. This 
development has been attributed to the catalytic role of the government in the United States (Malerba, 
1985; Saxenian, 1985). US defence and space programs provided the market and the funds for the 
industry. 
This is not confined only to microelectronics technologies. In the 1950s, growth in agricultural production 
and productivity in Punjab was relatively low, but since the 1960s it has consistently exceeded the national 
average. From 1965-66 to 1978-19, cereal production in the Punjab grew by 1Q.7Vo per year compared 
with 5Vo for the whole of India. The adoption of new technology, for wheat in mid 1960s and rice in the 
early 1970s, was the main lesson for this change in performance. Markets were undeveloped and the 
government had to do something about it. Five areas were identified to generate substantial externalities in 
agriculture in Punjab: technology development, irrigation, credit, informational markets, and human capital. 
In each case, government policies acted to offset market weaknesses (Stewart and Ghani, 1991). 
A clear area where the government needs to intervene is in the development of skills. As development 
proceeds, more difficult technologies are used and the need for more sophisticated and specialised 





education/training grows. To the extent that the education "market" lacks information on these specialised 
needs, or under invests in providing facilities of the right kind and quality, there arises the need for selective 
intervention. Moreover, since there is a serious risk of private under-investment in training at the firm level 
when labour is mobile, human capital development requires measures to induce more investment to 
support employee training, by firms individually or co-operatively, or by governments where private agents 
consistently under invest. These measures may be functional, applied to all activities, or they may be 
selective, targeting emerging sectors. 
The policies must also cover the development of institutions external to firms, to provide information, 
standards, basic research and other similar "public goods" relevant to capability development (Grossman, 
1990). As development proceeds, moreover, institutional interventions may grow more selective as the 
initial basic needs are met and markets function more efficiently. 
Therefore, the development of capabilities is the outcome of a complex interaction of incentive structures 
through government interventions to overcome market failures to form the necessary human capital, to 
increase the technological effort of the country and develop the necessary institutional capability to support 
the economy achieve international competitiveness. It is the interplay of all these factors; in a given country 
settings that determine how well individual producers learn the skills and master the information needed 
Chapter 6 Conclusion: Newly Industrialized Economies to cope with industrial technologies. The same can 
be said at the national level, how well countries employ their factor endowments, raise those endowments 
over time, and grow dynamically in the context of rapidly changing technologies is very crucial to increase 
their international competitiveness. Thus, S&T policy and management is a very complex issue. To look for 
one single best approach is not wise. Determination, persistence and long-term view of capable 
governments are very crucial. Clear policies, well-trained and skilled manpower, strong institutions and their 
co-operation and networks are always at the basis of successful development. Obviously all of these 
require huge investments and long-term commitment anything less cannot produce results. Since the 
developing countries are disadvantaged from this point of view, they need a great deal of international 
assistance, particularly the least developed among them, to help them help themselves. 
The information technology sector may be viewed as a source of productivity growth in all economic 
sectors - that is, as an important infrastructure - and as an industry in its own right. This study supports both 
views but emphasises the first, since this is where most of the benefits are likely to come from for late 
comer industrialising countries. Governments can play a catalytic role in developing this infrastructure and 
in piloting and demonstrating various services to utilise the new infrastructure and stimulate the effective 
use of these services in support of economy-wide competitiveness. 
Governments are influencing the overall development of the IT industry in both the advance and developing 
countries. They have also invested heavily in the computerisation of key public and social services, tax and 
customs administration, public financial management, public infrastructures, and public information 
services. More recently, public sector agencies are learning to use information technology to promote 









6.6 Lessons Learned from NIEs 
General lessons 
There are important general lessons learned from the experience of the NIEs. The most important are 
classified into issues of sustainability, flexibility and transferability, quality, priority and result. 
1. Sustainability 
To use S&T as a base for economic and social development successfully, one needs to build it gradually in 
a sustainable manner. 
- Investment made today in S&T should be sustainable also tomorrow. A classical example, we have 
it in the Soviet science and technology system. It was serving mainly the Soviet military power and 
was not linked to economy of the country and proved to be unsustainable. Soviet Union collapsed 
and its scientific institutions as well. Entire science cities have been abandoned and become ghost 
cities unable to sustain their continuity. India particularly seems to have, to some degree, followed 
a similar pattern but long-term sustainability will become difficult if it is not linked soon enough to 
the economy. Brazil's S&T movement was linked to the military government at the beginning 
emphasising nuclear research. Its bias towards the basic sciences may be traced to it. While the 
East Asian countries emphasised the light industries before going to the more demanding heavy 
industries and high-tech industries for the same reason of sustainability and have succeeded. They 
have outperformed, in economic terms, both Brazil and India. 
- Skill generation and retention should be sustainable and should grow with demand. The other 
advantage of starting from the light industry is that they are less skill intensive. At that stage brain 
drain can be less problematic. As you climb the ladder of higher technologies you need higher 
skills and brain drain problem becomes serious. Retention of skilled workforce should be given 
importance. If the economy is growing, as it did in the East Asian countries, then reverse brain 
drain will also possible. But as the case of India proves it, developing huge number of skilled 
manpower without in parallel developing the industry to absorb them for long time does lead to 
heavy brain drain problems. 
- Proliferation of institutions in not sustainable. This can happen when the activities of various 
ministries are not co-ordinated and they have a free hand. They can make more damage than they 
can help because duplication is inevitable and rivalry possible. To undo it can be very costly. 
Therefore, it is better to be careful at the start. There is huge number of S&T institutions in India 
and Brazil, which are not well linked leading to inevitable duplication of efforts and smaller budgets. 
- Basic sciences or basic research have a long gestation period, therefore, developing countries 
should keep them to the minimum necessity. But technical and engineering skills have immediate 
relevance to the industrial technology development. Thus, they are more sustainable because they 
are directly active in the productive sector. In this respect, the tigers have done it right. 
- National consensus on major S&T policies and projects increases sustainability. Different 
interested groups may pull in different directions. You need their backing. Otherwise the aggrieved 
parties will frustrate implementation. The very size of India and Brazil makes it difficult to have 
national consensus on any big national investment project and also time consuming. The tigers 
have an advantage because of their smaller sizes and strong governments. They have managed to 
have consensus on important national S&T projects by bringing aboard all the major stakeholders. 





- Government's expenditure should be always within the manageable limit. Otherwise financial crisis 
leads to austerity measures starving, in the process, deserving science and technology projects. 
This was particularly true of Brazil. India has incredibility managed to keep a high expenditure, 
level relative to its economy, on R&D but the return has not been exiting. 
2. Flexibility and transferability 
The S&T environment is rapidly changing. Keeping up with continuous change is a must. Scientific 
discovery or technological innovation in one area can have an impact to the other areas. Therefore, ability 
to adapt quickly and transferability of skills and knowledge should be always kept into the equation. 
- When old techno-economic paradigm changes and a new one are coming, the old S&T institutes 
may become less relevant. This is the time when these institutions should adapt or face death. Old 
cows should be allowed to die peacefully or face the consequence of feeding them without getting 
back anything in return. 
- Political ideologies should not guide the development of S&T because makes one insensitive to 
actual market demands and, thus, it is less flexible to change. 
3. Quality 
Quality is a relative term. The best measure is relative to immediate competitors. Here, we are talking of 
policies, institutions and human resources. Their mere presence does not guarantee success. Therefore, 
the culture of quality should be nurtured early on in the process of technological development of developing 
countries. 
- Not only number of skilled workforce but also quality of skill is crucial to technological development. 
- Not the number of institutes but the quality and the co-operation among themselves is crucial. 
- Polices should not be only a declaration of intentions but must be implemented. It is not the type of 
polices that matter most, but the quality of implementation. 
- It is not the presence or absence of TNCs that help or hinder the technological development but 
the quality of relationship between local private enterprises, the TNCs and the government that 
matters most. 
- It is not whether a government should intervene or leave everything to market forces. It is the 
quality of intervention that matters most. 
4. Priority 
Are all S&T equally important to rapid economic development of the developing countries? 
- Some are more important than others depending on time and circumstances. 
- IT, at the present time, is the most pervasive technology that can contribute to improve to the 
productivity of all sectors. 
5. Result 
S&T as the basis of economic development of a developing country can be best measured by the 
contribution it makes to that particular country in the international competitiveness. 
- Excellent institutes in isolation cannot help in achieving international competitiveness. 
- Highly skilled workforce with poor management cannot bring international competitiveness. 





- Even market forces alone, in the developing countries, cannot get result without government 
support, particularly in the high-tech industries. 
- Too much government intervention and control hampers the market operation and the rent seeking 
behaviour abounds to the detriment of competitiveness. 
Particular lessons on IT 
Institution level efforts to invest in and manage information technology have to draw heavily on information 
from external sources, including suppliers and consultants, and inputs from technology institutions, and 
from overseas. Even large firms find it too costly to collect information on alternative information 
technologies, sources and prices. This is particularly the case for imported and fast changing technologies. 
The most successful countries like Korea and Japan have helped importers and adopters of IT by 
developing specialised agencies or programs for information acquisition and dissemination. 
The problems of inadequate availability of reliable information on technology choices, of biased information 
from suppliers, and of information asymmetries between multinational suppliers and local users are 
pervasive in information technology and most acute among small and medium-size enterprises. Therefore, 
developing countries need to take appropriate actions with regard to IT diffusion. The following are 
suggested based on the lessons from the NIEs. 
The main lessons about policies and programs for IT diffusion in industry and services are as follows: 
- The policy context is crucial because it defines and co-ordinates the role and activities of the major 
players in the national innovation system of a country. It includes trade, industrial, technology and 
competition policies - as well as IT-specific policies to improve access to, and to create markets for 
information technology products and services (as though public procurement). 
- Government can lead or play a catalytic role in developing IT policies, manpower, computerising 
public administration and financial services, diffusing IT application among small and medium-size 
enterprises, promoting software and computer services, mobilising local and global information 
resources, and inducing collaboration among public, private, academic, and foreign agencies. 
- Technology parks and incubator facilities that provide shared infrastructure and support services 
are important for clustering and networking, and for providing key services for small and medium 
software and information services firms. 
- Demonstration projects can be extremely persuasive in addressing the entrepreneur and 
technologist‟s scepticism. These projects should involve real users in real work settings, not 
showpieces in research institutes. 
- Collaboration among suppliers and users is often necessary to match supply with demand - and 
networks, clearing-houses, intermediaries, private associations, and other channels are vital to 
effective adoption and diffusion of new information technologies. 
- Consulting and extension services often subsidised for early adopters of IT, are especially 
important for small and medium-size enterprises. IT adoption often requires changes in core 
business processes, so the risks go beyond the investment costs for IT. For small and medium-
size enterprises, diffusion programs typically use cost sharing to reduce risk and induce users to 
take manageable risks. 
- The business problems and technological capabilities of users should be well understood to design 
diffusion programs. Potential users need to see the business rationale for adopting information 
technology and the ways it can improve their competitiveness. 





- Firms need complementary human resource development programs for adopting and managing 
information technology. 
- Public agencies should rely as much as possible on contracting out systems development and 
computer support services to the private sector, in view of the fast pace of change in IT and the 
limitations on the civil service to develop and maintain a large and responsive in-house information 
systems organisation. 
- The lack of any central oversight and a critical mass of in-house expertise in the public sector often 
hinder the sharing of information, common applications, bulk procurement, and lessons of 
experience, and the development of information standards and protocols and common information 


























SSA countries are traversing very cloudy and turbulent times. They need a new breed of leadership with 
strong vision and feeling of the promised land of peace, stability and work. 
 
In Part ll we are continuing what we started in Part I. We are still answering the first study question but in 
SSA countries. Therefore, we are trying to answer the question: What is the state of S&T policy and 
management in SSA countries? What is the state of their IT? Of course, the state of S&T and its integration 
with the socio-economic development is the major concern. The fact that these countries are still heavily 
dependent on primary goods production and export shows that industrialisation has still to mature in Africa. 
industrial technology is at rudimentary stage. And as whole this part of the world is known as the least 
developed and technologically backward. What went wrong? The next chapters will shed light on this 
question. 
The structures of the following chapters are the same as in Part I. It starts from a broad S&T policy analysis 
and implementation to IT policies and implementation. International environmental factors, policies, 
institutions, human capital formation and the melting-pot where the integration of S&T or IT policies with 
economic development plans are assessed. Finally the lessons derived are summarised. 
 
  












7. S&T in Sub-Saharan African Countries 
7.1 Introduction 
The following three chapters deal with the SSA countries. Similar to what we have done in Part I about the 
NIEs, we will continue in this part also to look separately into S&T in general, IT in particular and concluding 
remarks for the SSA countries. It is clear that SSA countries are way back by every measure from the NIEs. 
The question is whether S&T have matured to support a healthy socio-economic development in SSA 
countries or not. Let us find out if the poor economic performance is linked to the poor S&T base available 
in these countries. 
The section has been organised in a way suitable to answer the question 'Where do the SSA countries 
stand with regard to S&T?' Therefore, the environmental context in which S&T is evolving in these 
countries, the institutional capabilities they have been able to create, the human capital formation achieved 
and the consequent learning and international competitiveness will be discussed. 
SSA countries include all but the Northern African countries. This research excludes also South Africa 
because it is a special case with less SSA characteristics. Most of these countries have the lowest per 
capita income in the world, which ranges between US$90 of Mozambique and US$750 of Zimbabwe in the 
37 low-income groups of countries. While among the middle-income group the range goes from US$1,050 
of Equatorial Guinea to US$6,880 of the small island of Seychelles. The countries at the top of the per 
capita list in SSA countries are: Botswana, Cape Verde, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Mauritius, 
Mayotte, Namibia, and Seychelles. That of Seychelles, Gabon and Mauritius is higher than that of South 
Africa (US$3,400). But all of these countries are small with the exception of Namibia, which is big in 
territorial size (823,000sq km) and small population of 2 million people. For example, Seychelles has only 
78,000 people and the remaining all are below 1.5 million people and territorial size below 28,000sq km 
(Table 7.1). 
Closer look into the GDP growth of these 37 low-income countries shows that during the 1990-91 period 
only 11 countries grew relative to their respective growth during the previous decade, 1980-90. Particularly 
three countries, Mozambique, Uganda and Lesotho showed the fastest growth. Mozambique's GDP during 
the previous decade was growing at an average of 1.8 percent per year while in the 1990s grew at an 
average of 6.9 percent. Uganda's growth was more than double the previous decade, from an average 3.1 
during the 1980s to 7.2 percent during the 1990s. That of Lesotho grew at slightly less than double of that 
of previous decade, from an average of 4.3 during the 1980s to 7.6 during the 1990s. Ethiopia also grew 
during the 1990s at double of that of 1980s, from an average of 2.3 to 4.5 percent, but it was far below the 
average growth shown by the previous three. The others that showed improvement in their GDP growth 
during the 1990s are Benin (from 3.2-4.5%), Ghana (3.0-4.3%), Malawi (2.3-3.6%),Mali (2.9-3.3%), 
Mauritania (1.1-4.3%), Niger (0.1- l.5%), and Nigeria (1.2 – 2.7%). Eritrea‟s average GDP growth is 
estimated to be 6.5% or 7% during 1993-97 but there is no base of comparison in the previous decade; the 
country was not independent yet. 
 





















Growth of the econ.; annual % growth of value added 
For 1980-90 and 1990-97  
GDP Agriculture Industry Services Exports 
Low-income countries 
Angola 11 3.8 J40 8.4 0.7 -5.7 5.1 -3.0 5.6 
Benin 6 2.2 380 2.3 4.5 5.1      5.1 4.1 4.1 -3.1     3.3 
Burkina Faso 11 2.6 240 3.2 3.3 4.1 1.9 2.7 -0.4    -2.4 
Burundi 7 1.2 180 -10.4 -3.7 -2.8 -8.0 -3.0 -3.2 
Cameroun 14 9.1 650 -1.7 0.1 3.2 -3.8 -0.5 4.7 
Central Africa 3 1.1 320 -0. 1.2 1.5 0.1 0.7 -1.2      0.6 
Chad 7 1.6 240 - 1.8 5.4 0.0 -0.5 3.7 
Comoros 0.518 0.0022 400 - - -           - - - - 
Congo, D.R. 47 5.1 110 -5.0 -6.6 3.0 -15.9 1.2   -17.4 9.6     -8.8 
Congo, Rep. 3 1.8 660 -0.6 0.7 0.9 0.6 0.5 6.3 
Cote'd'Ivoire 15 10.2 690 14.4 3.0 2.6 4.2 2.8 1.9      5.0 
Eritrea 3.8 0.801 210 - - - - - - 
Ethiopia 60 6.5 110 21.4 4.5 3.0 4.1 6.9 8.6 
Gambia 1.18 0.409 350 - 5.2 - - - - 
Ghana 18 6.6 370 4.7 4.3 2.7 4.3 6.1 7.1 
Guinea-Bissau 1 0.3 240 -6.5 3.8 5.5 2.7 1.4 -1.7    14.9 
Kenya  28 9.3 330 3.5 2.0 0.8 2.0 3.6 2.3 
Lesotho 2 1.4 670 12.7 7.6 4.0 11.8 6.0 9.9 
Liberia 2.894 - - - - - - - - 
Madagascar 14 3.6 250 -0.9 0.8 1.7 1.1 1.0 -1.7     4.0 
Malawi  10 2.3 220 -7.9 3.6 4.7 1.9 2.7 3.3 
Mali 10 2.7 260 15.1 3.3 3.4 7.0 2.1      1.8 6.4 
Mauritania 2 1.1 450 4.0 4.3 5.0 3.7 4.0 0.1 
Mozambique 19 1.7 90 3.6 6.9 4.6 -5,2     2.3 10.4 9.3 
Niger 10 2.0 200 3.0 1.5 2.3 -1.7     1.3 -0.3     0.9 -2.9     0.8 
Nigeria 118 30.7 260 0.7 2.7 2.6 -1.1     0.5 4.8 -0.3     3.6 
Rwanda 8 1.7 210 10.6 -6.3 -5.8 -11 -6.9 3.4    -15.3 
Sao Tome & Principe 0.138 0.038 270 - - - - - - 
Senegal 9 4.9 550 6.9 3.1       2.4 2.2 4.1      3.7 2.1 1.0 
Sierra Leone 5 0.9 200 -12.8 -3.3 -1.5 1.7     -6.4 -2.7    -3.9 0.2    -18.4 
Somalia 10 - - - - - - - - 
Sudan 27.86 7.801 280 - 6.4 - - - - 
Tanzania 31 6.6 210 - - - - - - 
Togo 4 1.4 330 -4.4 2.2 14.7 2.0 -0.3  -20.6 1.3 
Uganda 20 6.6 320 9.9 7.2 3.8 13.0 8.5 17 
Zambia 9 3.6 380 - -0.5 - - - - 
Zimbabwe 11 8.6 750 5.8 3.4      2.0 3.1      3.8 3.2     -0.8 3.0      2.7 10 
Lower-middle-income 
Cape Verde 0.399 0.436 1,090 - - - - - - 
Djibouti 0.636 - - - 23.0 - - - - 
Equatorial-Guinea 0.421 0.444 1,050 - - - - - - 
Namibia 2 3.6 2,220 4.1 -      106.6 4.3 2.9 -0.2     4.2 4.4 
Swaziland 0.952 1.369 1,440 - 4.1     2.6 -           - - - - 
Upper-middle-income 
Botswana 1.51 4.922 3,260 - 7.8 -           - - - - 
Gabon 1 4.9 4,230 1.2 2.6 2.3 2.7 -0.3     3.3 - 
Mauritius 1 4.3 3,800 0.4 5.1 0.3 5.5 6.3 - 
Mayotte 0.108 - - - - - - - - 
Seychelles 0.078 0.537 6880 - 2.4 - - - - 
S. Africa 38 130.2 3,400 13.0 1.2      1.5 2.9      2.5 0         0.8 2.3      1.8 - 
Source: World Bank, World Development Report, 1998/99. 





From the remaining, 18 countries showed decline in their GDP growth in 1990-97 relative to that of 1980-
90. Five countries in particular showed negative GDP growth during the 1990s: Burundi, Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Zambia. Kenya's GDP growth during 1990-97 was 2.0% per 
year, which was by half less than that of 1980-90 growth of 4.2% per year. 





1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 
World (billion) 60.7 129.1 315.1 2,002.0 3,415.3 
LDCs (billion 18.9 28.3 57.9 573.3 738.0 
SSA (billions $) 2.0 3.8 8.0 49.4 36.8 
Share of LDCs as % of world 
exports 
31.1 21.9 18.4 28.6 21.6 
Share of SSA as % of world 
exports 
3.3 2.9 2.5 2.5 1.1 
Share of SSA as % of LDCs 
exports 
10.6 13.4 13.8 8.6 5.0 
Source: UNICTAD 1979, 1989 and 1991, table 1.1, elaborated by Simon et al. (1995) and quoted in Castells (1998). 
It is not difficult to show that the SSA countries are at the margin of the global economy. The world export 
shire of SSA decreased even from the 3% that it used to be in 1950 to 7.7% in 1990 (Table 1.2).It was not 
able to maintain its share as per cent of that of LDCs exports, which decreased from 10.6% in 1950 to 5.0% 
in 1990. This is a very poor performance by all measures. There are many reasons for it. The major factors 
are explored in later sections. 
Table 7.3: Structure of export (percentage share), 1990. 











SSA 63 29 1 7 1 
East Asia and 
Pacific 
13 18 22 47 19 
South Asia 6 24 5 65 33 
Europe 9 16 27 47 16 
Middle East % 
North Africa 
75 12 1 15 4 
Latin America & 
Caribbean 
38 29 11 21 3 
Low & Middle-
income countries 
31 20 15 35 12 
Low-income 
countries 
27 20 9 45 21 
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No. Of patent 
applications filed 
in 1995 Primary Secondary 
1980 1995 1980 1995 1980 1995 Res. Non-
Res. 
Low-income countries 
Angola - - - - - - - - - - 
Benin - 3.1 - 59 - - 177 - - - 
Burkina Faso 2.6 3.6 - 31 - 7 - - - - 
Burundi - 2.8 20 52 - 5 32 - - - 
Cameroun 3.2 - - - 15 - - 3 - - 
Central Africa - - 56 -  - 55 0 - - 
Chad - 2.2 - -  - - - - - 
Comoros - - - -  - - - - - 
Congo, D.R. 2.6 - - 61  23 - - 3 15 
Congo, Rep. 7.0 5.9 96 -  - 461 12 - - 
Cote'd'Ivoire 7.2 - - -  - - - - - 
Eritrea - - - -  - - - - - 
Ethiopia - 4.7 - 24  - - - - - 
Gambia - - - -  - - - - - 
Ghana 3.1 - - -  - - - - 42 
Guinea-Bissau - - 47 - 3 - - - - - 
Kenya  6.8 7.4 91 - - - - - - 28,728 
Lesotho 5.1 5.9 66 65 13 16 - - 8 2,608 
Liberia - - - - - - - - - - 
Madagascar 4.4 - - - - - 22 3 21 15,802 
Malawi  3.4 5.7 43 100 - 66 - 3 5 28,868 
Mali 3.8 2.2 20 25 - - - - - - 
Mauritania - 5.0 - 60 - - - - - - 
Mozambique 4.4 - 36 40 - 6 - 5 - - 
Niger 3.1 - 21 - 4 - - - - - 
Nigeria 6.4 - - - - - 15 - - - 
Rwanda 2.7 - 59 76 - 8 12 - - - 
Sao Tome & Principe - - - - - - - - - - 
Senegal - 3.6 37 54 - - 342 55 - - 
Sierra Leone 3.8 - - - - - - - - 5 
Somalia - - - - - - - - - - 
Sudan - - - - - - - - - - 
Tanzania 4.4 - 68 48 - - - - - - 
Togo 5.6 5.6 - 85 - - - - - - 
Uganda 1.2 - 39 - - - - -  20,840 
Zambia 4.5 1.8 77 77 - 16 - - 4 90 
Zimbabwe 6.6 8.5 - - - - - 5 56 177 
Lower-middle-income 
Cape Verde - - - - - - - - - - 
Djibouti - - - - - - - - - - 
Equatorial-Guinea - - - - - - - - - - 
Namibia 1.5 9.4 - 92 - 36 - - - - 
Swaziland - - - - - - - - - - 
Upper-middle income  
Botswana -- - - - - - - - - - 
Gabon 2.-7 - - - - - 189 32 - - 
Mauritius 5.3 4.3 79 96 - - 361 1 3 4 
Mayotte - - - - - - - - - - 
Seychelles - - - - - - - - - - 
S. Africa - 6.8 - 96 - 52 - - 5,549 5,501 
Source: World Bank, World Development Report, 1998/99.  





These evidences seem to point to one thing. The gap between the developed countries and that of SSA 
countries is increasing at increasing pace in the last three decades. These are the decades when 
'knowledge' is increasingly emerging as the power behind the economic performance of countries. II has 
played a significant role in this knowledge generation race and increased its speed. All of this is happening 
at a time when the SSA countries are not even aware of it or seem not to have the necessary resources to 
do something about it. This research is arguing that if SSA countries do not take action before it is too late, 
their fate may be catastrophic. 
A closer look at the structure of SSA countries' exports show that 92% is made up of primary products, an 
economic structure that did not change much from the colonial period four decades ago (Table 7.3). Of this 
63% is made up of fuel minerals and metals, which is basically the extractive industry dominated by the 
multinationals with insignificant spin off effect on the rest of the economy. 
It is very clear from Table 7.4 that SSA countries have insignificant S&T capability. AII the indicators give us 
a dismal picture. This research, as it has done in the previous two chapters with the NIEs, will show that 
increased international competitiveness is not possible by following the traditional way of confining oneself 
in the supply of primary products only but by mastering the necessary knowledge (science and technology). 
It will show that the SSA countries are losing ground with every passing year. 
7.2 Environmental context 
In a recent World Development Report by Word Bank (1998/99) 37 of SSA countries are classified as 
lowest income group which is about 70% of all African countries. Their economics are the least developed 
in the world and heavily dependent on aid for development. Their political environment is that of instability, 
civil wars and, recently, regional wars are on the brink of erupting ones again in the region of the Great 
Lakes and the Horn of Africa. The legacy of colonialism is still visible. 
Basically SSA countries have two faces, the modern and the traditional. The modern is usually found in the 
urban centres and the traditional in the rural areas. Mamadou Dia (1996:3) has a point in arguing that most 
African countries found themselves saddled with a hybrid and disconnected institutional system. The formal 
or modern institutions transplanted from outside, mostly as a result of the colonial heritage had been 
superimposed upon indigenous, informal institutions characterising the civil society and reflecting its culture 
and tradition. The result was institutional disconnect with more far-reaching ramifications than in Latin 
America and Asia, which also underwent the colonial experience. African countries experienced a 
'disconnect' between the state and the civil society, between the formal and informal private sectors, and 
between the corporate and societal culture. Many African rural communities and nomads are completely 
cut off from the mainstream economic and social life of the country. 
The colonial legacy is nowhere more evident than in the fact that SSA countries are made as the suppliers 
of prime products to factories of colonial masters and the extension of their own markets. This is true even 
today. Most of the SSA countries depend on the export of few primary products. If we see the World Bank 
report (1989), between 1965 and 1987 the proportion of exports accounted for by primary products rose 
from 92 to 94 percent in low income African countries while falling slightly from 95 to 90 percent in middle-
income countries. This was the result of a colonial economy that destroyed the intra-African trading 
systems, which were not Europe-oriented, and the capture of their resources (Young, 1986, p.28). But 
continued specialisation on primary products did not give comparative advantage to the African economies. 
Primary product prices are subject to more severe fluctuations than manufactures which gives rise to 





special difficulties for economic management (See Macbean, 1966; Ranis and Fei, 1988). Specialisation on 
primary product offers less in the way of economies of scale and learning than manufactured exports. 
Moreover, the large share of world exports of African Economies in certain commodities, together with low 
price elasticity, mean that increases in output result is less than proportionate increases in earning 
(Stewart, Lall, and Wangwe, 1992). 
Following the dismal performance in the process of industrialisation, MF and the World Bank pressed for 
structural adjustment of the African economics. The Bank's structural adjustment policies have also 
contributed to the exacerbation of the situation by focusing on expansion of the traditional primary export 
production. Instead of doing something concrete to alleviate the foreign debt burden, this is crippling the 
poor countries‟ economies in Africa. The Bank has been preaching austerity measures beyond the capacity 
of most African countries. These coupled with mismanagement of the economy and corruption in the 
government and the recurrent drought has thrown millions of Africans into extreme poverty, which has 
become a way of life. 
The political situation is even worse. Stable governments are rare. Too many military coups, civil war and 
corrupt dictators. Democracy has yet to grow. People are increasingly losing confidence in their 
governments. Foreign investors find Africa still full of political risk with the exception of few. Peace and 
political stability plays a determinant role in economic development. Countries enjoying the high economic 
growth rates are invariably those with strong leadership and relatively smooth successions and virtual 
freedom from pending civil upheavals (Whitaker, 1986). Exclusionary practices that could keep some from 
participating in administrative, policy, and economic decision-making are therefore very likely to sow the 
seeds of institutional and political instability. There is an enormous need for leadership commitment to a 
more inclusive institutional formula behind which entire nations can rally (Dia, p. 250). Moreover, 'the 
channelling of virtually all lager investments through government, and complex licensing and allocation of 
foreign exchange often create rewards for loyal allies and windfalls for the government officials who 
administer them' (Whitaker, ibid.). Most of the time this leads to the corrupt government systems observed 
in Africa. Arthur Lewis (1965) already had said that African leaders demand to be treated like Egyptian 
pharaohs and to be a minister is to have a lifetime's chance to make a fortune. The challenge is, therefore, 
the creation of stable, transparent, accountable and more efficient government civil services. 
The impact of the 'cold war' on the Sub-Saharan African countries has been tremendous. At a time when 
the two camps were very busy enlarging their zone of influence, Africa was again divided among the West 
and the Soviet Block in a new subtle way of new colonisation of ideology. Access to economic aid was very 
much dependent on your affiliation. At the times of fighting for political freedom, socialism was trendy in 
many parts of Africa. Any country wanting to attempt a third way was considered a suspect and was 
increasingly isolated. The 'non-aligned' movement of countries was trying to create a new forum but it was 
not an influential movement. 
The SSA countries operate now in an international trade increasingly unfavourable to them. Currently the 
big and powerful developed countries dominate the international trade. A clear realignment in the 
international markets is taking place. In the foreseeable future the international trade will be dominated by 
the three trading blocks: North American trade block, the European Union trade block, and Asian trading 
block. The black continent is nowhere. The scientific and technological backwardness is there as the 
biggest stabling block to this continent to take its right place in the international trade and economy. 
The SSA countries did attempt to redress the scientific and technological deficiency in the early 1960. The 
time was when most of them got their freedom from the colonial rule. It was clear that the strategies 





followed in the past had made the.se countries completely dependent on their previous masters. Something 
had to be done. International agencies tried to help in the development of S&T development in Africa and 
the first conference under the auspices of UNESCO was held. It is considered a landmark. It was in Lagos, 
Nigeria, in 1964. The conference was about Organisation of Research Training in Africa in relation to the 
study, conservation and utilisation of natural resources. The conference adopted the Lagos Plan for 
Scientific Research and Training in Africa. The goal was to assist African governments in taking appropriate 
steps for the advancement of scientific research with the help of international co-operation. 
In 1967 in Yaoundé, Cameroon, was held the Symposium on Science Policy and Research Administration 
in Africa. The purpose of the Symposium was to evaluate the situation regarding science policy and 
research organisation in the light of Lagos Conference and to analyse and forecast national science policy 
situation according to geographical, political and economic realities. 
In 1970 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, from 5-16 October a Regional Symposium on the Utilisation of Science 
and Technology for Development in Africa was held. The Symposium trade 43 recommendations relating to 
policy-making and planning in S&T; human resources for scientific and technical development; 
infrastructure for S&T; national resources survey; research and development; industrial research and 
development; and regional co-operation in S&T. 
Castafrica I was held in Dakar, Senegal, from 2l-30 January 19'74.The major topics were: trends of S&T 
policies in the countries of Africa, new technologies and the possibilities for their development and 
application in Africa, scientific and technological co-operation in Africa. This conference gave to participant 
countries the means and opportunity to exchange information about their respective S&T policies; and 
promoted scientific and technological research and international research co-operation. Thirteen years 
later, the CASTAFRICA II was held in Arusha (Tanzania) from 6 to 15 July 1987. It debated and evaluated 
the progress of S&T since CASTAFRICA I; it debated also science and technology policies for rural and 
industrial development; and the bases for scientific and technological development (education and training, 
scientific and technological research, science and technology services). It strongly appealed to the 
Governments of African Member States to define and implement clear national S&T policies and allocate 
the resources necessary to strengthen their scientific and technological capabilities. Using S&T for the 
judicious exploitation of the natural resources of the continent was considered the only way to improve the 
standards of living of the peoples of Africa (UNESCO, 1988). 
If one sees the concrete actions taken by the African countries in terms of S&T policy organs established, 
some change has been made. For example at the time of CASTAFRICA I only Algeria, Egypt, Gabon, 
Tunisia and Ivory Coast had ministries explicitly assigned the responsibility to formulate a national S&T 
policy while other twelve countries had established some kind of S&T or Research .councils. Reports show 
that the number of S&T policy organs has increased significantly since CASTAFRICA I. In 1979 such 
organs increased from 69 to 157, i.e. 88 new bodies were created. The number of ministries increased from 
5 to 18 for natural science research; from 2 to 25 for medical research: from 4 to 21 for industrial research, 
from 7 to 25 for environmental research (Forje, 1987). In 1991, With exception of Cameroon, Congo (Rep.), 
Cote d' Ivoire, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, and Senegal that had an adequately functioning Science & 
Technology bodies, all the rest of SSA had fairly stable or poorly organised S&T bodies (UNECA, 1991). 
Institutional development has mainly benefited agricultural research and research in the economic and 
social sciences. Capabilities in the engineering and technological sciences in the overwhelming majority of 
African countries have changed little since CASTAFRICA I (UNESCO, 1988, p. 175). 





With regard to manpower development, African countries have not been able to achieve the targets they 
set in GASTAFRICA I by 1980. The exception is Egypt. Nonetheless, the number of scientists and 
engineers more than doubled from 1970 to 1980, i.e. from 18,589 to 40,812 (UNESCO, 1986, SC-
87/CASTAFRICA II/REF 3, p.24). The number of students in higher education rose from 142,000 in 1960 to 
1,169,000 in 1980. 
The resource allocation decided by Dakar conference was at least 1% of GNP by 1980. But 'the average 
percentage of GNP allocated by African countries falls within the range of 0.2% to 0.5%. Some African 
countries have even noted regressive trends in GNP allocations (See Forje, in A. Ahmad (ed.), 1993). 
UNESCO launched in 1989 the Priority Africa programme along the lines of emphasis outlined in the Lagos 
Plan of Action for the Development of Africa (1980-2000). In pursuance of these aims, UNESCO organised 
in 1995 a Conference titled 'Audience Africa' designed to identify priorities for Africa development, which 
produced a series of recommendations on capacity building in Africa. In order to help in the capacity 
building, UNESCO's Intergovernmental Information Programme (IIP) has introduced informatics into the 
education system in selected African countries. IIP plan is to extend its activities under Regional Informatics 
Network for Africa (RINAF) to include a growing number of African institutions to further consolidate the 
joint activities of African scientists in education and administration. Moreover, UNESCO is promoting the 
development of a Satellite University of Science and Technology (SUST), an inter-university network to 
broaden global education exchange Via Satellite broadcasting (hup://www bellanet 
org/partners/aisi/policy/entry,/Nigeria htm). 
In the last few decades, the rapid industrial expansion has been associated with a rising standard of living 
in Asia leaving SSA further behind. We cannot attribute this dismal performance in SSA countries to the 
colonial legacy or to flaws in the post-colonial African ruling class. Rather, some patterns of state behaviour 
and structure that arose out of the character of the colonial state and the ways in which the post-colonial 
state adapted its colonial legacy contribute toward an understanding of the dimensions of the present crisis  
(Young, 1986, p.26). Furthermore, it can also be attributed to the poverty of 'knowledge' and lack of political 
will and determination. It is from this context that we need to look for a window of opportunity to exploit a 
good S&T (in its broader sense) policy to initiate an adequate industrial technology in order to escape from 
the vicious circle of poverty. Particularly IT can play a major role in acquiring information and knowledge 
and disseminate it where required. Not only that, it could be a valuable tool in the way we produce and sell 
goods and services. At the end, that would help the SSA countries to escape the increasing marginalisation 
from the global economy. But this is simpler said than done. The following section will show how complex 
and painful can be to grow and mature as internationally competitive economy. 
7.3 S&T policy 
The S&T in relation to economic development in SSA is an area least researched. The literature shows lack 
of systematic coverage and what is available is fragmented and anecdotal. The aim of these two chapters, 
therefore, is to use the available material and understand the factors underlying of the vicious circle in 
which these countries are found. Similar structure to that used in Part I of the research with the NIEs is 
followed as much as possible. 
Vision and goals 
SSA countries departed with a great vision at the time of their independence from the colonial powers. This 
vision was one of a quick industrialisation. The la.st four decades dismal performance has shaken that 





vision. The confidence is very low. At times, in extreme cases, some think that there is no hope for Africa 
because it is increasingly marginalised from the global economy. But African people can never afford to 
lose that vision of a continent of peace, stability, and prosperity. It happened in South Africa when the 
situation seemed hopeless and, now, it seems Nigeria will be next to see some glimpse of hope for 
manmade disasters, which is mostly the case of African countries, can be undone. Therefore, the vision is 
still the same: making Africa a continent where people can work in peace and harmony to develop all their 
human capital resources to exploit properly its rich natural resources. It is to gain a respected place within 
the international community and gain a fair share of the global economy. 
The Lagos Plan of Action, say that the long-run objectives of the SSA countries is (i) the alleviation of mass 
poverty and improvement in the standard of living of the people; (ii) self-sustained development; (iii) 
national and regional self-reliance. Stewart, Lall and Wangwe (1992) call it 'sustainable economic growth 
combined with social justice'. But what could be the role of S&T to bring these socio-economic objectives 
into reality? The two have never been integrated consciously. To avoid this, trends and priority areas of 
R&D and related activities have been discussed in meetings of experts from the region, for example 
meetings organised by UNESCO as a follow up of CASTAFRICA I in Nairobi in 1983 and in Dakar in 1985. 
The identified priorities were achievement of food self-sufficiency; combat desertification, rational 
development and exploitation of rivers, lakes and oceans; exploitation and valorisation of mineral 
resources; valorisation and dissemination of research results; use of national languages for the 
popularisation of science; enhancement of the role of social sciences in the assimilation of technology and 
innovation by people at large; encouragement of appropriate technologies and their diffusion and 
commercialisation; and the selection, assimilation, and adaptation of imported technologies (UNESCO, 
1988, p189-90). 
SSA countries governments are, in general, fully aware of the important role that S&T can play in the socio-
economic development of their countries but very few have a clearly defined national S&T policy aimed at 
ensuring the systematic use to achieve development plans. On the other hand there are few with relatively 
developed science and technology policy-making bodies (Senegal, Cote d'Ivoire, Nigeria, Ghana, Kenya, 
Cameroon and Congo Republic) (UNESCO, 1986, 1987). In the national S&T policy of these countries we 
encounter the following S&T objectives: 
- -to determine the overall orientation of national S&T policy (provide policy advise to the 
government, determine technological priorities appropriate for supporting the socio-economic 
development, to prepare plans and budgets, and to develop endogenous science and technology 
and less dependent S&T capability); 
- -to build and manage the national science and technology system (invest in S&T infrastructure, to 
create effective research co-ordination system, to develop scientific and technological manpower, 
to control brain drain, to encourage the scientific and technological development in all sectors with 
adequate resources, to develop research institutes where necessary, to strengthen regional and 
international scientific and technological co-operation ); 
- -to execute R&D and provide S&T services (to build up national documentation and information 
centre for dissemination of scientific and technological research results, establishing patenting 
system, provide local consulting services in technology transfers, promote S& T awareness within 
the society at large, ).  
In general, priority was given to agriculture, food processing and storage, afforestation and desertification 
control, traditional medicine, communicable disease control, energy, mineral resources, technology 





assessment and the appropriate technologies, administrative and social sciences, instrumentation and 
information services, and the popularisation of science. African countries have to catch-up in S&T if they 
want to really give a better living standard to their people. In a world that is changing very fast, the danger 
of being left out is very high. In fact, the information technology revolution has increased the power of 
mankind to generate knowledge. But Africa does not have this power yet. This means that the more time is 
lost in catching-up the more will be the gap between the developed world and the less developed countries. 
That may mean 'being condemned for ever for a life of poverty without hope'. Therefore, Africans need to 
master all the 'knowledge' they need to break the circle of poverty in which they are trapped. To learn as an 
individual, to learn as a community, to learn as a country and to learn as a region bound by this one 'goal' 
requires a strong leadership, people with a clear vision and determination that can inspire confidence and 
enthusiasm to their people. This is the key to every development strategy. But how do we get or make such 
'leaders'? May be Africa needs to learn how to 'uncover' its leaders as well. 
Science & technology policy 
It is rare to find in SSA a country with a macroeconomic policy well integrated to and assisted by S&T 
policies, including that of developing the required highly skilled manpower to achieve economic and social 
development. Polices were frequently changing, particularly during the cold war time, as a result of 
countries going back and forth from the capitalist to the socialist camps. Other times, apparently good 
policies were rendered ineffective because what is said and done was different, i.e. policies were only 
paper work or rendered so by weak, corrupt and ineffective governments. At other times it was the political 
instability in these countries the culprit. Anyway, the origin and development of S&T in SSA countries is 
linked to the colonial past. After independence many of these countries sought the help from UNESCO and 
other UN agencies in the field of S&T policy formulation. UNESCO did organise a number of international 
meetings to increase awareness and to promote S&T for the socio-economic development in Africa. The 
countries we have mentioned above with functioning S&T bodies have received technical assistance at one 
time or another from LINESCO and other UN or other international development agencies. But a lot 
remains to be done. 
Recently, a professor of Addis Ababa University was lamenting the disconnect that exists between the 
research policy, S&T policy and development policies. In his own words, 'A .sound research policy, 
correctly articulated with the country's S&T and development policy as a whole, is needed if the general 
objectives of the Addis Ababa University are to be promoted. A key component of this policy is obviously 
scientific, as it will be impossible to respond to our countries needs without the wise use of science in 
developing the biological, human, social and economic resources of the country' (E.Bekele, 1996). He 
suggested that the academic individualism prevalent in his university be replaced by integrated systems 
approach where multidisciplinary research is encouraged, and the professional separation of technologists 
from economists and of training from research, that is commonplace, be discouraged. Given that this is a 
typical problem of SSA countries, the suggestion is valid for all to boost scientific and technological 
research for social and economic development of their countries. Now we will first go over the economic 
and industrial policies in SSA countries, as these give the clues of the implicit S&T policies, and then, we 
will be back to discuss the limited explicit S&T policies. 
To understand how S&T policy can contribute towards the successful achievement of socioeconomic 
development objectives, we need to explore the experience of SSA countries' performance first. There are 
three types of explanations suggested in the literature about the failure of the economic performance in 
SSA countries. One is the inward oriented, heavily protectionist trade policies and the interventionist price-





distorted industrial policies adopted (Berg Report) which led to adjustment packages by the Bank. The 
second is the deteriorating terms of trade and the worsening debt situation that have caused an import-
drought which has starved industry of essential imports and consequently brought industrial development to 
a half (external shocks). The third is the weak industrial capability and deficient institutions. Now, let us give 
some brief explanation of the conflicting analysis made of the dismal performance of the SSA countries. 
In the ongoing debate of SSA economic performance, S&T has never been a big issue. One of the main 
reasons is that SSA countries are at the initial stage of industrialisation where simple labour-intensive 
technologies are more relevant. The same was true of the East Asian Tigers three-four decades when they 
were starting their industrialisation process. Usually S&T are associated with high-tech or R&D at the 
technology frontier and as such are considered less relevant to SSA context. But in reality, even the so-
called simple technologies need institutional support to become effective. We will witness again and again 
that SSA countries failed to establish a working industrial structure based on mature technologies through 
sustainable technology transfer mechanisms. The lower labour cost should have given them competitive 
advantage. But effort to increase the skills of the labour force to increase labour productivity and the 
creation of able management cadres is even missing. All add up to make a very sad picture. SSA countries, 
therefore, need at the very heart of their policy debate the skills of their people and their productivity, the 
support to relevant technology transfer and management, and entrepreneur culture development, which are 
all elements of S&T policy debate. Let us have a quick view of the ongoing debates and we will try to relate 
it to S&T policy and management later on. 
Most SSA countries were engaged in a massive programme of state-sponsored industrialisation after 
independence. As a result, the industrial sector grew on average by 8 percent per annum during the 1960s 
and accounted for 15 per cent of the region's GDP. For a variety of reasons, however, such a rapid 
expansion could not be sustained, and a process of de-industrialisation started. One of the major factors is 
the 'development-related debt' which ultimately resulted in the 'debt crisis' of SSA. We do agree with those 
writers that have concluded that when the expected growth and development did not materialise and, 
instead of contributing to the process of development, these development loans retarded it by pre-empting 
an increasing share of their limited foreign exchange resources for debt service payments (Abbou, 1993). 
The structural adjustment advocated by the World Bank, requiring many African countries simultaneously to 
increase the production of supply of traditional exports is responsible, in part, for worsening terms of trade 
in the 1980s, and will lead to a continued deterioration if the same policies are followed in the 1990s. This 
conclusion applies to major minerals - copper, aluminium and petroleum - as well as crops (See Stewart et 
al., 1992). For example, coffee and cocoa, accounting for nearly half of SSA earnings from agricultural 
primary products, Africa's share of world exports exceeds the price elasticity of demand. Thus 'an increase 
in the volume of SSA exports would definitely result in a fall in earnings'. A similar condition almost obtains 
in other commodities, including sugar; groundnuts and sisal, together accounting for over 60 percent of the 
SSA agricultural exports (see Godfrey, 1985: 32). 
Import liberalisation is an important element of most structural adjustment packages. Although the 
devaluation of the exchange rate offsets some of the effects of the adoption of undifferentiated import 
liberalisation, this reform tends to have a sharply negative effect on industrial activity. It is true that 
previously highly protected industry cannot compete with international competitors, particularly when at the 
same time they are denied of money to restructure and invest in better technologies to meet competition. In 
fact, the deindustrialisation observed in many countries in the 1980s can be explained by the shortage of 
foreign currency. Assuming the financial crisis was not there milder, selective and temporary protection with 





greater use of tariffs rather than quotas could be effectively used, i.e., phased out over a ten-year period as 
efficiency increases (Stewart, Lall, and Wangwe, 1992). Regional trade to increase the size of the market 
with protection could be used in the context of export-oriented policies. But protection need be 
complemented by selective interventions in factor markets to ensure that the skills, knowledge, 
infrastructure and institutions needed for competitiveness are forthcoming (ibid.). 
Furthermore, the absence of efficient large and medium sized indigenous private sector and the lack of 
interest shown by foreign investors to invest significantly in Africa makes the privatisation of public 
enterprises as neither desirable nor politically or economically feasible (Adam and Cavendish, 1991). The 
recent reforms in China could be a valuable lesson to SSA countries. China set up holding companies to 
reduce political interference. IT raised market pressures through increasing domestic and external 
competition. It reduced subsidisation of public enterprises and allowed joint ventures between parastatals 
and foreign companies. Therefore, what is needed is to increase the efficiency of parastatals through 
increasing managerial incentives and autonomy (ibid.). 
Jamal and Weeks (1993) show that there was a general decline in export performance during the 70s and 
80s in SSA countries. Of the 15 countries for which comparable data were available, real export growth 
was negative for only two during 1965-73, whereas it was negative for as many as 11 during 1973-84 and 
remained so for nine years during 1980-90. Further, while SSA countries had a considerable better export 
performance than all low income countries in the earlier period, they fared considerably worse 
subsequently. They reject the conventional explanation that blame the poor policies of the SSA countries 
(overvalued exchange rates, monopolistic marketing boards which set up crop prices, higher levels of 
taxation, subsidies, and higher and less uniform protection for industry and more use of direct controls). 
There is no documented profound policy shift sweeping the SSA region during the 1970s. But the fall in 
terms of trade of SSA, which was considerably higher than for developing countries taken together and in 
particular for low-income Asian countries, is one of the major contributing factors that led them into a deep 
economic recession and stagnation. 
Wage earners have been represented as a privileged and perhaps parasitic class in SSA Observers across 
the political spectrum endorsed it. It fitted well into the neo-classical anti-wage-labour bias, and even the 
'inappropriate technology' school agreed with the neo-classicists that wrong techniques were being used 
and that no set of relative factor prices would put the matter right. But Jamal and Weeks (1993) argue 
against it and wonder why 'the Great Depression of the West brought on a thorough going reappraisal of 
accepted economic wisdom. On the contrary, the Great Depression of Africa has prompted in the West the 
rejuvenation in development economics of precisely the dogma, which the crisis of the 1930s had 
discredited once and for all'. 
Many have also voiced strong criticism against corrupt government systems in SSA countries. They say 
that confidence in the public sector is ever diminishing. These are full of inefficiencies and 
maladministration. The once Executive Secretary of the Economic Commission for Africa, Adedeji correctly 
said that the poor economic management of economies in Africa has put a question mark on the ability of 
the public sector to play a dynamic role in the development process. They have become 'a self- 
perpetuating, self-centred and self-aggrandising cabal' (Ravi Gulhati, 1989, p. 57). Some leaders have 
gone too far to plunder the economy such as the Mobutu of Zaire and some military leaders in Nigeria 
becoming the real problem to industrialisation and development, in otherwise richly endowed countries. The 
political instability of many SSA countries can be even attributed to the kind of political leadership they 
have. 





Now that we have given some of the major economic policy debate, let us turn specifically to S&T issues. 
The available limited S&T capabilities in SSA countries can be seen in the above broader context in order 
to have a better understanding of the complex issue at hand. 
The de-industrialisation process, that started after the oil shock of 1973-4 and continued during the 1980s, 
has raised a number of questions particularly those of S&T development in Africa, which is the interest of 
this research. Even though, the Dakar Declaration of 1974 (see Appendix 4) was very explicit about what 
should be done to redress the African scientific and technological capacity, nothing had been done to avert 
the de-industrialisation in SSA of the 1980s. We do contend that SSA countries failed in the process of 
industrialising because their macroeconomic policies were not integrated with appropriate technology 
transfer choices and implementation management. At the same time the political and social environment 
was not conducive for development in general. Now let us focus our attention on the S&T policies and the 
structure of the policy-making bodies in its dynamics. 
The international agencies such as the UN - through its various Departments such as UNESCO, UNECA, 
UNDP, and WHO - has tried to assist African countries to reverse the vicious circle through better health, 
education, and S&T development. The thinking of these agencies have been guided by the firm belief that 
Africa should have the necessary human capital to be able to take its fate in its own hand. In this line, 
UNESCO (1979) has proposed and tried to promote an S&T model to help the poor developing countries 
get out of their vicious circle. The model is also known as the 'UNESCO Model'. This model is composed of 
five parts: 
1. Planning: setting technological goals and developing matching policies and action programmes for 
achieving them;  
2. Co-ordination: monitoring other institutions' activities in technological fields and aligning them with 
existing policy;  
3. Implementation: carrying out specific action programmes in selected technological areas; 
4. Advice: providing information to the government and the public on technological issues; and 
5. Advocacy: mobilising support and resources for the advancement of technology. 
This model advises that the place of such an institution preferably be in the office of the head of state under 
the direction and supervision of the president of the country himself. 
With the belief that S&T policy instruments are very useful to accelerate the development of science and 
technology, particularly for the less developed countries, the 'UNESCO model' has been pushed on to 
them. Let us have a closer look at it. This model is based on the notion that technology policy (or plan) is 
the legal and political expression of a nation's leadership desire to enhance the contribution of scientific and 
technological capabilities for national development. It was meant to reduce the tendency and attitudes of 
the productive sector to rely on foreign technology. In other words it is a deliberate choice, it is a 
commitment to that choice, and it is the act of co-ordinating all the activities the leaders of that given 
country make in order to achieve a sustainable development. Otherwise, every individual enterprise and the 
different government ministries, departments and institutions will pull in different directions and the 
economic development will be hard to achieve. UNESCO model's framework incorporates technological 
priorities (choices); building up of indigenous technological capabilities (strategies to be adopted); 
technology transfer mechanisms; infrastructures suitably equipped with skilled manpower and equipment to 
meet operational international standards; funding institutions and enterprises with defined roles in the 
development of indigenous capability; co-operative models for mutual benefit at regional and international 
level; definition of policy instruments from planning to evaluation of performance by various institutions, the 





objectives of the national development plans being the yardstick throughout; and the gradual building up of 
a national potential in high technologies. 
Early on, we have been discussing about macroeconomic policies because they set the ground for the S&T 
policies. Policy-making bodies are the prerequisite for the development of appropriate S&T policies. This is 
an area where a lot remains to be done in the SSA countries, even though, considerable improvement have 
been made in this regard. One of the major constraints for such bodies is lack of resources. We do 
perfectly agree with Vitta (1993) when he says: 'So disproportionate are the means and the ends that the 
institutions lack of resources amounts to an unspoken agreement between the institutions and their 
sponsors not to take their mandates too seriously.' 
With regard to the requirements of the UNESCO Model, Vitta (ibid.) says that even those institutions that 
claim to be directly under the office of the head of state never get the personal attention they expect. They 
are mere formalities. The power conflict between the technology policy institutions and the ministries is in 
the very structure of the way many African countries work. It is a recurring feature in the statutes of many 
African institutions for technology policy for the state to enact a statute requiring an institution to regulate 
activities of rival institutions hierarchically at a par with it, or even above it. This amounts to installing a bias 
towards failure in that institution right from the outset (ibid.). 
If you look things from the professionals' point of view, you would see a different picture. It is possible to 
say that African professionals are not completely free to exercise their expertise. Particularly in regions 
where there are repressive regimes, the.se professionals refrain from giving their expert advice for fear of 
reprisals from those in power. To avoid this they prefer to exactly do what they are told to do rather than to 
risk. Anyway they know that only those people that know 'how to win friends and influence people' will end 
up making the decisions. Usually the professionals are not among them. If you are pushing a particular 
policy very hard and it is not liked by those who control power for whatever reason, you may end up 
labelled as 'the opposition' and soon will lose only your job, if you are lucky. 
At times the institutions have the fund and the right policies but the 'implementation' is poor. The reasons 
for such poor performance are many. Among the major ones are: lack of strong and professionally 
motivated leadership, lack of skilled manpower, lack of properly designed incentive systems, brain drain, 
and lack of institutional accountability. These problems are all interwoven. For example, let us say that the 
head of the technology institution is a political appointee. His being loyal to the government has earned him 
the position and will help him to retain it or move into higher positions. The incentive to professionally work 
is not in sight. Reward and performance are not linked. He cannot be a source of inspiration to the people 
he leads. What he is and what he does gives a message that 'loyalty more than performance is what 
counts'. The professionally oriented people will not be motivated to work in such a place. They will be the 
first to leave the institution. This will increase the brain drain. The institution most likely will be the place for 
average people who are interested in keeping their jobs through loyalty to their immediate bosses. As a 
result the institution does not live for the objectives for which it was established but its own survival. In such 
institutions corruption thrives easily because accountability has been eliminated. 
It has been suggested that African policy researchers and analysts should do something to change the 
negative situation of poor technological performance. Incremental change within the status quo or radically 
through new structures is the possibility (Vitta, ibid. p, 38, 38). The incremental change is possible in a 
stable work environment where there is continuity, which requires a higher institutional maturity than what is 
available in SSA, given the frequent office reshuffling and change of people because of political motives not 
known to the analyst. The radical change is even much tougher because it assumes a considerable power 





on the side of the analyst, which is never the case. Therefore, there is not much that the policy analyst can 
do unless a host of other variables in the political landscape change too. 
Many good policies failed because they were not properly communicated. Particularly in Africa, where there 
are traditional institutions living side by side with the modern formal institutions, communication is of 
singular importance to mobilise the people toward a common development objective. The lack of 
integration of these two institutions has led to a lot of conflicts that have contributed to block the road to 
quick progress. Indigenous channels of communication can serve as powerful instruments of change such 
as the culturally based channels of communication over technology-based mass media in reaching out to 
rural population. It is possible to blend traditional and modern systems of communication, thereby 
converting the modern channels into two-way, interactive media, can maximise the impact of messages 
(Dia, 1996). Development planners and designers generally bemoan Africa's lack of capacity to exploit its 
resources. The experience of Eritrean Popular Liberation Front (EPLF) and Tigrean Popular Liberation 
Front (TPLF) largely belie this. They indicate with a clear policy, strong political will, and appropriate human 
resources; Africans can successfully tap their local resources (ibid. p.2a9). Unfortunately, these very two 
countries are engaged in a conflict of border dispute since the mid-1998. The irony is that the leadership of 
these two countries was considered among the 'New Hope' for Africa. This is a good clue why Africa is 
remaining behind by losing its energy into unnecessary internal and external conflicts. There is always 
possibility to resolve conflicts without resorting to force, this is what Africa should learn most and quickly to 
save its entire energy for the eradication of poverty and underdevelopment. 
Policies to be effective should be accompanied by appropriate reward and incentive mechanisms. In other 
words the direct or indirect rewards and incentives should be in line and not militate against the policy. 
These rewards and incentives need not be confined only to the people whose behaviour is to be influenced 
but also to those things with which the people closely identify with (Vitta, 1993). 
The conclusions we get from the above analysis is that Africa, with the help of UN agencies' consultants, 
have established science and technology policy making bodies and produced policies that remained mostly 
unimplemented. The major reason is that most of the SSA countries are politically unstable and also 
heavily indebted. These factors are denying Africans the basic environment and resources to build S&T to 
support their economic development. 
7.4 Institutional capability 
'Institutions are the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, are the humanly devised constraints 
that shape human interaction'(North, 1990). In the industrial context these provide finance, information, 
services, standards, export assistance and the like, but the required network is not thrown up automatically 
by the market. Thus, it is frequently needed active state support, especially in science, technology, 
education and infrastructure (Lall, 1992). 
Creating S&T institutional capacity in SSA countries would mean a greater ability for countries to make 
optimal use of the existing technical capacity and resources in a sustainable fashion. The focus here is on 
capacity utilisation and absorptive capacity. In most African countries, the broadening of the institutional 
base has tended to weaken the system as a whole instead of strengthening national S&T capabilities, since 
new institutions have seldom been established on a planned basis with due attention to existing structures 
and medium- and long-term requirements. The increased number of institutions has, therefore, often led to 
the dispersal of scarce available resources (human, material and financial) among projects and 





programmes with similar objectives; as a result a widespread lack of effectiveness is to be observed 
(UNESCO, 1988, p175). Many researchers now and again are saying that the problem with SSA countries 
is the weakness in the institutional side of capacity building, particularly that of science and technology. 
Based on the World of Learning 1995 (Table 7 .5), the countries with relatively significant scientific and 
technological institutional development in SSA countries are Nigeria, Kenya, Ghana, C6te d'Ivoire, Senegal, 
Congo (Rep.) and Cameroon. The rest are basically at the initial stage. What is most important is not the 
number of institutions but the quality, which in SSA countries is basically absent. 
Various forms of organisation for S&T policy structures have been tried out in Africa. Some countries have 
established autonomous bodies with legal status and financial independence, while others have set up 
ministries, which are concerned exclusively with S&T research or else have this responsibility among 
others. Here below, we will see the experience of those considered to be advanced by the SSA countries 
standard. 
Kenya has established its National Council for Science and Technology (NCST) in 1977 (Parliament Act 
19'/7, chapter 232) It comprised four Advisory Research Committees in Agriculture, Medical, Industrial, and 
Natural and Physical Sciences. When the East African Community collapsed in 1979, the Act 1977 was 
amended and five semiautonomous research institutes were established: Kenya Agricultural Research 
institute (KARD, Kenya Medical Research Institute (KEMRI), Kenya Trypanosomasis Research Institute 
(KETRI), Kenya Industrial Research and Development Institute (KIRDD, and Kenya Marine and Fisheries 
Research Institute (KEMFRD. The Council's basic responsibility is to formulate policies and plans, advise 
the government on priorities and co-ordinates research; while the advisory Research Committees formulate 
strategies for implementation of the policies and plans; and finally, the Research Institutes carry out 
research and technology development activities (UNESCO, 1987, p.118). NCST was first put under the 
authority of the Ministry of Planning and Community Affairs. Later, it was placed under the Office of the 
President, Cabinet Affairs (1979), under the newly created but short-lived Ministry of Regional 
Development, Science and Technology (1982), and finally after the reorganisation of Government 
ministries, under the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology (1983). The fact that NCST reports to 
the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology, while the Research Institutes are under their respective 
sector ministries, has introduced new problems of coordination of research and working relationship 
between them (p.121). Nonetheless, a great progress has been made to create institutional capability in 
S&T in Kenya and the attempt to support the socio-economic development of the country is beginning. 
Ghana's National Research Council (NRC) was created in 1958 (Research Act 1958 no. 21), a year after 
the country took independence. Under the inspiration of President Nkrumah, national development policy 
and planning assumed a comprehensive and systematic character. The need to provide a scientific basis 
for development programmes was fully recognised. In order to do so, the country started to provide 
adequate resources for scientific activities and to co-ordinate such activities for national development 
(UNESCO, 1986, p.40). But the frequent changes of political leadership in the period since 1966 to 1982 
had severely affected the support given to S&T development in the country. The NRC, as of 1962, included 
the President, the Minister responsible to the President for research and the Executive Secretary of NRC 
as 'statutory' members. There were in addition, seven nominated members (the Minister of Agriculture, the 
Minister of Education and Social Welfare, the Vice-Chancellor of university of Ghana, the Vice-Chancellor 
of the Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology, the Secretary of the Cabinet, the Secretary 
to the National Council for Higher Education and the Executive Secretary of the State Control Commission). 
In 1963 NRC was merged with the Ghana Academy of Learning ending up to become the Research 
Division of the Ghana Academy of Sciences. Finally in 1966, the Ghana academy of Sciences was 





reconstituted into the present Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) and the Ghana 
Academy of Arts and Sciences (ibid. p. 42). Originally, the CSIR reported to the Ministry of Economic 
Planning. But now it reports to the new Ministry of Industries, Science and Technology, which has the 
overall responsibility for the formulation and implementation of the country's industrial policy, for the 
development of science and technology policy and for the application of science and technology to industry 
and agriculture. CSIR is the principal organ through which the Ministry attempts to execute the S&T 
development and co-ordinating functions. The Ghana Standards Board also comes under the Ministry of 
Industries, Science and Technology (ibid. p. 42). 
In Nigeria, the origin of science and technology policy-making date back to 1966 when it established by a 
decree no. 83, 1966 the Nigerian Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (NCSIR), which never came 
into existence. At that time, the Government asked UNESCO to help it in the task of building the S&T 
infrastructure. UNESCO mission undertook a .study for four years, which involved extensive consultations 
with relevant ministries such as Agriculture, Heath, Industry, Works and Housing, and Mines and power as 
well as with regional governments, universities, and research institutes. Based on the report of the mission, 
the government of Nigeria promulgated a decree no. 6, 1970 which replaced the previous decree (no. 83, 
1966) and established the Nigerian Council for Science and Technology (NCST). This had four specialised 
research councils: the Agricultural Research Council of Nigeria (AREN), the Industrial Research council of 
Nigeria (IRCN), the Medical Research Council of Nigeria (MRCN), and the National Sciences Research 
Council of Nigeria (NSRCN). These research councils were established between 1971 and 1973. But 
NCST was replaced for being ineffective in 1977 (ibid. p. 79). Later on, the National Science and 
Technology Development Agency (NSTDA) was established by decree no.5, January 1977. NSTDA was 
given executive powers unlike its predecessor and its Chairman was made a commissioner who sat on the 
Federal Executive Council. The Council of NSTDA was composed of fifteen distinguished scientists. Soon 
after in 1979, NSTDA was transformed into the Federal Ministry of Science and Technology by an act of 
the Parliament, Science and Technology Act, January 1980. This body controls and manages all the 23 
inherited research institutes, research programmes and activities in the country. 
Cote d'Ivoire set up a Ministry for Scientific Research in 1971, Presidential Decree no. 7l-480. The Ministry 
is responsible for promoting, directing, co-ordinating and planning scientific research in the light of the 
development of science and its application to the economic, technical and social development of the 
country. This Ministry has a Cabinet and four Central Directorates. To the Cabinet are attached two 
autonomous departments and five technical advisors. Its responsibility is to make research policies, plan 
research activities, to co-ordinate, evaluate and identify structures and research projects and programs, 
and coordinate international scientific co-operations. The four Central Directorates are the Directorate for 
Research and Programmes, the Directorate of Administrative and Financial Affairs, the Directorate for 
Training, and the Directorate for Information and Publications. Besides, there is the Council for Scientific 
research, a consultative body, attached to the Ministry for Scientific Research to advise on directions of 
scientific policies. This is composed of ten ministers and sixteen scientists and it works through ad-hoc 
committees (ibid. p55). Cote d'Ivoire shows an impressive number of research organisations and 
institutions. In 1986, there were 57 of them of which 30 were universities research organisations, 6 were 
foreign, and the remaining public institutions and state enterprises (ibid.). 
Senegal established the Counsel interministeriel de la recherche scientifique et technofogique 
(Interministerial Council for Scientific and Technological Research) in 1966, decree no. 66813 of October 
1966. At the same time a Bureau des affaires scientifiques et technofogiques (Office for Scientific and 
Technological Affairs) was established and placed under the authority of the Secretary-General of the 





Office of the President of the Republic. These structures operated with the assistance of an expert from 
UNESCO during the first decade (1960-70) (ibid. p87). In 1971the Inter-ministerial Council was attached to 
the office of the Prime Minister. Since then, it has been presided over by the Prime Minister. The office 
of Science and Technology affairs became the Direction des affaires scientifiques (Directorate for Science 
Affairs) and came under the authority of the Secretary of State at the Office of the Prime Minister 
responsible for the Plan. This in turn became the Ministry of Planning and Co-operation in April 1973. The 
General Delegation for Scientific and technological Research was established in 1973 (Decree no.73-1100) 
attached to the Prime Minister Office and all the research centres and stations under ministries (except 
those attached to universities) came under its control. Later in 1979, this became a Secretariat of State 
responsible for the making of science policy and management in the country known as SERST (ibid. p.88). 
Some writers have gone to the extent of saying that SSA has had a good supply of well educated 
personnel and reasonable access to new technology, systems, and methods, as well as a reasonable 
share of good policies. But the region has been unable to use these resources effectively because it has 
generally lacked an institutional base with the required legitimacy, accountability, stability, enforceability, 
and incentives. As a result, economic and political achievements are generally not fully institutionalised 
(with the needed enforcement and incentive mechanisms) or internalised by the broad civil society to make 
them sustainable. They are therefore prone to reversal with changes of regime and leadership (Dia, p.28). 
It is also true that there is a big problem of brain drain in SSA. These countries are losing the best people to 
the advanced countries where they can better remuneration and better working environment and facilities. 
But it is hardly possible to say there is a good supply of highly skilled manpower. 
The number of institutions of higher learning and research has increased in SSA countries since 
independence. But still their quality (even their number) is very low by world standards (Table 7.5). Even 
the maintenance of this limited number of institutions is becoming increasingly difficult to many SSA 
countries. At times it is very difficult to get the required political, social and economic support to strengthen 
these institutions. In fact, SSA countries research institutions depend heavily on external support. 
Sustaining these institutions with local means only is extremely difficult and the very long-term sustainability 
is continuously questioned. To give an example, Kenyan higher learning institutions, which are among the 
best in SSA, are experiencing resource starvation and their formative years are considered by far better in 
terms of financial resources than the present times (Wandiga, 1996). This is because international donor 
support was high at the beginning and their pullout has been followed by near collapse of the system. This 
is evidence that sustainability was not part of the original plan. It was assumed that countries would 
immediately assume responsibility for the continuity of these institutions. A similar experience is being 
reported in Tanzania. Research in the Ministry of Agriculture is characterised as too little trying to cover too 
much in an extended system of research facilities at some 55 institutes, stations and substations. Many of 
these were developed as a part of donor assisted development projects and research stopped when 
external assistance stopped at the end of the project (Widstrand, 1992. p53). A study of "The flow of 
Information: Social and Economic Science in Sub-Saharan Africa" by Dr. E.K. Hicks et al. (1997) show that 
still the major problems of African researchers is lack of funds, lack of scientific literature, inadequate 
income, and inadequate administrative, professional and organisational resources. 
Science and technology institutions in SSA countries are the exact replica of the institutions in the 
advanced countries. In fact, most of them have their origins linked to the colonial times or established and 
funded by institutions in advanced countries (at least at the beginning). They require considerable 
resources, which the meagre resources of SSA countries find it unsustainable. The consequence is that the  





Table 7.5: Higher learning and research institutions in SSA countries. 
Countries Learned society, research 




Angola 7 3 - 
Benin 6 1 - 
Burkina Faso 10 1 2 
Burundi 5 1 5 
Cameroun 23 6 3 
Central Africa 10 1 3 
Chad 5 1 2 
Congo, D R - - - 
Congo, Rep. 13 1 4 
Cote'd'Ivoire 22 1 8 
Eritrea - 1 - 
Ethiopia 15 2 3 
Gambia 3 - 1 
Ghana 35 3 10 
Guinea-Bissau 5 2 5 
Kenya 41 4 12 
Lesotho 4 1 1 
Liberia 8 1 3 
Madagascar 16 3 3 
Malawi 22 1 - 
Mali 12 - 7 
Mauritania 3 1 3 
Mozambique 7 1 - 
Niger 12 2 1 
Nigeria 57 23 26 
Rwanda - - - 
Sao Tome and Principe - - - 
Senegal 27 3 6 
Sierra Leone 9 1 4 
Somalia 10 1 6 
Sudan 13 8 4 
Tanzania 18 3 12 
Togo 12 1 4 
Uganda 15 3 1 
Zambia 20 2 5 
Zimbabwe 54 2 10 
Lower-middle-income 
Cape Verde - - - 
Djibouti - - - 
Equatorial Guinea - - - 
Namibia 7 1 1 
Swaziland 7 1 3 
Upper-middle-income 
Botswana 3 3 4 
Gabon 6 2 2 
Mauritius 7 1 3 
Mayotte - - - 
Seychelles 1 - 2 
South Africa 102 19 13 





best brains leave them for better salaries abroad and the quality of these institutions has been observed to 
deteriorate over time. But we cannot agree more with some of the authors that have suggested that SSA 
countries have to think themselves out of their current predicament (Court, 1991), which should have been 
present in the making of these institutions in the first place. Research capacity is essential for the 
development of these societies (Nelson, 1995; Thulstrup, 1995) and thus research funding should be part 
of their culture. Basic but adequate scientific infrastructure need be developed to support the research 
activities of African researchers including an adequate remuneration. The idea that SSA countries cannot 
engage themselves in scientific activities is dangerous. Thinking and searching is natural and it is part and 
parcel of any society. What is required is new and innovative way of organising research resources to 
minimise costs and maximise benefits. A new model that suits the developing countries need be found. 
Wandiga (1996) based on the experience of Kenya said that universities' research activities are 
insignificant and tend towards the basic research and the few applied researches carried lacks clear 
mission. If this is said of a country, which together with Nigeria is considered the research power of SSA 
countries, what can we expect from the rest? In a similar vein, E.Bekele (1996) tells us that in Ethiopia 
research is biased towards the biological, agricultural and medical sciences; and that they do not fully cater 
for the R&D needs of the various ministries, research institutes and industries. He notes also that material 
incentives for researchers, in addition to academic promotion, would be needed to encourage staff to give 
up part time work and concentrate on research as a strong R&D tradition cannot be expected to develop in 
a community of disgruntled academics. Basically the same is true of all the other SSA countries and 
concrete measures need be taken to correct the situation. 
It is important that we look also on how the S&T institutions in SSA countries are making and diffusing S&T 
results. The universities, the industrial research and development institutes, and the enterprises are the 
main players in the development and promotion of appropriate industrial technology and human resources. 
Below are presented ECA findings on the impediments to such institutional capacity building and the lack of 
competitive industries in SSA. 
The impediments observed in the universities are the following: 
- Divergence of opinion amongst university dons on the "publish or perish syndrome" 
- The gap between the national development plans and their translation into national 
technological plans from which researchers can select R&D programmes 
- The ineffective collaboration between institutions of higher learning and other relevant 
authorities to train the required manpower with specific status and skills needed to implement 
technology plans within a given time  
- The lack of adequate institutes of technology having the competencies to appreciate the 
lengthy process and complexity of skills for the development of indigenised industrial 
technology 
From the industrial research and development institutes' point of view the following impediments have been 
identified: 
- Total absence of technology registry to expose young scientists and engineers to a wide variety of 
technologies and patents  
- Lack of conscientious effort to appreciate the inter-dependence that should exist between industry, 
science and technology institutions and policy makers, resulting in total or partial absence of u 
organised and integrated approach in the selection and execution of S&T programmes  





- The Prevalence of the dominant school of thought that university education in general qualifies the 
recipient to be more capable of finding solutions to technological and business problems, rather 
than the operator of the business in question  
- Lack of conscientious effort and support to study, upgrade and adapt indigenous techniques to a 
level of mass production in industry.  
- Inadequate funding of R&D.  
- Lack of satisfactory working conditions and adequate remuneration und incentives resulting in high 
turnover of manpower  
- Lack of employment opportunities in the industrial sector of the nation leading to brain drain 
According to UNESCO, the number of scientists and engineers involved in R&D in Africa is only 
0.4% of those in developed countries.  
- Shortage of infr6ttucture Some countries do not have even a bureau of standards, others lack 
industrial R&D institutes, technology registry, industrial consulting services, small industry 
promotion agency, engineering design and prototype manufacture, and most important of all a 
powerful and competent policy implementing agency.  
- Lack of competent staff in the policy making body, where the competence required involves 
industrial technology management, consulting experience or exposure to technology registry 
mechanism, information expertise, in-depth knowledge of patenting system, etc. Having scientists 
without any of these exposures and experience in key positions cripples the institution and 
whatever their levels, they will proceed cautiously. 
Poor status is given to industrial scientists in decision making and it is compounded by lack of financial 
compensation, as opposed to social scientists, lawyers, and business administrators, who are given the 
opportunity to fully participate in the important decision making processes of the country. On the other 
hand, the constraints hindering the enterprises' contribution to the development of local capacity in R&D are 
considered to be: 
- The dominant thinking prevalent in the local enterprises that the best markets from which to 
purchase (acquire) technologies or research services are all outside the continent's borders. This 
attitude reflects how little of the R&D capability to develop technology, is known by potential user 
enterprise, and by inference, the low level of confidence by the enterprises in themselves regarding 
that capability It is also an indication that enterprise have no share allocated to them by 
government to contribute to any national technological endeavour Most serious of all, this situation 
is a reflection of inadequate level of communication between the planning mechanism for S&T 
development and the user enterprises 
- Lack of package of incentives to attract the production sector into the training of professionals and 
ultimate involvement of risky ventures such as commercialising indigenous innovations and 
inventions Some countries have an investment promotion organ, which spells out certain 
concessions, but here again, the level of involvement, which was deployed in arriving at the above 
package, will determine the degree to which the enterprises will be tempted to "bite the bait". 
- Lack of close involvement of industry in government plans The hallmark of success in using 
enterprises to assist in the implementation of development plans depends much on the level of 
interest existing between the government and ii5 industry support services on the one hand, and 
the enterprises on the other This bond is one of mutual understanding of what the government is 
Planning to achieve, how and when, plus the expected contribution from the industry and under 
what conditions Such collaboration reveals the determination of each partner while simultaneously 
enhancing the industry appreciation of local R&D capabilities 





- In some countries, there is lack of appreciation of the relationship between the level of 
development of manufacturing activity and progressive development of a nation Efforts are 
therefore not intensified right from the educational programmes to breed scientist and engineers 
who can assist in the development of the industrial sector The €nterDris6 under such situation 
therefore do not have the appropriate manpower to make them effective. 
More can be said of gaps in the innovation system in Africa. The major ones are the scarcity of information 
about easily assimilable technology and the lack of support made available for technical entrepreneurs. 
Information lack is leading to re-inventing the wheel with the consequent duplication of efforts and wastage 
of resources. Technical entrepreneurs don't get the required support such as raising capital, conducting 
needs analysis, designing appealing products, calculating risk, and establishing distribution channels (See 
Tiffin, Adjebeng-Asem, and Afofabi, 1987; Davis, Tiffin, and Osotimehin, 1994). 
Ideally, even a small, relatively poof country should possess the requisite institutional linkages, actors and 
resources to ensure the selective generation and adaptation of at least some kind of technology and their 
diffusion throughout the appropriate sector. However, when scientific, technological or managerial skills are 
not locally available, institutional gaps prevent effective deployment of capacity. Vertical complementary 
assets analogous to those available in developed countries to facilitate the movement of technology and 
skills through the economy are a necessity in Africa. Many Africans in the public sector are called upon to 
work on projects involving technology transfer or industrial development. But many are unfamiliar with the 
dynamics of technological change or with the institutional structure of innovation systems (Reddy, Aram, 
and Lynn, 1991; Davis, Tiffin, and Osotimehin, 1994). Usually there is bias towards science-producing 
institutions such as universities, public laboratories or technical schools. But that constitutes only part of the 
entire universe of science and technology institutions. SSA countries lack familiarity with such innovation 
support mechanisms as credit schemes, management services, marketing advice, technical outreach 
services, co-operative arrangements, business incubators, tax incentives, and many other devices for the 
promotion of innovation which dot the technology policy landscape in industrial countries. 
To help overcome the difficulties of SSA countries, some authors have proposed a Management of 
Science, Technology and Innovation (MSTI) research and service initiative in Africa (Davis, Tiffin, and 
Osotimehin, ibid.). They propo.sed a regional MSTI with the following characteristics: 
 It should aim to create a regional network with national or sub-national centres. 
 Al least one of network's nods should include a university-based MSTI teaching and research unit 
of international stature.  
 International and national services should jointly fund the network and its components.  
 The network should be service - and action-oriented It should mobilise the full range of services 
necessary to grow competitive businesses These services can be roughly classified as follows: 
1. an investment fund that can make smart patent investments; 
2. institutions, programs, information, and events for training in all aspects of business and 
management: 
3. infrastructure for all aspects of technical, management and marketing services; 
4. social networks, apprenticeship and mentoring opportunities; 
5. Policy, management and strategic planning leadership at various levels: local, sector, metropolitan, 
national, etc. 
The service activities should be organised on a sector basis and should be delivered by non-governmental 
organisations, with some costs recovered The argument is that the teaching and research units, small 





number of centre of excellence (to keep up with scientific and technological development), and a local 
group of 'technology drivers' are the three inter-related components of network necessary in building 
science and technology base for competitive industrial development in Africa (Figure 7.1). 
Figure 7.I: Teaching/Research, centre of excellence, and technology-drivers relationship 
 
 
In this context 'technology drivers' refer to organisations which provide technical, managerial, administrative 
and financial services to firms, that could be co-operative industrial technology centres supported by 
industry to provide technical assistance, training and networking facilities. Or university-industry 
(Laboratory-industry) active interfaces to promote and commercialise the knowledge assets of universities 
or public labs by providing services such as: policy research, management and financial advice, market 
research, computer and software services, technology transfer, seminars, training, translation, testing, and 
other consulting services. The precise configuration of technology drivers depends on national economic 
priorities and the level of organisation of local economic interests.  
Moreover, international, regional and sub-regional networking is of great help. Particularly international 
development agencies have in different ways contributed towards the development of S&T in SSA 
countries, The prominent one has been UNESCO but there are many other such as UNECA, UNDP, 
UNIDO, WHO, FAO, and other development agencies such as SAREC, DAAD, CIDA, IDRC, ICTP, AREC, 
NORAD, NUFFIC, USAID, FINIDA, DANIDA, GTZ, ODA, SIDA, AERC, CODESRIA, OSSREA and the 
British Council. On a bilateral basis many of the developed countries governments have helped in the 
development effort of the SSA countries through the above mentioned agencies or directly, which usually 
categorised as foreign aid.  
There is lot of debate ongoing with regard to foreign aid for development in the developing countries. 
Commenting on the magnitude of donor assistance to Tanzania and its side effect, Carl Widstrand (1992) 
has noted that more than USD 10 billion donor money have sunk since 1970. The amount has overtaken 
exports in value terms in the form of budgetary import support and project and technical assistance 
financing. The rate of dependency on foreign aid is so bad that the yearly 'Paris Club' consultations can 
dictate anything to the country's leadership. Similarly with regard to donor co-ordination, Widstrand have 
said that the capacity for co-ordination is very low among all partners. There were enormous gaps in 
knowledge about projects between donors, especially in research projects, which usually do not top the 
priority of the big donors. There were cases of financing of identical projects and even a deliberate 
exploitation of donor co-ordination inefficiency. Nowadays because of online information through the 
Internet, it is likely that there is greater donor co-ordination than in the past. 
Networks at international, regional and sub-regional, and national levels are very important for the diffusion 
of science and technology information. It is also the basis of greater coordination and co-operation. In SSA 
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countries this possibility has been hampered by the low level of availability of transport and communication 
services. Ms. Lalla Ben Barka, Assistant Secretary General of UNECA addressing the Africa's Transport 
and Communications Ministers Meeting (May 25-26, 1999), said that the lack of appropriate policies and 
regulations have hampered the realisation of the full potential and possibilities of the sector. With just 1.3 
km per 1000 sq. km of tarred road and 2.8 km per 1000 sq. km of railroad, Africa is far behind the rest of 
the world. That is why more need to be done to create regional and sub-regional science and technology 
information databases, research and training networks, and a network for African scientists to enable them 
share experience and information. Some networks have emerged. For example, African Network of 
Scientific and Technological Institutions (ANSTI), African Research for Solar Energy (CRAES), African 
Regional Centre for Engineering Design and Manufacturing (AREEDEM), and African Regional Centre for 
Technology (ARET). Similarly, Sub-regional projects and programmes had been set up, sometimes with the 
assistance of international organisations, to solve certain common problems, in particular in the agricultural, 
heath and transport sectors. 
The crucial role played by the triad of good policy, good institutions, and good leadership in the strong 
performance of East Asian countries has been repeatedly confirmed. Good leadership is generally the 
starting point (as in East Asia, for example), with good institutions providing the necessary link between 
leadership and policies (World Bank, 1993). On the contrary, poor performance of SSA countries is largely 
due to patrimonial distortions in the management of the state (Dia, 1993). This state of things should be 
reversed, if any worthwhile development is to take place in Africa. 
7.5 Human capital formation 
It is well known that 'skilled manpower' is central to technological capability, thus, to effective 
industrialisation. African economies are potentially rich in human resources, yet people are relatively 
neglected, badly educated and in poor heath with their capacities frequently underused. The consequence 
is low labour productivity and lack of competitiveness compared with countries where human resources are 
more fully developed and better used. This is so despite the fact that low wages should make African 
economies very competitive (Helleiner, 1992). 
Where human capabilities have developed, unattractive conditions of work have frequently led to massive 
blain drain. It is estimated, for example, that there are more African graduates working outside Africa than 
those employed in African countries. Ghana is estimated to have lost 50 percent of its doctors between 
1981 and 1984 (Stewart, tall, and Wangwe, 1992, p.34). Only the Council for Science and Industrial 
Research of Ghana between 1980-85 and 1986-91 lost 68.3 and 37.8 percent respectively of its trained 
research staff to outside organisations locally and abroad. But improved facilities and incentives helped to 
reduce that figure to l0 percent in 1995 (Assoku, 1996). In general in SSA countries, the scientific personnel 
is mainly found around universities and research institutions. The official wages of these scientific 
personnel is ever decreasing because of inflation and static wage structures that don't adjust to the living 
cost of the country. To take an example in Tanzania, university salaries of 1992 were around USD60 per 
month, which carries a family for 20 percent of the month and the researcher can therefore devote 20 
percent of his time to university teaching and research for survival reasons. The result of which is research 
productivity and teaching suffers and good researchers seek positions outside the country (Widstrand, ibid. 
p. 104). 
It is to be remembered that the Dakar Declaration had recommended 2000 scientists and engineers per 
million inhabitants for countries with GNP $200 and above; 1400 scientists and engineers per million 





inhabitants for countries with GNP between $100-$200; and 1000 scientists and engineers per million 
inhabitants for countries with GNP below $100. These targets had to be achieved by 1980. But none of the 
SSA countries have been able to achieve it by the agreed time. But now, all the countries on the African 
continent have institutes of higher education, except for Cape Verde, Comoros, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, 
Gambia, and Guinea-Bissau. In the 43 countries that offer higher education, the total number of students 
rose from 142,000 in 1960 to 1,169,000 in 1980 (UNESCO 1986). Table 7.6 gives trends in numbers of 
students in higher education, per 100,000 inhabitants, and percentage of female students of the SSA 
countries. All the countries surveyed showed a steady increase in the number of students over the years, 
except Uganda that showed a decrease in 1980, may be because of the protracted civil war. Percentages 
of female enrolment are relatively low. Only Botswana, Madagascar, and Swaziland show enrolment higher 
than 25 percent. 















Angola (1) - - 28 16 33 - 
Benin (1) 70 15 - 18 172 16 
Botswana 62 32 102 40 142 44 
Burkina Faso 19 20 27 22 51 22 
Burundi 27 11 46 25 48 - 
Cameroon 113 15 134 - - - 
Congo 241 10 475 15 - - 
Cote d‟Ivoire 106 17 239 19 - 22 
Ethiopia - - 45 32 46 11 
Gabon (1) 101 20 - - 270 26 
Ghana (2) 93 16 138 21 - - 
Guinea (1 289 18 368 19 261 22 
Equatorial Guinea (2) - - 317 10 - - 
Kenya 66 - 77 25 75 29 
Lesotho - - - - 188 59 
Liberia 152 22 210 28 - - 
Madagascar (1) 110 52 260 - 354 - 
Malawi (1) 30 16 38 28 38 - 
Mali (1) 47 10 23 11 78 12 
Mauritania 126 14 109 31 69 30 
Mozambique (1) - - 8 21 9 - 
Niger 12 10 27 20 42 22 
Nigeria 66 16 186 - - - 
Uganda (1) 49 18 44 23 52 27 
Central Africa Rep. 33 - 75 8 99 10 
Rwanda (1) 25 - 24 10 24 15 
Senegal 172 18 238 19 191 21 
Sierra Leone 54 16 55 - - - 
Somalia 65 11 - - - - 
Sudan 133 16 153 27 - - 
Swaziland (1) 210 39 336 40 287 - 
Tanzania 19 14 - 17 31 - 
Chad 14 5 - - - - 
Togo 104 14 187 15 145 - 
Zaire (1) 101 - 100 - 105 - 
Zambia (1, 2) 174 14 129 - 134 22 
Zimbabwe 136 - 113 - 219 22 
Source: Report of the Ministerial Conference on CASTAFRICA ll, 1987, p. 17 [- = Not available; %,F = percentage 
female and (l) = I982 data instead of 1983; 1981 data instead of 1980] 





In the second half of 1980s, Africa had 0..36% of the world's scientific potential (close to 20,000 research 
engineers and scientists). It accounted for 0.4% of the world's research and development (R&D) 
expenditure. It produced 0.3% of mainstream science, i.e. published, listed, cited, and commonly used 
science (see UNESCO, 1985; Davis, 1983; and Braun ET al., 1988). Nigeria and Kenya had one third of 
the total scientific potential and one half of the scientific output in the SSA (Gaillard and Waast, 1993). 
It is an established fact that at the heart of SSA countries' poor industrial performance lies the lack of skilled 
manpower. Then, it is appropriate to ask what is the critical mass of skill that Africa needs to take off? Enos 
(1991) in his book 'The Creation of Technological Capability in Developing Countries' approaches the 
whole issue of technological capacity development by looking into (l) nurturing of skills, (2) creating of 
organisations and (3) instilling of purpose. while doing so, he looks into the primary, secondary, and tertiary 
sectors of the economy separately, but he defines these sectors slightly differently from what they are 
customarily defined. In the primary sector are included agriculture, livestock raising, fishing and forestry. In 
the secondary sector are included those activities involving the processing and distribution of goods, 
including mining, manufacturing, transport and communication as well as all the technical institutions 
serving them including research and development organisations, design and construction firms, 
engineering and management consulting, and the armed forces. In the tertiary sector are grouped banking 
and finance, medical care, wholesale and retail trade, the administrative branches of government, 
education, and private services as well as those technical organisations that provide them with the 
knowledge they need. 
Based on the above structure, Enos tries to estimate the number of individuals to be trained for a 
hypothetical illustrative developing economy of a popular on of 20.4 million people with a GNP per capita of 
$420 and percentage of GNP arising in manufacturing considered to be 14. Enos had determined the best 
policy for a developing country lacking technological capability and wishing to substantially increase its rate 
of economic growth. This policy suggests, first, to use the scarce resources of that developing country to 
create the ability to master technology, and after this ability has been adequately created, the country's 
scarce resources should be allocated to installing and operating the techniques. The conclusion seems to 
be nothing special and intuitively logical but Enos had to derive it from a quantitative growth model (p. 129). 
Table 7.7. Estimates of cumulative numbers of technically trained persons needed to absorb the 
modern techniques to be adopted during the production programme (years Y + 8 to Y +2O) 
Skill Level Primary sector Secondary sector Tertiary sector Total economy 
Basic - 200,151 183,635 383,786 
Medium 
Agricultural 154,200 - - 154,200 
Industrial 161,000 50,131 10,506 221,637 
Commercial 24,560 25,241 32,892 82,693 
Nursing - - 3,799 3,799 
Teaching - - 37,410 37,410 
Total 339,760 75,372 84,607 499,739 
High 
Agr. scientists 41,300 - - 41,200 
Engineers 800 5,589 7,574 13,963 
Doctors/dentists - - 2,389 2,389 
Total  42,000 5,589 9,963 57,552 
All levels 381,760 281,112 278,205 941,077 
Source: I L Enos (1991),The creation of technological capability in developing  countries, p 135 





Enos has tried to make a 'manpower planning', a twenty-year plan, for that illustrative developing economy 
we have mentioned earlier. He says that 'the county's acquisition of sufficient technological capability is 
assumed to take the first seven years of the country's Twenty Year Plan, this interval being consistent with 
optimal policies derived from the two growth models he did develop. Thus, year 1 to 7 of the plan are 
devoted to building technical competence, and year 8 to 20 to installing and operating (with an adequate 
number of technically trained persons) modern techniques. Based on data provided by Roerner and Stern 
(1981) and making his own assumptions, Enos arrives to the estimates given Table 7.7. 
This Twenty Year Plan is designed to double the national income and output of the developing country but 
the necessary increases, according the calculation of Enos, in the number of trained persons are of highest 
orders of magnitude. The next table gives a better view of it (see table 7.8). 
Table 7.8: Estimates of the numbers of technically trained persons needed to sustain production  
 
Skill Level 
No. Of technically trained persons needed Gross average annual rates of growth (%) 
Beginning of plan (year 
T) 
End of plan (T+20) Average over the plan 
(T to T+20) 
Over the production 
phase (T+8 to T+20) 
Basic 1,605,000 1,988,786 6.1 6.7 
Medium     
Agricultural 3,000 157,200 27 39 
Industrial 8,000 229,637 23 33 
Commercial 5,000 87,693 21 28 
Nursing 1,500 5,299 14 19 
Sub-total (17,500) (479,829) (23) (32) 
Teaching 100,000 137,410 6.6 7.5 
Total 117,500 617,239 14 19 
High     
Agr. scientists 1,000 42,200 26 36 
Engineers 2,900 16,863 14 20 
Doctors/dentists 1,000 3,389 11 16 
Total  4,900 62,452 19 27 
All levels 1,727,400 2,668,477 7.3 8.5 
Source: Enos, ibid. P. 136. 
If we assume that what Enos has derived is fair representation of the actual needs of developing countries, 
then, the implication that follows is that a lot of training is required which, evidently, seems beyond the 
capability of the developing countries. This elasticity of demand for technically trained persons are far 
beyond what one might expect, and yet if we look at the figures in more detail we should not be surprised. 
There is plenty of evidence from developing countries that they need far more technically trained persons. 
All this evidence indicates that there are substantial needs to fill. These needs are relatively most acute 
where medium-level skills are concerned, as reflected in the differences between the current stocks of 
persons with medium level skills in agriculture, industry and commerce and the stocks needed to exploit 
modern techniques planned for adoption. In the illustrative economy, current stocks are, on average, only 
one twenty-fifth of the stock needed by the end of the twenty-year Plan (p. t37). 
The portion of the relevant age groups with technical training should be, therefore, one in ten. This is 
assuming that both girls and boys were to have access to the various vocational courses, and allowing for 
wastage rate of 5 percent per year for those who are being trained, or have received their training, one 
comes up with an estimate of one in ten. This ratio is exactly equal to the portion of secondary school 
students receiving vocational education in the republic of Korea (Amsden, 1989, p.224). 





Therefore, everything seems to point out that African countries are required to make heavy expenditures on 
human resources development if any chance of taking off and catching up the advanced countries in the 
coming decades is going to be possible. Where from will these funds come, from aid and loans? Is it 
possible with the existing heavy burden of debt? It is obvious there is no simple solution. A lot of creative 
thinking is required. Some of the creative ideas should deal for example on how to stop all conflicts in Africa 
and reduce defence budgets to minimum and use the money for education and health and development. 
Recently, the World Bank has come with a new idea of how to help meet the Sub-Saharan African 
countries' demand for highly skilled manpower. It established, in 1997, the African Virtual University (AVU). 
The objective of the AVU is to build world-class degree programmes that support economic development of 
Sub-Saharan African countries by educating and training world-class scientists, technicians, engineers, 
business health care providers, and other professionals. It did start with 12 universities in the English 
speaking countries of Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Zimbabwe, Ghana, and Namibia; followed by 7 French 
speaking countries and 3 Portuguese speaking countries. The plan is to have 25 sites operational in 1998. 
AVU is a first-of-its-kind interactive-instructional telecommunication network. The World Bank finances the 
supply and installation of satellite receiver terminals at the universities. Programme course package 
consists of videotaped and live lectures supplemented by class notes, textbook and homework. Internet 
based courses as a free standing as well as enhancements to the video-based lectures were also in plan. A 
digital library programme to make scientific information available to African students and faculty was being 
developed (http://www.avu.org/english/aboutisum.htm). 
Similarly, UNESCO is promoting the Satellite University of Science and Technology (SUST). It was initiated 
in collaboration with the National Technology University of Colorado (USA) to produce post-graduate, 
scientific and lifelong learning programmes for distribution to participating schools, universities, homes and 
work places. With the Cairo University of Egypt serving as the Arab ho.st of SUST, Nigeria will serve as the 
host for the rest of Africa' But what is the chance of the sustainability of such .satellite based higher 
education systems, assuming it works well? Is it not going to create another dependency No one can tell at 
this stage? 
It is a very welcome help from the international community to reverse the bad trend of illiteracy, lack of 
education, S&T backwardness in the SSA, but African governments and people should take their destiny 
into their hand. No excuse is acceptable for not doing enough for education and technical training. The best 
possible of wealth distribution is education. What could be more desirable than educating people to help 
themselves? 
7.6 The Melting Pot: technology management and economic development 
When we were discussing the 'technology management of the NIEs', we had followed a particular structure: 
organising, networking, learning and competitiveness, Given that The SSA manufacturing industry in the 
world market is non-existent, that structure is less important. Therefore, we focus more on industrialisation 
policies' implementation, World Bank restructuring impact, and S&T policies and implementation. 
SSA countries' national development plans took little account of S&T. These plans seldom contain a clear 
translation of socio-economic objectives into scientific and technological objectives together with a 
description of the research programmes to attain tho.se objectives and a statement of the necessary 
financial resources (UNESCO, 1988, p187). The reasons given by the same report for the poor integration 
of S&T into national development plans are basically three. The first is lack of complete and reliable record 





of scientific and technological potential (resources available for the study of all problems involved in 
application of S&T to development). The second is lack of skill of policy-makers in planning and 
programming research activities and the process of integrating them into national development plans. And, 
the third is the fact that the main research bodies in some countries are the local outposts of foreign 
institutions, which have no link with the socio-economic objectives of the country (ibid. 187-8). 
Let us now for a while focus on industrial technology in SSA countries. These are basically intertwined with 
the industrial policies and economic policies in general. Inadequate industrialisation policies left African 
countries dotted with 'white-elephant' types of manufacturing plants that were not sustainable because, the 
required institutional support, for adequate learning to transfer the technologies to make it sustainable, was 
not there. Besides, the rapid industrialisation attempt made during the 60s and 70s were made by plunging 
into debt the continent more than it can bear leading to a terrible situation of vicious circle from which many 
SSA countries have not been able to get out. The external shock was also very great for the African 
industry to withstand it. 
The structural adjustment policies were basically the make of IMF and World Bank, presumably to help the 
continent to get out of the mess. But it has also exacerbated the situation. Two decades later, the situation 
in S&T in SSA seems worse than ever. Positive human resource development has been offset by brain 
drain problems. The policies of specialisation on primary products such as cocoa, tea, coffee, minerals and 
oil did not perform well for the decreasing prices of such commodities in the global markets. The global 
market is biased towards the manufactured goods particularly with high technological content favouring the 
advanced countries at the expense of least developed countries. 
When we come to S&T in particular, it is possible to enumerate a number of reasons why African countries 
failed to get the expected result. The major factors are lack of resources, failure to integrate 
macroeconomic policies to S&T supposed to support them, power conflict between S&T institutions and the 
various ministries, the failure to retain and motivate the scarce highly skilled manpower, the disconnect 
between research and industrial development, and Lack of institutional support to indigenous 
entrepreneurs. 
The 1980s were years of industrial stagnation and even dc-industrialisation for many sub-Saharan 
countries. "In nineteen countries (hat is half the countries of SSA but covering much more than half the 
population), industrial growth was less than 2 percent per annum from 1980 to 1987; in ten of these 
countries, industrial production fell over this period (World Bank, 1989). For SSA as a whole, industrial 
production fell by over 1 percent per annum. These countries were thus moving away from the long-run 
goal of industrialisation and diversification, in a clear conflict with longer-run development needs (Stewart, 
Lall, and Wangwe, 1992). 
In nearly all economies, manufacturing industry has been critical agent of the structural transformation that 
marks the transition from a primitive, low productivity, low income state to one that is dynamic, sustained 
and diversified (Lall, 1992). But in Africa, besides the very heavy indebtedness, the pattern of 
industrialisation was, for the most part, inefficient by every measure, highly protected, highly import 
dependent, with very low linkages with the rest of the economy and associated with very low levels of 
export.  
But, nonetheless, Africans want to be emancipated not only politically but also economically. Many African 
authors have suggested the path of national self-reliance and collective self-reliance of Africa as a 
legitimate aspiration to control one‟s own economic and social development. To understand this feelings 





one can see the African Declaration on Cooperation; Development and Economic Independence, adopted 
by the Heads of State and Government of OAU at the Tenth ordinary session in Addis Ababa on 25 May 
1973; 32nd Ordinary Session of the Council of Ministers of OAU in Nairobi, 1979; the OAUIECA Symposium 
on the Future Development Prospects of Africa Towards the Year 2000 in Monrovia, 1979: the ECA/UNEP 
Seminar on Alternative Patterns of Development and Life Styles for the African Region in Addis Ababa, 
1979; the ECA Conference of Ministers'14th Session in Rabat, 1979; and OAU Council of Ministers' meeting 
and the Ordinary Session of the Heads of State and Government in Monrovia, 1979. 
Adedeji (1981) contends that a series of failures have amply demonstrated to African countries that, as a 
group and as the least developed region in the world are in a least enviable position. Co-operation with the 
prosperous industrialised countries based on trade and aid is not going to help them become prosperous 
by maintaining traditional economic patterns and dependent relationships. Particularly under the classical 
international division of labour whereby African states remain suppliers of basic raw materials and 
importers of capital, technology, technical know-how and manufactured products. 
The 1980s have become the lost decade when the de-industrialisation process took place and the 1990s a 
decade of painful and slow recovery with the closing years of the century bringing another chain of regional 
wars with the consequent detrimental result to the African economy as a whole. This last thing is a clear 
indication that SSA needs political stability first and foremost if at all an economic recovery will be possible. 
It is within this context that we need to discuss the industrial technology development. 
Developing technological capability is particularly meant to help in the process of industrialisation. Buying 
modern sophisticated machinery does not necessarily mean it will improve technological capability. These 
misunderstandings in the past have created more problems than it solved. For example in Tanzania the 
Morogoro Shoe Factory (Lall, 1992) illustrated some of the worst features. It was a project financed by the 
World Bank. It was meant to exploit the large supply of hides and skins to manufacture shoes for the export 
market. The technology used was sophisticated and beyond local capability to operate efficiently. The 
factory has never reached 5 percent utilisation of its capacity and the quality of the shoe was not even 
acceptable to local market. The choice of technology was made with the help of an Italian consultant. The 
project was a complete failure. 
In Cote d'Ivoire, Tanzania and major areas of Nigeria, interesting facts have been observed. These 
countries have failed to build up local capability to initiate and manage industrial ventures efficiently without 
the heavy dependence on foreigners and on imports. The many inappropriate technology decisions, low 
capacity utilisation and the non-existence of exports were common to most manufacturing enterprises in 
these societies. Despite the differences in political and economic philosophy and irrespective of whether 
the enterprises were in the public sector, were owned by foreign ventures, were joint ventures or were 
privately owned, all exhibited similar weaknesses (Stewart, Lall, and Wangwe, 1992). 
But, it does not mean always that the industrialisation activity in SSA has been a failure. There are 
instances of success as well. For example, in Nigeria we have the successful Ibru conglomerate and the 
town of Nnewi (see Stewart, Lall, and Wangwe, 1992). Ibru conglomerate was founded by Michael lbru, a 
Nigerian entrepreneur, who pioneered the distribution of frozen fish, and subsequently moved into fishing, 
palm oil, citrus and pineapples production and canning, as well as joint enterprises with foreign companies 
in ventures including construction, brewing, and prefabricated housing. The organisation has created a lot 
of employment to people while at the same time it has been consistently profitable, permitting expansion 
into new areas. A similar experience occurred around the town of Nnewi. It is an example of local industrial 
development based entirely on private initiative and with no foreign investment. The area started as the 





main centre for the import and distribution of parts for the motor industry. Manufacture of parts followed. 
Technical assistance has come from Taiwan, with local engineers sent to Taiwan and Taiwanese visiting 
Nnewi for limited periods. There are significant, but unofficial, exports. 
Zimbabwean industrialisation has probably been the most successful among SSA countries. By the end of 
the 1980s, the sector accounted for nearly 30 percent of GDP, with a value added of $1.5 billion. It was the 
second largest employer, accounting for 17 percent of formal sector employment. There has been 
considerable import-substitution and significant growth of manufactured export (but with some decline in 
the proportion exported during the 1980s). The sector showed notable diversification with significant inter-
industry linkages. However, although there is relatively little new foreign investment, there is very heavy 
dominance of whites over ownership and management (Riddell, 1992). Another successful country is 
Mauritius which has developed a garment industry in the last fifteen years, which has displaced the sugar 
as the island's biggest export (Ghani, 1989). 
While the examples of successful industrial development in the large-scale formal sector, whether owned 
by the state or by private enterprises, have been unusual, especially among indigenous companies, the 
very small-scale sector has been notably successful. According to the review of evidence presented by 
Liedhofm (1992), small -scale firms never account for less than 59 percent of total industrial employment, 
while in Sierra Leone the ratio is 95 percent. The vast majority of these firms are very small (employing five 
or fewer). The share of industrial value-added of firms with less than ten workers ranges from 26 to 64 
percent. 
The most important activity is clothing, followed by wood products, metal products and food processing. 
The majority of small enterprises are located in the rural areas, mostly linked, in one way or another, to 
agriculture. As shown by Bagachwa and Stewart (1992), The small rural enterprises adopt labour intensive 
technologies and produce simple appropriate products. All the studies of efficiency show that small 
enterprises in Africa exhibit social cost-benefit ratios that easily exceed one and are invariably higher than 
of the formal sector. But these goods and services are not exportable, unlike the myriad SMEs in Taiwan, 
we have already seen in previous chapters, which have successfully evolved around TNCs and local firms 
to produce for the export market, earning more foreign exchange to finance further industrial development 
in a virtuous circle. 
On the other hand, the evidence presented by Liedholm suggests that the 'graduation' rate in African 
economies - the proportion of micro enterprises, which grow into middle sized enterprises - is very low in 
Africa. One explanation for the relatively low graduation rates in African economies is entrepreneurial 
deficiencies, especially marked in relation to middle sized enterprises. Another explanation is policy 
framework biased against agriculture that has also hurt the growth of small rural enterprises. There are 
many other biases in government policies in resource allocation. The credit and foreign exchange as well 
as trade policies and products policies have systematically favoured the large scale in most African 
economics (See Stewart (ed.) 1987; Stewart and Ranis, 1990; Haggblade et al., 1990; Wangwe, and 
Ndlela in Stewart et al., 1990). 
The high degree of public ownership in African industry and other sectors is often blamed for much of the 
observed inefficiency. African public enterprises have had a very poor profit record in 1980. For example, 
the net losses of public enterprises in Niger were 4 percent of GDP, in Mali, 6 percent, while the large 
investments by parastatals in Kenya produced a rate of return of only 0.2 percent. Other measures of 
efficiency also show weak performance. For example, Tanzania public enterprises have exhibited high 
capital intensity and low capacity utilisation. In Ghana, public enterprises showed higher capital intensity 





and lower labour productivity than private enterprises. Nonetheless, there are some efficient public 
enterprises such as the Kenya Tea Authority, the Ghanaian Volta River Authority and the Zimbabwe Iron 
and Still Co. (See Berg Report, World Bank, 1981; James, 1986; Wangwe in Stewart, Lall, and Wangwe, 
1992; Killick, 1978). 
Friedman (1993) quoting Mazrui (1988) says that while the ancient African kings built palaces and pyramids 
the modern presidents erect steel mills and hydroelectric dams, the new 'temples'. This is to make his case 
of saying that in Congo Brazzaville, the ruling elite make these 'temples' because they are the constant 
source of their private wealth. A classical example of plunder of state wealth is that of Mobutu, the late ruler 
of Zaire and allay of the West during the cold war, which left the country in complete economic and social 
ruins and now in a civil war'. In the minds of some of the best Africans, the indirect contribution of the West, 
and particularly of France, to the private appropriation of Zaire by a military/bureaucratic clique removed 
much of the credibility for future policies of international co-operation (Castells, 1998). The Nigerian case is 
similar to that of Zaire (Democratic Republic of Congo). The successive military rule and the personal 
appropriation of oil wealth have destabilised the country. Now, after the sudden death of Gen. Abacha, the 
country seems to have rediscovered the road to democracy. But the economy of the country is in total ruins 
and the Nigerian people are poorer now than at independence despite its rich oil deposits. 
If you take even Kenya, the more economically stable country in East Africa in relative terms, the political 
elite has extensive business interests and it is common place that political positions are used as a base for 
successful economic activities (Bigsten, 1993)" One of the major constraints on growth in the African 
economies is the unwillingness to undertake reforms that threaten the entrenched elite. In Kenya, 
indigenous business class and multinational firms have prospered behind high import barriers, making it 
possible to earn high profits by selling on the home market because they have connections with political 
elite (ibid.). 
Tribalism or ethnicity per s6 is not a reason for political instability in the African continent but it has been 
politicised as a means to control political power and through this the economic resources of the country 
within the above context. The ethnic differences that are at the forefront of Africa's political scene today are 
politically constructed rather than culturally looted (Castells, 1998). 
It is believed that direct foreign investment (DFI) would enhance industrial efficiency and would also help 
the capital account of the balance of payment, thereby relieving the chronic foreign exchange shortage. It 
would also become a vehicle of technology transfer. However, the past record of foreign investment, do not 
show a markedly positive record of DFI in African economies [see Cockcroft, Mytelka, Ohioehenuan and 
Poloamina in Stewart et al (eds.), 19921. But DFI has been limited to the extractive industry or primary 
products. In general, it is possible to say that DFI in SSA is very small. In the First African regional 
Conference on Science and Technology (1995) the DFI in Africa was assessed to be comparable to the 
amount attracted by Singapore and concentrated in a few countries and in a few sectors such as oil and 
mining. IT has been noted that NIEs are heavily relying on FDI to strengthen their technological capacity. 
The problem with Africa seems to be the result of mainly the political instability, even though, recently there 
is growing market openness and better and more attractive policies to potential investors. 
Incentives do have an important role to play, directly and by influencing the development of capabilities. It is 
the interaction between incentives, capabilities and institutions that fundamentally determines industrial 
efficiency. While the unfavourable external environment handicapped industrial effort, the major 
responsibility for poor performance in large-scale formal sector industry lies with failures with respect to 





each of these elements, in incentives which have discouraged efficiency that resulted in deficiencies in 
institutions and in capabilities. 
On the other hand, because of the political problems that would arise from excessive reliance on DFI, joint 
ventures are often suggested as a way of gaining the benefits of DFI, while reducing foreign control. There 
is an optimistic scenario that joint ventures will gradually transfer entrepreneurial, managerial and technical 
functions to the local partners. This would, first, increase local capacities, and then, also the bargaining 
power of the local partner, which depends, among other factors, on local managerial and technical 
capability [see Barba Navaretti, Cockcroft in Stewart et al., 19921. But there is no evidence that joint 
ventures perform any better than MNCs in terms of technology choice or efficiency, nor, however, that they 
perform any worse. 
African governments have spent large sums of money on universities, national scientific Research Councils 
or Science and Technology Commissions that have confined themselves on high-powered research and 
manpower training only (UNECA, 1991). These very institutions were supposed to be the engine of the 
whole national development, by isolating themselves from the entrepreneurs, bankers, lawyers and 
educational institutions, i.e. from the very society they were supposed to lead, became ineffective as agents 
of socio-economic development. But there are few successful results in developing new varieties of rice 
and wheat, in the production of compost manure, and early diagnosis of certain diseases (UNESCO, 1988, 
p16). 
A lot remains to be done to enable SSA countries to adopt and implement measures for the development of 
an adequate technological base. An appropriate application of S&T with a view to ensuring an integrated 
development process with strong inter-sector linkages is a must to start with. In other words, co-operation 
arrangements between universities, research institutes and enterprises must start. In the process of 
creating the right environment of intersector co-operation, the government's S&T body, through its policies, 
plays a very crucial role. This is particularly valid to all developing countries. 
CASTAFRICA II recommendations are widely held in Africa, and one of the views they reflect is that the 
basic problem to be solved is that of an under-supply of adequate science and technology (Hill, 1987). 
Improvement of capacity to manage technology, and to make and implement effective policy for it, requires 
the development of better diagnoses of skill deficits and institutional bottlenecks in policy management, 
policy processes and management traditions in Africa. African S&T policy makers have been more 
successful in thinking about how to organise the supply of S&T than in thinking how to organise the 
demand for it (Davis, Tiffin and Osotimehin, 1994). That African countries need to work on the demand-pull 
aspect of innovation is also emphasised by UNECA report (1991). 
Therefore, to promote S&T for industrial development in Africa, the supply and demand side of the equation 
need be synchronised. The point made by Vitta (1990) is still valid. He suggested four sets of constraints 
that must be rectified if technology policies are to be made effective in Africa. Implicit technology policies 
must be made explicit; 'informal management' which he equates to tradition and corruption should be 
replaced by professionalism, weaknesses in institutions for policy management need be eradicated, and 
content of technology policies should be relevant and clear. Africa need to wake up to address these issues 
now more than ever because the danger of being at the margin of the global economy is increasingly 
threatening and closer than over. Politics as a means of control of economic resources for personal, family 
or ethnic group's advantage should be totally rejected. Political stability should be given priority with greater 
trust and co-operation among African countries in order to make unnecessary the recurrent arms race and 
conflicts, only then, one can really think and work on real development issues. Otherwise, all the 





macroeconomic development policies and activities and sound S&T policies for industrial technological 
development that is produced every year in international conferences or in government planning offices (to 












8. IT in SSA Countries 
8.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, we will consider the experience of SSA countries in IT policies and management. 
Computers, particularly the microcomputers, are penetrating the SSA countries. How are these countries 
coping with this new phenomenon? Of course the SSA countries have their peculiar situation with regard to 
IT use and diffusion. It is very relevant at this stage to capture this peculiar experience in order to learn how 
best to cope with this new and pervasive phenomenon known as the 'micro-electronics revolution'. 
8.2 Environmental context 
We are on the verge of entering the new millennium. IT has become the norm in the advanced countries. 
Even the NIEs, particularly those of the South East Asia, have done a lot of "catching up" in IT. They have 
become heavy consumers of it and to some extent also are participating in the supply of it. At times their 
being late comers have given them the opportunity to be among the early adopters of IT. These countries 
are cited as good examples of leapfrogging in information technology. While SSA countries seem to be 
slow in reacting to this revolutionising technology, even though microcomputers are coming in significant 
number. The diffusion seems slow and unsystematic and changing the economic landscape of Africa may 
take years. But there is an opportunity to those who are quick to invest in IT in a way that can expand their 
capabilities in education and training as well as work. 
Ethiopia has been mentioned as the first African country to acquire a computer in 1960 (Afrique industrie, 
No. 372, I July 1987). But there are evidences that as far back as 1952, the Governor General of the 
French Equatorial Africa (FEA) established a data processing workshop with traditional IBM equipment for 
the processing of civil service payroll, the FEA customs statistics and other statistical data 
(htlp://www.sas.upenn.edu/African-Studies/ECA/nan2a.html). Since then, there has been progress. But, by 
world standards, Africa is still in the initial stages. The total present market for the IT products in Africa has 
been estimated at no more than 2 billion French francs (less than $400 million), about one thousandth of 
world market ("Marches; I'Afrique est-elle dans la course?" Jeune Afrique, No. 1535, 4 June 1990). This 
contrasts with an Africa share of world industrial production of between 1 and 2 percent. 
World Bank financing and assistance in IT have become quite pervasive in Africa, and projects with IT 
components are increasing in scope and complexity. A recent study found that significant IT components 
were present in over 90Vo of all Bank lending operations in Africa in fiscal year 1990 (Hanna, et aI., 1990; 
Hanna and Schware, 1990). Perhaps more significantly, the volume of Bank lending for IT has been 
growing since l98l at an average annual rate of nearly 307o. While IT is only 3Vo of a typical project's cost, 
it can be as large as 6OVo and total expenditure on IT are quite substantial. IT lending in the Bank projects 
in Africa in 1989 was US$180 million, twice the level of 1986. The African continent accounted for almost 
one-third of all IT lending by the Bank in 1989, which amounted to US$570 million (Hanna, 1990). 
The first computers were installed mainly in the headquarters of the ministries (typically Finance and 
Planning), in central statistical offices, and in the major public utilities (railways, electric power'). The use of 





computers often was mandated to facilitate the management of a single project or to be used by a technical 
assistance consultant. Gradually, the establishment of formal multi-year development plans, and the need 
to manage data-intensive tasks such as treasury accounting, tax and customs, the civil service payroll and 
the national census, started to make demand of computing facilities. Aid agencies and foreign companies 
provided technical assistance and computer vendors suddenly took an interest in Africa. 
Taylor and Obudho (1977) tell us that at the beginning there were relatively few Africans trained in 
statistics, computers and information systems, these functions were staffed mostly with expatriates funded 
from multilateral and bilateral technical assistance programs. Frequently these expatriates introduced 
computer-assisted tools that focused narrowly on the implementation of isolated segments or tasks of a 
project, without adequate attention to how the segments might subsequently be integrated or how the 
project overall might be sustained. All too often, IT was inappropriately introduced and used, and concepts 
and methodologies were transplanted without being adapted to the African institutional environment. 
In the 1980s, as part of structural adjustment programs and with the encouragement of the Bank, many 
governments started to introduce computing facilities. As a result, IT became more widely diffused. But, in 
1985, it was estimated that nearly half of the information market in Africa was provided by foreign aid 
(African Business, October 1985).  
That being how computer technology came to Africa, the communications infrastructure was   still is. Africa 
has very low level of telecommunications. The number of telephones in SSA countries is 14 per 1000 of the 
population, but South Africa alone has 100 per 1000 of the population. The low-income countries' average 
is 11 per 1000 of population (World Bank, World Development Report 1998/99). Even though 
improvements are made, SSA countries, excluding South Africa, are still way lagging behind the rest of the 
world. 
The pace of restructuring in the African telecommunications sector has been accelerating since 1990 as 
telecommunications operators established as joint stock companies, regulatory agencies created and 
private participation in the cellular industry is growing. For example, the national telecommunication 
operator in Guinea was partly privatised in early 1996. In Cape Verde, the government announced a tender 
for 40 percent of the national operator in 1995; in Ghana, there are two and soon to be three cellular 
competitors while Tanzania has issued tenders for additional cellular operators. Some 23 African countries 
had cellular systems in operation by the end of 1995. A significant development is the planned partial 
privatisation of incumbent operators and the introduction of second fixed-link operators in Ghana and 
Uganda, which was announced early in 1996 (ITU, African Telecommunication Indicators 1996). 
Africa is slowly getting connected to the worldwide Internet Network. In 1994, the first SSA countries were 
connected and by December 1995, 16 African countries had direct Internet connectivity. South Africa has 
one of the world's highest densities of Internet users (ibid.). By May 1999 there were only three countries 
without full Internet connectivity: Eritrea, Congo, and Somalia (http://www3.sn.apc.org/africa). All but 
Somalia will have one shortly. But it should not be a difficult thing to set up a full Internet connectivity in 
Africa with the many International Agencies ready to help with funding and expertise. This will be 
elaborated later, in the section on institutional capability also. 
Internet access in Africa has been largely confined to capital cities, although a growing number of countries 
do have them in some of the secondary towns. Most African capitals now have more than one Internet 
service provider (ISP) and in early 1999 there were over 300 public ISPs across the region. Seven 
countries had l0 or more ISPs - Egypt, Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania and Zimbabwe - 





while 20 countries had only one ISP. Although Ethiopia and Mauritius are the only countries a monopoly 
ISP is national policy, i.e., the private companies are barred from reselling Internet services, there are other 
countries in which this practice still continues, predominantly in the Sub-Saharan African where markets are 
small (ibid.). 
In some countries the public telecom operators have made a special policy to provide local call Internet 
access across the whole country. To do this, the local telecom operator establishes a special 'area-code' 
for Internet access that is charged at local tariffs, allowing Internet providers to immediately roll out a 
network with international coverage. With the massively reduced costs for those in remote areas that this 
provides, it is surprising that so far only 13 of the 53 countries have adopted this strategy - Burkina Faso, 
Ethiopia, Gabon, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Chad, Togo, Tunisia, and Zimbabwe 
(Jensen, 1999). It is difficult to measure actual number of Internet users, but figures for the number of 
dialup accounts provided by ISPs in Africa are more readily available, the estimate of which is more than 
500,000 subscribers with an estimated number of hosts at about 25,000. This represents about 0.06% of 
the world's 43 million hosts (ibid.). 
SSA cannot fully exploit the opportunities offered by IT with such low level of telecommunication service 
infrastructure. Isolated microcomputers, no matter how large their number is, cannot bring the required 
productivity and efficiency. At the same time telecommunications infrastructure requires substantial capital 
investments which is in short supply in all African countries, particularly some are heavily indebted. It is a 
real paradox, therefore, to ask for more investment in telecommunications infrastructure when there are 
some more pressing needs like the debt servicing, and feeding the population. Really hard times are ahead 
of Africa. The immediate benefits have to be traded off with the long-term benefits. But Africa is full of 
contradiction, there are many luxury items consumed by African countries like cars, VCRs etc. by the 
affluent few. Telecommunications services and computers, on the other hand, should be considered as 
necessities to make SSA countries' economies more efficient and the integration with the world economy 
possible. 
The global restructuring in the telecommunications market has some hope for Africans. The trend is that 
the national telecommunications service companies are progressively leaving place for the few very large 
international telecommunication carriers, which will control the supply of the world telecommunications 
services. This means that each country need only open up their local market to such corporations to get the 
benefit of an efficient telecommunications services and get connected to the world. The mergers in the 
international telecommunications companies in the world may definitely push African countries to follow suit 
and open up their markets. This may give way to better telecommunication services and at cheaper than 
the prevalent prices, which are in general higher than in the developed world. 
At this point, it is relevant to consider the thoughts of Castells (1998) in his 'End of Millennium' book where 
he exhaustively discusses the 'information age' and the 'networked society' with the implication to what he 
calls 'the rise of the Fourth World'. These social groups are those excluded by the information society or 
networked society, and SSA countries are one of them. With the exception of selective integration of small 
segments of African capitals, affluent markets, and profitable exports into the global networks of capital, 
goods, and services, most of the economy and the overwhelming majority of the population are left to their 
own fate, between bare subsistence and violent pillage. Globalisation of world economy may not 
necessarily bring benefits to SSA because it is steered by profit motives. The eradication of poverty or 
ignorance under which their peoples are chained is not the problem of TNCs that dominate the global 
markets. Only the people that have their life at stake can do something about it. 





Therefore, given the environment of the new global economic older, strong leadership is required from 
governments in the SSA countries to use the powerful tool of IT to solve their social and economic ills in 
partnership with their people and international community. This will require a new social and economic 
philosophy than the crude capitalist system we have around us. Castells (ibid. p.161) calls 'black holes of 
informational capitalism' to the rise of inequality, social polarisation, poverty, and misery in most of the 
world. We agree with the warning he gave that, 'unless there is a change in the laws that govern the 
universe of information capitalism, since, unlike cosmic forces, purposive human action can change the 
rules of social structure, including those inducing social exclusion. There will be no escape from pain and 
destruction inflicted on the marginalised' (ibid. p.162). 
8.3 IT policy 
It is very difficult to speak about IT policy and management in SSA countries becau.se it is a new 
phenomenon. It is true that computers are coming to these countries, particularly the microcomputers, but 
nothing systematic is yet done, like national IT plan, to follow an efficient and effective path of diffusing the 
use of computers for economic development. May be African governments are not sufficiently aware of the 
full potential of IT or they consider them as too advanced and costly to be interested in them. But one thing 
is for sure that even the SSA countries cannot afford to ignore them. The future is of information 
technology. 
Vision and goals 
It is clear that while African countries have started to make investments into computer and related 
technologies there is a dearth of underlying computer technology, which hardly rises above the basic level. 
The effective application of IT, therefore, has hardly begun. But since the uncontrolled introduction of IT can 
be as harmful as the absence of this technology, it is important for nations to analyse critically their current 
status in IT, in terms of national objectives, the resources required and costs (Zwangobani, 1988:156). 
SSA countries have one simple and grand vision: to have a decent living standard for their people. 
Industrialisation and the underlying technology transfers were all meant to achieve this vision. IT, as the 
new pervasive and revolutionary technology, is at the heart of the current industrialisation experience in the 
world. If the first wave of industrial revolution has left Africa out, we cannot let this new industrial revolution 
based on IT pass it by. It is within this framework that a national IT policy should identify the requirements, 
make provision for' necessary resources and promote the effective use of IT for the betterment of society. 
This gives us more reason to find the right place for the national IT Plan within the national development 
plan. 
Therefore, the national socio-economic development plan should be the basis for the setting of technology 
priorities. All over the world, the significance of 'microelectronics revolution' has been recognised and given 
due attention. SSA countries cannot afford not to list it in their priorities for their vision has less chance to 
materialise without it in the 2l't century. Priority areas should be allocated adequate resources to ensure 
success. This process normally leads to the sector development of IT, which requires co-ordination to avoid 
duplication. On the other hand, experience has shown that a national policy on IT is a major determinant in 
developing and improving IT itself. It is with this in mind that we are looking for the vision and objectives 
that SSA has to achieve with IT. 
Let us analyse what could be the long-term objectives that SSA countries should look for to achieve. At the 
basis of computing facilities acquisition made by civil services, or individual education and research 





institutions, or international agencies, or non-government organisations or individual enterprises in the SSA 
countries, we usually find one or more of the following implicit or explicit objectives: 
1. To help produce goods and services that can compete in the international market; 
2. To get connected with the world information highway; 
3. To make most of the internationally available scientific and technological know-how for 
development; 
4. To educate and train people; 
5. To help improve the national health management; 
6. To improve the efficiency of public agencies management and services; 
7. To monitor and control pollution, and manage the environment for sustainable economic 
development: 
8. To help in the cultural development of the country. 
The above objectives are emphasising the role of IT as an infrastructure. This is true of all developing 
countries in general and in particular of SSA countries. It is logical that at the initial stage of industrialisation 
countries are mainly users of IT than producers. If they succeed in the process of industrialisation, at a later 
stage based on their comparative advantage, they may pass to the advanced stage of producing and 
competing in the international market in the supply of IT products and services. But that is far from the sight 
now. 
There are now attempts to help African governments come with clear vision and national IT Plan such as 
the one given by the African Information Society Initiative (AISI) to support and accelerate socio-economic 
development across Africa (see Appendix 5). The latecomers like Eritrea can benefit from the study and 
recommendations of such initiatives and have the chance to use it as a checklist for the future national 
information and communications infrastructure plans. 
IT policy 
A policy, that clearly recognises the strategic importance of IT and tries to use a national IT plan for 
introducing and diffusing the right kind of these technologies, is found nowhere in the SSA countries. This is 
because there is lack of skilled manpower, there are other more pressing needs to attend to and, of course, 
there is a severe foreign exchange shortage to make adequate investments in IT. Nonetheless, the lack of 
awareness of the potential benefits of IT to the economy, among the leaders of these countries, is not to be 
excluded. 
Even with the necessary awareness, the task of introducing, diffusing, and integrating IT into the socio-
economic fabric of the SSA countries would be very difficult and, if successful, a matter of a generation's 
time because of the very low literacy levels. Assuming the necessary capital investment is available, to 
educate and train people and allow them to have enough experience to build all the necessary know-how 
and skills in IT requires time. 
One is tempted to give up by looking at the sheer amount of money required to develop all the 
infrastructure facilities for IT before it could be used and exploited to make a real difference in the economy. 
But let us think of the money paid for debt servicing to the first world. Add to it the money African countries 
spend for their armies and the money that ends up in the pockets of corrupt government officials, it would 
not be difficult to figure out that the necessary money is there but not used properly. Of course the issue of 





debt cancellation must be accepted by the international community if at all a real development is to take 
place in Africa. 
Is there any serious attempt by SSA countries to shape the IT policies and plans to bring about the much 
desired socio-economic development vision? Under the general title of 'National computer centres' a wide 
variety of different bodies can be found in African countries. Often, the national computer centre will 
represent the only major initiative so far taken at the national or government level to encourage computing 
and the diffusion of skills. The terms of reference, mandates, responsibilities and the scale and scope of 
activities varies very much. In some cases, these institutions are at a formative stage and their role is 
confined to the preliminary formulation of national IT policy, sometimes being essentially the secretariat of a 
national committee dealing with this subject, or having some co-ordinating function (see Gahan, 1992: 2O). 
The tasks of national centre may include formulating national IT policy, developing IT plans, implementation 
of selected aspects of IT plans, systems development and implementation, usually for the public sector, 
maintaining a centralised computer service, investment promotion, providing training in IT skills, approval of 
imports of hardware and software, drawing up import guidelines, and standard software development. 
Country examples include Congo (Republic), for instance, where there is a body that deals with IT co-
ordination. In Guinea, there is the CNIG. In Mozambique there is a special commission on IT founded in 
1980 but it has not yet published a national policy. There is however the body CTD for IT co-ordination. 
Nigeria has the CCC for IT co-ordination (Le courrier, No. 113, January/February 1989). More elaborate 
structures are also found, notably in Senegal and C6te d'Ivoire, for instance. C6te d'Ivoire has a national IT 
commission and executive body (Computers for industrial management in Africa; the case of Cote d'Ivoire, 
PPD. 154,2l March 1990). Ethiopia has a national Computer Centre under the national Science and 
Technology Commission (Computers for industrial management in Africa: the case of Ethiopia, PPD. 176, 
18 September 1990). 
IT has been introduced into Kenya's information systems and services without specifications of overall 
national developmental and information needs to be achieved. Policy and decision makers have further 
complicated this situation. They have often concentrated on the procurement of hardware only, without 
consideration of human resources, for software development and/or adaptation of technology. Lack of co-
ordination in the selection and procurement of information technology has reduced the possibility of co-
operation needed in the development of national information resources as well as the chance of co-
operative efforts to facilitate information exchange at national, regional and international levels. To have an 
effective information policy there is a need for an effective national IT policy (Kenya: national information 
and Informatics Policy, 1988). Information and the knowledge that comes from it are a very critical factor in 
the national development of any country. IT becomes a very powerful tool in the management of 
information resources if properly designed and used. Unfortunately many SSA countries have a very poor 
information management capability. 
Zwangobani (1988:164) hits a very important point while discussing the performance of the inter-ministerial 
committees, usually established to recommend on IT policies. First, these committees are often dominated 
by people without IT skills. Almost all of them seem to have an ephemeral existence. The high staff 
turnover in government does not explain this phenomenon. In Kenya, Tanzania and possibly Zambia, these 
committees were established, met for some time and then withered away. This may be another indication 
of the lack of commitment to IT on the part of non-IT officials. Equally it may be an indication of a lack of 
commitment to the purposes for which the committees were created, for any government committed to a 
set of goals would surely set up viable machinery to achieve and maintain them. But, given the tendency to 





use the main IT authority (e.g. government computer centres) as both the main policy- implementing body 
and as a resource centre, the manager of the government computer establishment is in a pivotal position 
and could help in bringing the commitment missing in the ephemeral inter-ministerial committee. He is able 
not only to influence policy formulation and its implementation, but also to catalyse the process of policy 
formulation (ibid.). It follows that the experience, training and drive of this individual (or the team) can have 
an important bearing on the pace of events in IT in the public sector and perhaps in the country as a whole. 
It is known that the import policies adopted by a country will have important effects on the spread of 
technologies within the country. Sometimes these effects are unforeseen, and they may be quite opposite 
to what the policy maker intended. In absence of explicit IT policies, duties, tariffs, sales taxes, 
import/export licences and foreign exchange permits can work as the implicit policies. For example, in 1985 
for 24 African countries the average rate of duty (which sometimes included fiscal tariffs etc.) was over 34 
percent (Survey of government policies in informatics, UNIDO/IS.526, 4 April 1985). By contrast, developed 
country tariffs on computers are very low. The most-favoured nation tariff rates on computer central 
processing units in 1987 were 5.4 percent for the European Community, 4.9 percent for Japan, and 4.3 
percent for the United States of America. Tariffs on computer peripherals and computer parts were of a 
similar order, although some peripherals attracted duties of up to 13.8 percent in Japan (Kostecki, 1989). 
Given the intense levels of competition between the three, the low rate of duty is striking. They of course 
partly reflect the general openness of the world trading system, but also the strong demand for such 
products among industry and the services sector in developed countries.  
The choice of such high duty levels in African countries, says Gahan, may have been made with one or 
several objectives in mind, such as to discourage foreign exchange expenditures in general; encourage 
capital expenditures on other types of machinery; increase government revenues; and encourage local 
manufacture of computer equipment. 
However, analysis has shown that computer use is highly sensitive to computer price, with a price elasticity 
of about -1.5. This means that a policy that doubles price will reduce usage by two thirds. Protectionist 
policies which attempt to foster the domestic production of hardware will do so at the cost of significant 
reductions in the application of computers in the national economy (Flamm, 1989). 
In Ethiopia, a corporation or factory wanting to acquire a computer must obtain Ministry of Industry approval 
before seeking foreign assistance or requesting a foreign exchange allocation [Computers for industrial 
management for Africa: the case of Ethiopia" (PPD. 176, 18 September 1990)1. In Ghana, a manufacturing 
firm has to apply for an import licence from the Ministry of Trade (on the recommendation of the Ministry of 
Industries, and Science and Technology). These procedures are not as time-consuming as they used to be, 
but they are now a first step before competing in an uncertain foreign exchange auction, where a full 
deposit in local currency is necessary. Customs duty and sales tax on computers and electrical and 
electronic equipment generally are fixed at 50 percent of the c.i.f. value. Importers with their own foreign 
exchange resources are reported as being charged an additional 50 percent (Ayiku, 1989). In Zambia, by 
contrast, trade policies for electronics are reported as being progressively made more stringent. Except for 
government and structural needs, which are given special consideration, all other users have to obtain 
permission to import and also queue up for foreign exchange. Data processing machinery attracts a 30 
percent ad valorem customs duty and also an import sales tax of 25 percent, making an effective landed 
value 55 percent above the import value. To this is then added a local sales tax of 10 percent. Imports of 
automatic data processing equipment amounted to $3.1 million in 1986 (Wadia, 1989). 





Today many African countries are asking more IT lending to improve performance an4 productivity. Still, 
only a few countries seem to have policies and environments that promote widespread and effective IT 
application in all sectors of their economies (Jules-Rosette, 1986) - IT policies in Botswana follow a laissez-
faire approach (Datta, A., and Baffour-Awuah, M., 1988). In other words, the decision whether or not to 
make use of an innovation is left mainly to individual organisations. But the absence of a national policy in 
Botswana is creating some problems such as the proliferation of incompatible brands. For instance the 
Geological Survey Department, in 1988, had ten computers of four different brands" There were five 
machines from one brand, but all are of different models. But the government in Botswana is cautious 
about the adoption and application of innovative IT techniques. Policies governing the activities of various 
ministries and other agencies of the Government in the acquisition and use of both hardware and software 
are monitored by the Computer Steering Committee which also oversees the standardisation of public 
sector database systems as well as staff training. A good IT policy would ensure that selected hardware 
and software were used rationally, thereby resulting in considerable economies. 
A problem such as that of education and training will be subject also to frequent redefinition, as a 
consequence of technological change. As noted above, the rapid changes in technology that have taken 
place in the world of computing mean that late comers have had an opportunity to skip some of the less 
efficient stages and to move directly into more advanced fields, we refer to this as leapfrogging. The 
reduced costs of equipment and the increasing user-friendliness of software means that the possibilities of 
using the technology in a productive way have increased. But there are several problems also. The 
personal computer is leading the computerisation process in Africa. Personal computers can be relatively 
easily maintained. However, maintenance from the manufacturer is less likely to be available (Afrique 
industrie, No. 390, 20 April 1988). Thus, the skills required may have decreased in level, but the volume 
required has increased very much. Repairs and maintenance of thousands of personal computers is not the 
same as repairing one or two mainframes. Therefore, national IT policies need to take care of the whole 
package that concerns the process of computerisation, if it is going to be effectively and efficiently used. 
There will remain also the question of whether there are specifically national or regional solutions to be 
sought and roads to be taken. Some opinion would suggest, for instance, that Africa should turn to software 
specific to its countries, and there should be computer service companies, for which a market exist (Afrique 
industrie, No. 390, 20 April 1988). But the market may be in many cases a potential one, needing many 
steps before it becomes a real consumer market, ready and able to pay for hardware, software and 
services to meet specific requirements. Again, the idea of software production for local requirements has to 
be defined more precisely: there are undoubtedly specific language needs, or, for instance, accounting 
needs resulting from particular social security or taxation systems, and these can and should be met by 
specifically tailored software. But the standard solution will usually be quicker and more appropriate: a 
straightforward database or spreadsheet application will meet the majority of requirements and will be a 
great deal cheaper. 
The evidence so far explored show that SSA countries have a long way to go in terms of organising 
themselves better to exploit the opportunities offered by IT to help them increase their international 
competitiveness. National IT Plan would increase public awareness and give more sense of direction and 
co-ordination and the AISI expertise can be of great help (Appendix 5). Therefore, without assuming that 
everything can be accomplished with good policies and plans, the effective use of policy instruments can 
accelerate the learning process and these countries have to learn how to best use them to achieve their 
development goals. 





8.4 Institutional capability 
The dissemination of IT requires the development of an adequate institutional support. There are many 
aspects to this, ranging from setting standards for the procurement and use of IT to building indigenous IT 
production capability. Always essential, however, ale modern telecommunications and widespread diffusion 
of computers, In general, telecommunications networks and services in Africa are grossly inadequate in 
terms of unmet demand, low penetration nation-wide, and poor quality and reliability of service. 
In a few African countries the importance of telecommunications for the wider development of an industrial 
society, which allows a full use of the information processing capabilities of computers, has already been 
recognised (Gahan, 1992). Cote d'Ivoire has sytranpac, Cameroon has COMPAC, and Gabon has 
GABOPAC and that means they already have or soon will have public data networks of the Transpac type 
(Afrique industrie, No 379, 5 November 1987). In Nigeria, the oil companies are at the forefront of network 
development. Shell have its own network based on leased lines. A subsidiary of the Nigerian National 
Petroleum Company has installed a network said to be the largest in Africa (Computers for industrial 
management in Africa: the case of Nigeria, PPD. 126, 10 July 1989). 
With regard to telephone density in Africa, there are only 14 telephones per 1000 people in SSA. In 
general, the quality of service in Africa is poor, with local call completion rates of less than 30%, compared 
to more than 70% in OECD countries. International call completion are even worse, often below 20% 
(Sanders, warford, and wellenius, 1983; Lomax, 1990). It is difficult to have a clear picture of the number of 
personal computers per 1000 people in SSA, even the recent World Bank world Development Report 
(1998/9) does not give one. But the figure for the low and middle-income countries is 8.7 computers per 
1000 people and SSA countries do have considerably lower figures than that. On the other hand, the 
number of Internet hosts for SSA is 2.03 per 10,000 people. But remember that of these only South Africa 
has 30.67 Internet hosts per 10,000 people. 
Investments in telecommunications facilities in Africa grew between 1990 and 1993. However, like 
revenues, investment declined in 1994 by l9ok. Around 60% of investment was generated from internal 
resources or self-financed. This is relatively higher proportion compared with other developing countries 
regions, suggesting a lack of capital from other sources. Multilateral assistance, although in decline, 
accounted for a further 20% of telecommunications investment while the remainder came from bilateral and 
other sources such as grants, reserve drawing, and commercial lending (ITU, African Telecommunications 
Indicators 1996). 
As for the gap between Africa and the industrialised world, computer spending in Africa in 1988 averaged 
0.34Vo of GDP, compared with 1.47o of GDP in Italy, and 2.5Vo in the United States (Africa File and ISPA 
Nord/Sud, 1991). On average, spending on computerisation – as a percentage of GDP - is six times higher 
in industrialised countries than in Africa. Investments in IT tend to stimulate a supply respon.se from private 
industry and also serve to catalyse complementary investments in terminals and computer equipment. The 
"gap" serves to illustrate the extent to which industrialised countries have become advanced users of IT 
and suggests that African countries still have significant requirements in terms of IT catching-up. 
A number of large firms are directly present in some African countries, although coverage is far from 
complete. Thus, for instances, IBM has agencies in its biggest markets: Cameroon, Cot6 d'Ivoire, Morocco, 
Senegal, Tunisia and also Algeria. In 1989 IBM sold 6,000 personal computers and about 200 
minicomputers. However the turnover of IBM in Africa is only 60 percent of that in Portugal. Bull and Unisys 





are important also (Marches: l'Afrique est-elle dans la course? (Jeune Afrique, No. 1535, 4 June 1990). IBM 
started representation in Uganda through Business Systems Limited in late 1980s (lrvian, 1989). Computer-
land had four franchises in Africa, Cameroon, Cote'd'Ivoire, Gabon and Senegal in 1987 (Afrique industrie, 
No. 379, 5 November 1987). 
Kenya has many dealerships but it has been the focus of direct action by major manufacturers, whose 
involvement is in the form of subsidiary companies, such as ICL Kenya and NCR Kenya (Computers: 
making a mark on man's activities, The Weekly Review, l1 March 1985). In Zambia, it has been noted that 
the market for computers is much skewed. A survey of computer usage in late 1986 noted that of a total 
116 computer companies covered in the survey, the top two had supplied 97 percent of them (Kelly, 1987). 
In Zimbabwe, in 1988, C.F.Tulley Associates had a staff of more than 300 and franchises for Goupil, 
Epson, Isotimex, Ferranti and Compaq. It also provides regional support for Data General in Eastern 
Central and Southern Africa (African Business, April 1988). 
The question of second-hand equipment would bear closer examination in the African context. 
Technological change is so rapid that in developed countries perfectly usable equipment is often described 
obsolete. In some cases the opportunity is being taken to export it to developing countries rather than 
scrapping it. There are market institutions to take care of matching the supply and demand of second-hand 
technologies. For instance, the systems of "cartes grises" for the Ministry of Transport in Benin has been 
computerised with (second-hand) IBM equipment by the company Paris Computer Exchange, which 
specialises in the sale of second-hand computer equipment and services (Jeune Afrique economie, No. 1 
10, July/August 1988). In other cases proximity to a more advanced computer market of itself does facilitate 
such transfers. For example, 80 percent of the installations in Botswana were ex-Johannesburg, in 1986 
(Zimbabwe special report, South, No. 70, August 1986). 
What are the major obstacles to increasing activity on the part of computer companies in Africa? Clearly the 
most important obstacle was currency restrictions and payments difficulties. This was followed by a lack of 
demand for computer products. The other obstacles were inadequate telecommunications, non-tariff 
barriers, lack of suitable local agents, and lack of market information. The remaining possible obstacles 
were unreliable electricity, unsuitable climatic conditions, low cost producers' competition and language 
difficulties. Adaptation of products to the African markets has taken place in certain cases, notably in 
software and in services. For both of these commercial practices were the commonest cause of adaptation, 
followed by language. Hardware changes were occasioned most frequently by the power supply followed 
by operating temperature and humidity. Other causes for adaptation cited were altitude, packaging, 
keyboard cables and local telecommunications requirements (Gahan, 1992). 
The role of official development assistance in the development of computing in Africa is a significant one, 
although there are some grounds for believing that it is largely an unconscious one. Many projects for 
improved public administration involve the computerisation of information systems. Equally, there have 
been a number of activities targeted at the development of human resources in the IT field. For instance, 
significant training is provided in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland by industry. 
Students are sponsored by the British Council and the Overseas Development Administration on courses 
run by manufacturers and training companies (Information systems training and developing countries, 
Proceeding of a workshop, British computer Society, Developing countries Specialist Group, London, 
1989). A Wang regional sales director is quoted as saying: "half the African market is someone's foreign 
aid" (African Business, October 1985). 





Today, at the end of the millennium, a large number of international agencies are funding and helping to 
overcome the connectivity problem of SSA countries to avoid the marginalisation from the global economy 
and international community. Internet connectivity in Africa is slowly progressing. There are a number of 
international agencies and organisations involved in Internet initiatives (see Appendix 6). But years will 
pass before we could have the evaluation of their performance, as this is a recent phenomenon. For 
example, USAID Leland Initiative Project is an initiative by US Government. It is a $15 million project in a 
five-year time to extend full Internet connectivity to 20 or more African countries in order to promote 
sustainable development (http://www.info.usaid.gov/rcgions/afrlleland./project.htm). Similarly the Dutch 
initiative to help information and communications technologies development in the developing countries has 
been launched in 1996. The International Institute for Communication and Development (IICD) has been, in 
fact, established by the Netherlands Minister for Development Co-operation Mr. Jan Pronk for such a 
mission. In short, the major activities of IICD will be to identify the demand for ICT applications in 
developing countries and to find the right supply of ICTs available in advanced countries to match them 
(information@ iicd.org). 
As we have seen, a lot remains to be done to develop the required institutional support to diffuse 
information technology use for the SSA countries to make a real difference to their economics. 
8.5 Human capital formation 
We have already seen in the previous chapter that the human resource supply situation in African countries 
does not look encouraging. Human resource in IT is not an exception. It is even worse, given that it is 
relatively new to Africa. System analysts are either difficult or impossible to find. The .situation with respect 
to the supply of programmers is better than that for systems analysts. For operators, the supply situation is 
even better. ln-company training, computer manufacturer or supplier training, and universities are the main 
source of trained computer staff of all types. However, the distribution of training sources differs sharply 
once the total of computer staff is broken down into systems analysts, programmers, and operators. 
Systems analysts are predominantly university-trained or trained by the computer manufacturer of supplier, 
with in-company training and technical qualifications being infrequent. Programmers also have 
preponderantly university qualifications but in-company training and technical qualifications are more 
frequent than are computer manufacturer or supplier training. In contrast to this, operators have in-
company training as their most usual training source, with computer manufacturer or supplier training being 
second. Fairly few have technical qualification or university qualifications (see Gahan, 1992). 
A quick overview of IT training in SSA can give us an understanding of the efforts made. In Botswana there 
are commercial schools (African Business, June 1988), In Cote d'Ivoire there is a training centre in Abidjan 
for officials. No fewer than 95 percent of analysts/programmers and 55 percent of software engineers are 
nationals (Afrique industrie, No.386, 20 February 1988; No.390, 20 April 1988). In Gabon, the institute 
African d'informatique provides training in IT on a regional basis (Ie courrier, No. 113, January-
Februaryl989, p. 54). In Kenya training is provided by Kenya Polytechnic, with a three-year diploma course 
which includes industrial experience. The University of Nairobi Institute of Computer Science has a 
postgraduate course. About 20 schools have computers with at least three using them in teaching (African 
Business, June 1988). In Nigeria, at least 26 firms undertake training (Okoye, 1989). In Senegal, there is a 
Centre de formation a la microinformatique de Dakar. This is in connection with the chambers of commerce 
and industry in Dakar and Le Havre, the latter having the Centre Normand de rechrche en informatique 
(Cenori) (Afrique industrie, No. 390, 20 April 1988). In Sierra Leone, the Institute of Public Administration 
and Management at the University of Sierra Leone provides training in IT, based on the realisation that 





accounting and computer could not be treated as independent subjects (Computers for industrial 
management in Africa: the case of Cote d'Ivoire, PPD. 154, 21 March 1990). 
Much training is carried out directly by the manufacturers of computers or their agents, usually of customers 
or their employees. ICL, for instance, has training centres in Egypt, Kenya, and Zimbabwe among other 
countries. Where possible it arranges for courses to be held in the countries concerned but many 
employees and customers also go to ICL in Britain, perhaps as many as 1,500 from Africa each year 
(Hutchinson, 1987).  
SSA countries have a very serious problem with regard to IT skill shortage. The existing institutional 
capacity to develop and train highly skilled IT manpower is insignificant. What is available is mainly geared 
towards the operational skills. This shows again the failure of SSA governments to take the necessary 
action to build the necessary critical number of highly skilled IT professionals if any real exploitation is 
possible of this revolutionising and pervasive technology in the near future. Buying computers and more 
computers, as if it were an ornament, would mean nothing to the ailing economy and the poor civil service 
administration. African systems analysts and designers, networks experts, communications experts and 
hardware engineers are a priority list for those who want really the productivity that can follow a judicious 
use of IT. Otherwise, it all amounts to 'put the cart before the horse'. 
It is clear that systems analysts and designers, and programmers are in short supply in Africa. But at the 
same time, the Bank lending finding suggests, the demand for more IT is obvious. Therefore, before 
embarking into any serious project of computerisation process, Africans should develop a critical mass of IT 
professionals and governments should lead in such endeavour. This should be integrated with the national 
human resource development plan. 
8.6 The Melting Pot: IT management and economic development 
In the 'first-level' of our diagnosis with the NIEs, we have discussed the organising, networking, learning 
and competitiveness, here that will be not necessary because IT is only at the initial stage of development. 
Therefore, we will limit ourselves to what is happening in SSA in broader terms whenever the scanty 
literature permits us to do so.  
In SSA countries where the dominant situation is the absence of any coherent IT policy at firm level or 
nation level, it is hardly possible to talk of IT management. In government departments, agencies, or public 
and private enterprises computers are mostly isolated islands of installations. Based on the limited literature 
available, we will see how these computers are used and managed. 
According to Gahan (1992: 44) there are only few countries in which between 25 and 50 percent of the 
factories use computers. These countries are Kenya, Botswana, Malawi, Seychelles and Zambia. There is 
no obvious correlation with country size or with levels of development of the economy as a whole or the 
manufacturing sector in particular. For instance, Zimbabwe, although it has one of the most elaborate 
manufacturing sectors, has low usage. The same is true for such large and relatively resource rich 
countries such as Nigeria, and also for C0te d'Ivoire, which has been making a particular concentration on 
national IT policy. 
According to 'Kenya: national information and Informatics Policy' (1988:192), in Kenya, the first computer 
was introduced in 1961, but growth was slow until 1975. There were four mainframes in 1965 and 30 in 
1975. By 1981, however, there were 127 mainframes and the number has continued to increase steadily. In 





1985, it was estimated that there were about 2000 computers in East Africa, 90 percent of which were in 
Kenya with Uganda and Tanzania sharing the remaining l0 percent. The introduction of minis in the late 
1970s and micros after 1980 has contributed in the growth of computer installations. The micros, in 
particular, have had a significant impact on the public and private sectors due mainly to decreased costs, 
increased power; portability and user friendliness. They are becoming more popular than the mainframes 
and minis. 
In the SSA countries, the application of IT is mainly restricted to big business organisations, government, 
parastatals, banking and some educational institutions. These applications include; in Finance: payrolls, 
invoicing, inventory control; Banking: in-house administrative functions, customer accounts; in Travel & 
trade: rolling stock logistics railways, airline reservations and ticketing; in Mass media: news agencies (e.9., 
Routers, sending reports to newspapers), radio, subscriber trunk dialling and international subscriber 
dialling, including use of phone cards; in Tele-referencing; World Net, which has occasionally been 
transmitted in some countries T.V.; in Education' universities, Polytechnics, and a few secondary schools; 
libraries: mainly those of international organisations using computers for information retrieval; Document 
Productir.tn - Government and micro-computer use by the university libraries. 
A study of minicomputers and medium-size mainframe installations, in some Franco-phone African 
countries, indicate that in 1989 the overwhelming majority of these were in the services sectors, especially 
in banking, insurance, transport and communications. Companies clearly identifiable as manufacturers 
were very few. As against this, there is evidence of the use of computers by larger manufacturing firms. In 
Benin, Societe benonoise de brasserie is computerised for management purposes. In Cote d'Ivoire, Societe 
ivoirienne de raffinage, Abidjan, uses computers not only for management but for maintenance planning 
also. In Niger, SONITEXTIL is computerised for management, In Nigeria it is estimated that more than 50 
percent of all industry is using computers for accounting, either in-house or using external services 
("Computers for industrial management in Africa: the case of Nigeria", PPD.l26, l0 July 1989). 
It is not difficult to note that the small available computing resources in the SSA countries are under-
utilised. It has been remarked in Mauritius, which is relatively advanced in the application of computers, that 
much of the existing computer installations are under-utilised (Bunjun, 1986). This is believed to be the 
case in Nigeria also, especially in the public sector (Akinlade, 1989). This is not, in fact, confined to 
computing resources only. Capacity or machine utilisation in Africa is in general about 30 percent. But for 
computers it can nevertheless be in certain cases remarkably high. For example, in Gabon the installations 
at Air Gabon, Comilog and Comuf function perfectly in extreme conditions (Afrique industrie, No 390, 20 
April 1988). But there are many instances where computers are mainly used for word processing purposes 
only and the utilisation rate may go as down as 10 percent. This seems the case also in Eritrea. This will be 
discussed in later chapters.  
Computer maintenance is another critical factor in SSA countries. There are a number of physical problems 
that can interfere with the well being of a computer such as: temperature, dust, humidity and irregular 
electricity supply. The public power supply is, however, the most commonly cited problem followed by dust, 
while temperature and humidity are minor problems (Gahan, 1992). The telecommunications infrastructure, 
on the other hand, can affect the computer networks in a country and create problems. Given the poor 
telecommunications infrastructure in SSA one expects it to be the most problematic area. But up to now it is 
perceived less problematic than power supply. The reason for this may be that the typical use of computers 
in African countries does not call for as sophisticated a telecommunication system, with networking and the 
linking of computers being relatively little known. On the other hand, the availability of a public 





telecommunications body to supply dedicated data links to computer users would mean that more reliance 
would have to be placed upon the public telephone network for data transmission, should this be 
necessary. Now that internet connectivity in SSA is at the forefront, the problematic character of unreliable 
and limited telecommunication infrastructure will be recognised for what it is poor and unreliable services 
with vast parts of the countries not yet connected.  
The repairs and maintenance issue is likely to be the most intractable of those facing the computer 
manager in a developing country. In view of the widespread shortage of spare parts and the lack of 
technical skills, there is certainly a high degree of down time due to unprepared faults. In Nigeria, it has 
been noted that in extreme cases systems can be out of action for months or even years for such reasons 
(Akinlade, 1989). The problem of maintenance can sometimes be exacerbated by a proliferation of brands 
of computers. This may make the problem of a supply of spare parts more difficult and it may make the task 
of fault diagnosis and repairs more difficult also. The problem of proliferation has been noted in Kenya, 
where the tying of donated computers to a particular brand is also negatively perceived (Scott, 1989). 
Government policy formulation in C6te d'Ivoire is directed towards a reduction in the number of foreign 
suppliers (Computers for industrial management in Africa: the case of C0te d'Ivoire, PPD.154, 21 March 
1990). 
There has been considerable success recently in developed country markets for what are called fault-
tolerant computers. These usually have more than one central processing unit, and indeed most of the 
internal hardware is duplicated, and this is automatically invoked in the event of failure of the primary 
hardware. Such computers are widely used in applications such as banking, where continuous connection 
between the different branches is regarded as absolutely necessary. This could be good news for SSA 
countries for it could help a lot in alleviating their maintenance problems. 
So far, we have discussed about hardware maintenance but there is also the software maintenance. Many 
software problems are difficult to resolve. It is, in fact, the more subtle errors that remain the longest. Some 
of them arise through unexpected interactions between different pieces of software, or as a result of 
incompatibilities between, for instance, the application software and the operating system or between the 
operating system and hardware, especially peripherals. The latter kind of problems is especially 
disagreeable. Any computer manager will have stories of a problem for which the different hardware and 
software suppliers all disclaimed responsibility, each blaming the other as the source of difficulty. In SSA 
countries this is a difficult problem because the necessary skills are not there in sufficient number. It is a 
crippling problem that can only be solved by making the required investments in human capital formation. 
In SSA countries, it is virtually non-existent the production of computer hardware and software. The supply 
of adequate support services is also scarce. But something is emerging. May be, one day when enough IT 
professionals and user market are available, the multinational computer hardware and software companies 
are attracted by Africa. Then, a real IT industry may slowly emerge in the distant future. At present, 
personal computers of IBM compatible type are produced in Cameroon. The company INTELAR first 
launched its Intel 8088-based computer in 1988 and now offers a range of machines including ones based 
on 80386 processors, video graphics array etc. All the machines are described as being resistant to heat, 
dust and humidity (lntelar: L'Intelligence artificielle Inc., sales brochure). Cote d'Ivoire is also engaged in the 
assembly of minicomputers in conjunction with a company from Taiwan province of China (Le courrier, No. 
1 13, January-February 1989), and Kenya assembles a personal computer clone, the Neptune. 
An example of computer related production may come from Nigeria, where a project to manufacture 
uninterruptible power sources in Lagos has been identified and is under consideration by United States 





investors (Snydcr et aI., 1990). Trans-Africa Computer Services of Zimbabwe manufactured computers and 
local area network stations (Computers in Africa, September/October 1988). Also in Zimbabwe, C.F. Tulley 
Associates and Plessey Zimbabwe have a joint venture to assemble clones (Olivetti and Bulgarian 
Isotimpex). They were assembling about 600 a year in 1988 (African Business, April 1988). 
Many are suggesting that African countries, to make a start in the IT industry, should do so first in software, 
because the capital equipment costs are lower than in other industries and because there may be domestic 
market opportunities for software to meet African conditions. For example, a software package specifically 
for small and medium sized African building contractors has been designed in Gabon (African Business, 
March 1989). In Mozambique there exist already twenty groups capable of joint serious work in IT, and 
there is talk of some specialists forming a co-operative (Cumbane, 1989). Business applications for 
MSDOS machines were written in Zimbabwe by Micropac (Pvt) of Harare and supported in Malawi, Zambia 
and Zimbabwe already in 1988 (Computers in Africa, September-October I 988). 
Computer services also are a major growth area. One survey in Botswana, for instance, gave l0 major 
companies offering consulting services, supply, repair, assembly and training. One of these companies 
(Ngami Data Service) offers a specialist program for hunting licences (African Business, June 1988). In 
1988 in Cote d'Ivoire there were about 20 computer services companies, and competition was keen. The 
largest was Cieria (Compagnie ivoirienne d'etsdes et de realisation en informatique et automatisme) which 
had an annual turnover of about 600 million CFA francs (Afrique industrie, No. 386, 20 February 1988). 
Computerising the civil services in Africa would mean a lot to improve the inefficient and bureaucratic 
systems of African governments. In recent years African Governments are more and more looking to IT to 
improve the public sector management, hence their institutional capability, and some of their social and 
environmental problems. The following paragraphs are examples taken from the Bank's lending in 
information technology (Hanna and Boyson, l 993): 
- The Agricultural Services and Institutional Development Project in Rwanda provides support to 
information systems in a number of public and private organisations, such as the National 
Directorate of Plant Health and Plant Quality, the Department of Fruits and Vegetables, and the 
Department of Teas and Herbs. The goal is the establishment of a central support unit with 
systems analysts and programmers, and a decentralised approach in computing using mostly 
microcomputers and local area networks. 
- In Madagascar, IT is used for ^sector policy and public expenditure analysis, parastatals 
monitoring, personnel systems, food stock monitoring, livestock production and agricultural 
research planning. 
- The use of IT is targeted for project monitoring and evaluation, development of information systems 
and services for rural planning, and for local governments and rural institutions. Technologies such 
as micro computing, facsimile and electronic networks are being used in Morocco and Kenya for 
this purpose. 
- The Bank has funded several projects that include information management systems for planning 
and monitoring use of land, water and other natural resources, and for integrating environmental 
considerations into economic policies. Algeria, Tunisia, Madagascar and Kenya are using 
geographic information systems and other new technologies and approaches to gather and 
process data on natural resources as well as geo-based socio-economic spatial data, and to 
evaluate the environmental impact of public policies. 





- In the Republic of Guinea, the Bank has financed a project to help the government establish a 
system for managing forestry and fishery resources. The project IT to manage hundreds of 
thousands of hectare of forest, register land rights and plan and research offshore fisheries 
management. A project in Chad is using microcomputers and satellite date, and training local 
scientists to collect and analyse information to formulate techniques for range land conservation 
and crop-livestock integration. A forestry development project in Tunisia includes communication 
equipment, forestry inventory based on satellite imagery, and information systems for research, 
monitoring and planning. 
- It is being applied to energy and transport planning, policy analysis and pricing, regional planning, 
and railway, port, airline and utility management. For example, the Second Power Project In 
Zimbabwe, in an effort to make power more reliable and available at the lowest possible cost, is 
using computers extensively to determine which facilities to rehabilitate and upgrade, and to extend 
the distribution and transmission networks. A project in Nigeria aims at improving the performance 
of key transport parastatals. Computer systems are being used in the parastatals to improve 
internal financial controls, accounting and management information systems, define financial 
targets, and carry out revenue/cost studies. 
- It is being used for planning and research, analysing manpower needs, MIS for all levels of the 
educational system, curriculum planning, school location and capacity monitoring, and computer 
assisted instruction. Kenya is using computerised information systems to process and analyse 
education and financial data and to reform the examination system, making it more efficient and 
even designing the examination itself. 
The Bank IT leading shows that African countries are increasingly looking for IT to solve some of their 
problems for the projects always have an IT component, But there seems to be a misconception about 
what IT can do and not do. Automating activities using IT by itself is not a solution. For example, it is not 
enough to introduce computers to improve debt reporting when the ultimate objective is to improve the 
capacity to analyse debt problems. Equipment and figures by themselves do not create people trained to 
use them. As Strassman writes, "A bad strategic situation cannot be corrected by automating it (Gold, 
1988; Miller and Doyle, 1987; Heitzman, 1990; Symons and Walsham, 1988; Robey and Rodrigucz-Diaz, 
1989; Kaul, Patel, and Shams, 1987; Strassman, 1985). 
In general, computerisation in Africa has led to improvements in institutional performance and productivity 
by inducing local capacity building in policy analysis, monitoring, and evaluation, investment planning and 
budgeting, fiscal control and accounting, and resource mobilisation. Computerisation has also facilitated 
marked improvements in public investment programs by supporting efficient systems for dealing with debt 
and trade management, and industrial promotion. Agricultural and crop management, as well as railways, 
airlines and port management, have, in turn, benefited from IT use (Moussa and Schware, 1992). 
The improvement in performance, however, has not been uniform. In fact, in a large number of projects 
reviewed, weak project management, unresponsive administration and procurement, inadequate design 
work, and insufficient training have limited real productivity gains. Moussa and Schware identify five "core" 
factors that act as constraints on the diffusion and success of IT projects in Africa: institutional weaknesses; 
human resources; funding problems; the local environment; and technology and information changes. To 
some degree, all these factors are overlapping. Insufficient planning, for example - a "symptom" of 
institutional weakness - can result in a shortage of qualified personnel or an underestimation of project 
costs. similarly, virtually all the symptoms shown (see Table 8.1) can lead to delays in implementation, or to 
unfinished projects. They have, however, created these five categories because, individually, each focuses 





on a group of problems that are closely related. It is noteworthy, too, that these factors are not unique to 
Africa or, for that matter, to the developing world. Institutional and personnel problems, for example, may 
be found throughout developed countries. The most problematic area - technical specifications of 
hardware/software requirements - is also a major issue for developed nations. In the African projects, 
however, the incidence of such problems was alarmingly high. In the category of institutional weaknesses, 
for instance, they found that well over one-fourth of the projects had one or more serious planning or design 
problems. In 2l of the 76 projects, the computerisation plan was not sufficiently relevant to organisational 
objectives. In 22 cases, the objectives of the computerisation were unclear, and in 15 cases, there were 
serious concerns about the project's feasibility. 
While some of these factors are unique to Africa and the rest of the developing world, many can be also 
found in industrialised countries. The difference is that developing nations have less capacity to overcome 
the constraints. Accordingly, the implementation of IT in Africa demands far more intensive planning than it 
has heretofore received. Project design must take into account the client's limited absorptive capacity. 
Table 8.1: Key problems/constraints to IT implementation in Bank projects in Africa 





lack of management  commitment to 
and responsibility for IT program 
Unclear objective  and priorities 
Impractical strategies 
Tendency for "quick fix" 
Unpredictable absorption capacity 
inadequately designed sys 
Cost over-runs of varying degrees 
Implementation delays and chaotic 
development 
User dissatisfaction 
Improper sequencing of activities 
Inappropriate technology 
Resistance to change 
2. Human resources Shortage of qualified personnel 
Inadequate compensation of technical staff 
High turnover of technical and competent 
managerial staff 
Insufficient counte.par(s to external 
consultants 
lack of professional training programme or 
career profiles 
Inadequate uses awareness 
Insufficient support 
Problems in operation 
High turnover 
Implementation delays 
Risk that project may come to a halt 
Technical know-how not transferred 
3. Funding Underestimated project costs 
lack of recurring expenditure 
Unfinished projects 
Implementation delays 




Lack of vendor representation 
lack of backup equipment, spares 
Imbalance between private/public sector 
wags 
Inappropriate procurement policies 
Inadequate site preparation 
General lack of professional to solve 
technical problems 
Implementation problems and delays 
High staff turnover 
Inappropriate procurement 
Equipment problems and 
implementation delays 
5. Technology and 
information 
changes 
Limited hardware and software availability 
Inappropriate software 
Dependence on individual suppliers 
Incompatible hard-software technology 
Data not shared 
Over-reliance on customized 
applications Uncontrolled costs 
Source: Moussa and Schware(1992), “Informatics in Africa: Lessons from World Bank Experience”, World Development, Vol. 20, 
No. 12. 





The most difficult question in SSA is the question of sustainability. Even the most successfully implemented 
projects need be tested against time. The question of sustainability should be incorporated in every future 
IT project, particularly the funding and maintenance aspects. There is much that can be done to help 
ensure the successful adaptation and diffusion of IT in Africa. The SSA countries, in particular, should from 
the outset give due attention to how best can IT be managed. Making computer hardware and software 
available is not enough. Nor buying computers because it is fashionable. Therefore, a serious thought must 
be given of where IT strategically fits within the African context and from there depart to fill all the critical 
gaps to properly exploit it. One of these critical shortages in Africa is that of IT professionals, as it has now 












9. Conclusions on SSA Countries 
In this chapter, it is concisely assessed why SSA countries have failed to use S&T as a base for their 
economic development and the main lessons summarised following the same structure of the chapter six 
for the NIEs.  
The policies of African countries during the 1960s and 1970s emphasised protection of African industry but 
placed little emphasis on efficiency and they have failed. The adjustment policies of the 1980s focused 
almost exclusively on efficiency, and paid no attention to capability building, thus, they also seem to have 
failed. The balance between these two extremes is very important. 
How do you get the balance? There is not a single best answer, but we could see the experience of 
Taiwan, South Korea and, in the African context, Mauritius to learn from them. These countries first built up 
strong human capabilities through heavy investment in education; they protected import-substituting 
industrialisation for a period (not too prolonged) and once industrial capability was established, they 
changed their incentive system to favour manufacture of exports based on simple and labour-intensive 
technologies (like textiles). They did not abandon protection of domestic industry, but provided incentives 
for efficiency through domestic competition and government pressures on firms, including pressures to 
enter export markets and face competition from international markets after a predetermined number of 
years. Allocation efficiency was promoted through realistic exchange rates, fairly low protection levels and 
relatively low wage rates. South Korea particularly relied on vertical pressures, while Taiwan and Mauritius 
more on horizontal pressure (Ranis, 1990; Amsden, 1989; Wade, 1984). 
Besides human resource development, Africa needs foremost policies for efficient industrialisation. 
Learning from those that have done it is possible. They have to be able to develop their own industries and 
run them efficiently without over depending on others to do the job for themselves, which is very costly 
anyway, therefore, unsustainable. Despite some successes, the overall assessment of past patterns of 
industrialisation from the perspective of capacity utilisation, industrial linkages, growth in productivity, 
reduced dependence on foreign management and technology and experts, is negative in Africa (Lall, 1992, 
in Stewart, Lall, and Wangwe eds. 1992, 22). 
It is well known that 'skilled manpower' is central to technological capability, thus, to effective 
industrialisation. African economies are potentially rich in human resources, yet people are relatively 
neglected, badly educated and in poor health with their capacities frequently underused. The consequence 
is low labour productivity and lack of competitiveness compared with countries where human resources are 
more fully developed and better used. This is so despite the fact that low wages should make African 
economies very competitive (Helleiner, 1992). Where human capabilities have developed, unattractive 
conditions of work have frequently led to massive brain drain. 
9.1 S&T and economic policies integration 
It is difficult to see clearly in the case of SSA countries the interplay of S&T and the economic policies. To 
appreciate it better a broader definition of S&T can help. This is not a S&T environment where a large 
number of R&D institutions, whether linked to universities of industries, and industrial complexes interact in 





the process of innovating and diffusing of new technologies like it is the case in the industrialised countries. 
In SSA countries it is only possible to talk of technology transfer, the efficient utilisation of technology, the 
development of technical skills, the diffusion and learning of new techniques. Of course, the activities of 
higher learning institutions like universities, polytechnics and technical schools is an integral part of the 
process as institutions entrusted with the responsibility of generating skills and introducing new techniques 
and technologies. But the industrial research is virtually unknown in SSA countries for the simple fact that 
they are at the initial stages of industrialisation process. 
Since every serious technological industrial development is based and preceded by technical skill 
development, it is important to ask whether the skill generating institutions are integrated to the needs of 
the emerging industries in the SSA countries. This was not the case. SSA countries have created 
educational and training institutes inherited from their colonial masters or built directly copying the structure 
of those in the advanced countries. Universities were established on the basis of 'publish or perish' 
principles one finds in the advanced countries. This have led African academicians to look for the outside 
world for models and recognition (international journal publications) regardless of whether the subject of 
their research and findings are relevant or not to the economic development of their country. The paradox 
in fact lies here. A poor country makes investment in research that should benefit first itself. But the picture 
above is the opposite. Indirectly amounts for the poor country financing the advanced countries' research 
for they only have capacity to exploit scientific result at the scientific frontier. Their research should have 
focused on best technology transfer and diffusion to strengthen the country's industrial development. The 
same could be said of the few R&D institutes. These should have helped to support the weak emerging 
industry at home. But it was not the case. 
Similarly, matching the skills produced by the higher learning institutes to that of the demand in the industry 
is important. But in this respect also there is a clear failure. The shortage of highly skilled manpower in SSA 
countries is still in place. What is worse is that even what is available is of a poor quality, given the poor 
resources with which the institutions are supposed to work. Curriculum is not revised to keep it in line with 
the needs of the industry, particularly that of the technical schools. The skill generating institutes and the 
industry are so far apart that relevance of curriculum is a subject mostly given a lip service only. Industrial 
technologists do not participate in the design of curriculum to make it really of some value to the industry. 
Usually industry chooses in-house training to create the skills needed. It is by far the most relevant kind of 
technical skill generating that is taking place in the SSA countries. It needs to be recognised and given due 
support. 
Even the light industry requires primary education to support the trainability of simple techniques to their 
labour force. But this basic education has remained so low for so long in the SSA countries. In 1995 the net 
enrolment ratio as percent of the relevant age group at the primary level was above 90 percent for only four 
countries of the SSA countries. 
In general it is possible to conclude that the higher skill producing institutes in the SSA countries have not 
moved in pace with the industrial needs of their countries. Their activity was dominated mainly by teaching 
and they have failed to give support to industry in industrial consulting services, in industrial technology 
research, and special skills training. The existing total separation of industry from higher learning 
institutions is recognised as unproductive and wasteful structure but concrete action to change it have not 
come yet. Of course, there are some isolated attempts by isolated institutes but are not sufficient to change 
the landscape. 





From the fragmented literature available on industrial policies in the SSA countries, it is clear that these 
countries lacked a coherent industrial strategy linked to the rest of the economy. The macroeconomic 
policies in SSA countries were swinging from agriculture bias towards industry bias causing damage to one 
sector or the other. All sectors of the economy are important but depending on circumstances some sectors 
are given priority over the others. But there is always a minimum level of activity in each sector for the 
whole economy to be viable. To implement economic policies skills, tools, equipment, machinery, and know 
how is required, which in simpler term is called technology. It is this technology with which a given 
economic policy is to be pursued that was not made clear. Those responsible in the different economic 
sectors at the implementing end finds it difficult to make the technological choices and manage them 
efficiently, assuming they make the right choices. Macroeconomic policy-makers assume this particular 
spot to be frictionless if the S&T aspect of the policies are not studied and guidance given. This assumption 
has proved to be very costly to SSA countries. It is not very difficult to see that many policy makers 
consider importing the technology (equated to buying the machinery), installing it, giving .some basic 
training to operate it is all there is in mastering technology. This is not true. Mastering technology is a very 
complex issue that cannot be left to chance. You need a host of institutions to support it. S&T policies 
should help build, manage and improve institutional framework for the best way of organising and 
developing scientific and technological activities capable of supporting all kind of industrial sectors. This is 
why macroeconomic policies or national economic development plans should incorporate the S&T required 
to making it a success. This integrated approach is what is missing in SSA countries. 
The melting process could not work properly because the main ingredients are missing. These are factors 
such as a clear vision of what technology for what specific objective of economic development; institutional 
support to small private firms and entrepreneurs during their learning period, in terms of finance, technical 
and marketing support; efficient large and medium sized indigenous private sector; interest by foreign 
investors in SSA countries; and development-related debt to finance state-sponsored industrialisation in 
area where the private-sector fails to invest, assuming that public sector is professionally managed and 
works by the rules of the market. 
The de-industrialisation process observed, particularly in 1980s, may continue in absence of significant 
money flowing towards the SSA countries than is actually the case at present. Many of these countries are 
desperately trying to meet their huge debt service charge. Many are continuously asking for debt payment 
rescheduling and still unable to meet them. The exit from this impasse is not clear yet. Debt cancellation 
would greatly help. But even that will not be enough. All types of conflicts going on should stop and the 
political stability restored first. The rule of jungle should be replaced by the rule of law. Only then the 
confidence of foreign investors can be restored and the above mentioned missing things can be put in 
place and reverse the grim picture of the present times. 
9.2 Priority given to IT 
In SSA countries, the very awareness of IT importance and pervasive character is very low let alone 
considering IT for priority in their limited S&T activities. Recently, the AISI came up with a vision, strategies 
and objectives that the African countries should follow to make the most of IT in the coming decades, so 
that Africa does not remain marginalised. This is a great contribution to improve the awareness of the SSA 
governments but by itself cannot generate anything useful and the actual push should come from each 
country. 





Computers have been coming to SSA for a number of years now, but more needs to be done to really feel 
the difference they can make to a society in general and to the economy in particular. Appropriate national 
IT policies and plans well integrated into the very economic and social fabric is what is needed. That was 
not the case for S&T in general and to expect it for IT would be simply farfetched. This is because S&T 
have never been truly addressed in SSA countries and industrialisation has never benefited the real 
support it needed. Radical change in thinking and attitude towards S&T in general is required. In particular, 
being this the era of microelectronics revolution. IT need be given a more serious attention than letting 
computers come in to the country. 
A computer is not a magic tool that the mere presence of it makes wonders. If not properly used can be the 
most expensive gadget added to the already long list of underutilised machinery and equipment in the SSA 
countries. This becomes automatically an unsustainable game. Therefore, this kind of trend need be 
reversed and IT should be made to increase returns by reducing costs. The first to benefit could be the 
large, corrupt and inefficient government administrations in SSA countries. The potential is there to 
increase the quality of social services as well as that of industry in general. Particularly the efficiency and 
reliability of transport and communication services, the financial services and tourist services could improve 
tremendously and could be linked to the global economy with ease. Of course, the international 
competitiveness of such industries could also improve. 
Even though help is necessary to build S&T in SSA countries, it should not be based on it and left to the 
whims of donor countries or aid agencies. SSA countries have never left their defence needs to outside 
help alone. Why not do the same for S&T for the sake of a sound economic and social development? 
9.3 Institutional capability 
Institutions are the basic fabric of a society. 'They shape the rules of the game in society and are the 
humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction, structures the incentives in human exchange 
(political, social or economic)'(North, 1990). These institutions emerge cither spontaneously over time 
(customs and tradition) through simple interaction without premeditation, or they can be the result of a 
conscious plan. In economic activities, the institutions that are the result of 'free interaction' are known as 
the markets. Government institutions, on the other hand, are established to consciously manage the life of 
a society in a way that serves best the group of people that it represents. 
Coming to SSA countries, both the governments and the private firms are active in the economy. But many 
governments have shown the tendency to control and direct the economy in various ways. This is in a 
situation where the markets are small and yet not fully grown, like what one seen in the developed 
countries with exceptions in the urban areas, particularly that of the capital cities. Much of the structure of 
the government institutions and markets is based on the colonial legacy. Dissect between the urban 
concentrations and the rural traditional African life is very clear and conflict of interest has become 
inevitable. For example, the government proceeding with its projects of exploiting the natural resources of 
the country such as in timber and mining industry as well as the wild life preservation and the making of 
national parks, inevitably enters in direct clash with the traditional and rural society's way of life. These 
communities live on hunting, pastoral life and subsistence rural fanning. Their very livelihood depends on 
the forests, pasture lands and land in general. The idea is of destroying entire communities' life to build a 
new and better life based on industrialisation with all the new set of value system of a consumerist and 
materialistic society. After having done that, the expected better life is not there. The only thing one could 
say, then, is that the people would have been better off in their old peaceful way of life with less material 





prosperity but in harmony with nature and a stable community support system not available under the new 
situation. But the next question is if that could be possible at all. 
Multinationals and their drive for the global economy is pushing everybody in the world to an endless drive 
towards more production, consumption for the sake of wealth generation for the minority rich people. The 
old 'gold rush' mentality is still here with us driving these new colonisers for more new land, markets and 
new gold. But there is a limit to earth's natural resources and the national and international institutions 
should change the rules of the game. Both government institutions and the market forces should work hand 
in hand to bring the desired change. Market forces alone will do never that, as the past has amply 
demonstrated. 
SSA countries, therefore, should have the courage to look into the matter and understand the need to 
balance the urban and rural development. S&T is the best tool to natural resource conservation and 
sustainable exploitation. For example, wild life conservation in national parks and tourism industry can be 
linked so that the growth of both is attained simultaneously. But the people and the communities in the area 
have to be the main beneficiaries and should, therefore, participate in the projects from planning to 
implementation. 
In SSA countries there is a very small number of institutes engaged in S&T activities and its diffusion. The 
universities and other institutions of higher learning are mainly engaged in the production of highly skilled 
manpower. Even this manpower is, at times, inadequately prepared {.o implement technology plans critical 
to the country's industrial development. Add to this the missing link between policy makers, S&T institutions 
and industry. This is why there still exists lack of conscious effort and support to study, upgrade and adapt 
indigenous techniques to a level of mass production in industry. 
Finally, the institutional capability to enable the SSA countries build up information and communications 
infrastructure is very weak. IT, as the basis for such an infrastructure, is only beginning to be recognised 
and the international agencies are trying to assist the SSA countries to get connected to the global 
economy and the international community through the Internet. But more need to be done and soon. 
9.4 Human capital formation 
First of all, there is not enough information to tell exactly the extent of human capital stock in the SSA 
countries. Based on what is available, the picture we make is very poor indeed. There is extreme shortage 
of skilled manpower virtually in every field. At the same time, the poor industrialisation level makes it very 
difficult to keep the skilled available manpower and brain drain problem is acute and common to all. 
The major employer in the economy is the subsistence rural economy followed by the government defence 
force, civil services, and public enterprises. African scientists and engineers don't have many opportunities 
to work outside the few higher learning and research institutes and ministries. Even the universities are 
mainly geared towards teaching, and research is only a minor activity. 
Technical training does not adequately meet the demand both in terms of quantity and quality. The 
curriculum in schools has only very limited technical subjects not to say that technology is not integrated 
into the school system in general. This shows that SSA countries need to make a significant investment in 
technical skill development if at all any serious industrialisation process is to succeed even at the level of 
light-industry development. 





IT skills in SSA countries has an even worse image of what has been said of technical skills in general. The 
basic computer skills were first acquired through in-house training or sending staff abroad for training. 
Education ministries were usually very slow to react to the appearance of computers. Some private schools 
have jumped to exploit the opportunity and have made significant contribution in giving the basic computer 
operation skills. But quality is at times questionable. There are also a few universities that have introduced 
diploma and degree programmes in computer science and information systems, but it is a drop in the 
ocean. 
The most critical IT skills are still missing. There are very few African IT professionals in SSA countries that 
can make systems analysis and design and carry it all along to the implementation and make it operational 
system. Today to exploit the full potential of IT you need experienced teams of professionals such as 
analysts, designers, network experts, database administrators, communications expert, and hardware and 
software engineers and maintenance engineers. This important link is missing in SSA countries and using 
foreign experts is unsustainable. Action need be taken immediately to reverse the situation. 
9.5 The Melting Pot: technology management and economic development 
In SSA countries before asking what is the result of the 'melting pot', one needs to ask whether the 
ingredients were in the 'pot' in the first place. To make the point, let us go back to the existing situation. 
The main players in industry are the government through the public enterprises, the multinationals in the 
extractive industries, and the small private enterprises. The question now is whether these three main 
players had been guided by macroeconomic policies that would reinforce a mutually supportive industrial 
structure to enable a sustainable economic development for the country. The other is whether this same 
macroeconomic policy envisaged the gradual build up of an industrial technology. The answer to both is 
negative. 
Policies in SSA countries were changing frequently either because of political instability or to suit the 
political and economic interest of the ruling elite and enrich themselves and their prot6g6s through rent 
seeking behaviour, Long-term technological development to increase their countries international 
competitiveness was only remote to the whole process of policymaking and industrial management or at 
best paper work only. This can be said of all SSA countries, may be, with very few exceptions. 
9.6 Lessons learned 
SSA countries need political stability and a transparent political system first and foremost. The first 
innovation, therefore, has to be found in the political arena. Ethnicity is not the problem for political 
instability. It is the fight for political power and the economic control of the leading elite using ethnicity as a 
means to mobilise supporters by promising gains for one‟s own social group. Therefore, equity, justice and 
participation of all sides could solve the problem. 
The next move from there would be a good macroeconomic policy based on the consensus of all parts. 
This macroeconomic policy should have embedded in itself the S&T policies and projects to make the 
development of the necessary industrial technology for a sustainable economic development in the country 
possible. 
IT is a very useful and pervasive technology to be left alone to chance by the SSA countries. It can 
contribute to improve the transparency and efficiency of the government administration. It can also increase 





reliability and efficiency of industry in general by bringing it closer to the global economy and markets. In 
particular transport and communication, trade, financial services and tourism industry could immediately 
benefit from it. 
Now we will try to summarise the lessons in terms of sustainability, flexibility, quality, priority and result as 
we have done in the case of NlEs. 
l. Sustainability 
- In SSA countries, the 'development-related debt' or industrialisation based on easily obtained debt 
proved to be unsustainable. The industrial plants were not both carefully designed and 
implemented or the revenues generated were siphoned by corrupt government officials to their 
personal accounts in foreign banks. Therefore, SSA countries must strive for better development-
related debt management and corruption-free public servants. 
- The generation of skills was not in line with the demand made by industry or at least was not of the 
right quality. As a result the lower productivity of labour and or the lower quality of industrial 
products were uncompetitive even in local markets, therefore, unsustainable. Therefore, skill 
development should be related to the industrial demand and better human resource management 
to improve the labour productivity and reduce brain drain of the region. 
- The S&T bodies were unable to direct the technological development because they were in a 
weaker position to influence industrial decision-making or had not the required budget to function 
properly. This should be reversed. 
- Technical and engineering skills were not given adequate attention and as a result S&T for 
industrial development could not take off. Technical and engineering education should be 
strengthened. 
- Heavy debt burden had a detrimental effect to industrialisation because international financial 
institutions asked for 'structural adjustments' that in turn led to less money for education, technical 
training and industrial technological development support. Structural adjustment should be taken 
with caution and on a case by case basis without disrupting the investment on education and 
industrial technology. 
2. Flexibility and transferability 
S&T is a fast changing environment. But scientific information flow to the SSA countries is very slow and 
small. Thus, they are less sensitive to important changes in technological trends. 
- Universities are the major S&T institutions in SSA countries. But starved of money, they are 
increasingly loosing the best people and their development in the best of the cases have grown 
very slowly or remained stagnant. [n some cases their quality deteriorated. Definitely, they are not 
the centres of change. Therefore, they should play a major role as agents of S&T change. 
- The diffusion of best practice and promising technologies and techniques are difficult and take a lot 
of time. At times, they don't even diffuse because hardly institutional support exists to help the 
small and medium-sized private firms to try it and absorb it. Diffusion of industrial technology 
should be institutionally supported through the creation of smaller but flexible institutions that 
evolve with the demand of their services. 
- Political appointees are heading most of the SSA countries' public enterprises. They are more 
concerned to please their bosses than managing professionally. Thus, the leading by example 





required by top management at the critical time of technology transfer and learning is very difficult. 
Public enterprises should be professionally managed to rever.se this trend. 
3. Quality 
SSA countries are far behind in building the culture and mentality required for quality industrial activities. 
- They lack experienced and skilled manpower in sufficient quantity, but more so in terms of quality. 
- The quality of public service institutions is very poor. In S&T activities, in particular, the few good 
institutes are islands in a landscape where the majority is of lower standard. 
- Networking among different institutions is very poor. Particularly that of regional institutional 
networks is almost non-existent or ineffective. 
- The multinationals present in SSA countries are mainly engaged in the extractive industries. They 
did not have any spin-off effect on the other industries. At times, they have contributed to the state 
plundering by co-operating in fund transfer to personal accounts of corrupt officials (example in 
Zaire, Nigeria, Angola etc.). 
Therefore, SSA countries should understand that quality is the key to international competitiveness. This 
can come only if quality consciousness is made of the people's culture. The governments should use their 
purchasing power to raise quality awareness among local suppliers. For that matter, the wide practice of 
buying abroad for quality reasons has a detrimental effect to the quality of industrial products at home. This 
tool should be used effectively to build the culture of quality in their respective countries. In fact, they should 
start by making high quality of service standards from the civil services first. 
4. Priority 
- There seem to be no technological priority in SSA countries. 
- IT is not given priority nor SSA countries are investing enough to prepare the groundwork for the 
exploitation of IT as an infrastructure. The danger of being marginalised in the global markets is 
ever increasing. 
It is time for SSA countries to make science and technology assessments and make choices relevant to 
support their country specific industrial development needs. IT has become an infrastructure, without which 
is impossible to get connected to the global economy, and as such the SSA countries should take more 
seriously than has been the case in the past. 
5. Result 
- In all respects, SSA countries have lagged behind. Poor institutions, poor skilled manpower, and 
inefficient and corrupt government administrations have filled the African landscape. 
- SSA countries industries do not count in the global economy and as such it is not possible to talk in 
terms of international competitiveness outside the primary products supply. 
The least developed countries must get the international community support to educate and particularly to 
train their people in technical skills. There is no question about those burdened by the debt, they should be 
relieved and helped so that they can incest in their people. Only when people are educated can they fully 
participate in the political and economic life of their countries. Above all, Africans themselves must develop 
regional cooperation and networks among themselves in order to be able to solve their political, social and 
economic problems. 





So far, SSA has failed to develop the very basic elements of S&T and the small achievement made is not 
integrated to its socio-economic development. Some African countries, take for example Nigeria, have the 
natural endowments and a critical mass of highly educated manpower but the political instability is blocking 
the country from the path of development and catching up with the developed world. Let us hope that the 
current mess existing in Africa will be remembered in African history for the contributions it will have made 
for learning from the mistakes being perpetrated in the social, political and economic life of Africans. 
Africans had enough of it. Hopefully soon, they will take control of their lifc. But at the same time, the 
international community should stop in particular those who fuel instability by selling arms in the region. If 
not, it will backfire. In a world reduced to a big village, tanks to communications and transport technologies, 
protracted instability will fuel international terrorism. Our globe will be less attractive to live in. The 
preaching of democracy made to Africans, alone, cannot change things. It is possible to use election 
systems to perpetrate subtle dictatorship or control of power by few elite (no problem if the interest of the 
West can be maintained through these elite) while the masses have no real voice. More than anything else 
stability pays economic dividends. Therefore, a real partnership is required from all sides, the advanced 
countries and the developing ones, to make the world a better place to live by using science and 



















Science and Technology in Eritrea 
 
 
This is about a very young country. Young age is the time of energy and dreams. 
If taken seriously and guided properly that energy can turn dreams into reality. 
Eritrea can use its energy to master S&T in the fight 




Part lll deals with the case of Eritrea. The study question is the same to what we have tried to answer in 
Part I and ll. What is the state of S&T policy and management in Eritrea? What is the state of its IT? IT 
starts with S&T in general. IT tries to assess the implicit and explicit policies with regard to the promotion of 
S&T in the country form the point of policy, human resource development, and institutional support and the 
integration of it to the economic development plan. This is followed by the assessment of the IT diffusion in 
the country including policies adopted and the implementation of them. The study was meant to have a 
complete integrated view of the present situation in the country including the lessons learned so far. 
 
In the chapter on the 'Future of Information Technology in Eritrea', an attempt has been made to give the 
general trend of S&T in the world. This is followed by what Eritrea could do to bridge the gap using policy 
instruments to guide the development of its human capital formation, its institutional capacity and in 
particular the use of IT as an infrastructure on which to build the county's economic development in the 
future. Finally, the research concludes by giving some major recommendations. 
 
  












10. S&T in Eritrea 
10.1. Introduction 
 
In this chapter we will focus on S&T in general because in the next we will see IT in depth. It will 
immediately be apparent that Eritrea is a beginner and faces a dearth of institutional capability and lack of 
highly skilled manpower in every aspect but more so in S&T. Policy analysis in the country is at its 
inception. The grand vision presented in the Macro Policy of 1994 has yet to be supplemented by detailed 
S&T policies that can be the basis for the true development of industrial technology. 
Eritrea is the newest country in Africa. It is beginning to build its economy from the ashes of a destructive 
3O-year war of liberation from Ethiopian rule. It has witnessed a rapid deindustrialisation process during 
1975-1991 period. The industrial technology base left by the Italian period has completely died. This shows 
how wars and civil conflicts in Africa are claiming heavy losses on the very socio-economic fabric of their 
societies. This is one of the major factors why science and technology development and the resulting 
industrialisation in Africa have been very disappointing. On the other hand, the industrial plans and policies 
of Africans ale inadequate and so is the institutional infrastructure needed for industrialisation. The results 
are limited financial resources, under-utilisation of installed industrial capacities, inadequate industrial skills, 
poor ability to negotiate for technology, and deficient industrial and technological information. 
In this chapter we will explore the situation of science and technology in Eritrea. We will start from the 
historical and present state of industrialisation of the country. The historical and current industrial 
development of the country will be used as the basis of the analyses to be made later with regard to S&T 
policies and management, human resource development, and institutional capability development so far 
achieved in the country. 
10.2 Environmental context 
Eritrea, as a modern country with the present boundaries, was established only a little bit more than a 
hundred years ago when the Italians first colonised it in 1890. In the 1940s and 50s, by the standards of 
other African colonies of the period, industry in Eritrea was highly developed. But with the change in the 
world order after the World War II, Eritrea enters a new chapter in its history, which led it to a very 
destructive and long, 30 years, war of liberation. The progress Eritrea had made has been undone and its 
industries and the highly skilled and extensive working class were lost. 
This tiny country's interest was sacrificed to propitiate the strategic interest of the super powers in their fight 
to maintain and expand the zone of their influence in a world divided into two parts: the capitalist and the 
socialist camps. The Americans and the British felt more secure if Eritrea were annexed to the Ethiopian 
monarchy. This political decision made outside this country cost beyond the proportion of its small size. 
Now it is one of the least developed countries in the world where the struggle of catching up is very difficult. 
Industrial technology is at its lowest. The existing highly skilled manpower is insignificant and the 
institutional capabilities are at the lowest level. But fortunately, there is a sense of purpose and 
determination on the part of the government and people that anything is possible for those who work hard 





as has been the case in the war of liberation. This culture of 'we can do it on our own' has matured during 
the years of struggle and is infusing hope and self confidence, which are very important for getting results. 
At present Eritrea has a population of 3.8 million and the GNP per capita of US$ 210. Its GNP is US$801 
millions with one of the lowest total debt outstanding and disbursed of US$76 millions in 1997 (World Bank 
World Development Report 1998/99). The economy has achieved an average annual growth rate of about 
6 percent in the five years from 1993-97(National Economic Policy Framework and Program for 1998-2000, 
p.5). In 1995 agriculture contributed 11.2 percent, industry 22.7, distribution services 39.3, and other 
services 26.8 of the GDP. In 1996 agriculture contributed 9.8 percent, industry 27.4, distribution services 
40.1, and other services 22.7 of GDP (IMF 1997, Eritrea: Selected Issues, p.4.). Inflation averaged around 
6.5 percent in the last five years from 1993 to 1997 (National Economic Policy Framework and Program for 
1998-2000). 
Full background information of Eritrea's industrial development in given below. After that, we will directly go 
to the analysis of explicit and implicit S&T policies that have most impact on the economic development of 
the country. 
History of the Industrial Technology in Eritrea 
During the fifty years of Italian colonial rule, the Eritrean economy was substantially transformed. This 
transformation took place in the form of large-scale urbanisation, transportation infrastructures and light 
industrialisation, and the formation of a pool of skilled manpower. Historians attribute this rapid change 
particularly to the Italian invasion of Ethiopia in 1935. Eritrea was used as the base for the commercial and 
political penetration of Ethiopia which was considered ideal for the demographic colonisation as well as a 
classical colonial strategy of developing sources of raw material and markets for metropolitan industry of 
Italy (Kellion, 1996, p 97 /98). 
It is not difficult to see the transfer of technology that was occurring in every major project undertaken 
before preparations began for the invasion of Ethiopia. The most important projects are: 
- the construction of a medium-gauge rail line from Massawa to beyond Akordat, via Asmara and 
Keren: 
- the construction of a network of primary and secondary roads, particularly in the central highlands; 
- the reconstruction and expansion of the port of Massawa after a devastating 
- earthquake in 1921; 
- the development of large -scale irrigated cotton production around Tessenei modelled on the 
Gezira project in the Sudan;  
- the development of citrus and sisal plantations on the eastern escarpment and the Keren area; 
-  the expansion of salt production at Massawa and Assab, and the development of potash mining in 
the Danakil depression (see Yemane Mesghenna, 1988; Araia Tseggai, 1981; Tom Kellion, 1996). 
It was a decade of intensive economic development, from mid-1930s to mid 1940s that transformed 
Eritrea's society and economy from one that was overwhelmingly rural and traditionally based to one with a 
significant urban and industrial component. This transformation occurred in two stages under two different 
political regimes. But both stages were driven by the same primary forces of massive state expenditure on 
war- related projects and a massive influx of Italian nationals. The first stage, 1934-40, involved the Italian 
invasion and occupation of Ethiopia, which transformed Eritrea into transportation centre for the short lived 





Italian East African empire and increased the Italian population of the colony from about 600 to 100,000 as 



















The second stage, 1941-45, involved the British conquest of Eritrea and the rapid development of a light 
industrial economy subsidised by Anglo-American wartime policies, but built and manned in large part by 
the 60,000 Italians who remained in the colony. The sustained war-boom brought on the Eritreans a 
tremendous social transformation (Table 10.2). Massawa port, by 1935, boasted the most extensive 
harbour facilities between Alexandria and Cape Town (Ceylon, 1936). In 1937 Assab became the only 
entr6pot for Italian East Africa. Asmara and Dekemhare became the centres of a regional road transport 
industry that employed 100,000 men. By the mid- 1940's roughly 20% of Eritreans lived in urban areas 
(Keilion, op,cit.). In 1947 the industry was employing 33,699 workers of which only 5,675 were Italians and 
all the remaining were Eritreans (G.Fiore, 1950). It was also diversified but always within the light industry 
(Table 10.3). It was a tremendous transformation indeed. 
Even after the Italians lost Eritrea in 1941. The economic boom continued because the British Military 
Administration retained the Italians to continue to work in the civil services and encouraged Italian 
entrepreneurs to develop import-substitution industries and agricultural estates to serve their war time 
needs. The Eritrean industries grew particularly in food processing, chemical, glass and shoe 
manufacturing, as well as increased agricultural production, to satisfy local and regional demand through 
wartime marketing parastatal, the U.K.C.C. (ibid. p. 103). 
Table 10.1: Italian population in Eritrea 
 


















1952-1960 10 000 
 
Table 10.2: Industrial activity in Eritrea in 1938  
(excluding mining, fishing, catering, and artisan 
works) 
Type of enterprise Number of firms 
Construction 383 
Construction materials 241 
Transport 846 
Mechanical works 227 
Beer, ice, and malt 25 
Flour milling, pasta and bakeries 269 
Textile 3 
Wood and furniture 96 






Total number of firms 
 
2198 
Source: Compiled from G Fiore, 1950 
 





Table 10.3: Industrial activities in Eritrea, 1947 
 
 
At this particular time, in 1946, the British opportunism was very apparent in their very act of dismantling, 
removing and selling-off much of the infrastructure built during the Fascist boom, including Massawa's port 
facilities, cement factory, aerial cableway and Gura airfield (Pankhurst, 1952). This marked the end of the 
war boom and a new era of uncertainty appeared on the horizon. But as a leftover of the Italian East 
African colony‟s legacy, the Ethiopian market for Eritrean light industries and transport services remained 
intact. It even grew after Eritrea's federation with Ethiopia. 
Italian capitalists and entrepreneurs dominated the Eritrean economy from the beginning up to 1974, the 
beginning of Ethiopian Socialist Revolution and the intensification of the war of liberation in Eritrea. The 
exodus of the Italian population started immediately after the World War II and culminated in 1974 with the 
coming of the Ethiopian socialist revolution. It was already clear that Italian investments were markedly 
decreasing by the end of the 1950s (see Table 10.4). As the Italians were going away progressively it 
meant more employment opportunities for Eritreans, but also reduced demand for many local manufactures 
and services. Nonetheless, an Eritrean urban working class and middle class formed during this period, 
and it was these classes in particular that created the nationalist movement that was to profoundly alter the 





Type of Enterprise Number of Firms 
Flour milling 
Manufacturing of pasta 
Bakeries 
Milk and milk products 
Oil /fats production 






Perfume and cosmetics 









Metal works and auto garages (mechanici) 

























Source: Compiled from A. Infante (Dott.), 1947 










1945 1949 1953 1956 1958 1959 1960 
Retail - 1773 1349 1315 1325 1136 341 
Wholesale 1117 - 162 161 287 138 169 
Import/export - 301 334 334 327 198 172 
Commercial 
agents 
- - - 62 60 60 44 
industrial 527 977 395 456 627 616 486 
Artisan 1221 814 745 968 1009 350 305 
Total no. of 
licenses 
2865 3925 2985 3296 3635 2498 1517 
Source: G. Cerbella. 1959, p. 168.  
 
The sad part of the story starts in 1962 when Eritrea was officially annexed to Ethiopia, The Eritrean 
economy enters into a more or less 'permanent recession' (Kellion, op.cit. p. 106). It signals also the 
beginning of the exodus of many skilled Eritreans migrating to Ethiopia, Sudan, and the Arab world in 
search of employment. "It was during this period, late 1950s early 1960s, that the Eritrean economy began 
to rely in some measure on remittances from abroad to maintain living standards. Many of Eritrea's best 
educated, wealthiest and most skilled people relocated to Addis Ababa, and Asmara was reduced to an 
economically stagnant provincial city. Thus, despite its industrial infrastructure and skilled workforce, Eritrea 
- outside Assab - was fast becoming an economic periphery of the Ethiopian Empire" (ibid. p. 107). The 
Emperor's own effort, backed by large sums of USA capital, concentrated on developing Ethiopia's 
industrial capacity in the central Shoa provinces at the heart of the Empire. But by 1970 Eritrea still 
accounted for over a third of the industrial activity of Ethiopia and Eritrea combined (Firebrace and Hofland, 
op cit. pp.7I-72). 
By the time of the Ethiopian socialist revolution, in 1974, investment had ceased, and with the escalation of 
the war in early 1975 Eritrea was clearly on the brink of another economic phase: that of destruction. The 
17 years of full-scale warfare in Eritrea (1915-1991) effectively destroyed the colonial economy. The 
transport system was completely destroyed. Many towns were completely or partially destroyed and the 
nationalisation of private property and industry by the Ethiopian revolutionary government (1975) led to the 
final exodus of Italian industrialists. Massawa was damaged by bombings after its liberation (1989). Other 
losses are the military related deforestation and the estimated loss of 80,000 cattle, 14,000 camels, 200-
300,000 sheep and goats. The human losses, around 185,000 guerrilla fighters and civilians died in the 
war, over 12,000 fighters permanently disabled; and more than a million people fled their homes (Kellion, 
op cit. p. 108-10). 
The above brief account gives a clear picture of the ups and downs of the Eritrean economy up to 1991. 
But it is by no means complete because there is also another side to the story. A new political economy 
was being shaped as the new nation was emerging from the bush and the war of liberation. By the end of 
1977 the Eritrean freedom fighters controlled all of Eritrea except Asmara and other two towns (the ports of 
Massawa and Assab), but were unable to operate most of the factories for lack of raw materials and 





missing or damaged parts. In spite of the difficulties, the fighters were able to operate the power stations in 
all towns they occupied, maintain telephone communications and water supplies, and run some smaller 
factories including the Keren groundnut and incense processing plants (Firebrace and - Holland, op. cit., p 
71). The EPLF made maximum use of the period 1977-78 to expand their light industries in the base area, 
bringing out machinery and raw materials from the towns captured. Thousands of skilled and semiskilled 
workers joined the EPLF to be employed in the workshops of Sahel province and in operating the newly 
acquired plants and equipment. Most of the workers joined the front at this time. According to the EPLF 
estimate, in 1971 alone the number of skilled workers in the EPLF increased threefold; by the end of the 
year they were producing millions of pounds worth of material and covering 80% of the needs of the front 
(ibid. p 71). 
Since the withdrawal of the fronts to their base areas in mid 1978 the EPLF's industrial sector has 
continued to expand. A sound technological base was being established. It was based on the concept of 
self-reliance because it was the cornerstone of the Eritrean revolution. During the visit James Firebrace and 
Stuart Holland made to Eritrea during the war of liberation in 1985, they witnessed the fact that 'self-
reliance' is no empty slogan but an integral part to all the economic activity of the EPLF. At that time, self-
reliance was the means for satisfying the EPLF's material needs. Today after liberation, it is seen as a 
strategy for improving the overall productive capacity of the Eritrean people. The Government of Eritrea 
does promote trade relations based on mutual advantage and seeks economic assistance free of political 
strings. 
The concept of self-reliance in Eritrea evolved in the long years of war of independence as a result of 
necessity rather than of pure ideology. The two big superpowers were on the side of Ethiopia and Eritrea 
had to rely on itself and its own resources and people. It did work. Already in 1982 EPLF stand on self-
reliance was mature and clear. "Self-reliance is a necessary precondition for the establishment of an 
independent and developed economy. The pursuance of a policy of self-reliance is essential for the total 
independence and liberation of a society. Politically it is the only means to complete freedom. Economically 
it is likewise the only means given...prevailing international conditions that enable people to develop their 
economic potential depending on their own material and human resources. Socially, it is an essential 
liberating process, emphasising as it does working co-operatively and collectively to satisfy your own 
needs. Dependence breeds subservience and lack of self-confidence. Freedom from dependence 
enhances a people's independence of thinking, innovativeness, perseverance and pride in work and 
struggle' (Firebrace and Holland quoting EPLF, Self-Reliance in Economic Field, 1982). 
During the war of liberation, every visitor to the base areas of the EPLF commented on the ingenuity of the 
workers in the EPLF workshops. Not only were spare parts, cooking utensils, teaching materials, aids for 
the disabled, and hospital equipment put together from the captured debris of war, but EPLF was also 
constructing many of the machines necessary for producing these items. Firebrace and Holland observed 
that the most useful materials were the wood from ammunition boxes, shell and bomb casings, springs and 
sheet metal from destroyed vehicles. The process was almost literally from shells to ploughshares. Every 
available material was put to good use or recycled. The containers, the watches even the black plastic 
sandals which all EPLF fighters wear were locally produced and then recycled (ibid. p.74). 
Let us look a litter deeper at the work done during the war times. It is clear that it is all learning and 
straggling to survive by your own means, it was learning under stress and continuous crisis. Perhaps one of 
the greatest signs of the maturity of self-reliance could be seen in the big hospital, drug manufacturing, and 
the various workshops and garages the EPLF were able to establish to meet all their needs. The 





technology in the workshops was sophisticated and included a number of lathes, drills, saws, a truck brake 
tester and electrical testing equipment. One of the engineers at the She'eb estimated that they could make 
60% of the vehicle spare parts in their own workshops. Many of the machines used in the workshop were 
made by themselves. This included a power saw, a metal planing machine, a hydraulic press, metal 
grinders, an angular metal-bending machine, a tabular metal-bending machine and a forge. They were 
constructed from a variety of materials including broken truck springs, chassis member, tank armour, shell 
casings and the lead from the truck batteries. The ingenuity of the mechanics was plain to see. Land 
Rovers, criticised for being underpowered, were being fitted with more powerful 6-cylinder Toyota engines, 
while their own engines were bored out to increase their cylinder capacity from 1600cc. to 2400cc. and 
fitted with larger diameter Toyota pistons (ibid.). Eritrean inventiveness encountered at the Suakin EPLF 
garage was again transparent. Normal trucks were being converted into oil tankers on site with the 
containers built from sheets of scrap metal. Trucks were being re-assembled using parts originating from 
different countries, with 'engine swapping' commonplace. The workers describe the hybrid results as 
'Vodka-Cola' trucks, since most of the vehicles supplied to the Ethiopian government were American up to 
1974 and Soviet after 1977, One of the workshops homemade creations was a tire vulcanising machine for 
re-treating truck tires. The Suakin mechanics had simply copied the principle from an imported model and 
built one themselves, which was operating adjacent to the original machine (ibid. p. 75-83) 
Firebrace and Holland talking about the roads built by the EPLF said: "Within the limited technology at the 
EPLF's disposal, some of these roads represent major feats of engineering. The most dramatic route we 
travelled was the 'Challenge Road', cut in 1982 into the precipitous eastern slopes of Sahel mountains to 
give direct access to the Northeast Sahel front. This road twists and winds its way from valley floor to 
mountain ridge with 37 hairpins built over fortress-like supporting walls in a stretch of 12 km long. Swiss 
engineers, in peacetime, without air attack, would be proud of it (ibid. p.75). 
The achievement made in health services by the EPLF was impressive. A 420-bed Central Hospital was 
built spread out over five kilometres of dry-mountain valley floor carefully hidden under trees or built into the 
hillside. It had operating theatres, surgical, medical, orthopaedic and obstetric wards, a special unit for 
facial injuries as well as laboratories and X-ray units, an ophthalmic unit, a dentistry unit and blood storage 
facility. There were also six regional hospitals, eight health centres, fifteen health stations and over 40 
mobile teams, over 1500 'bare-foot doctors' and more than 140 village health workers and traditional 
midwives (ibid. p 102-111). 
Based on their study Firebrace and Holland concluded: "In spite of the severe difficulties imposed by the 
war, the EPLF has established a substantial light industrial sector in the base areas. Industrial development 
in Eritrea will face a very different set of problems when peaceful solution is finally found. But the EPLF's 
achievements to date provide a strong argument within the overall case for the economic viability of the 
future self-governing Eritrea" (ibid. p.83). 
The paradox in the Eritrean case is that destruction and construction, though in different scale, seem to go 
parallel. You see the industrial base built during the 1940s, 50s and 60s being destroyed during the 30-year 
war of liberation. At the same time, a new sense of confidence in ones own capabilities and the learning 
and building from the bush is the new hope for a new foundation of future technological development of the 
country through enterprising and innovation for survival. This is the seed of hope of the country. IT is based 
on a culture of endurance and continuous learning, which are at the base of every knowledge and 
innovation. 
 





Current Profile of Eritrea 
The principle of 'self-reliance‟ that evolved and grew during the war of liberation, is still present more than 
ever in this newly independent country. It is not difficult to understand the strong roots it has in the minds of 
the leadership of the country. In a recent interview, President Isaias Afewerki said: "Billions of dollars have 
been spent in cases like Somalia, Cambodia. Where have these billions gone and how society benefited? 
And what can the international community or the UN claim was achieved? Is it peace or the transformation 
of living standards? Nothing has changed. In fact, the international community has created institutions that 
give the false impression of resolving problems but in fact only perpetuate problems and create parasites" 
(Eritrean Profile, March 21, 1998). 
In today's world, nobody seems to believe in the internal capacities of the developing countries to solve 
their economic, social and political problems. As a result of these, the international community usually 
prescribes solutions for them but the cure has not been found yet. This small country is challenging that 
way of thinking. It is shouting and saying: "We can do it on our own if you could only believe in us and give 
us the chance to do it on our own!" This is why the Eritrean President said: "Aid should be a temporary 
dose, like aspirin, or a temporary drug with appropriate regulations to limit the time frame for its dosage or 
you will get a habit. It is better to take a bitter pill to cure the disease rather than have false drugs that will 
develop the habit of dependency" (ibid.). 
The Eritrean leadership, according to some political economy analysts, has taken a 'risky decision' while to 
others a 'brave decision' with regard to aid by altogether scratching it from their vocabulary as a debilitating 
and crippling factor. Many do not believe that Eritrea can rebuild its economy, national infrastructure, 
agriculture, industry and social fabric that have all been destroyed during the war without much 'aid'. To 
them this concept of 'self-reliance' is considered to be a 'folly and bad experiment' that puts at stake the 
very future of the Eritrean people. On the other side those who take it as a 'reasonable and courageous 
decision' they support it in view of all the failed aid projects in Africa and elsewhere in the developing world. 
Nobody thinks the fact that looking into one's own resources within one's own nation is a weakness. But to 
base one's own development on aid goes against the building of nations on the simple fact that with aid 
non-government organisations and charities that do the job on behalf of society and governments abound 
crippling the development of national institutions hence reinforcing the cycle of dependence. 
The Eritrean way of thinking and doing is to lay the foundation on self-reliance where aid could be an 
element to support the building of institutions and the development of skilled manpower by participating in 
the different projects and programmes. It negates the idea of aid as the foundation of development. Eritrea 
does have an established tradition of self-reliance. It suits it to build on it. Of course, there has been a lot of 
controversy about this concept. But Eritrean leadership, trained pragmatically in the long war of liberation, 
find it unconvincing that aid with the strings attached to it could really solve their national problems. The fact 
that they have been able to challenge one of the biggest armies in Africa, with all its resources, by relying 
on themselves economically and militarily, have built a very strong sense of self-confidence that no theory 
can shake away. This is what the President of Eritrea said defending the idea of self-reliance: "We learned 
the hard way. During the war, no one supported us. When (Emperor) Hailesellasie was in Ethiopia, the 
United States supported Ethiopia. Then Mengistu overthrew Hailesellasie and allied with the Soviet Union. 
All that time, we got nothing from the US or then the Soviet Union. So we had to find a way to achieve our 
goals by relying on our own resources. Now the benefit of that experience prevails: We can do it on our 
own" (ibid.). 





By some, it has been interpreted as arrogance to say no to some kind of 'aid'. For them a beggar has no 
choice but to accept everything offered to him. But the Eritrean leadership does not consider itself as 
beggar. Eritrean leaders firmly believe that they are the owners of their own destiny. They have their own 
national development projects and will accept any aid that fits within these projects. Any other aid project 
that wants them to divert their focus and attention from their national priorities will not be accepted. To 
others, it may be even offensive to hear from the Eritreans statements like "Give us the fund and we will 
manage it ourselves." They want their own exports to do the job otherwise no fund is given. Is it a 
communication problem? Or, is it that donor agencies don't have confidence in the ability and integrity of 
recipients? It is both. Maybe it will take time for the Eritreans to sell their idea of 'aid' and their approach to 
development. They need also to learn how to effectively communicate and sell their new ideas. 
We have seen in the first part of this section that Eritrea's industrial development was going backwards 
because of war and deliberate neglect by the Ethiopian government. As a result, the relatively advanced 
industrial base developed during the 1930s and 40s was virtually lost. The few remaining enterprises are 
working on very old technologies of the said era. 
Now the government is working hard to attract foreign investment by creating an investment conducive 
environment. Direct foreign investments and joint ventures are slowly growing, for example the old Coca 
Cola factory is being modernised and expanded by a joint venture between the Government and the Coca 
Cola Company of USA. Rothmans Cigarette Company has purchased the Gash Cigarette Factory. Eritrean 
capitalists in Diaspora are also investing in these privatised companies such as Asmara Sweater Factory 
and Mereb Textile Factory. Anadarco, an American oil company, is doing oil explorations in the Red Sea, 
Keangnam, South Korean construction firm (part of Daewoo conglomerate) is operating in the country in 
big construction works. Others are in the making like the joint venture in telecommunications between 
Daewoo of South Korea and the Telecommunications Services of Eritrea, a government owned company. 
Most of the public enterprises are in the process of privatisation. The government of Eritrea had inherited 
42 public enterprises, which were nationalised by the Ethiopian government during the socialist regime (T. 
Haile, 1996: 67). First, the Eritrean government has decided to give full autonomy of operation to these 
enterprises in the hope that they become more competitive. But it was very difficult to bring the desired 
modernisation and competitiveness with lack of capital injection, skilled manpower, and capable and 
professional managers. Lately, the government has decided to privatise these enterprises and has already 
put 23 of them on the list for sale through auctioning, agreement between the two parties, partnership, the 
selling of .shares, rent and selling to workers and managers of these production centres (Eritrean Profile, 
vol. 3, No. 21). Already nineteen have been privatised by May 1999. Soon the remaining will follow. 
Everybody's hope is that this market economy system will bring healthy competition and attract foreign 
capital. This may lead to the modernisation of the Eritrean industries. 
The study made by the Ministry of Trade and Industry in 1996 (Table 10.5) shows that the number of 
manufacturing enterprises grew from 958 in 1992 to 2443 in 1996, of which 46 were public enterprises. In 
1996, 157 of these enterprises had i0 or more employees and the remaining were all small establishments 
with less than 10 employees (Ministry of Trade and Industry, 1998, p.3-a). Further, the study shows that in 
1996 the manufacture of furniture was more than five times that of 1992, in terms of number of 
establishments. Overall, the manufacturing industry grew 255 percent in number of establishments. The 
annual increase of gross output and input of manufacturing establishments of the country in the last five 
years was 22.1 and 29.5 percent respectively. While the added value of the manufacturing sector has 
increased by about 16.4 percent per annum. The 1996 total gross output of Eritrea's manufacturing 





establishment was 1080.14 million Nakfa out of which 53.7 percent was an intermediate input and the rest 
46.3 percent was the value added at market prices contributed by the establishments (ibid, p. 1a). 
Table 10.5: Manufacturing Sector of Eritrea, number of firms 
Manufacturing Branch 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Manufacture of vegetable and animal oils and fats  16 16 17 20 39 
Manufacture of grain mill products 295 399 516 553 624 
Manufacture of bakery products  76 81 120 282 335 
Manufacture of made-up textile, except apparel 11 11 11 11 11 
Manufacture of knitted and crocheted fabrics and articles 89 86 88 97 102 
Manufacture of footwear 20 20 22 49 55 
Printing 12 12 15 14 11 
Manufacture Soap detergents, cleaning & polishing 
preparations, perfumes and toilet preparations 
25 25 25 23 21 
Manufacture of other chemical products 24 28 32 38 41 
Manufacture of glass and glass products 6 6 6 22 28 
Manufacture of structural non-refractory clay and ceramic 
products 
73 104 108 285 346 
Manufacture of basic precious and non-ferrous metals 128 132 134 157 182 
Manufacture of parts and accessories for motor vehicles 
and their engines 
26 26 86 20 16 
Manufacture of furniture 101 106 321 322 522 
Others 50 57 72 118 110 
Total 958 1109 1573 2011 2443 
Source: Compiled from the Ministry of Trade and Industry Statistical Bulletin, Results of the Survey of Eritrea’s Manufacturing 
Industries, 1992-1996, p.3. 
 
In a recent study by Yacob Fisseha (1996) 'Micro, small, and medium enterprises in Eritrea' (MSMEs), it 
has been found that about three-fourths of the enterprises visited during the survey were of the micro group 
and the remaining were divided between the small (22%) and the medium (1%) sizes. In terms of the total 
employment among the sample enterprises, however, the micro-group accounts for only about a half while 
the small and the medium groups account for about 40 and 8 percent, respectively. 
Based on the study it is estimated that nation-wide there are about 52,188 enterprises employing some 
92,288 people, which accounts for approximately three-fourths of the country's total employment in the 
private sector, excluding fishing and traditional agricultural sectors (ibid., p.43). The percentage distribution 
of the 52,188 enterprises among the three basic size groups is 81.7 percent micro, 17,5 percent small, and 
0.8 percent medium.24.2 percent are found to be in manufacturing, 60.5 percent in trade, and 15.3 percent 
in services. The urban localities account for 60% of these enterprises and for 69% of their employment. 
Asmara alone accounts for 30% of the number of enterprises and for almost 40% of the corresponding 
employment found in the whole country (ibid. p.38). 
A large majority of the Eritrean MSMEs is young, with an average age of eight years. In fact, almost two-
thirds of them (63.1%) were established since liberation. At the industrial level, the following groups have 
higher than the national average: auto repairs, 4.8 workers; catering, 4.0; fishery (not fishing per se) 2.7; 
metal works, 2.7; leather works, 2.5; and foods/drinks, 2.0. In terms of location, as one moves from the 
rural to the urban areas, the size of the labour force naturally gets bigger (ibid. p. 45). 
The enterprises or industrial groups that experienced the highest growth in labour force size are: metal 
works (growth of 192%), and leather (113%) in manufacturing; fishery (175%) and leather or shoe retail 





(164%) in trade; and auto repair (211%) in services. Finally, there is some clear-cut consistency among 
size groups: growth at every level of categorisation was higher for the bigger enterprises than that for the 
smaller ones, For example, for the three basic sizes, the growth rates in average labour size were 11 
percent for micros, 76 percent for small, and 217 percent for the medium enterprises (ibid. p.47). 
From the day of liberation in May 1991, the Eritrean Government has been working very hard to establish a 
conducive environment for the development of a market-led economy where the foreign direct investment is 
welcome, But encouraging investment in a vacuum is not possible, therefore the Government is trying its 
utmost in the building of the country's infrastructures, including an efficient and effective institutional 
capacity in the regulatory and legal environment. The whole legal system is being studied to introduce new 
laws capable of leading the country to the 2lst century. Some progress has been made in all sectors but a 
lot remains to be done. The greatest of which is development of skilled manpower for all sectors in the 
economy. 
There is no question that the Eritrean government is delivering what it has promised in various projects 
undertaken. Western observers consider it an autocratic government that needs to go a long way to put 
democratic institutions in place but like its achievements, An ILO mission after investigating Eritrea wrote: 
"The mission found that Eritrea is perhaps the only country in sub-Saharan Africa to have successfully 
turned relief into development on a large scale"(ILO, 1995, p.99). Many western journalists as well have 
written about the corruption-free government of Eritrea. The recent IMF report says that Eritrea‟s GDP grew 
8 percent in 1997. According to 1998/1999 World Development Report, per capita of Eritrea is US$ 210, 
almost double that of Ethiopia and approaching that of the Sudan. Life expectancy is 55 years, which is 
higher than that of Ethiopia (49) and Sudan (54). According to UNICEF April 1998 statistical information, 
Eritrean infant mortality rate has reached 78/000 while that of Ethiopia is I 131/000 and total gross primary 
enrolment rate for the country is now 51% as compared to 54% for the Sudan and 31% for Ethiopia. The 
enrolment rate for girls for Eritrea is 51% and that of Ethiopia and Sudan is 24% and 48% respectively. But 
access to safe water to Eritrean population is only 22% while that of Ethiopia and Sudan is 25% and 73% 
respectively. 
In the last seven years, the country has made real progress in infrastructure development, production, 
employment, price stability, fiscal discipline, and accumulation of external reserves. During the period 1992-
1997, real output growth averaged about seven percent. Annual average rate of inflation was maintained at 
less than 6.5 percent, The deficit from over 16 percent in 1996 was reduced to 5.5 percent of GNP in 1997 
and gross reserves in months of import of goods and services increased to over six months in 1997. But 
now this promising progress made is threatened by the border conflict started in May 1998 with its 
neighbour Ethiopia. 
No doubt Eritrea is one of the poorest and least developed countries in the world. It needs to break down 
this vicious circle of poverty and underdevelopment, and be able to give a decent standard of living to its 
people. It needs to catch up fast in order to share in the world's global economy. This has to be done within 
the context of high expectation of a people which has been deprived of everything because of manmade 
disasters, war, and a cycle of drought that has repeatedly hit the delicate natural environment of the 
Sahelian Region of Africa. Therefore, there is no time to waste. The Government should come up with 
concrete development policies to change this situation of economic and social underdevelopment. 
According to the Government of the State of Eritrea Macro Policy (November 1994), the country has 
adopted a two-pronged approach to tackle the challenge of its socio-economic development. The first 
prong addresses the immediate problems of resuscitating the economy and rehabilitating certain sectors 





through a programme of recovery and rehabilitation. The second prong addresses the fundamental 
development problems and prospects of the country and charts the direction of its future growth. 
This research is particularly addressing the second prong of long-term development problems. Being the 
national development objective to make the country "modern, technologically advanced and internationally 
competitive economy within the next two decades" (Macro Policy, p.10). Without dwelling in whether two 
decade time frame is reasonable or not, our main research question is to see how Eritrea could exploit the 
opportunities offered by IT to strengthen its economic development in the shortest possible time. 
Among the development objectives of Eritrea we find that the national development effort will be directed to 
the realisation of a developed capital, knowledge-intensive and export-oriented industries and services, and 
the development of a competitive regional financial centre. And under the Science and Technology Policy, 
the objective is said to be "to keep Eritrea abreast of developments in production, transport and service 
technologies in order to assure an upgraded and modern economic system that is competitive in the world" 
(p. 37). No matter how the national development objectives of Eritrea are over-ambitious in terms of time 
frame, it is a clear indication of the Eritrean leadership desire to cut corners in the process of economic 
development and the political will is there. 
The growing evidence shows that Eritrean Government means business. The rapid progress made in 
infrastructure development achieved in education, health services, energy supply, and communications and 
transport after independence is a clear indication of the political will present in the country, For example, in 
a recent interview, Mr. William Anderson (outgoing head of USAID in Eritrea) gave his impression by 
saying: 'the government and the people have a very clear vision of where they want Eritrea to go and a 
strong determination to get there. In fact, in my 25 years work in development, I don't believe I have seen 
any people who have more clear vision or a great determination to achieve that vision as well as optimism 
that they would be there' (Eritrea Profile, Vof.6, No.13, June 5, 1999). Similarly WHO Country 
Representative, Mr. Elmi A. Duwale, said: 'I really think that the Government of Eritrea has done a quantum 
leap in the development of health services in such a short period of time. I have personally witnessed the 
development of health services in Africa for the last 30 years - first in my home country and then with WHO 
for the last 25 years from the biggest country Nigeria to Tanzania, Uganda and now Eritrea. I believe that 
what Eritrea has done in eight years was not achieved even in 20 years in most of these countries' (Eritrean 
Profile, Vol. 6, No.9, May 8, 1999). 
To make sure that all the fever for development in Eritrea does not remain only a wishful thinking or a 
dream, a careful study is required to support the implementation of such a policy. Our study departs from 
the assumption that science and technology is the engine of development. IT is so pervasive and powerful 
technology that it is going to continue to reshape every aspect of human activity and occupy the central 
place in any development process in the 21st century. It is a powerful tool to learn with and work with in 
every field of human endeavour. Fortunately the cost of this technology is ever decreasing and has become 
affordable to households. And poor countries like Eritrea can benefit a lot in allocating part of the national 
infrastructure development budget to it. Our argument is that even a least developed country like Eritrea 
can greatly benefit by investing in modern digital telecommunications infrastructure as the basis for the 
national computer network and Internet to support the economy. This will enable the country's financial 
sector, the tourism sector, trade and industrial sector to become more competitive internationally. Improved 
social services through enhanced educational system, health system, culture and art, and environmental 
management would be possible. 





Knowledge is at the basis of any development process. Our modern times more than any other era has 
acquired a tremendous power of knowledge generation, which is mostly attributed to science and 
technology development in particular that of IT. The last four decades have witnessed the information 
technology revolution. Mankind has amassed huge capability in information processing, storage, and 
communication, This in turn has increased the rate of knowledge generation and thus of innovations and 
development. But this capability is only found in the developed world and not in the less developed world 
like Eritrea. The more time passes and nothing is done the gap between the developed and the less 
developed world is going to increase. 
To redress this unfavourable situation, Eritrea must act quickly to develop the necessary infrastructure for 
the development of science and technology. This starts with the right science and technology policy choice 
and institutional capability development to implement it. Eritrea immediately needs to develop the ability to 
select and effectively use technologies that can make the most impact on its development. One such 
technology, the author thinks, is information technology. 
10.3 S&T policy 
 
Eritrea believes (Macro Policy, 1994, p.30) that the 1,200km coastline and over 300 islands of different 
sizes are adequate grounds for the development of tourism and port services. Eritrea‟s location at the 
crossroads to Europe and the Far East places it in a position to access important global as well as regional 
markets for both inputs and outputs. The country's strategic location is expected to be contributing factor in 
the attraction of foreign business wishing to access the various markets. As a result becoming a trade, 
tourism and service- hub in the region are considered the future of the country. 
The explicit S&T policy-making mechanism is yet rudimentary. But there are fiscal policies to encourage the 
investment on new technology and the government attitude is very pragmatic. The concept of self-reliance 
of the war of liberation is very much alive. Dependence on one's own resources and people is pushing the 
country to learn fast. The country needs more time to mature and come with a clear picture and structure 
for a systematic acquisition and diffusion of the necessary advanced technology. 
What we are witnessing in Eritrea is only the beginning of the technological transfer'. New technologies are 
coming in the country but to master it requires time. The more advanced technology the newly established 
firms import, the more they are dependent on foreign inputs in terms of spare parts, materials and technical 
assistance. It is widely accepted that to limit such dependency, every developing country should establish 
S&T institutions to help accelerate the adoption and diffusion of critical technology. An industry matures 
technologically if it is able only to sustain itself without much dependence from the outside. In other words, 
a network of adequate number of customers and suppliers should exist to make vertical integration 
possible. At the same time, related industries should also be equally developed to exploit possible synergy 
and the possible fertilisation of new hybrid of firms and industry. It is within this framework that we need to 
see S&T policy-making body to contribute by creating a conducive-environment for the creation of critical 
industries and the diffusion of critical S&T in the country for mature industries to emerge. 
The service sector in general is information intensive activity. Sea ports, airports, trade in general, banks, 
insurance, and transport are today based on information technology. A regional service-hub without 
information technology is unthinkable. Therefore, because, on the one hand it is a pervasive technology of 
the future and on the other hand is the basis of the service sector, information technology is considered to 
deserve a particular attention in the development of Eritrea. In the country there is not yet any systematic 





way of diffusing and using IT for creating a competitive advantage. In this chapter we will see S&T in 
general, in the next chapter IT diffusion in the country, and finally in the chapter on the 'future of Eritrea', we 
will argue for the strategic importance of IT for the country's future development. 
Vision and goals 
Let us start our presentation from the socio-economic development vision and goals of the country. Later 
on, we will try to link it to S&T in relation to these development goals. The Government of the State of 
Eritrea in its Macro Policy of 1994 has adopted the following national development objectives: 
- Improved agricultural production through the development of irrigated agriculture, and by 
enhancing the productivity of peasants, pastoralists and agro-pastoralists. 
- Developed capital and knowledge-intensive and export-oriented industries and services. 
- An upgraded and technologically improved informal sector (micro enterprises now on the margin of 
the formal economic structure). 
- A developed tourism sector and high-grade conference and convention facilities. 
- A competitive international financial centre. 
- A developed and systematic public health-care system. 
- Broad-based education incorporating widespread dissemination of skills and languages and 
extensive human capital formation. 
- An effective social welfare and safety net system. 
- An upgraded and safeguarded environment that is free from pollution. 
- A decentralised and democratic political system. 
- An internally peaceful and stable nation at peace and in harmony with its neighbours. 
- A free and sovereign state where human rights are respected. 
Based on these development objectives, it is not difficult to derive the S&T objectives of the country. In fact, 
the list of development objectives starts with a very important statement, which says: "The overriding 
national objective is the creation of a modern, technologically advanced and internationally competitive 
economy within the next two decades." It is really a very great challenge to achieve this. But the Eritrean 
Government seems to be determined to cut all possible corners to achieve it. To achieve the above stated 
objectives broad-based growth strategies have been adopted. This is to mean that rehabilitation and 
reconstruction on the one hand and an integrated development in all sectors on the other hand will be 
undertaken in parallel (see Figure 10.1). 
The current S&T policies are too broadly defined. The objectives are mostly implied. Some of the implied 
S&T objectives in the agricultural sector are drip-irrigation system, use of improved seeds, improved breeds 
in the animal husbandry and poultry, pest control and animal disease control (including immunisation 
technologies), introduction of modern storage facilities, food security information system, and the 
introduction of a modern mechanised agricultural system. 
Knowledge-intensive industries are mentioned but we can only guess to what it may mean. It may mean 
computer software industry or engineering plants and firms, or petrochemical and chemical industries or 
others. This needs to be more specific. 
 
 






















In the tourism sector specifically high-grade conference and convention facilities are mentioned but there 
are many others implied like the different types of star hotels and catering services of international 
standard. A modern tourism industry is highly dependent on modern transport and communications 
systems as well as professional management and marketing skills. In here, the information and 
communications infrastructures are very important and IT is the sine qua non technology. 
To achieve the economic objective of developing a financial centre of international standard, the objective 
of S&T should be the development of IT of relevance to the financial systems. This is highly dependent on 
communications and information infrastructure development. It requires also highly skilled manpower with 
international experience. This objective assumes also the ability of the country to attract international 
financial institutions. It could aim for a more modest regional financial centre development of international 
standard. 
All of these major economic development expectations can only be realised with extensive human capital 
formation and thus the education system has to extensively expanded and modernised. The same applies 
to the health services. The challenge faced will be how to get money to invest on these social sectors. 
Finally, one of the major objectives of saving the environment from pollution requires Eritrea not to become 
a dumping area for old and polluting technologies escaping the more stringent environment protection laws 
in the developed world. That is, Eritrea is going deliberately on more advanced and less polluting 
technologies but more expensive than the older technologies. So far, the facts show how difficult it is for 
developing countries to achieve this ambitious objective. For example, in Eritrea car pollution has increased 
during the last seven years because the country had become the dumping place for second hand cars, 
trucks and buses. Definitely with the present regime of car pollution control regulation, the environment 
cannot be protected from air pollution. 
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To conclude, in Eritrea explicit S&T objectives are missing and the few times that are mentioned are very 
broad and at times vague. There is a clear need of explicit and specific S&T objectives for specific sectors 
and for the general national infrastructure as a whole in order to concretely support the implementation of 
the national social and economic development objectives. 
S&T policy 
UNESCO S&T model, as we have already seen in chapter six, proposed five functional activities such as: 
planning, co-ordination, implementation, advice and advocacy. It advises that such an institution be placed 
in the office of the Head of the State under the direction and supervision of the president of the country 
himself. In Eritrea the National Development responsibility is divided among the Office of the President, 
Ministries and Government Authorities (see Box 10.1). 
The Macroeconomic Management develops and maintains national strategic economic reconstruction 
policies that establish the priorities for the Government's long term investment, monetary, fiscal, trade, co-
operation and institutional objectives regarding the Nation's management and administrative systems. This 
activity is managed by the Office of the President and Ministry of Finance and Development through a 
Working Committee comprised of Ministry of Finance and Development, Ministry of Industry and Trade, 
Ministry of Tourism, Ministry of External Affairs, and Bank of Eritrea (ibid, p, 6). 
The Strategic Economic Planning establishes national, provincial, regional and sector indicative planning 
objectives consistent with the Government's long and medium term development plans, and issue 
indicative national planning guidelines for the next year to ministries, enterprises, and agencies. This 
activity is the responsibility of Office of the President, Strategic Planning and International Economic Co-
operation Department in consultation with the Ministry of Local Government and central agencies (ibid. p. 
7). 
The organ of the State of Eritrea Government responsible for the S&T policy-making, by default, seems to 
be the Office of the President, Strategic Planning and International Economic Co-operation Department. 
The line ministries have established their respective 'Research and Training Departments', but they do not 
have policy guidelines with regard to S&T priorities which should be given by this office. Why is this vacuum 
created? It may be because, at the present time, the country's priorities are in rehabilitation and 
reconstruction. The need of priorities and guidelines is not yet felt. After not too long, the lack of it will 
create duplication and problems of co-ordination. Now, these research departments are only established 
with one or two people working without any real long-term research agenda. The lack of skilled and 
experienced manpower and research budget is their greatest stumbling block. 
Therefore, in Eritrea there is not a separate S&T policy making body. Research activities are decentralised 
at ministerial level as we have already said above. In the new government structure, each ministry has a 
department of research and training. These departments are new and are still to be staffed with appropriate 
skilled personnel and the necessary budget to carry on their new duties. The exception to this is the 
Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Energy and Mines where they have started to function, though, in 
a limited sense. It is unrealistic to expect much from these institutions in the near future for they are badly 
equipped to do the job. There is a critical shortage of highly trained manpower in all fields; there is also 
problem of getting funds from the government for research purposes, as the country is in a transitional 
period of economic rehabilitation after a long war of liberation and money is in short supply. 
 























Even the University of Asmara has not been able to carry out research programmes on a sustainable basis 
in some selected areas with potential of solving social and technological problems of the country. Suffice to 
say that the University of Asmara with a newly established engineering programme, only three years old, 
cannot undertake a leading role in the development and diffusion of technology in the country immediately. 
It has started with a 3-year diploma programme in civil, mechanical and electrical engineering, and it 
upgraded to degree programme in 1999. The country had the first batch of48 engineering graduates from 
the three departments on July 4, 1998. More needs to be done before this College of Engineering can play 
a role in leading and supporting the industry in the development of industrial technology for economic 
development. 
It does not mean, though, that in the private sector the small entrepreneurs are not actively engaged in 
creative innovations to satisfy some of the basic needs of the Eritrean society particularly in metal and 
wood works, in mechanical repair services, and home-made spare parts. 
In Eritrea everybody speaks of technology and technological development. New technology in construction 
industry, computerisation in offices and factories, modern machinery in factories, etc. 'Modern farming 
Office of the President responsible for strategic planning such as: 
1. Macro Economic Management 
2. Strategic Economic Planning 
Ministry of Finance and Development for resource allocation and estimate process:  
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technologies' is currently the buzzword in the country. Some initial indications of introducing the drip-
irrigation technology are evident. For example we have it in one flower-farm near Asmara, in another 
banana farm in the Gash-Barka region, another in the Eastern lowlands in Gahtelay farm. Similarly it is 
possible to mention other examples from the industry such as the new marble manufacturing plant in 
Ghinda, the Fred Hollows IOF Laboratory (Lenses manufacturing plant, a high-tech firm), ASBECO asphalt 
making construction firm, etc. [n the services sector in the Photo and Video services, tens of firms have 
introduced modern computer processing technologies. It is also impressive the number of computers for 
office automation in the country since 1992. 
It is not uncommon to see Eritreans returning from the Diaspora with certain skills and technological know-
how working hard to establish small firms based on modern technologies. It is not uncommon also to hear 
them complaining about the absence of institutions able to give required support, absence of skilled 
manpower, lack of adequate infrastructures, like communications and transport systems, to enable them to 
benefit from international connectivity. 
It is no wonder that Eritrea, as a newly emerging country from the ashes of a 30 year long war of liberation, 
lacks the necessary resources to establish S&T institutions. There is no adequate number of highly skilled 
technical manpower and professional management and administrative body with the necessary experience 
to run such institutions. Money is also in short supply to establish even some long overdue support 
institutions. Thus, for the foreseeable future, research activities may remain an insignificant portion of the 
university's activities and other institutes or government agencies. Here, a dose of foreign aid could be 
administered to institutionalise research activities and develop a good base for a research culture to 
develop in the country. 
We have said that there are not yet systematic R&D activities nor, for that matter, a systematic promotion 
and diffusion of S&T in the country. There are few fragmented and isolated instances of research activities 
going on, for example research on renewable energy development in the Department of Energy. In the 
Ministry of Agriculture research on pest control, water and soil conservation, improvement of seeds and 
animal disease control are carried out on a limited basis. There are a small number of research activities in 
various ministries, particularly dealing with various assessments of social and economic profiles of the 
country. Where do they all fit? How could they be co-ordinated? Is there any continuity? How could the 
information be effectively used and disseminated? AU of these and similar questions could be addressed 
by S&T policy analysis and would lay the necessary foundation for effective and efficient management of 
science and technology. 
Some may argue that the process of S&T policy making is costly and the country does not have the luxury 
of spending such money. But the answer is simple. If the country is dealing with machinery and know-how 
in the day to day activities, which it is, then to ask which machinery to buy, how to effectively adapt and 
maintain them, how to develop the necessary skills required is not out of place. Entrepreneurs can do 
something about it but not all. Their capabilities as individuals are limited. The incentive to do it is not 
always there because they are, most of the times, after quick returns. But the changes we are talking about 
to bring in the country are not possible by simply leaving the things to market forces. Our small 
entrepreneurs don't have the experience, nor the knowledge and the money to undertake it on their own. It 
is here where the national policies come into picture, to act as a force to coordinate, guide and promote the 
creation and diffusion of technologies that can make the difference to improve and the change the living 
standards of the country, 
Below, an assessment of what is going on in practice in the country in the various sectors is given. 





10.4 Institutional capability 
From Science & Technology point of view, Eritrean institutional capacity can be analysed following the 
UNECA (1991) discussion which looks at it from three perspectives: the universities, the industrial research 
and development institutes, and the enterprises. 
In Eritrea there is only one university, University of Asmara. This institution in terms of year of 
establishment is one of the oldest universities in the continent. The catholic nuns, Comboni Sisters, 
established it in 1958. But because of the political problems in the country, it could hardly grow. It was 
established during the Eritro-Ethiopian Federal Government. Soon followed the annexation of Eritrea to 
Ethiopia by force in 1961. The Hailesellasie regime did everything it could to marginalize it. The fear was 
that it might become the centre of Eritrean students' political struggle. The whole trick was to disperse 
Eritrean students in Ethiopian higher institutions so that the best brains are trained and possibly retained in 
Ethiopia and in the long run dilute the national identity of the Eritreans. But this strategy did not work fully 
because the very students that have joined Addis Ababa University continued their political struggle in 
Ethiopia. And at one point, a significant group of them joined the armed struggle of Eritrea, eventually 
becoming the leaders of the armed struggle. 
When one tries to look at the possible gap that might exist between the national development plans and 
their translation into national technological plans from which researchers can select R & D programmes, 
this becomes a very difficult task because such explicit plans are nonexistent. The national development 
plans are, at best, incomplete and less articulate. This may be because the country was mainly taken up by 
the rehabilitation and reconstruction phase. But now the country is entering into a new phase of the 
development stage and articulate national economic plans are needed very much. There is a need for 
national technological plans that could be the basis for the selection of R & D programmes. At present there 
is no clear basis for research selection at the university and other institutes or agencies. The broad science 
and technology mentioned in the Macro Policy (1994) or in some other proclamations do not constitute a 
national technological plan. An immediate action should be taken to fill this vacuum. 
Collaboration between the university and other relevant authorities to train the required manpower with 
specific status and skills needed to implement technology plans within a given time does not exist simply 
because the university itself is not sufficiently endowed to do so. In fact, the Engineering College is only 
three years old. It has started with a diploma programme now upgraded into a degree programme. It is only 
focusing on teaching. It needs some time before it can strengthen its departments with all necessary 
facilities such as experienced staff and other materials to embark on projects on specific skills training for 
implementing technology plans in the industry. But soon it needs to do something about it. The university 
has already accumulated some experience of collaborating with various government departments with 
regard to training in public administration, law and journalism and mass communications, archaeology and 
social works. Similar things can be arranged between the College of Engineering and the industry. 
In the country there are very few institutes of technology having the competencies to appreciate the lengthy 
process and complexity of skills for the development of indigenous industrial technology. Industrial research 
and development institutes are completely absent in Eritrea. There is total absence of technology registry. 
There is lack of conscious effort to appreciate the inter-dependence that should exist between industry, 
science and technology institutions and policy makers. There is a lack of conscious effort and support to 
study, upgrade and adapt indigenous techniques to a level of mass production in industry. There is no 
funding for significant R & D. There is lack of employment opportunities in the industrial sector for people 





such as chemists, physicists, mechanical engineers, with the exception of civil engineers, which are highly 
demanded at present time in the country. There is lack of competent policy-making body in industrial 
technology management. 
It is not possible to talk of enterprises' contribution to the development of local capacity in R & D. First of all 
the industrial firms in Eritrea are very small in size and number; second, they are mainly light industries. 
What they do is import the machinery they need from abroad and try to produce and sell as much as they 
can. Their market is mainly the domestic market. At times some individual entrepreneurs succeed to make 
an imitated machine for their own use to replace the old one and save money on new machinery. 
Therefore, there is not a conscious effort to undertake research activity. There is little incentive and support 
given by the Government for the private enterprises to get involved in risky ventures of commercialising 
indigenous innovations and inventions. The Ministry of Industry and Trade was mainly engaged in the 
management of the 42 or so public enterprises inherited from the Ethiopian regime. But now, the 
Government is in the process of privatising these enterprises. In the near future it will have none to manage 
and will be freer to engage on promoting industrial technology in the true sense such as: making available 
of easy to assimilate technology, giving financial support for technical entrepreneurs, finding markets etc. A 
recent attempt by the Ministry of Trade and Industry to organise a technology exhibition, October 15-I7, 
1998, was meant to redress this deficiency but more needs to be done. 
10.5 Human capital formation 
We know that human capital formation is at the basis of successful industrialisation process and 
technological development. Therefore, a focus on the human resources of Eritrea is the next logical step. 
Let us start from the very human resource policies of the country and its performance. The Macro Policy of 
the State of Eritrea (1994) gives the following objectives and policies: 
l. Objectives 
- To produce a population equipped with the necessary skills, knowledge and culture for a self reliant 
and modern economy, 
- To develop self-consciousness and self motivation in its population to fight poverty, disease, and all 
the attendant causes of backwardness and ignorance. 
- To make basic education available to all. 
2. Policies 
- Universal primary education up to seven years will gradually be made available to all, 
- Skilled manpower requirements of both the public and private sectors will be met by a steadily 
increasing enrolments at the secondary, technical and vocational schools, 
- Continuing education through formal and informal channels will be promoted to achieve higher 
literacy rates and enhanced competence, 
- Tertiary education will be expanded selectively to meet the envisaged manpower requirements of 
the country. For diversified skill acquisition, this will be supplemented by utilising training 
opportunities afforded by the international community, 
- The emphasis of technical/vocational training will be the imparting multi-craft dexterity and skills 
that enhance the job adaptability and retraining potential of the student, 





- The Government, the community and the direct beneficiaries will be made to contribute varying 
amounts towards financing educational costs. The Government may resort to levying surcharges to 
meet part of the costs of education, 
- Official recognition and/or professional accreditation of skills and academic attainment will be 
awarded only after undergoing government established certification procedures, 
- There will be no restraint on the provision of education by the private sector, 
- The standards of private schools will be maintained by curricula issued by the Ministry of 
Education. Private schools are expected to follow this curriculum but they will not be limited by its 
coverage, 
- Non-secular schools will be given accreditation of professional competence (in nonreligious 
matters) only after completion of established national certification procedures (Macro Policy, 1994, 
p.39-40). 
The present Eritrean Government has made it clear from the very beginning that human resource 
development will be given priority. In fact, the Macro Policy (1994) has declared that universal primary 
education up to seven years will gradually be made available to all. 
A skilled manpower need of the country is being progressively improved by increasing high-school 
enrolments, opening up more vocational and technical schools. Tertiary education is also expanding 
selectively. 
The primary level net enrolment from 22.4 percent in 1991-92 increased to 28.8 percent in 1996-97. The 
net enrolment in the middle level has gone up from 7 to 7.9 percent; and that of second level education 
increased slowly from 8.6 percent to 10.4 percent. While gross enrolment was 51 percent, 30 percent and 
16 percent in primary, middle, and secondary education in 1996-97. 
Table 10.7: SCHOOLS 1988i89-1995/96 in Eritrea (Government and Private) 
Level Owner Pre-liberation Post-liberation 
1988/89 89/90 90/91 91/92 92/93 93/94 94/95 95/96 
Primary Gov‟t 162 141 137 258 342 385 405 442 
Non-Gov‟t 84 80 77 123 105 106 105 95 
Total 246 231 214 381 447 491 510 537 
Middle Gov‟t 42 37 37 47 46 55 68 72 
Non-Gov‟t 19 21 22 18 25 26 20 23 
Total 61 58 59 65 71 81 88 95 
Secondary Gov‟t 17 13 16 20 20 27 27 29 
Non-Gov‟t 4 4 3 5 7 6 6 7 
Total 21 17 19 25 27 33 33 36 
Technical Gov‟t 1 1 1 2 2 2 3 3 
Non-Gov‟t - - - - - - - - 
Total 1 1 1 2 2 2 3 3 
Source: Eritrea: Basic Education Statistics and Essential Indicators 1995/96, Ministry of Education, 1996, p.17 
 
The above table (Table 10.7) shows that the number of primary schools has increased 250.9 percent from 
that of the academic year 1990-91, the year immediately before liberation of Eritrea. While middle schools 
and secondary schools have increased by 161 and 189.5 percent respectively. 
Total Government expenditures on education, without including expenditure for higher education, in 1992 
was Birr 34.7 million, in 1993 Bin 46.3 million, in 1994 Birr 58.8 million, in 1995 Birr 90.3 million, and in 





1996 Bin 91.0 million. Out of the 91 million spent in 1996, expenditure on salaries accounted about 57.6 
percent. 
.The technical and vocational education has expanded significantly in the past four years. In addition to the 
two intermediate level Technical Schools of Asmara and Winna, other two new private technical schools 
that of Pavoni and Don Bosco, at Asmara and Dekemhare respectively, have been opened recently. 
Several new vocational training centres providing courses of 6-8 months duration in a variety of skills are 
opened in various high schools across the country. In 199516 Asmara and Winna had 536 students out of 
which only 59 were female students. In the Asmara Comprehensive, Halai, Assab, Mai Habar, Mendefera, 
and Makalasi vocational short term training centres a total of 434 students graduated out of which 217 were 
females. In the Technical schools students are trained in general shop, general metal, machine shop, auto-
mechanic, survey, drafting, wood, electricity, and radio. While the short term training in the various training 
centres were given in: wood work, construction, auto-mechanic, agriculture, electricity, metal works, 
plumbing, machine shop, and secretarial work. 
If we try to observe the change of the last few years, we see that Asmara Technical School has graduated 
594 from 1992-96, and that of Winna graduated 315 from 1991-95. 
At the present time there are around 40,000 students in Eritrean high schools. This is only about 10 percent 
of the high school age population. If Eritrea wants to catch up in the coming 20 years, it should be able to 
put the 40,000 students of high school age to attend vocational and technical schools to achieve the level 
of the South East Asian tigers. We have already discussed about the need to put one in ten, like South 
Korea, of the 12-18 years old students in vocational and technical training (see chapter 6). If we take the 
capacity of Asmara Technical School, it was 410 in 1996-97 academic year. Assuming that we open a 
technical/vocational school of a capacity of 500 students, Eritrea would need to open at least two per year 
for the coming 20 years (40 schools) to be able to accommodate 10 percent of the high school age 
population. This is of course with assumption that by then the country will have high school enrolment rate 
of not less that 90 percent. If we take the apprenticeship prevalent, in the formal and informal sector, in the 
country into consideration, then, the number of such schools need be lower. 
In a recent interview with the President of the country, Isaias Afewerki, the issue of human resource was 
raised and he clearly said that human resource is the comer stone of Eritrean development. In his own 
words: "Another dimension of our strategy is to develop human resources to the maximum. That may have 
come as a result of our recognition of the limitation of our natural resources. Without developing human 
capital, it is senseless. That is what we are doing now. Yes we need roads, bridges, airport, and water 
supply. But we cannot develop the infrastructure without developing our human capital. We are talking 
long-term strategy, 20-years. We have to educate our people." A successful arrangement with the World 
Bank on human resource development strategy was designed for the next five years. The Government of 
Eritrea has a plan within the coming five years to produce highly skilled manpower that could be flexible in 
accommodating or using whatever resources, internal or external, is available (Eritrea Profile, March 21, 
1998, p.3). This project wants to produce about 500 in advanced degrees, i.e., Masters and Doctoral 
degrees, in all the critical field of studies where a nucleus of critical mass of highly educated people is 
required to enable the country's economy start become competitive in the 21st century. In line with the 
philosophy of self-reliance, the country wants to acquire soon in various areas a critical mass of expertise 
and liberate itself from dependency on foreign expertise. This by itself does not constitute the national 
human resource plan. 





The national human resource plan, which is launched with the above-mentioned project, is going to 
address the clear mismatch between the existing training activities and the labour market needs. Therefore, 
the national human resource plan should be based on labour market information, otherwise soon the 
training may increase the number of unemployed educated people, Poor countries more than others should 
avoid 'training for unemployment' because there is scarcity of skilled manpower that needs to be filled. This 
can be achieved through a careful national human resources plan that does not assume the current and 
future demands for skilled labour in the economy is so great that there is no risk of over-supply. 
Of course, the success of this kind of project depends very much on many other variables such as the 
ability to control brain-drain and effective and efficient utilisation of human resources through an 
enlightened human resource management. The development of such a critical mass of highly skilled 
manpower will be the basis of scientific and technological development of the country. In the mean time the 
country has started to employ a significant number of expatriates particularly from India and the Philippines 
for its high schools, the university, and other government departments. Hopefully this reliance on expatriate 
expertise will be limited to the short and intermediate term of the country's development. 
University of Asmara is the only university in the country. It became a Chartered University in 1968. It 
became a state university in 1977 and came under the Ethiopian Commission for higher Education, 
supposedly to serve the Northern Regions of Ethiopia, Students were coming from every corner of Ethiopia. 
But this did not last long because the war of independence intensified in 1988 and 1989. Particularly when 
Massawa was captured in February 1990, the Minister of Education of Ethiopia decided against the will of 
the people to transfer it to Ethiopia in September 1990. The transfer lasted only less than a year since the 
transfer because Eritrea was totally liberated in May 1991. But the University's facilities were mostly 
transferred to Ethiopia and about 55 percent of its staff left because they were Ethiopians. 
It is possible to say that the University of Asmara started afresh in September 1991 with a new group of 
fresh students, about 1,000. From only 13 degree- and diploma-awarding departments, the university grew 
to 26 departments with another three to start soon, among which is the department of Computer Science. 
The number of regular students grew from 1683 to 2908, i.e., it almost doubled but evening students have 
declined from 1259 to 188 because the programme has been phased out. The number of staff increased 
from 62 to 237 of whom 167 are Eritreans and expatriates are 70. But 62.8 percent of the Ph.D. holders are 
expatriates. The total number of degree graduates from 1991 to 1998 is 1602 of whom only 205 are 
females while the total number of diploma and certificate graduates is 843 of whom 220 females (University 
Statistical data). Based on the observation of the last seven years it is possible to arrive at an average 
number of graduates per year. By excluding the abnormal years, there have been about 400 in 
undergraduate degrees and about 100 diploma and certificate/year'. University of Asmara is still a small 
university and needs to grow fast to meet the growing demand for its services. 
The 'publish or perish syndrome' is also present at the University of Asmara. This is because the policy of 
the university says that to climb the academic ranks one should publish in international journals. Nothing is 
said about possible contributions to local industrial development. No scientific journal is yet published in the 
country. Unless change is brought soon, the heavy teaching load of teaching staff at the University does 
not allow the staff to engage in research activities hampering the growth opportunities of staff with possible 
serious negative effect on retaining them in the long term. Research facilities and funds with the institutional 
infrastructures need also be established. At present, it is not an exaggeration if we say that there is an 
insignificant research activity carried out by the University. It was only towards the end of 1997 that a 
research division has been established with an appointed head and slowly a University Research 





Committee was established by the end of the first quarter of 1998. Hopefully this new structure will lay the 
foundation ground for research activity at the University. 
It is very clear that Eritrea lacks the necessary human capital to make quick technological take off. But if the 
current commitment of the government on education and training continues, the country will soon have 
enough skilled manpower to sustain an economic recovery and development. It should not be forgotten that 
Eritrea has a great reserve of skilled manpower in Diaspora, A good policy to attract the Eritreans in the 
Diaspora will make the thing much easier for the country. 
10.6 The Melting Pot: technology management and economic development 
The cornerstone of Eritrean development policy is 'self-reliance' and 'avoid heavy borrowing'. Even 'Aid's 
not accepted with enthusiasm by Eritrean leadership as we have explained within the industrial history of 
the country in the chapter 1. 
In construction industry new modern companies are emerging, for example Keangnam, Space 2001, Elmi, 
Raza Enterprises, Seghen, Ghedem, ASBECO and East Africa Construction etc. Interesting partnerships in 
jointly undertaking big construction projects, like road construction, is taking place. For example, a 
consortium of government and local private companies are jointly working on the highway construction of 
the road Keren-Tesseney (US$ 31.25 million). New restaurants and hotels are springing up all across the 
country. The mining sector is also slowly emerging, for now mostly doing exploratory activities.  
The rebuilding of the totally destroyed Eritrean railway built by the Italians is another great example of 
Eritrean ingenuity and self-reliance strategy. Had it been done by foreign companies, it would cost US$ 
200m. Today, about km 70 of the Massawa-Asmara railway has been rebuilt. David Hirst gave an account 
of it (Eritrean Profile, August l, 1998, first published in The Daily Star).In his words, "There can be few relics 
of the steam era like the 49-tonne Giovanni Ansaldo, Genoa 1937, or the 30-tonne Ernesto Breda, Milan 
1927, outside museums, and surely none being restored as an integral part of a country transport system." 
Eritrean Railway boasts some 20 of these quaint machines. This transformation is led by old foremen 
trained during the Italian colonial period. It costs Eritrea nothing in foreign expertise, and a few million 
dollars for track-laying machine and a special, indispensable type of nuts and bolts. Seen from 
modernisation point of view, this is quite the opposite. But from the point of view of a poor and developing 
country doing it with only internal resources is nonetheless an achievement. There is no doubt it will 
contribute greatly in the development of tourism in Eritrea as a 'working museum'. It will promote also the 
hardworking character of the Eritrean worker more than any other effort to attract foreign investment. 
With the recent revival of the fishing industry, exports started to increase amounting to 2,000 tonnes in 
1994, and a similar amount in the first 8 months of 1995. But it is a very insignificant amount of the 
maximum sustainable yield of 70,000-100,000mt. The Ministry's plan is to increase industrial fisheries up to 
15,000mt by 1999 through increased investment including joint ventures (Ministry of Marine Resources and 
Fisheries, Meeting of Eritrea's Development Partners, Asmara - Eritrea, November 2, 1998). They have 
started to introduce better fishing technologies but a lot remain to be done. The bulk of exports are bound 
for Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Ethiopia and Israel. Significant, unrecorded amount of fish continues to be sold in 
the Yemeni market via informal export traffic. Moreover, plans are underway to open the European markets 
to Eritrean marine products and some trial export has been attempted. It should be remembered that in the 
1950s-1960s the Eritreans fisheries were a thriving industry. Annual catches of well over 25,000 tonnes 





were reported. Over 80% of this production consisted of pelagic - sardines and anchovy - which were 
processed into fishmeal or sun-dried for export for European and Far-Eastern markets. 
In the development of the industrial technological base, the government is sticking to the principle of self-
reliance which can be summarised as 'do it yourself if you can, learn to do it yourself as soon as you can, 
and modify things to suit your particular needs'. Investors are required to use expatriates only when skilled 
Eritreans are not available, even then, the expatriate experts should stay for the time necessary for 
Eritreans to take over. 
It is interesting to observe the metalwork shops and mechanical repair service garages are very busy in 
trying to modify new model cars to suit the local needs. For older model cars, making the spare parts they 
need is not a problem. This shows only that the country was closed to transfer of the latest technology, 
particularly after the 1974 Ethiopian revolution. After 1991, all this is changing fast. A lot of new car models 
are flooding the country, new heavy and modern construction machinery are coming which is forcing the 
garages and machine shops to cope with the new changes in demand by introducing modern technology 
and skills. 
The Medeber (in Asmara) compound, an area reserved for small metal and woodwork businesses, is one 
of the main supplier of local basic needs at the lower end of the market. It is not difficult to observe that 
entrepreneurial ingenuity is creating new products. Most of their products are household utensils, 
appliances, house furniture, metal or wood made doors and windows, etc. It is not rare to see these people 
to make their own simple machines, usually imitated products. It is a self-sustaining thieving business. In 
the past not much has been done to support these entrepreneurs. 
The Eritrean Government had embarked upon a rehabilitation and reconstruction programme. In the last 
few years it has undertaken rehabilitation and renovation program of Massawa and Assab salt plants, 
Agordat fibre factory and tobacco plant, in the Western Lowlands, and rolling mill and are furnace in 
Asmara and Marble factory in Ghinda. Significant achievement has been made in the area of locally 
manufactured building materials as well. The construction industry is one of fastest growing sectors. A 
considerable build up of heavy modern construction machinery has been achieved in the last few years 
since independence. Together with it technical skills are in the increase. 
The Department of Industry's objectives are to modernise existing industries and direct them toward 
becoming export enterprises. The Department aims at creating export-oriented industries, introducing 
appropriate technology and managerial know-how and improving the country's accumulation of foreign 
reserves for further expansion. New industries will be directed to rural areas in order to create jobs, 
indigenous technology will be made more competitive and conscious efforts will be made to promote 
women's participation in industry. Plans to decentralise as well as privatise the management of public 
enterprises will be put in place and current subsidies will be removed. Consequently, the role of the 
Government will merely be regulatory. 
All of what we have seen above shows that the country is trying to transfer new technologies, adopt and 
adapt them to suit the country's needs, and diffuse them. This is happening in every sector. But it is not 
possible to say that there is any systematic diffusion of technology except that by induction, i.e. that of 
learning from the innovating film next door. Of course in all these, skilled Eritreans coming back from the 
Diaspora are contributing a lot in the process. 
 
















11. IT in Eritrea 
11.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, we have discussed about the broad S&T policy making process in Eritrea, the 
place of R&D in the government structure and the role it plays in the development of the country. Now it is 
time to focus on IT in particular. It is considered necessary to study the diffusion of IT in the country 
because it can help us understand the existing dynamics of this emerging industry. We can identify the 
major variables that are at play; the major problems that hinder the growth of this industry and see how far 
market forces alone can achieve in the context of a poorly endowed developing economy. This will enable 
us to chart the possible government intervention to complement the dynamics of the market forces to 
ensure a rapid development of IT to become an infrastructure backbone for the rapid development of the 
economy and global networking. 
The chapter will start from the exploration of the diffusion of computers in various sectors and then move to 
IT policy analysis following the same structure in all the previous chapters with NIEs and SSA countries. 
We will see the diffusion of information technology in Eritrea. When we say information technology diffusion 
we mean what is happening in terms of computers and communications technology, institutional capacity 
development, human resource development, and the implementation of computerisation projects. We will 
try to analyse information technology transfer methods and the country's leapfrogging possibilities. This 
prepares the basis of a framework on which the country can base the development of this pervasive 
technology that will become the backbone of the entire economic system in the 2Ist century. 
11.2 Environmental context 
Microcomputers are invading the African continent. Eritrea is not the exception (see Table 11.1). The 
Customs Office of Eritrea has started taking record of data processing machines entering the country in 
1995. It includes all computers, adding machines, and calculators. In value terms, these machines have 
more than doubled in 1997 (Birr 32,415,673) from that of 1995 (Birr 14,760,526).In the three years, from 
1995-1997, a total of Birr 73,311,571 valued data processing machines have come to Eritrea. 
Table 11.1: Data processing machines entering Eritrea in 1995-97 in value 
Year Quarter 
 1 2 3 4 Total 
1995 5,278,044 2,798,036 3,462,743 3,221,703 14,760,526 
1996 4,823,875 6,243,629 7,272,286 7,735,582 26,075,372 
1997 8,092,711 6,507,772 10,428,404 7,446,786 32,475,673 
Total 18,194,630 15,549,437 21,163,433 18,404,071 73,311,571 
Source: Customs Office, Asmara Head Office, 1997. 
 
To have a better look of the diffusion of computerisation process in Eritrea, a survey with a sample of 200 
government and private organisations, most likely to use computers, was taken from which 176 (Table 
11.2) responses were obtained. 81.25% (143) were having computers while the remaining 18.75% (33) did 





not have them. From those who do not have computers at present, 69.7% (23) said they need computers 
and 86.95% (20) of these are planning to buy within the next two years. 
Table 11.2: Responding organisations classified by size (number of employees) 
Organisations by type & size (No. Employ.) 
 
Gov’t Private  International Total 
Micro (1-10) 7 38 2 47 
Small (11-50 14 19 3 36 
Medium (51-100) 11 7 - 18 
Large (>100) 27 15 - 42 
Total 59 79 5 143 
 
Immediately after the end of the war of liberation, in 1991, it was impossible not to notice the increasing 
number of microcomputers entering the country. The first computers to arrive in Eritrea were in L984185 
academic year at the University of Asmara as a part of a research project in the Department of Biology. 
They were four Mac PCs. The next computer was at the then National Bank of Ethiopia, Asmara Branch, in 
1986. Few PCs were also introduced in EPLF head offices in Sahel after mid 1980s. 
If we study the distribution of the first computer introduced in each of 143 organisations that have said they 
have computers, we find that the majority (19%) introduced computers for the first time in 1994, The early 
adopters (7%) have them in 1989 and 1991. The early majority (27.5%) appears in 1992 and 1993. The 
late majority (45.8%) seems to be almost equally distributed among the years 1995, 1996 and 1997. The 
19 (10.8% of the 176) organisations that said will be going to buy within the next two years can be 
























Figure 11.1: Organizations and their first computers 
installed by year







The year 1989 signs the beginning of the arrival of a steady stream of computers in the country, 18 
computers arrived at the University of Asmara in that year. No computers in 1990, it was the year Massawa 
was captured and all trade and communication was at a standstill in the whole country because of the war. 
After the liberation of the country, 24 May 1991, 25 more computers arrived in the country. In our survey of 
the 176 organisations, from 1992 to March 1998, in each year arrived 52, 246, 253, 212, 256, 446, and 141 
respectively. In addition there were 103 more computers with unknown year of arrival. The total was 1740 

























































Figure 11.3: Computers by source of purchase






Table 11.3: Existing computers by source and  year 
Source 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 19976 1997 Mar98 Unkyr Total 
Europe 2  12 13 133 59 55 108 97 41 13 533 
Italy -  12 6 107 9 31 46 9 7 - 227 
Germ -  - - 3 2 3 3 21 - - 32 
UK 2  - 7 14 6 6 25 18 19 6 103 
Nether -  - - 5 1 - 14 7 - - 27 
Denmar -  - - - 4 10 - 34 - - 48 
Others -  - - 4 37 5 20 8 15 7 96 
America 1  - 10 77 46 33 29 80 17 17 310 
USA 1  - 9 77 43 32 27 77 16 17 299 
Canada -  - 1 - 3 1 2 3 1 - 11 
Asia -  - 5 19 64 27 16 23 7 61 222 
Dubai -  - 1 13 3 2 11 9 - - 39 
SArabia -  - 4 6 - 8 - 4 2 - 24 
India -  - - - 61 - - - - - 61 
Other -  - - - - 17 5 10 5 61 98 
Africa 1  - 14 - 26 14 32 143 9 20 259 
Eritrea -  - 14 - 26 11 32 143 9 20 255 
Ethiopia 1  - - - - 3 - - - - 4 
Unknown 
source 
19  13 7 27 68 94 47 128 17 3 421 
Total 23  25 49 256 261 223 232 471 91 114 1745 
 
The source of the computers is as follows: Europe 533 (30,54Eo) led by Italy 227 and U.K. 103; America 
310 (17.77%) with USA accounting for most of it (299); Africa 259(14.84%) which is 255 from suppliers in 
Eritrea and four from Ethiopia; Asia 222 (12.72%) with India leading with 61 followed by Dubai 39 and 
Saudi Arabia 24; and other 421 (24.13%) from unidentified source (see Table 1 1.4 and Figure 11.3, 11.4). 
 



























Figure 11.4: Computers by brands





Table 11.4: Existing computers by source and brand 
Brand & 
source 
Compaq Dell Macint. IBM Olivetti Others Total  
Europe 67 45 11 73 103 234 533 30.54% 
Italy 3 - 4 2 103 115 227  
Germ 5 12 - 3 - 12 32  
UK 49 - - 21 - 33 103  
Nether 3 - - 22 - 2 27  
Denmar - 25 - 4 - 19 48  
Others 7 8 7 21 - 53 96  
America 61 52 27 84 - 86 310 17.77% 
USA 61 52 24 83 - 79 299  
Canada - - 3 1 - 7 11  
Asia 17 1 - 39 - 174 222 12.72% 
Dubai 6 - - 10 - 23 39  
SArabia 6 - - 10 - 8 24  
India - 1 - - - 60 61  
Other 5 - - 10 - 83 98  
Africa 90 - 1 44 16 104 259 14.84% 
Eritrea 90 - 1 44 16 100 255  
Ethiopia - - - - - 4 4  
Unknown 
source 
27 19 10 38 21 306 421 24.13% 
Total 262 117 49 269 140 908 1745 100% 
 
When the computer brands have been analysed, the leading brands emerge to be IBM 269, Compaq 262, 
Olivetti 140, Dell 117, Macintosh 49 and the remaining 908 computers from other 63 brands. It shows the 
proliferation of computer brands which has a negative impact on supply and repair services (See Table 
11.4; figure 11.4, and appendix 7). 
The source of information of the purchased computer technology, in order of importance, is personal 
contact with distributors, donor agencies, local connections, consultants, and journals & magazines. 
If we study the distribution of computers in the sample, Government civil services organisations are at the 
top with an average of 20.2 computers per organisation. This average is even higher than the average of 
the international organisations of 17.4 per organisation. 63.9 percent of the computers are found in the 
Government civil services even though the number of such organisations in the sample was only 31.3 
percent of the total. This can be explained by the fact that those in the civil services are bigger in size while 
the private enterprises are dominated by the micro enterprises. The private enterprises average is 5.4 
computers while that of the public enterprises was found to be the lowest 1.3 computers per organisation. 
In the sample 54.5 percent of the responding organisations were private enterprises but accounted only 
29.7 percent of the identified computers (see Table 11.5). 
  





Table 11.5: Distributions of computers among organizations 
Types of 
organisations 





employee ratio No. % No. % No. % 
Gov‟t civil 
service 
55 31.3 1111 63.9 7382 35.1 20.2 1:6.6 
Public 
enterprises 
20 11.4 26 1.5 5297 25.2 1.3 1:204 
Private 
enterprises 
96 54.5 516 29.7 8224 39.1 5.4 1:16 
PFDJ 
companies 
11  57    5.2  
Computer 
business 
27  290    10.7  
Consulting 
firms 
14  62    4.4  
Manufacturing 17  49    2.9  
Others 27  58    2.1  
International 5 2.8 87 5 106 0.005 17.4 1:1.2 
Total 176 100 1740 100 21009 99.4 10.2 1:12 
 
But when we look at the computer employee ratio, we find a different view of the situation. In the 
international organisations we find one computer for 7.2 employees, almost one computer per employee. 
Next comes the Government Civil Services with 1 computer per 6.6 employees and the private enterprises, 
1 computer is for 16 employees. The ratio of all the organisations in the survey was 1 computer per 12 
employees while the lowest ratio is that of the public enterprises with 1 computer per 204 employees. This 
could be explained by the unwillingness of the Government to invest in them because they are in the 
process of privatisation but at the same time these are labour intensive type organisations. 
Within the private enterprises, computer services companies have 56.2 percent of the computers while 
making only 28.1 percent of the number of companies in the sample. In fact, computer services companies 
and organisations, with an average of 10.7 per organisation, have the highest average next to civil service 
organisations and the international. 
The computers are used for a variety of applications and the dominant ones have been found to be office 
administration, accounting, payroll, inventory management, record management, publishing, training, 
billing, work scheduling, production management, marketing and process control and others (33 were 
mentioned). 
83.22% of the respondents are aware of package software suppliers, agents or sellers in the country while 
33.57% only are aware of the presence of custom software making firms. There are no packaged software 
producers in the country. If there is a problem with commercial software package, a user company would 
usually get help, advice or technical support within the country 39.86%. Those who get it only sometimes 
are the majority 46.85%. Only 9.79% said they never get it. The nature and type of help, advice or technical 
support sought by the users can explain the difference in response. If these are simple and uncomplicated, 
then, getting help and support would be easier than when the situation is more complicated. 
Suppliers of microcomputers, printers, tape/disk drivers, VDU terminals are now available in the country but 
of mainframe computers are unheard of, there was only one IBM minicomputer in the whole country, in the 





Eritrean Electric Authority supplied by the IBM representative in the country. Getting from suppliers within 
the country 3 1/2" diskettes, magnetic tapes, continuous printer papers, toner for photocopier/laser, cables 
and connectors, fuses for electronic equipment, standard RAM chips, printer ribbons and the like is easy. 
Punched cards are not known in the country. Most of the respondents have never used 8" and 5 1/2" 
diskettes, magnetic tapes and standard RAM chips. 
Table 11.6: Ease with which computer users get repair and maintenance services 
Computer 
parts 
Easy Difficult Impossible Don’t know Total 
No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % 
Hard disk 
drive 
46 32.17 65 45.45 10 6.99 22 15.38. 143 100 
Floppy disk 
drives 
50 34.97 61 42.66 9 6.29 23 16.08 143 100 
Printers 71 49.65 56 39.16 3 2.10 13 9.09 143 100 
VDU, terminal 30 20.98 59 41.26 17 11.89 37 25.87 143 100 
CP 36 25.17 66 46.15 20 13.99 21 14.69 143 100 
 
In general, it can be said that getting repair and maintenance services for hard disk drives, floppy disk 
drives, VDUs, and CPUs is difficult. Getting printers repaired is relatively easier, may be previous repair 
and maintenance skills in photocopy machines, typewriters and the likes could be easily transferred. It is 
encouraging to see those who say that it is impossible to get repair and maintenance services are below 
14Vo for all the computer parts. But at the same time it can be easily noted that those who do not know, 
probably because they are new comers, are significant. Given that computer repair and maintenance 
services business at most is four/five years old, it is a big progress (see Table 11.6). 
A very interesting character in the computer repair service business has been observed. Customers seem 
to be unwilling to pay the price for replacing a standard part as is done elsewhere in the world. The Eritrean 
market seems to be unable to bear. Therefore, the repair business is forced to look a way over it by 
repairing the malfunctioning part rather than replacing it. It is said to be cheaper but inconvenient because 
getting spare parts for such repairs is difficult. 
At present there are no computer societies or clubs or user groups that could act as a source of information 
of computer technology and help in the diffusion of information technology. The major sources of 
information are the computer hardware/software suppliers (10.63%) with magazines and journals 
accounting for 22.38% of it. 
The most popular and widely used software in the country are: Windows 95, MS Word, MS Excel, MS 
Access, MS Word 97, MS Excel 97, MS Access 97, dBase, Lotus 1-2-3, WordPerfect 6, and Graphics and 
CAD. In addition MS Publisher 97, Visual Basic 4, Application Generator/4Gls, Teleprocessing Monitors, 
Optimising Compilers, CASE and other 75 different types of software packages in use have been identified 
(Appendix 8). 
During the 1993 and 1994, the first private computer schools appeared around the capital city of Asmara. 
These computer schools grew in number and size. Most of them started to give a number of other 
computer services such as: computer repair services, computer installation services, provision of computer 
supplies services, computer hardware/software sales services, and networking services. Now, their number 
fluctuates around 30, all in Asmara. Some of them have started to look outside the capital city by opening 
branches in other towns like Massawa and Keren. 





Even though Eritrea had one of the most sophisticated telecommunication networks in the 1950s, today it 
has one of the least developed telecommunications infrastructures in the continent. Eritrean 
Telecommunication Services is the sole carrier in the country. It is the remains of the Ethiopian 
Telecommunication Services Asmara branch. Recently there was a joint venture to be signed between the 
South Korean Daewoo Company and the Eritrean Government. This move would have brought the 
required capital injection, technical and managerial expertise to the country. The Eritrean Government 
clearly said that the move was done to expand and modernise the telecommunication services 
infrastructure in the country. But the venture had encountered a number of difficulties. First it was the 
financial crisis in East Asia (South Korea) and then it was the turn of Eritrea because of the border conflict 
with Ethiopia. There is a possibility that it may fail. 
The Government is hoping to link all the major towns in Eritrea in a telecommunication network based on 
the digital switching system. At present, only Massawa, Assab, Dekemhare, Mendefera, and Keren are in 
the network.  
In the development of information technology, the ability to control physical environment factors such as 
temperature, humidity, and dust is very critical. At the same time infrastructure development such as the 
availability of regular supply of electricity, telecommunications infrastructure, hardware and software 
support services are of paramount importance. We can get some ideas of the situation in Eritrea from the 
Table 11.7 
Table 11 7: Physical and infrastructure problems for computer users 
Problem Major Minor Mo Problem Don’t know Total 
No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % 
Temperature 4 2.8 14 9.79 116 81.12 9 6.29 143 100 
Humidity 5 3.5 11 7.69 119 83.22 8 5.59 143 100 
Dust 44 30.77 56 39.16 43 30.07 - - 143 100 
Power supply 50 34.97 64 44.76 29 20.28 - - 143 100 
Telecommunication 21 14.69 31 21.68 48 33.57 43 30.07 143 100 
Lack of hardware 
support 
50 34.97 33 23.08 47 32.87 13 9.09 143 100 
Lack of software 
 support 
38 26.57 36 25.17 51 35.66 18 12.59 143 100 
Shortage of 
supplies 
38 26.57 42 29.37 52 36.36 11 7.69 143 100 
 
With regard to temperature and humidity the majority, 81.12 and 83.22 percent respectively, have said it is 
not a problem to the well functioning of computers. Even though a slight majority, 39.16 and 44.76 percent 
said that dust and power supply respectively are a minor problem, 30.77 and 34.97 percent respectively 
consider it a major problem and the rest consider it not a problem. This shows that dust and power supply 
are a major problem to some, to others a minor problem and still to others not a problem at all. May be this 
could be explained by difference in localities of the organisations. In some areas the supply of electricity is 
not regular because this infrastructure is being restructured and renovated. Dust could be less a problem if 
in the centre of the city rather than in the periphery because quality buildings and asphalt streets decrease 
the dust, 
Telecommunications infrastructure is considered by a slight majority (33.57%) not a problem while about 
3O.07% don't know what to say about it, may be because they are new in computer use or they do have 
stand alone workstations and have not yet considered networking. Those who consider it a major problem 





are only 14.69%, these are definitely the vanguard group who are looking for LANs and WANs and the lack 
of adequate telecommunications infrastructure is hampering their progress. 
Shortage of supplies is not considered a problem by a slight majority (36.36%). While 29.37% considered it 
a minor problem, but still 26.57% considered it a major problem. This may be explained by the fact that the 
most common types of supplies are available but other specific and specialised type of supplies not for the 
mass market are not easy to get and have to be specifically ordered for the user, if requested. Since this is 
infrequently done they are not in priority list of importers and takes time to get them supplied from abroad. It 
is possible to say that the size of the market determines who gets the priority in the market. 
With regard to hardware/software support, the respondents are almost equally divided among those who 
say that lack of hardware support is a major or not a problem (34.97% and 32.8'7% respectively). Again the 
possible explanation of this contradiction may lie in the fact that those who need the latest type of computer 
technology or computer systems would find it difficult to get adequate and quality support and services from 
within the country. While those who need less complicated support and services because of the simple 
computer system, they could not complain of the services and support they get locally. On the contrary, the 
majority (35.66%) of the respondents say that lack of software support is not a problem. Most probably 
because the software used is standard packaged purchased software. 
Table 11.8: Time to get repair services 
Time taken No respondents Percent 
A week or less 44 30.77 
1-2 weeks 34 23.78 
3-4 weeks 23 16.08 
1-2 months 10 6.99 
3-4 months 7 4.90 
5-6 months 2 1.40 
>6 months 11 7.69 
Don‟t know 12 8.39 
 
To get some indicators of repair services efficiency, look at Table 11.8. Most of the repair services take 2 
weeks or less, i.e.54.55%. Instances of repair services that take more than 6 months account for 7.69%, 
these are most likely not to be repaired at all. But it is also possible that when the level of expertise 
increases and more efficient computer repair services come into picture what thought unrepairable become 
repairable. For example, in the Business License Office there were five computers out of order. A number 
of computer technicians have tried and failed to repair them and they were lying idle for a number of 
months. Recently, they were all repaired by a new computer repair services business firm. This could be 
considered as an indicator of the low level of computer repair services, but at the same time competition is 
increasing in this sector and skills also are improving. There is no doubt in the very near future the 
computer repair service sector will be of a higher standard and quality.  
Respondents when asked about the Government's help and involvement in the diffusion of computer 
technology in the country, they were almost equally divided into two groups with 44.76% for 'Yes' and 
50.35% for 'No'. There is no doubt that those who said "Yes' are the government departments and public 
enterprises because they get help in training and consulting services from EISA (Eritrean Information 
Systems Agency), while on the other hand the private firms get no help in this respect and will say 'No'. The 





Government gives help basically by giving training and sponsoring computer seminars. But all the 
respondents unanimously (97.90%) said that there is a real need of computers and that they do help in 
improving the productivity of the country. Probably this is an indicator that there is sufficient awareness for 
computerisation process in the country. 
Therefore, it is possible to say that something is moving in the diffusion of information technology in Eritrea. 
International Agencies and the Government Civil Services are the driving forces. But with regard to support 
services, the private computer service businesses are playing a significant role, behind which the skilled 
Eritreans from the Diaspora are the main players. This trio: The Government, the International Agencies, 
and skill and money of Eritreans from the Diaspora should continue to work together to make it a 
sustainable development. 
11.3 IT policy 
Vision and goals 
There is no IT plan in Eritrea. But something is moving toward that direction. Proclamation No. 53/1994, a 
proclamation to provide for the establishment of an EISA, is the first attempt of this. The IT objectives 
explicitly stated in this proclamation are: 
- to introduce, adapt and diffuse the right information technologies in the country; 
- to introduce and diffuse an appropriate set of policies and management practices for an effective 
and efficient application and exploitation of information technology in the civil service and all other 
economic sectors; 
- to encourage the 'continuous learning culture' in Government and private sectors by establishing 
appropriate training centres; 
- to develop enough human resource to support the information technology industry; to develop 
modern information networks in the country to make possible decentralised government and 
regionalisation feasible and effective;  
- and, to make sure the quality of computer and communications services support available in the 
country is comparable to the international standards. 
These objectives could be the basis for different kind of information technology projects and plans. It has to 
be noted, though, that the establishment of a body to look after the development of information technology 
of the civil services alone cannot make the country industrially competitive in the international market. If 
Eritrea's economy is an export-led free market system, it goes without saying that the private sector should 
grow in the use, adaptation and innovation in information technology. To make this possible, a very good 
strategy is required. 
IT policy 
The prevalent situation is that of 'laissez-fair' strategy, even though, some attempt is made to guide and 
standardise the kind of computer systems being introduced in the civil services through EISA. This was 
established by decree in 1994, as mentioned at the beginning of this section. It is under the direct control of 
the Office of the president. It was established as an autonomous entity of the State of Eritrea with two clear 
major objectives: 





1. In the area of Policy and Co-ordination: Develop, advice, implement, co-ordinate and promulgate 
government information technology strategies, standards, policies and guidelines, and in particular 
(Proclamation No. 53/1994, p 6/7): 
- to develop and promulgate a set of standards and supporting guidelines regarding government and 
public enterprise sector acquisition and maintenance of computers; 
- to develop appropriate set of policies and management practices supporting more effective and 
efficient application and exploitation of information technology within the Government and the 
public enterprise sector; 
- to develop and implement technical training programmes within the Government and public 
enterprise sectors, as well as develop programmes on improving and encouraging training delivery 
capacity within the private sector; 
- to support other Government policies and priorities in the area of information technology, such as 
increasing computer accessibility, conversion to national script; regionalisation; private sector 
industrial development; research and development; the development of high priority Government 
and public sector management information systems (MIS); and general manpower development; 
and 
- to give direction to private sector training operations in terms of curriculum and course content. 
2. In the area of client services: Provide a range of information technology services and products to 
clients on a reimbursable basis, and in particular: 
- to develop programmes and mechanisms to ensure acceptable quality in the delivery its services 
and products, and to ensure that there is an acceptable degree of client satisfaction; 
- establish internal EISA human resources training and education of staff in order to ensure that the 
skills and educational requirements are commensurate with the clients demands for services; and 
- implement internal technical resources bases and associated managed facilities in order that 
current and anticipated client demands are met in a cost effective manner. 
EISA is still in the process of formation. This Agency is acting as computer consultant to government 
departments and as regulator of computerisation process in the civil services. It is managed by a Director 
appointed by the President of the State of Eritrea and responsible and accountable to the Office of the 
President. An Information Technology Policy Advisory Committee (ITPAC) is established to advise the 
President 'on all strategy and policy matters pertaining to information technology requiring the President's 
decision or approval under the Proclamation.' ITPAC is composed by five members: the Office of the 
President as chairperson; Ministry of Finance and Development, member; Ministry of Trade and Industry, 
member; Ministry of Education, member, and; Central Personnel Administration, member (ibid. p.9-10). 
In EISA, at the time of the interview, there were one hardware maintenance technician, two computers 
applications experts, one database expert, two systems analysts & designers (including the Director), and a 
secretary. Two were on short term training in Germany while other two, University of Asmara fresh 
graduates, were recruited and getting on the job training. While the others are working only in the area of 
their expertise, the two systems analysts are multi-skilled. The Director of the Agency said that they could 
hire more computer professionals but there is not enough budget to do it. The Agency does not have the 
ability to cope with the increased demand of computer services in the civil service and public enterprises. At 
the time, it was focusing more on the regulatory aspect of their mandate rather than in the area of 'client 
services' or the technical support. 'So far we have sent to all ministries some general guidelines of how to 





introduce computer technology, Now we are in the process of revising a new guideline which soon will be 
communicated' (Interview, T. Ghebreab and Z. Abraham, October 13 and 29, 1997). 
The powers of the Agency are given in the Proclamation No. 5311994.In general, it has the power to guide 
and regulate the import or transfer of computer and communications technology systems for the 
Government and the Public Enterprises. This is to make sure that standard and relevant technology is 
transferred in the country. But since the restructuring of the civil services, the Agency, from being an 
autonomous unit working like a parastatal, changed structure and came directly under the Office of the 
President. It was made clear by the Director that EISA does not have any relations with Communications 
Department. It is confined to computer services for the civil services. 
In a recent Conference on Communications Policy organised by the Ministry of Information, from July 22-
24, 1991 in Asmara, all the legal, cultural, technological, political and economic issues of national 
communications policy have been raised, debated and recommendation passed for the government to take 
action. It was an attempt to develop broad national framework that could integrate the various activities 
touched by communications. It is so vital in today's world that left to itself could only lead to fragmentation, 
inconsistencies, and poor co-ordination. So far, the government has not taken an integrated approach. 
At the beginning EISA was an autonomous unit, financially self-sufficient and capable to generate its own 
revenues from its services. This went for one year and a half. But after the civil services restructuring, it 
came under the umbrella of the Office of the President. Now the practice of charging for services given is 
still there but collections are not made by the Agency and user departments are asked to make payments 
to the Ministry of Finance and Development directly. In the words of the Director 'at the beginning we were 
functioning more like a computer consultant in systems analysis & design and implementation working on a 
profit and loss basis. We were also doing some regulatory function. But today we are acting more like a 
regulating agency with some computer consulting services''.  
In the opinion of the Director the best way of organising the Agency would be to have two separate 
agencies: one to regulate information technology in general, and the other to give technical support and 
training in information technology. To implement the suggestion made above, the director continued 'I think 
that a national communications policy should be designed first. And then, based on the national 
communications policy, the government should establish the above mentioned agencies.' 
With regard to the existing computer technical support in the country, in the view of the Director, some 
Eritrean IT professionals are coming from abroad. Some have established computer schools, computer 
consulting services, and some small software companies. Some of these don't work the whole year in the 
country because the market is not mature enough to keep them busy the whole year. Nonetheless, a 
number of computer companies have emerged such as EWAN, BIT, CTS, ETSS, ICET, Gelately Hanky, 
ERICOM 2000, K.M. Computers, IBM Tesat, TFanus, etc. 
Even though something is emerging, it is not sufficient to adequately satisfy the emerging demand. That is 
why EISA is forced to engage itself in operational activities. But it is not appropriate for this Agency to be 
both a regulatory body and at the same time act as consultant or a computer service-giving organisation. 
Currently the Agency gives short-term computer training, such as applications software (one month 
training); systems networking (one month training); and database applications programming (two months 
training). 





The most critical computer skill the country needs, according to the EISA Director, is systems analyst & 
designer. The Director noted that some of the organisations buy computers before any kind of systems 
analysis & design has been conducted and they don't know what to do with them later on or use them 
inefficiently. Eritrea, therefore, should exploit the opportunity offered by information technology. To do so, 
Eritrea should focus on human resource development, according to the Director's opinion. It should develop 
networks experts, systems analysts & designers, programmers (particularly application oriented database 
programming). If this is done, Eritrea could even proceed to enter slowly the international software market 
using the expertise and experience of the Eritrean Diaspora. 
What information technology strategies and policies did EISA produce? None, except some directives in 
which was given a list of the kind of hardware and software should the Government Departments and 
Public Enterprises buy (this was done through circulars but never by giving a comprehensive manual of 
policies, procedures, and rules). It gives also very limited support in systems development and 
implementation, and limited training to the public sector. 
The existing manpower resources and facilities are not adequate for EISA to accomplish the mandate given 
to it in the Proclamation. The Proclamation No. 53/1994 is not working in practice. There is no clear picture 
of how this Agency is going to overcome its present problems. For one reason, EISA was established to 
serve only the Government and the Public Enterprises. It is possible to say that it does not have the 
mandate to formulate the national information technology policy or plans. On the other hand, there is no 
other Agency, Ministry, or Commission with this responsibility. 
Customs duty and sales tax on computers and accessories are around 17 percent, but importers with their 
own foreign exchange resources are charged as high as 50 percent. This is because the Customs Office 
does not accept prices in the invoices of importers but uses its own estimates which can be as high as 150 
percent of the real price or even double the original price. The time spent in clearing goods is also an 
additional cost, which at times can be really damaging to the business of importers. Business people say 
that recently some improvement have been made but still there is a long way to go to have in place a very 
efficient system in the various customs offices. One of the frustrations of computer services and suppliers 
companies is the low level of skill of the people in the customs offices. Particularly the poor knowledge of 
computer technology and the fast changing product range and prices in the computer industry is beyond 
their grasp and for any trivial thing they turn to their Head Office to get directions or information on prices. 
This takes long time and business people get frustrated. 
Some of the computer supplying companies were importing computer parts to be assembled and sold in 
the country because cheaper than importing a finished one. But computer suppliers had to discontinue it 
because of the Customs Office's existing policies. They were asked to pay a very high custom duties and 
sales tax, in other words, the tax paid for the different parts of a computer was considerably higher than tax 
paid for an imported computer. It is lower to pay a tax for a complete computer than for the unassembled 
parts of the same computer. Of course, the Customs Office does not mean to discourage computer 
assembly plants in the country but that is what in reality is happening. 
Therefore, the country needs very clear information technology policies and all other policies should work in 
synchrony with it and not militate against it, like what is sometimes happening with customs and tax 
policies. The people implementing these policies should also be up to the level of their task. 





11.4  Institutional capability 
The dissemination of IT requires the development of an adequate technical infrastructure. This may include 
developing institutes for setting standards for the procurement and use of IT, building indigenous IT 
production capability, developing digital telecommunications services, building computer support services, 
and building appropriate institutes of research and training. 
During the 1940s and 1950s Eritrea had one of the very sophisticated telecommunications services 
networks in Africa. This was totally destroyed during the protracted war of liberation with the exception of 
Asmara. By the end of 1998 in Eritrea there were a total of 34,696 telephones of which 25,0OO were found 
in the capital city of Asmara. This supply is only 50 percent of the demand. This gives us 0.913 (taking 3.8 
million population as given by the World Bank) telephones per 100 people (SSA excluding South Africa has 
a teledensity of 0.5 per 100 inhabitants). But its distribution is concentrated in the mainly in the capital city. 
Investment in telecommunications facilities in Eritrea is growing from year to year. There is one government 
owned telephone operator in the country. After 1991, within the limited resource available for expansion, 
the Telecommunications Services of Eritrea (TSE) has replaced the old analogue switching systems with 
the digital switching systems. At present there are one ARFIO2 model (the only old model analogue system 
left) and ten AX-10 model digital switching systems all supplied by ERICSSON. Two earth satellite stations 
have being installed, one for the Atlantic Ocean (1993) and the other for the Indian Ocean (1997). 
Microwave stations have been installed across the Asmara-Ghinda-Massawa line, Asmara-Ira-Elaberet-
Keren, and Asmara-Dekemare-Adikey-Senafe. In the near future Asmara-Mendefera-Areza-Barentu and 
Keren-Afabet-Nakfa will be added. The aim of these investments is to directly link all the major towns in a 
national and international network. The cities directly connected to the national and international telephone 
network are Asmara, Massawa, Assab, Dekemhare, Mendefera, and Keren. The rest of the country is 
linked to an operator room in Asmara through HF, VHF, and UHF radio link. 
The telecommunications sector is undergoing profound changes. The government is changing from its 
former role of telecommunications services provider to that of regulator. The country does not have a 
master telecommunications plan and as a result there was short-term focused planning and 
implementation. This is because of lack of funds to undertake major infrastructure changes, limited 
technical know-how and above all the lack of a regulatory institution. To remedy to this, the Government of 
Eritrea and the Government of Norway signed an agreement on August 28, 1995 for the provision of 
financial assistance in the establishment of a telecommunications regulatory institution in Eritrea. Soon 
afterwards the then Eritrean Post and Telecommunications Authority (today, The Communications 
Department) has signed in March 1996 a contract with the Norwegian Post and Telecommunications 
Authority (NPTA) for support and institution building to implement the project. The current budget allocation 
for the regulatory institution is about NOK 5.5 million of NORAD contribution and for the next 4 years 
extension, the budget proposal is US$1,970,000 as Norwegian contribution and US$626,000 in local 
currency as the Government of Eritrea contribution. 
Parallel to the regulatory institutional building, the Government of Eritrea is taking the necessary measures 
to privatise the Telecommunications Services of Eritrea into a joint venture with a South Korean Company, 
Daewoo. The Memorandum of Understanding was signed on June 17, 1997. Teams from both sides 
negotiated from July 24, 1997 - August 4, 1997 on the following agreed agenda: 1) Joint venture proposal 
of Daewoo, 2) regulatory requirements of Communications in Eritrea, 3) regulatory requirements of 





Investments in Eritrea, and, 4) needs and requirements of TSE. But the following major issues of 
differences called for lengthy exchanges and negotiations: 
a) Exemptions from taxation privileges and guarantees called by Daewoo's team. 
b) Distinction, extent and ascertainment of Daewoo's initial capital contributions in kind and in cash. 
c) Casting vote in the Board of Directors meetings reserved and always to Daewoo. 
d) Determination of Management and Services Agreement by Daewoo. 
e) Exclusivity of supply demanded by Daewoo for all materials and telecommunications equipment 
and requirements for all company for the duration of the company. 
f) Assignment and conduct of feasibility study. 
g) -Exclusivity of Management and Services Agreement with Daewoo. 
h) Daewoo to formulate and determine telecommunications tariffs. 
The Eritrean side made it clear that it can make some concessions with regard to exemptions from taxation 
for a limited period but rejected the other demands by Daewoo as 'not fair and equitable'. Soon afterwards, 
the Eritrean side sent a new joint venture proposal and Communications Proclamation of the State of 
Eritrea on August 22, 1997. Daewoo's team arrived in Asmara to take-up the negotiations again on 
September 24, 1997. After lengthy and exhaustive discussions on each and every article of the joint 
venture proposal, an agreement was signed on October 3, 1997. After this agreement the Eritrean team 
started working on the procedural matters concerning the incorporation of the new company. It was at this 
stage when, both the financial crisis in Asia and the border wax between Eritrea and Ethiopia, added 
difficulties to the implementation of the joint venture. It seems destined to abort. Nonetheless, the Eritrean 
side has accumulated new experience in the skills of negotiation and use it in the future in similar ventures. 
The expectation is to expand and modernise the telecommunications infrastructure of the country quickly. 
The Minister of Transport and Communications, when explaining the objectives of the joint venture, made it 
clear that all the cities in the country will have a telecommunications infrastructure to directly link them to 
the national and international telecommunications network by the year 2000. Presumably by the year 2003, 
the network will reach every corner of the country (Haddas Eritrea, 28 October 1997, p. 1). 
Another interesting move recently made by the Government of Eritrea is to enacting the 
COMMUNICATIONS PROCLAMATION, proclamation No. 102i1998. This proclamation wants to be the 
basis for the establishment of an open market oriented communications industry. The Ministry of Transport 
and Communications is the sole government agency vested with the regulatory authority of the 
communications sector. It will supervise and promote the provision of communications services in Eritrea. It 
has the authority to issue, renew, revoke or transfer permits, equipment approvals, certificates, assignment 
of frequency and other regulatory documents in the communications sector on behalf of the Government of 
Eritrea. The Department of Communications shall be the body empowered to exercise the authority. 
The proclamation states the various objectives the Department of Communications should achieve: 
1) Create a regulatory environment for the supply of communications networks and services. 
2) Promote fail competition and efficient market practice in the communications sector; 
3) Facilitate the entry into the markets for communications services of persons wishing to supply such 
networks and service. 
4) Ensure that operators, suppliers and installers meet their commercial obligations and such other 
obligations specified under this Proclamation in a manner which promotes cooperation and 
fairness. 





5) Protect operator, suppliers and installers and the public from the unfair conduct of other operators, 
suppliers and installers, regarding quality of services and payment of tariffs: 
6) Ensure that operators, suppliers and installers achieve the highest possible level of accountability 
and responsiveness to customer and community needs; 
7) Ensure that standard telecommunications, broadcasting and postal service is supplied as efficiently 
and economically as possible and at such performance standards which reasonably meet the 
social, industrial, and commercial needs of the community; 
8) Promote the development of the other sectors of the Eritrean economy through the commercial 
supply of modern communications services within the framework of the Proclamation. 
9) Establish technical standards and promote the development of Eritrea's communications industries 
capability and skills; 
10) Ensure that the Eritrean public have growing access to communications;  and  
11) Optimise the use of communication networks and services in Eritrea with due consideration for the 
rights of the operators, suppliers and installers and the public interest. (Proclamation No 102, 1998, 
pp 39-10). 
The major functions of the Department of Communications are: regulating the communications industry, 
ensuring safety and quality of communications services, giving advice and assistance to the industry, 
promoting competition, and facilitating the entry into the market for communications services by investors. 
Since there is always a gap between the good intentions and the actual performance, only time will tell 
whether the Department of Communications will have performed according to its plan and have established 
a vibrant and competitive communications industry. If Eritrea is able to establish a good 
telecommunications infrastructure in short time, the country will have one of the basic ingredients Ieapfrog 
into information technology. 
The Department of Communications says that 'The State of Eritrea takes the development of the 
communications services industry not as a separate service giving sector of the economy but as integral 
component of other social and economic development efforts. The State promotes this sector because it 
has direct effect on the efficiency of public and private business of the country. Furthermore, the availability 
of communications services determines how attractive Eritrea is to local and foreign investors. To make this 
possible, the Department of communications has prepared a telecommunications network development 
plan. The establishment of a modern and effective telecommunications infrastructure in Eritrea called for: 
a) The introduction of a new approach to replace the old policy and regulatory framework that 
governed and regulated a monopoly provision of communication services. To pave the way for this, 
a new communication law was proclaimed by the State of Eritrea. This proclamation allows the 
Eritrean telecommunications industry to pursue a flexible approach to provide modern and high 
quality services to all customers taking into account the fast technological change in the sector. 
b) The search and understanding of trends of the next cycle in the technological change to improve 
the network, with digital overlays, wireless systems and human resources development. 
c) The introduction of telecom and information communications base in the network by introducing 
radio transmitters operating in various modes and frequencies to enable the customer full mobility. 
Cellular radios, cordless telephones, radio pagers, pay phones are being introduced. In view of 
developing telecommunications and TV distribution multipoint radio system is being introduced. 





According to the master plan of the Ministry of Transport and Communications, in the coming three years, 
1998-2000(phase I), an additional 56,000 telephone lines will be installed which will be followed by another 
70,000 lines in the subsequent phase, 2001-2005(phase II). 
The required investment in the development of the information and communication infrastructure of the 
country is given Table 11.9 below. 
In addition to the above investment, a US$10 million investment would be required for telephone services in 
the rural areas. The rural telecommunications services are expected to be implemented in phases. In 
phase one, the intention is to provide phone services to 55 sub-region capitals that do not have phone 
services already. In subsequent phase, a total of I300 villages will be served out of a total of 2800 villages 
in the country. The implementation of this project may take 5 years (ibid. p.82). 








Subscriber premises equip. 1.9 2.8 
Switching and related investments 12.6 20.2 
Outside plant 6.2 18.0 
Transmission equipment 4.5 19.0 
Buildings, vehicles, tools & instruments  3.0 12.0 
Total 28.2 72.0 
Source: Communications Department, Final Quarter Report, 1998, pp 79-81. 
The national long distance network is planned as a grid system, so that if one system fails or there is traffic 
overload an alternate route is available, to ensure that there is no disruption of communications. It also 
aims to connect towns directly to their administrative capital or regional centres. All microwave equipment 
shall be SDH- STM 1 type except for some spur links which shall be SDH/PDH type. The traffic or the need 
for broad band on certain routes may in the future justify the use of optical cable systems. This network will 
be complemented by cellular and other wireless communications systems with the aim of providing these 
services in large urban centres and along busy highways (ibid. p. 75). 
Shore to ship services is planned to be established by HF and VHF shore to ship communications at two 
important ports of Massawa and Assab on the Red-Sea. National transit switching centres are being 
established and a switching hierarchy appropriate for the country is being implemented. International 
(regional) terrestrial links to neighbouring countries shall be extended using the SDH - STM Microwave 
system. Massawa - Asmara -Kassala (Sudan) will be extended and it is being constructed. The already 
existing link with Ethiopia via Massawa - Asmara - Dessie is upgraded by installation of SDH - STM system. 
Direct Massawa - Assab - Djibouti link is soon to be established. International satellite links exist through 
the earth station in Asmara (BetGhiorghis) and submarine Fibre Optic landing point in Massawa is planned. 
One Inmarsat station will be established in Asmara or Massawa soon. Data Service Providers are being 
licensed to operate in Eritrea (ibid. p. 76). 
Beyond year 2000, Eritrea expects to be a party to the Africa-One Fibre Optic cable network and it has 
signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the sponsors of the project. Under consideration is the 
Oxygen fibre optic cable project expected to be in place between year 2000 and 2004. This will provide a 





broadband communication for international services. The intention is also to introduce new services such 
as GMPCS. Internet service and Telemedicine soon (ibid. p. 82). 
Eritrea has been left behind in Internet connectivity. According to the Department of Communications, The 
main reason is because the country did not have the law to govern the communications industry. On March 
2,1998 a Proclamation No. 102/1998 Communications Proclamation has been enacted. The Department of 
Communications has been vested with the power of creating the regulatory environment for the supply of 
communications networks and services. A person, desiring to establish and/or operate a 
telecommunications network, and/or to provide a telecommunications service must obtain an operator's 
permit. The Department shall determine whether any of the activities referred to above are exclusive rights 
activities or limited competition activities. (Proclamation No. 102/1998, p. 45). Therefore, from now onwards 
private companies can establish value-added services such as the Internet by getting the license from the 
Department of Communications. Otherwise technically there should not be any problem.  
With regard to e-mail services, there are at least two private computer services companies giving such 
services. E-mail service is no more a problem for those who want it and do have PC and a modem at home 
or in their office. At present the country is one of the three African countries without full Internet 
connectivity. Somalia has none but Congo (Brazzaville) and Eritrea will have one shortly. Eritrea has signed 
a memorandum of understanding with the USA to co-operate in a mutual effort to establish a national 
Internet gateway in Eritrea on the 6 of August 1999, (Eritrean Profile, vol. 6, No. 22, August 7, 1999). The 
project should be completed and ready for public use within the next three months. 
In Eritrea now there are more than 30 computer businesses operating mainly from the capital city of 
Asmara. There is a Compaq dealer, an IBM representative, and H-P dealer. The rest are firms supplying 
hardware and software from whatever source to satisfy the demand of customers. Eritrean importers are 
increasingly looking to Dubai and it is becoming the centre of cheap computer products, but the Far East, 
Europe and USA are also very important sources. But particularly the quality and reliability conscious 
buyers look to Europe and USA. Besides, these companies give training, and maintenance services. Since 
all of these companies are established recently, mostly after 1993, they are young with critical shortage of 
skilled staff. 
Electricity supply is very essential for computerisation to take place. In Eritrea electric supply is controlled 
by Eritrean Electric Authority (EEA), which is an autonomous organisation under the Ministry of Energy & 
Mines. Reliable electricity supply is available for the capital city of Asmara, the port city of Massawa and the 
towns across the road of Asmara Massawa (an interconnected system). The other towns have their own 
electricity power plants, which work independently in a self-contained system. The electricity supply, in 
these towns, is not fully reliable and does not have a 24-hour electricity supply. Majority of the Eritrean 
population lives in rural areas, about 70 percent, and they don't have electricity supply. In fact, Eritrea has 
one of the lowest electricity consumption in the world, about 35 k Wh/year per head in 1995 (Programme 
Formulation Mission for Sustainable Energy in Eritrea, p. 3). 
All the generation stations run by EEA have an aggregate installed capacity around 71 MW, from which 
around 53 MW is in the interconnected system and nearly 18 MW in the self contained systems. In the 
Asmara-Massawa interconnected system, electricity is distributed in both 220Y and 127V. All the other self-
contained systems in the other towns are 22OV . A new thermal power plant with capacity of 84 MW is 
being built in Hirgigo, south of Massawa. A 132 KV transmission line from Hirgigo to Asmara will be erected 
and the self contained systems of Dekemhare, Keren, and Mendefera will be connected to it through 66 KV 
transmissions. This project is estimated to cost $200 million and expected to be completed in five-year time 





(War-Torn Societies Project - Eritrea (Infrastructure), Final National Workshop, Asmara 5-6 December 
1996,p.27). 
The expectation is that by year 2003 all the major towns will be interconnected in a national network and 
that the rural areas across the network will be getting access to electricity. By modernising the electricity 
distribution system, it is expected to improve the reliability of the electricity supply soon. This will be a great 
help to the diffusion of communications and information technologies in Eritrea. 
Government institutions to help the promotion, transfer and diffusion of information technology are almost 
non-existent. The only institution established under the Office of the President is EISA but it is hardly an 
institution that can absolve that mandate. Its services are very limited and confined to the civil services. The 
same institution was supposed to deal with policy issues and co-ordinate policy implementation but no 
progress has been made in this respect. An assessment of its activity is given below. 
1. Policy and co-ordination - It does not mean that EISA is not giving some services to Government 
Departments. But because the services are so limited and incomplete, they do not really match its original 
objectives. In the area of policies, what EISA has done, so far, is to give general guidelines and standards 
for government computer purchases. No manpower development activities are undertaken by EISA except 
some limited short-term training to government employees in the newly emerging MIS departments of the 
various government departments (see table 11.10). 
Table 11.10: Evaluation of policy and co-ordination of ISA 
ACTIVITIES Accomplished? 
Develop and promulgate a set of standards and supporting guideline regarding government and public 
enterprise sector: 
 acquisition of computer, and 





Develop an appropriate set of policies and management practices supporting more effective and efficient 





Develop and implement technical training programmes within the Government and the public enterprise 
sector. 
 







Support other Government policies and priorities in the area of information technology such as: 
 computer accessibility 
 conversion to national script 
 regionalisation 
 private sector industrial development 
 research and development 
The development of high priority government and public enterprise sector management information 
systems (MIS) 
 













2. Client Services: In the area of client services, EISA has done some reviews of information systems 
development proposals made by various government departments, some programming services, and the 
development of MIS for the Office of the president. With regard to its staff development, EISA has been 





very slow to action. It has only recently started to send few people abroad for short term training and 
recruited two fresh graduates from University of Asmara for on the job training (see Table 11.11 ). 
Table 11.11: Evaluation of client services of EISA 
ACTIVITIES Accomplished? 
Develop programmes and mechanisms to ensue acceptable quality in the delivery of its 
services and Products, and to ensure that there is m acceptable degree of client satisfaction 
NO 
 
Establish internal EISA human resources training and education of staff in order to ensure that 
the skills and educational requirements are commensurate with the client demands for services 
YES/NO 
 
implement  internal technical resource bases and associated managed facilities in order that 





EISA could become a very effective institution in the diffusion of information technology in the country if it 
could only mature in its institutional capability. Enough resources should be given to achieve the objectives 
for which it was established. Therefore, it deserves the necessary attention at the top level of the 
Government. 
11.5 Human capital formation 
The human resource supply in the IT skills from within the country is insignificant, almost non-existent. 
Computer training in Eritrea is a new phenomenon of the 1990s. Immediately after liberation, computers 
started to arrive in the country in significant numbers. In 1991 the only place where some basic computer 
application training was the University of Asmara. By 1993 few computer commercial schools had 
emerged. By the end of 1997 there were about 30 private firms operating in computer supply, services and 
training. But all of training was confined to operations of personal computers. Formal professional training 
of systems analysts and designers and programmers is non-existent. Even the only university in the 
country, University of Asmara, has not been able to establish a computer science department so far. The 
unit was established immediately before the independence but still is a unit within the Department of 
Mathematics. The best place to start higher computer skill development would be the university for there is 
no other institution on sight that can do that. Of course, the alternative is to send Eritreans abroad for 
training, which is expensive. 
The commercial computer schools are fast growing and their presence is being felt. They have contributed 
significantly in the production of computer operators (in the sense of basic computer applications skills), 
computer hardware maintenance technicians, and some programmers. One of such schools has trained 
about 2000 computer operators from 1993-1997. Another trained 730 people of which 502 where female 
trainees, from July 1993-1996. Still another trained 250 in Microsoft Office, 7 in network administration, 8 in 
programming, 7 in hardware maintenance, 58 in AutoCAD and 25 in accounting systems. 
It is estimated that about 2500-3000 computer operators are trained every year in the country from these 
commercial schools. But hardware technicians trained by these commercial schools could be as few as 40-
60 only. This is because the computer services companies themselves, to enter the market of maintenance 
services, were training few of their students for this job. This was rather a kind of apprenticeship. But few of 
the computer schools are considering starting a formal training in hardware maintenance leading to a 
diploma, I or 2-year programme. It is encouraging that some of these computer schools are starting to think 
regionally to the extent of establishing regionally competitive training institutions. 





It was possible to identify within the surveyed organisations 26 systems analysts, 63 programmers, 25 
systems managers, 54 hardware technicians, 38 training professionals, and 360 computer operators. Most 
of the systems analysts and managers are fresh graduates with little experience.24.48% of the respondents 
think it is impossible to get systems analysts in the country, while 40.56% consider it is difficult, 9.09% not 
difficult and the remaining 25.87% don't know. A quarter of the respondents don't know may be because 
they are newcomers to the computer world or they never needed a systems analysts and don't have any 
experience regarding it. With regard to programmers, 8.39% of the respondents said that it is impossible to 
find from local labour market, 49.65% said it is difficult, 23.08% said it is not difficult and the rest 18.88% 
did not know. With regard to hardware technicians 7% said it is impossible, 41.96%o difficult, 22.38% not 
difficult and the rest 28.67% didn't know. With regard to computer operators 79% said that it is not difficult 
to find computer operators locally. The majority of the respondents think that getting trainers (in computer 
applications and some kind of programming) is not difficult (not difficult 53.15%, difficult 14.69% and don't 
know 31.47%). 
To improve computer and communications technology diffusion, Eritrea needs to address quickly the most 
critical issue: the human resource development in information technology skills. These ranked in order of 
priority are systems analysts and designers, programmers, hardware maintenance technicians, 
communications and networks experts, and computer operators. For detail see the Table 11.12 below. 
Table 11.12: Priority in critical IT skills development in Eritrea 
Professionals Rank Total 




56 (39.2) 22 (15.4)  20 (14.0) 27 (18.9) 12 (8.4) 6 (4.2) 143 (100) 
Programmers 17 (11.9) 55 (38.5) 26 (18.2) 18 (12.6) 11 (7.7) 16 (11.2) 143 (100) 
Hardware 
technicians 




14 (9.8) 21 (14.7) 24 (16.8) 37 (25.9) 41 (28.7) 6 (4.2) 143 (100) 
Computer 
operators56  
24 (16.8) 12 (8.4) 15 (10.5) 22 (15.4) 63 (44.1) 7 (4.9) 143 (100) 
 
The University of Asmara, as the only higher learning institution, should take the challenge to address the 
shortage of supply in systems analysts & designers, systems managers, and programmers. The University 
has a plan to open a new department in computer science. 
Given that IT is becoming one of the basic infrastructures necessary to support all the sectors, it should be 
given priority. Otherwise, the increasing investment the country is making in computing and 
communications resources may lead to inefficiencies and loss of expected productivity because of lack of 
skilled manpower that can manage it effectively. But in the mean time this is done, short-term training 
abroad and within the country should be organised continuously to help organisations cope with the critical 
shortage of IT professionals and alleviate some of their problems. 





11.6 The Melting Pot: IT management and economic development 
Eritrea is no different from the rest of the SSA countries. It lacks any coherent IT policy at national level with 
few exceptions at firm level. 
Almost four years ago, EISA was established by proclamation. It was supposed to 'Develop, advise, 
implement, co-ordinate and promulgate Government information technology strategies, standards, polices 
and guidelines' (Proclamation 53/1994, p.6). What has been accomplished so far? Honestly speaking, the 
vision of the Proclamation has been totally forgotten. EISA has not grown as an institution. At best, it is 
acting as MIS department of the Office of the President with some limited consulting services to requesting 
ministries and departments, and from time to time, giving training to government employees. 
EISA was criticised for giving advice to government departments to buy specific preferred brands such as 
Compaq at one time. The other suppliers were unhappy about it and complained. Progressively things 
improved but it is a very important lesson that should never be forgotten in the future to never interfere with 
the free competition for it may have a damaging long-term effect. It is not to suggest that at a particular time 
a particular product is not the best value for money. In an industry where change is very fast and 
continuous, it is very risky to bet for a particular brand. But guidance needs to be given as to desirable 
features in order to manage properly compatibility and modularity issues. Even these need to be 
continuously revised to keep them up-to-date. 
When we come to the firm level IT strategies and implementation, we find that it is in a very poor shape. In 
the last six years, the country saw a flow of significant number of microcomputers (PCs) in both the 
Government and the private sector. Now, there are many government offices with computers. Our 
estimation is that 70 percent of computer purchases are made by the Government. Mostly these purchases 
were funded by development donor agencies such as USAID, SIDA, Italian Government, etc. UNDP is 
assisting the government in the building of the Public Sector management capability through various kinds 
of studies and partly financing the establishment of the Eritrean Institute of Management (EM) at 
Embatcalla. Several of theses studies are projects dealing with information systems development in key 
Government Departments such as the Central Personnel Office and the Business License Office. 
The private sector is mainly composed of micro-enterprises. It is possible to say that 99 percent of them 
can do their job perfectly without a computer, at least for the time being. But there are a number of small 
companies such as consulting services firms, travel agencies, computer services firms, photo and video 
services firms, some import export companies, shipping and forwarding firms and the like are increasingly 
making use of computer technology in their daily operations. 
Nearly all of the systems being introduced are used for batch processing. They are mostly found in the civil 
services, and other private services. The manufacturing sector is lagging behind service industries with few 
exceptions, like Fred Hoflows lens manufacturing plant which is a high-tech firm with computer based 
production system. Even large manufacturing companies' use of computers is only confined to office works 
like inventory control, payroll, accounts, and personnel records. In agri-business industry we are witnessing 
some radical changes. Recently the drip-irrigation technology has been introduced in few firms. This drip-
irrigation system is controlled by a computer system. 
National computer networks do not exist. Neither is the country connected to the Internet. But local area 
networks are emerging slowly within some government departments. 





The implementation of information technology projects is suffering from lack of critical IT skills such as 
systems analysts and designers, systems software and hardware maintenance technicians, 
communications networks experts, etc. Particularly bigger projects are invariably requiring external 
consultants for their systems studies. Examples abound of difficulties encountered by organisation in the 
computerisation process. Bank of Eritrea is trying to computerise its operations since 1993, but the 
progress it is making is extremely slow. Now it is a year since it got its hardware purchased but the banking 
software is still not selected and purchased. Recently the local computer network is installed and some 
information exchange does take place but it cannot be effective till the necessary banking software is 
introduced. The Commercial Bank of Eritrea is more or less in similar situation. The National Insurance 
Corporation of Eritrea has introduced a system with the necessary insurance software but the networking 
part is not yet installed because the corporation is building a new site for its Head Office and it is waiting to 
install it in the new building. 
The experience of the financial institutions shows how difficult it is for organisations in the developing 
countries like Eritrea, where the computer service industry is at its infancy, to develop their information 
systems and properly manage them. The most critical factors identified are lack of skilled manpower to man 
the emerging information systems, lack of sufficient fund, and lack of reliable local computer services 
support. 
In recent years African Governments are more and more looking to information technology to improve the 
public sector management and some of their social and environmental problems (Hanna and Boyson, 
1993). The Government of the State of Eritrea has from the very beginning shown great interest in it. To 
have a closer look a deeper sector analysis is given below. 
11.6.1 Information Technology in the Agricultural Sector 
Agriculture production in Eritrea is subject to the rainfall uncertainty and the consequences of having wide 
annual oscillations in grain harvests pose serious problems to food security throughout the country. The 
needs for food information in Eritrea relate to the quantification of annual cereal import requirements and 
the early identification of food crises amongst specific vulnerable groups of the population. Decision-makers 
make decisions based upon essential information sources, which regard the targeting of beneficiaries and 
matching types, quantities, timing and duration of relief to actual requirements. Other aspects of food 
security information include: regular crop forecasts, cross border flows of people, food and livestock, 
grazing conditions and herd sizes, prices of food and livestock, and other major determinants and 
indicators of the food security status of vulnerable groups. We will explore this based on the interviews (N. 
Piccioni, December 8, 1997) and documents from the Ministry of agriculture. 
For this purpose, in 1993, the Government of the State of Eritrea established an Early Warning and Food 
Information Unit. Assistance was initially provided by FAO under the Regional Project GCP/RAF/256/ITA 
and the national Project TCP/ERI/4451 (Strategy and Terms of Reference for Constructing a Geographic 
Information System and Database for the NFIS - Eritrea). These projects reviewed the situation with regard 
to the availability of data and the requirements for technical assistance to the Ministry of Agriculture and 
other participating agencies. 
From December 1996, a comprehensive National Food Information System (NFIS) in Eritrea was 
established and strengthened under FAO Project GCPS/ERI/0O2/ITA. In June 1997 the MOA/FAO 
prepared a Strategy Document and Work-Plan to identify the needs and develop the activities of the NFIS 
Project in Eritrea (ibid.). 





In support of this plan, the NFIS is organising a Geographic Information System (GIS) network to co-
ordinate food information throughout the country. The programme is intended to develop a National Food 
Security Information database and network. The formation of a spatially referenced database that is able to 
index and analyse diverse levels of information (agro-economic, socio-economic and food/relief 
management) is essential to this effort and will contribute to strengthening national food security by 
complementing the government's capacity to predict and react to food crises (ibid., p.7). 
The database structure of the NFIS consists of a series of specialised sub-databases. The data 
components are managed by specialised institutions for their own use and mandate and information is also 
aggregated into the central NFIS database. The specialised sub-databases are (ibid, p. l5): 
1. Sub-database on population and administrative structure (NFIS Unit) 
2. Sub-database on market prices (Eritrean Grain Board) 
3. Sub-database on stocks (Eritrean Grain Board) 
4. Sub-database on import/export (Custom Office) 
5. Sub-database on rainfall and temperature (Civil Aviation Department) 
6. Sub-database on remote imagery (Civil Aviation Department) 
7. Sub-database on agriculture production and inputs (Ministry of Agriculture) 
 Sub-database on agriculture production and inputs monthly (Ministry of Agri.) 
 Sub-database on agriculture production and inputs yearly (Ministry of Agri,) 
8. Sub-database on nutrition, consumption and vulnerability (Ministry of Health) 
9. Sub-database on population movements (Eritrean Relief and Refugees Commission) 
10. Sub-database on meteorological data (Water Department). 
The central database of NFIS has been established at the MoA's central server. Maintenance of the 
specific sub-databases are regularly updated by each agency and transmitted to the central NFIS server. 
This database has been developed in Microsoft Access and after the development stage the system will be 
transferred to Microsoft Excel formats. The benefits of this set up are that it can accept different formats 
from the above sub-databases and it can easily retrieve dynamically constructed data from all programme 
components. Data can be retrieved or keyed in manually. This format is compatible to the functionality of 
linking the NFIS database to a GIS database; in this case the underlying software is Maplnfo Professional 
4.1. The export functionality of Excel can replicate formats that are compatible with most standardised GIS 
software packages and it also can handle data analysis. 
The National Food Information System is composed of the national food information system steering 
committee, the national food information system technical committee, and the national food information 
system unit. 
The NFIS Steering Committee is the formal institution, chaired by the Ministry of Agriculture and Ministry of 
Health, in rotation, supervising and co-ordinating the overall system. The committee comprises the Heads 
of various departments/agencies participating for the National Food information System. These are the 
Ministry of Agriculture or Health, chairperson; General Manager of the Eritrean Grain Board, member; 
Commissioner of the Eritrean Relief and Refugees Commission, member; Head of the Water Department, 
member; General Director of the Civil Aviation Department, member; and Head of the Customs Office, 
member (Ministry of agriculture Early warning and Food Information Unit: Strategy Proposal and Work-
Plan, pp. 8,9,10). 





This committee's major responsibility is to guide, supervise and disseminate information relevant to food 
security through periodic Bulletins to be published by the NFIS Unit. It promotes a high profile for the 
National Food Information System and appoints a NFIS Technical Committee comprising of designated 
technical officers one from each participating department/agency. It reviews and approves the annual 
report of NFIS Unit and commission periodic reports on the status of the food information system for 
submission to higher government authorities as required (ibid.). 
The NFIS Technical Committee comprises the focal persons of each Agency and concerned Iine-Ministries. 
These are the heads of the Agrometeorological Division of the Civil Aviation Department, Research 
Department of the Eritrean Grain Board, the Relief Unit of the Eritrean Relief and Refugees Commission, 
National Food Information system Unit of the Ministry of Agriculture, Nutrition Unit of the Ministry of Health, 
Hydrometereology of Water Department and Expert of the Statistics Unit of the Customs Office. 
The NFIS Unit will report to the NFIS Technical Committee and the NFIS Steering committee as required. It 
is composed of the Head of the Unit, from the Ministry of Agriculture, and two assistants, also from the 
Ministry of Agriculture. The NFIS Unit acts as Secretariat to the Committee. The head of the Unit is ex 
officio member and Secretary to the Steering Committee and the Technical Committee (ibid.). 
Sustainability of the system can be seen from the technical and financial aspects. The technical 
sustainability of the NFIS is promoted through documenting in detail of the methods and procedures 
developed for the operation of the system, using a modular loose-Ieaf format to facilitate frequent revision 
and updating. Appropriate training is provided to the staff of the NFIS Unit and to key staff of other 
government agencies participating in the system (including staff at regional level), to enhance their ability to 
effectively implement the methods and procedures developed for the system. The financial sustainability is 
planned to be achieved by efficient utilisation of resources, budget allocation by the Government and/or 
sale of information and/or advertising, or sponsors, etc. (ibid. p.12, l3). 
This project (GCS/ERI/002/ITA) alone cannot be expected to cover all the areas of development. Its major 
role will be therefore to define clearly a general framework under which other projects and funds will be 
channelled to integrate its activities. In this respect, steps have been taken in partnership building under the 
co-ordination of the National Food Information System, such as the integration of the agriculture 
Information System component MoA/GTZ; the co-ordination with the ERREC and EGB components of the 
Canadian Food Grains Bank Project; the co-ordination with the FAO EMPRES programme; the co-
development of Socio-economic component with assistance from UNICEF - Eritrea; the Ministry of 
Agriculture agreement with USAID - Eritrea for allocation personnel to the NFIS Unit; and an agreement 
with TCP/ERI 6712 (FAO/MoA Support Project to the Development the Forestry and Wildlife Sub-sector) 
for developing joint GIS training activities. 
In due course, there is the possibility of proposing to host, under the umbrella of the NFIS, Famine Early 
Warning System (FEWS) Unit in Eritrea to integrate the NFIS Unit activities (ibid, p.13). 
This experience gained in the MOA is very interesting in many respects. To develop a National Food 
Information System is forcing a new thinking, that of inter-sector linkages and co-operation. Diffusion of 
information technology can also happen, to potentially laggard groups as a result of the push made by the 
early adopters somewhere else because information is required from the first, Therefore, it is possible to 
use the fervour of the early adopters to pull the potential laggards get involved into projects of information 
technology diffusion. 





11.6.2 Information Technology in the industrial Sector 
The industry in Eritrea was established during the 1940s and 50s. Today most of its industrial technology is 
old and obsolete. Computerisation in the manufacturing sector is non-existent. If there is any 
computerisation is in the office administration where few computers have started to replace the traditional 
method of work such as the accounts, stock control, payroll, and personnel records. These are usually the 
first office operations to get computerised. But there is an exception to all this. The case of Fred Hoflows 
IOF Laboratory, which is a high-tech manufacturing plant. It can be taken as anecdotal example that it is 
possible to implement high-tech manufacturing in Eritrea in selected areas. In the next paragraphs we will 
elaborate this case in more detail. 
FRED HOFLOWS IOF LABORATORY was commissioned in 1994 with funding from the Fred Hollows 
Foundation in Australia, with the express intention of providing developing nations with a source of high 
quality affordable IOF for use in extra-capsular cataract extraction and lens replacement surgery. The 
following discussion is the result of interviews (I. Fessehaie and K. Abraha, February 24, 1998) and leaflets 
published by the firm. 
The laboratory was deliberately and purposefully over engineered in order to guarantee the highest quality 
of manufacturing facility and a finished product that would match world class standards. It was designed 
specifically for the production of single-piece intra-ocular lenses and other sterile medical devices. The 
Laboratory was constructed by Eritreans under the direction of engineers and technicians from New 
Zealand, Australia and Eritrea. The Laboratory commenced with a staff of just four in 1993 and grew to 
around 20 in 1994 as technical, administrative and construction staff were employed to establish and 
develop the manufacturing facility. This team took the Laboratory through the IOF validation process and 
onto full commercial production, which commenced in early 1995. A second shift commenced in April 1996, 
which took staffing to its current level around 35 people. 
The IOF manufacturing equipment has been selected from independent proprietary equipment suppliers 
according to technical performance specifications cost effectiveness reliability and service and 
maintenance capabilities of the principal. Quite simply, the Laboratory in Asmara is a world class facility 
equipped with state-of-the-art production equipment from the USA and Australia. Key production equipment 
includes two 4-axis CNC air bearing lathes, with 0.2 micron resolution, producing truly equiconvex lenses; a 
sixteen station CNC air bearing mill capable of producing an infinite number of lens designs and 
dimensional variations; and a 3M (CFC free) Ethylene oxide steriliser. 
Quality is built into the product at every stage of the manufacturing process by an introductory set of over 
250 specially written Standard Operating procedures. The Laboratory is equipped with modern Quality 
Control testing facilities, including its own in-house microbiological testing laboratory. Validation and 
certification are regularly done. This process includes: routine validation of all critical process steps, internal 
audit quality assurance, routine external laboratory verification of product quality, at random, and external 
quality audit by The Fred Hollows Foundation GMP Auditors. 
Although the Laboratory production equipment is very versatile, currently it concentrates on the production 
of one lens design, the FHl06. This is a single-piece PMMA posterior chamber equiconvex (biconvex) lens 
with modified-C loops and no positioning holes. The lens has been subjected to intensive clinical trials in 
Nepal, Eritrea and Vietnam and has proven to be a universally acceptable lens. International surgeons 
have routinely confirmed that FH106 IOLs are of the highest quality and commended the Foundation's 





choice of lens design and agree it has universal application. (Interview with General Manager and the 
Production Managers of the Laboratory). 
Difficulties encountered during the transfer of this advanced technology were many, but the major ones are 
the following: 
1. Some key machinery from Australia that was installed the first time in 1994 was not to the expected 
standard. Management complained about it to the suppliers. Experts from Australia came to verify 
the problem and found it true. An alternative technology was found in the USA and it was replaced 
with success. To fix this problem took 6-months, i.e. 6-months equivalent of production loss. 
2. There was a 10-week production loss because bottleneck-machine (that from America) had a 
problem. It was not possible to fix it in the country. It was sent to America through DHL for repair. It 
was a very expensive exercise, about Birr 50,000. After this incidence, the same type of machine 
was having problems again. It was a real frustration and an unexpected headache to the 
Laboratory's management. Trial and error methods have temporarily solved the problem but it 
cannot be the lasting solution to the problem. A lasting solution to the problem would be to give a 
fully trained technical people capable to repair the machines in case of problems. This is the 
direction the firm is recently undertaking by sending an engineer for training. 
3. High rejection rate (up to 20 percent sometimes) was experienced. It is suspected the quality of 
wax used in the production process may be the culprit. The procurement function was carried out 
by an Australian until recently. He left behind him the legacy of buying from a single Australian 
supplier. Now the Eritreans are in difficulty in discovering new possible alternative suppliers. It is 
possible to say that a dependency was created and should be broken to move forward. 
4. The quality of training received by the Eritreans during the transfer of this new technology was not 
adequate. The training received in Australia was not a direct hand-on the new technology being 
transferred but of a general training (three Eritreans for 6-months). The second training, two weeks 
in America, was not sufficient to enable people to tackle problems but only to operate machines. 
Within the manufacturing sector The Fred Hollows IOF Laboratory is the only high-tech operating in the 
country. There are valuable lessons learned during the past four years of its establishment. It proves that 
high-tech firms can be established in developing countries such Eritrea but such projects should be 
carefully planned and the human resource development should be given due attention. Particularly, people 
should be prepared not only to operate them but also to maintain them without being over-dependent on 
external expertise. 
There is also some experience in a new marble and granite processing plant in Ghinda. The plant is 
located in a place where there was an old Italian marble processing plant. According to the report made by 
the managers of the plant, the plant has not been able to produce more than 50 percent of its plant 
capacity. The problem is the quarrying part of the plant, which is processed in the old manual method. This 
has created the problem of imbalance between the two processes. The other problem observed is that the 
blocks of granite or marble that come for processing in the plant are not of good quality and as a result 
breakage during processing is very high. All of these problems added up together are making it difficult for 
the new plant to become internationally competitive. The computer systems introduced in this plant are in 
plant processing control. 
These isolated instances of computerised manufacturing systems suffer the most because they cannot get 
readily from the internal market the services they require. For a sustainable diffusion, it is not enough to 
import modern machinery in isolation from the whole support system required. Therefore, the technology 





transfer framework should be carefully studied and the right combination should be selected for every 
sector as in this case of manufacturing industry. 
11.6.3 Information Technology in the Service Sector 
This sector accounts for 60 percent of GDP. It is considered to be very critical to Eritrea's economic 
development. Sub-sectors expected to grow rapidly are wholesale and retail trade, transport, 
communications, construction, financial services, and tourism services. The computer and communications 
industry is also an important infrastructure to support all industrial sectors. 
1 1.6.3.1 Information Technology in the Financial Institutions 
If we look to the financial services, in Eritrea currently there are not many financial institutions. The major 
organisations are The Bank of Eritrea, the Commercial Bank of Eritrea, the Housing and Commerce Bank, 
the Development and Investment Bank, and the National Insurance Corporation of Eritrea. Recently, the 
Housing and Commerce Bank (1994), private bank, and Investment and Development Bank (1998), 
government bank, were established. A number of private exchange-bureau were established in 1998. In co-
operation of the National Insurance Corporation of Eritrea, a number of private insurance agents have been 
also established in 1998. 
Information technology within the financial institutions is at its infancy. Computers are coming but they are 
still islands of workstations. Integrated banking software is not available. The major three financial 
institutions are briefly discussed below. 
1. Bank of Eritrea (BE) 
From what used to be a small branch office of the National Bank of Ethiopia, since 1991 it has become the 
Bank of Eritrea. It has currently about 80 employees and with the introduction of the new Eritrean currency, 
November 1997; it is managing on behalf of the Eritrean Government the monetary policies and the 
national reserves (Proclamation No.93/1997). 
Based on the information provided by the management (G. Abraham and K. Tekleab, October 10, 1997), 
we will discuss the available IT facilities and management at BE. In 1997 the BE has purchased 60 PCs, 31 
printers, 6 servers but it does not have a banking software. The total number of computers is 75, including 
the servers. The computer employee ratio is 1:1.07, which is highest computer density in the country. The 
project was funded by USAID for the financial aspect and UNOPS in the implementation as a capacity 
building of the Bank. These are not the first computers in the Bank. The first computers were 3 Compaq 
PCs brought to the Bank on a lease basis for office automation. Before that there was only a DBS operating 
system, NCR 990 system, installed in 1986 for General Ledger use. 
The new system is supposed to support in all the functions of the Bank: banking functions, administration, 
research, international fund transfer, money marketing, financial information, etc. Even though the 
hardware part of the project is all purchased, the banking software is in the process of selection and it looks 
that it is taking long time. At the time of interview, in October 1991, the managers responsible for the 
implementation of the computerisation process said that the banking system for internal use would have 
been completed in a month's time while the selection and purchase of the banking software may take 6-12 
months. But till April 1998 things were pretty the same with no progress and change at all. Another thing 





observed by the researcher was the removal and reinstallation, of the cabling of the internal network of the 
Bank, because it was not properly done the first time. 
The Bank during the systems analysis and design was assisted by an expert from EISA. A private 
computer company, EWAN Technology Solutions, the representative of Compaq in Eritrea, was the winner 
of the bid to supply the hardware. It was also the one that had to redo the networking after another small 
company failed to properly install it the first time. Why EWAN was not given the networking the first time is 
not clear. It seems that the Bank was trying to reduce its costs by selecting the cheapest bidder regardless 
of quality and reliability of service. But that decision proved to be wrong when it was discovered that the 
smaller company was inexperienced and could not deliver the expected quality of service. The Bank had to 
spend more than it would have paid if EWAN had done the job the first time. 
EWAN has the contract of hardware maintenance and computer training of the employees of the Bank. No 
training was given to employees till April 1998 but the computers are more than 8-months since they were 
purchased. Usually employees get computer training on their own, in their spare time and their own money. 
The computers on their desks are not used much for their daily activities, except some word-processing 
and exchange of information. This is true for all except the accounting section and saving department 
where simple custom made software written for managing the accounting process and the client saving 
accounts of the Bank are in operation. 
The MIS department of the Bank is just being established. There is only one person (they were two first). 
He is in charge of the new department. According to him, the greatest challenge facing the Bank is 
recruiting skilled computer professionals. Some time ago there was a second employee who left the Bank 
to form his own computer school. He was an experienced programmer who came from Addis Ababa, 
Ethiopia. The Bank is still working in its account section with the programmes written by this ex-employee. 
Even now whenever there is problem with the software, he is the one who does the maintenance work. It is 
amazing how easily the Bank lost that experienced programmer at a time when there is a very critical 
shortage of skilled professionals. It is clear that retaining skilled professionals is going to be a challenging 
job. One area of conflict is pay. The pay these professionals get in Government Departments and Agencies 
is viewed as not competitive in the market. Another flash point is that these professionals want to be treated 
as professionals with autonomy in their activity without too much interference. At the same time if you 
employ them without having enough challenging work, they feel unfulfilled and become dissatisfied. In this 
kind of work environment, they are forced to look for remunerative and challenging jobs with possibilities of 
development and growth. 
Therefore, it is clear that BE is only beginning experiencing information technology, but definitely it is very 
far away from using this tool as a strategic weapon. 
2. Commercial Bank of Eritrea (CBE) 
The Commercial Bank of Eritrea is the largest bank in Eritrea. This bank had 6.3 billion of saving out of 
which 1.6 billion (28-29 percent of the saving) loan was extended (Eritrean Profile, vol. 4 No.48, February 7, 
1998). CBE has about 300 employees and 15 branches all over the country. In addition, new branches are 
being built in Asmara and the rest of the country, 
Information has been provided by management of CBE (Y. Ghebremariam and P. Tesfagiofgis, October 74 
and 28, 1997) to enable us make basic assessment of IT situation and its management within CBE. When 
looked from computer facility's point of view, the bank makes limited use of computers. Similar to the Bank 





of Eritrea, it has not integrated banking software. The first computer was introduced in 1992. It was a 386 
PC used to write the in-house developed software. In 1993 ten other PCs arrived which were followed by 
25 new PCs at the beginning of 1994. Forty IBM compatible 486 PCs were purchased in 1995 to replace 
the older computers. By mid October of 1997, CBE had 83 PCs, including seven servers, plus l6 printers, 
one heavy-duty. Software used is Windows 95, Office 97, Novel 3.72, and DOS Environment. The 
computer employee ratio is 1:3.6, which is high compared to the average in the sample studied that is 1:12. 
It is even higher compared to that of the civil services of 1:6.6. 
The funding for the 25 PCs purchased in 1994 and 40 PCs of 1995 came from the USAID assistance. 
These computers are used for current, saving and credit accounts as islands of computer applications. The 
software used is made in-house. Therefore, they are simple and cannot support a real banking system and 
perhaps the most difficult stumbling block is the lack of in-house expertise to do that kind of job. The CBE is 
contemplating to introduce banking software that can support its commercial banking activities. It has plans 
to phase-by-phase introduce LANs in the Head Office and its branches in and outside Asmara. The WAN 
will be introduced at a later stage to connect bank branches in different towns of Eritrea (Interview with 
Yemane Ghebremariam, MIS head of CBE, 14 October 1997). 
At present the CBE is making use of two electronic data transfer systems to connect itself with the rest of 
the world: 1) Western Union, through communication software Money Link, and 2) Saudi-American Bank 
through Speed Cash.  
The CBE used the consulting services of EISA when it was introducing its computer systems. Particularly, 
one expert from EISA was involved in the development of the in-house software. 
The automation plan of CBE was prepared in 1995. The proposed plan was considered to be too expensive 
because in-house development would require experienced and skilled staff. It was assessed that it would 
take too much time and money to create a reliable system. The alternative was to buy an integrated 
banking computer system, an investment estimate of about $500,000 - $ I million. American consultants 
with the help of USAID were brought at the beginning of 1997 to make needs assessment with the clear 
mandate to recommend the best way to develop a modern banking system and to introduce an integrated 
computer banking system. The consultants chose to focus on the Foreign Exchange Department as a pilot 
study for the computerisation project. if successful, it would be replicated in the other departments and 
branches. The study's expected completion was by the end of 1997. But now the consultants are gone and 
the project seems aborted. The reason for aborting the project is not clear but lack of clear vision and lack 
of funds may be at the heart of such hesitations. 
3. National Insurance Corporation of Eritrea (NICE) 
NICE's journey towards the computerisation process started in 1992 when the first PC was purchased and 
placed in the accounts section. The aim was to acquaint and introduce the employees to computers. 
Parallel to this, employees were encouraged to take basic computer training in computer schools at the 
expense of the company. The following is based on information from the Finance and Administration 
manager of NICE (T. Ghebreselassie, October 8, 1997). 
Management was seriously looking for less risky and cheaper ways of introducing computers. It considered 
outside consultants but it was a very expensive exercise. Some Eritreans from the Diaspora when in the 
country for a short visit or vacation were offering some help in the process of computerisation but nothing 
could be done in short time with people that offered to help in their free time without charge. Soon 





management realised that this was not the way to a real computerisation and decided to confront the 
matter directly by making a contract with an Eritrean computer professional to write custom made 
accounting software for the company. After four months of work the project was almost complete when the 
company decided to stop it because it was a single-user system. According to the developer, the original 
agreement was to develop a single-user system but the company had later on changed its mind and with 
the excuse that it wanted a multi-user system stopped the project. In the company's view, the project was 
stopped because the developer could not deliver what was agreed upon, a multi-user system. Anyway, it is 
clear that the misunderstanding came because the contract was not a clearly written contract. 
After this experience, NICE contacted, through African Insurance Organisation, Great Plains Accounting 
firm that operates in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The specifications were prepared by NICE in consultation with 
EISA. The software of Great Plains Accounting was adapted to the needs of NICE with the help of two 
experts from the firm who worked for 60 days to install, adapt, and train staff of NICE. Conversion was 
smoothly done because the two consultants had insurance background and could understand all accounts 
for insurance activities. 
The new system was introduced parallel to the manual system for three months (August-December 1996). 
The new system results were compared to the manual system results and were satisfactory. In 1997 the 
company was working on the new system and the old system has been totally discontinued. A year has 
passed since the new system was introduced and is operating smoothly, according to the Finance & 
Administration Director of NICE. 
- The benefits gained from the new system are: 
- it has enabled the company to have up-date financial information such as balance sheet, profit & 
loss statements, and income statements; 
- it has enabled to do performance evaluation such as comparative analysis of budget against actual 
performance and make variance analysis, compare present against past performances and show 
the ups and downs of performance. 
- it has made possible activity report tracking ; 
- accuracy and timeliness of various types of reports have been tremendously improved, e.g. 
quarterly reports were taking a month to prepare with the old system but now takes only three to 
four days; 
- no more loss of files; 
- management time can be more effectively spent on real managerial issues and as a result quality 
of management is rising. 
A system down time as a result of software problem was not observed but because of hardware problems it 
does occur from time to time. According to Finance & Administration Director of the company, getting 
hardware maintenance support is not easy because, in general, there is short supply of experienced 
computer technicians in the country. The company is trying to alleviate that problem by training one of its 
staff in computer maintenance.  
Financial institutions are directed by Board of Directors chaired by the Ministry of Finance and 
Development. The BE, CBE and NICE are all public enterprises, the legacy of the previous socialist 
government of Ethiopia. There is always a conflict of interest between each institution's interest and the 
government's interest. Besides there is always delay to get approval of important decisions, programmes or 
projects. May be one of the reasons in the delays of computerisation projects is to be found in the quality of 
leadership at the Board level as well as the top executive level of each financial institution. It is doubtful that 





among the Board or the top executives, there are people that can act as sponsors to information 
technology projects with a real understanding that information technology is the future and life of these 
institutions. 
The experience of the financial institutions shows that at the beginning there was a tendency for 'quick fix' 
as a result insufficient planning was common. For example the situation in BE and CBE seems exactly that. 
Inadequately designed systems are the cause of delays in the implementation of the system in BE. How 
could one buy 60 PCs, 31 printers and 6 servers without first deciding what kind of systems software to 
use? It has to be remembered that this bank is small in size, only about 80 employees. Almost two years 
now from the start of the new computerisation project and yet the banking software is not selected. The first 
was in 1993, which was a limited computerisation for payroll and the accounts only. These new computers 
are mostly idle and it has been a year since they were purchased. In CBE the situation is not much 
different. The bank introduced some simple islands of computerisation in the saving, credit, and current 
accounts starting in 1993. But, even though the desire to create an integrated banking system has been 
there since 1995, so far nothing has been done. What is the problem? It seems that a decisive and strong 
leadership with a clear vision is missing because projects of integrated banking systems are not operational 
decisions but strategic. May be the Boards at the very top are not clear about it and have other priorities. 
One thing is clear, proper systems analysis and design are fragmented and incomplete. 
The experience of NICE is relatively better because their focus was on getting good and reliable insurance 
software, which they got and it seems to be doing well. But in all these financial institutions' experience it 
clearly results that good IT managers are not available and all the organisations that want to computerise 
will suffer as a result. 
Developing financial institutions of international standard is not possible without introducing, mastering, and 
adapting information technology. In a developing country's environment, the conventional information 
technology would be enough to achieve a significant leapfrogging. 
The financial sector in Eritrea, as we have already said it earlier, is dominated by government parastatals. 
The BE, CBE and NICE together make more than 90% of it. Particularly CBE and NICE they are making 
healthy profits. The majority of the employees in these institutions are at least high school graduates and a 
large proportion of them have been employed after the 1991 and are younger and easily trainable, if the 
banks decide to go for major restructuring based on IT. Their customer base is fast expanding because of 
the expanding business and the Eritrean in Diaspora opening accounts in Eritrea. This particular group of 
customers is demanding because it has been exposed to services in the developed world. Moreover, the 
government is encouraging Eritreans from the Diaspora and private investors to use Eritrean banks to open 
accounts in foreign currencies and it does not want them to be disgruntled because of poor quality of 
services. There is also a prospect of tough competition from more experienced foreign banks that may 
soon join the industry because the government is on the path of deregulation. Therefore, these financial 
institutions should grow and acquire the necessary skills and facilities as regional banking players and be 
prepared to match competition in an open market. They should work together to develop a framework to 
guide systematically the introduction of effective computer systems and be able to leapfrog from the 
present traditional, time consuming and inefficient financial services. This would sign the beginning of the 
formation of a financial services system of international standard. 
Money for the project could partly come from international agencies such as the World Bank and partly 
from the institutions' resources. Consultants could be used to advice to the appropriate banking software 
and IT infrastructure system to buy. The company that supplies the technology would be responsible for the 





installation, testing and training of employees with guaranteed post-installation services till the time local 
expertise is able to take over. After all, there are well-tested banking software systems already available 
that can be adapted to the particular needs of the said institutions. This amounts to make a big strategic 
jump toward future, which is a worthwhile risk. 
Earlier we had said that the financial sector in Eritrea is monopolised by the public sector, i.e. almost all of 
the banking and insurance activities are in the hand of the government, which is a legacy of the Ethiopian 
government. The only exception is the Housing & Commerce Bank, which is owned by the PFDJ (the ruling 
party in Eritrea) and private partners. In recent legislation, Proclamations No. 93/1997, Bank of Eritrea 
Proclamation and Proclamation No.94/1997, Financial Institutions Proclamation, deregulation of financial 
institutions has been established. This means private investors are allowed to invest in the financial sector. 
Hopefully this action will increase competition and will attract foreign banks to the region. These banks, 
definitely come with IT know-how and the local banks would be forced to invest in IT to meet competition, 
There is a possibility of building a strong financial sector. 
The objective of making Eritrea a financial centre of the region is a huge challenge. First of all, one needs 
financial institutions of international standards. To achieve this, first, the Bank of Eritrea should be able to 
give quality leadership in creating and regulating the environment for financial institutions. Second, private 
financial institutions should grow in number and in size and develop the capacity to compete regionally. But 
at present in the region the countries have not opened up to foreign financial institutions. Therefore, 
financial institutions in each country are confined to their own national boundaries and the formation of real 
regional banks or insurance companies will take time to be realised. But the wind of regionalisation and 
globalisation is pushing hard that changes are inevitable in the near future. Eritrea should build up its 
financial sector without wasting time. The implication of this is developing highly skilled manpower capable 
to manage and operate computerised financial institutions, and create regional and international financial 
connections and partnerships. 
The present state of IT in the financial institutions is at its infancy. There is no a real IT infrastructure. The 
BE, CBE, and NICE have been studied but with exception of the latter which has introduced an insurance 
software, the other two have yet to select and introduce banking software. It is taking unduly long time to 
make banking software selection, giving that the process of computerisation did start in 1993-94. The major 
problem is indecision, fear of risk, and lack of highly skilled manpower. Funding was possible with the help 
of international agencies such as the Word Bank, USAID and other international agencies, which are 
already doing much in similar projects in developing countries. Nonetheless, these cannot be excuses for 
not identifying the stumbling blocks in time and taking appropriate measures to solve them. For example, 
by now their systems analysis & design should be completed and the implementation would have been in 
an advanced stage. There is already standard banking software and there is no need to reinvent the wheel. 
Training of manpower could take place parallel to the systems study. Anyway, IT infrastructure does not 
mature overnight. Of course, ability to identify and prepare good projects in itself is an art. Having capable 
people to do it is a great asset. In fact, even preparing projects to get international funding can take 
considerable time without the experience in developing countries such as Eritrea. 
Some external commentators have said that the banking system in Eritrea is outdated and that the 
transformation of the sole commercial bank into an international standard bank with computerised 
operations and fast and easy international links is showing little progress (Economic/Commercial U.S. 
Mission to Eritrea, March 24, 1998). It is true. On the other hand, there are a host of other variables that 
need be taken into consideration to establish financial institutions of international standard beside IT 





capability. The absence of competitors in the Eritrean Financial market, and the inability of foreign banks 
and financial institutions to establish the creditworthiness of Eritrean banks could be cited as some of the 
causes why foreign firms are not prepared to allow the opening of credit lines for Eritrean businesses. At 
the same time, the banking system in Eritrea is not yet capable of accommodating their needs. Presently all 
international purchases are conducted through irrevocable letters of credit. But it is also understandable the 
extra caution that Eritrea is making in opening its financial market slowly and only to private banks run by 
qualified and professional bankers to avoid any possible future financial crisis. The Sign that Eritrean 
financial sector is opening up selectively to competition is clear but it should not take more time than 
necessary. It may be a good opportunity to become a competitive force in the region by being among the 
first movers. 
The joint Eritrean Libyan bank as a joint investment company between governments may become the first 
entrant after the financial institution proclamation of 1997. The Eritrean financial market is a small market at 
present but it can grow. Particularly if we think of remittances of the large number of Eritreans who live 
abroad and the tourism potential of the country. Besides the open market economic policy and the 
attractive investment policies of the country, are all factors that can change the face of the country. If 
quickly the basic infrastructures are put in place including appropriate institutional, legal and regulatory 
framework and mechanism, more and more investors inevitably will come to exploit the strategic location of 
the country. Therefore, there is a long-term possibility the country to become a trading and services centre 
in the region. But it should not waste time to build on the available opportunities for other regional players 
could snatch them. The most critical factors in developing a financial centre are appropriate IT 
infrastructure and highly skilled manpower in banking skills, financial skills, commercial skills, marketing 
skills, business skills, and IT skills are all very crucial for the development of a financial sector. The human 
resource development plan of the country should specifically address how to make these skills available to 
this sector. But All of these should be carefully designed to integrate the IT skills to every other skill. 
Now, what should BE, CBE and NICE do in order to play a leading role in the application of IT for financial 
institutions in the country? First, this being a strategic decision, they must, if possible, together commission 
systems study for modern- computerised banking system in Eritrea and prepare the terms of reference. 
Next, they could identify a company with the technology and experience in II for banking and make a 
contract for the systems study to identify the right IT for the Eritrean environment and its needs. Finally, a 
careful implementation of the project supervised by a joint committee should complete the transfer of the 
technology. The cost would be shared by all. This is implying a high degree of cooperation among the 
financial institutions, but the existing relationships are not strong and each is working alone. Therefore, a 
new ground must be broken. The distance must be shortened and a new culture of networking and closer 
relationships should be developed. For example, besides the above mentioned joint venture in IT transfer, 
they can jointly establish a banking training institute or periodically organise together short term training 
pertinent to the needs of financial institutions. There are also possibilities of conducting, jointly, research 
activities in the financial sector. 
Given that the services sector in general and the financial sector in particular is information intensive 
activity one expects a prominent place for it in the service industry. But the reality in Eritrea, at least at 
present, seems to be different. The experience of the financial sector in IT is limited and is not advanced 
compared to other sectors. There is no spin-off and spill over effect from the financial sector to the other 
sectors. May be this could be explained by the fact that the country was closed to new technologies 
because of the war of liberation and already the awareness of computer technology in the continent of 
Africa was high at the beginning of the 1990s. When finally the country got liberated in 1991, the PCs 





started to invade all government and private offices at the same time. The arrival of Eritreans from the 
Diaspora with computer skills gave impetus to the establishment of a number of computer schools and 
computer service businesses since 1993. The Government restructuring that took place in 1995 also did 
emphasise the idea of 'lean and efficient' civil services based on computer technology. All of this increased 
the public awareness of computer technology and as a result there is a big demand of computers in all 
government departments and agencies as well as public enterprises. Therefore, the financial sector, 
usually at the forefront of computerisation elsewhere, in Eritrea is starting together with all the rest to 
embark towards the process of computerisation, which in the context of Eritrean situation means mainly the 
standalone workstations. But this understanding is proving to be costly in that automating only the existing 
manual system does not improve productivity. Many of these workstations are not effectively used because 
they are turned into substitutes of typewriters. May be only 10 percent of their capabilities are used. This 
should not be allowed to continue and the financial sector should play a leading role in demonstrating in the 
use of IT as a competitive weapon. 
The country needs to identify some sectors, those considered to be the most critical to the economic and 
social development of the country, and a real IT infrastructure that can lead to a real competitive advantage 
should be developed. The financial sector is one of these critical sectors and IT should be considered a 
strategic area of focus. 
The Eritrean government should take a proactive strategy to IT like is doing in the transport infrastructure 
development. Therefore, it should not look passively or allow IT development in a fragmented way of small 
pieces here and there, which may create compatibility problems later on and frustrate the national 
connectivity in the future. For example, investing in the development of highly skilled manpower in IT could 
lay the ground for the effective use of IT as an infrastructure in every sector. Later on, it could lead to the 
development of software industry for export purposes, like many developing countries are doing because of 
the competitive advantage of lower labour cost. 
11.6.3.2 Information Technology in the Construction industry 
The construction industry in Eritrea is growing fast because of the opportunity created by the end of the 
long war of liberation. The country is facing the huge task of reconstruction, One big company is Keangnam 
Enterprises, a South Korean construction company. This is involved in big construction projects such as the 
one built near the international airport of Asmara, the Sembel Housing project ($70m);, Massawa Housing 
Complex ($60m), Tokar Dam project ($47m);, and the Hirgigo power plant ($114m). There are a number of 
construction companies (four Italian, five Chinese, and one American) busy building residential housing, 
public offices, roads, and dams (African Business, April 1998, p.22). To support the construction industry, a 
number of engineering consulting firms have emerged. Particularly the design stage of any construction 
project is being supported by computer technology. Whether it is within the Ministry of Public Works or in 
private engineering consulting firms, CAD systems are being introduced. 
Interesting development is going on within the construction industry. The Government and private 
construction companies have joined hands in the building of the national road network. The private 
companies are all Eritrean companies. They are working on the Ingerne-Tessenei road (190 Kms) 
construction project. The firms involved in the project, besides that of Ministry of Public Works, are Segen 
Construction Company, Gedem Construction Company, and Asbeco Company. If the project is successful, 
it will mark the beginning of a new era in the country where both the government and private firms work 
together complementing each other, particularly in big construction works and reconstruction all to be made 





with internal resources. This kind of joint venture requires higher degree of coordination where the 
computer information systems would contribute a lot. Engineers could benefit a lot if they could be joined by 
a computer network to support the design and implementation of projects. 
11.6.3.3 Information Technology in the Distribution industry 
The wholesale/retail industry is mainly composed of small family businesses. These firms are the least to 
need computers for their efficiency and as such no computers are seen in this industry. There are neither 
department stores nor supermarkets in the country at present. Very few big wholesale businesses and 
import-export firms are introducing computers for inventory control. 
11.6.3.4 Information Technology in the Transport industry 
The transport industry is growing but computerisation is unlikely to grow because computer use is limited to 
few bigger transport companies for office activities only. The majority of the companies are buses or tracks 
operated by individual owners. They rightly cannot see the wisdom of investing on computers to raise their 
productivity. 
11.6.3.5 Information Technology in the Tourism industry 
The country has over one thousand kilometres long of coastal line, about 360 islands, cultural and ethnic 
diversity, different land features, favourable climate and hospitable people. All of these together make up a 
huge potential for tourist attractions. In 1997 there were about 400,000 tourists in the country, mostly 
Eritreans living in Diaspora. But the facilities are poor. There are 1700 hotel rooms and 1500 pensions in 
the country (Eritrean Profile, November 15, 1997). To develop an internationally competitive tourist industry 
an adequate information technology infrastructure is required side by side with the building of new hotels of 
international standard across the country. 
Currently computers are found in travel agencies, which are linked to the international travel system. The 
few big hotels are starting to introduce computers which are mainly workstations for office automation. No 
computer network does exist to facilitate the bookings and reservations. This is mainly because the country 
is not connected to Internet. 
1 1.6.3.6 Computer industry 
At present in Eritrea there are more than 30 private computer businesses such as computer suppliers, 
computer repair services, and computer training. The well established of these are not more than 15. In this 
research we have interviewed 12 of them: Alem Computer Centre, BIT Computer School, IBM Tesat, Ewan 
Technology Solutions, Tfanus, CTS, K. M, Computers, Ericom 2000, Sewit International, ETSS, Asmara 
Computer Centre, and ICET. The insight we got is based on these interviews with their respective 
managers.  
Depending on the background of their respective owner/managers they position themselves in various 
ways. Some are mainly focusing in maintenance contract services with some limited training services; 
others, vice versa, focus on training with limited maintenance services; and still others focus on training 
with limited programming services. The dealers and representatives of well known brand names: IBM Tesat 
(IBM), EWAN Technology Solutions (Compaq), and Tfanus (HP) focus on computer sales and customer 
services which usually includes some training and maintenance services. EWAN and Tfanus give also e-





mail services. EWAN wants to distinguish itself in telecommunications installation services as well. Very 
few are exclusively in training. 
Recently, text-writing and small kind of desktop publishing services are being given. Four of these 
organisations want to be in Internet services as well. All of this proves that the market is very fluid and as a 
result these companies seem to be chasing demand wherever it is. Of course, there is loss of focus but for 
the time being, in a small market, it seems a wise decision. 
Systems analysis and design consulting services are virtually absent. Few of the firms could be able to give 
the basic consulting services in some systems analysis and design but the customers seem to be biased 
toward the foreign firms because the local computer business firms are perceived as beginners without the 
necessary skills and experience. The production of such higher skills in systems analysis, systems design, 
and in various programming languages is also absent. The University of Asmara is planning to open a new 
Computer Science Department soon to help in filling the gap. 
There is a very interesting development in Eritrea, though, the Eritreans from the Diaspora are slowly 
coming to the country with new skills and expertise and establishing their own companies. Most of the 
computer companies have being established by such people. For example, from the 12 computer 
companies with which an in-depth interview was conducted, 2 are from Ethiopia, 1 from Kuwait, I from 
Saudi Arabia, 1 Canada, the 7 remaining are from the USA. If the same trend continues in the future, it is 
possible to have consulting firms for systems analysis and design established soon or the same present 
computer companies grow to give such services. 
Networking in Eritrea is only beginning. There are several networking initiatives such as: AdalNet, EISA, 
ETE, and HealthNet. AdalNet is run by Beshir Computec and is a Fido node supported by PADIS-net in 
Addis Ababa which was operational since 1994. The connection is often unreliable because of bad 
telephone switching between the two countries (currently totally disconnected because of the border 
conflict). EISA is trying to come up with a master plan to build a Wide Area Network among various 
government institutions. The ultimate goal of the master plan is to develop a local network that can be 
linked to a full TCP/IP connection. The Eritrean Technical Exchange (BTE) is currently the major service 
provider in e-mail services. ETE is running a UUCP link. Linux PC servers are installed at the Department 
of Energy and University of Asmara to handle the network traffic. ETE connects 3-7 times a day to San 
Francisco in the United States. ETE connects over 35 institutions in Eritrea and has developed a user base 
that can nearly sustain full connectivity, if and when allowed. ETE is also the administrator for the ER 
domain and provides domain name services in the country. ETE is a non-profit project of the international 
collaborative for Science, Education and Environment, and accepts donations to support its network 
development activities in Eritrea. Two private computer businesses, EWAN Technology Solutions and 
TFanus, are also connected to this network for e-mail service giving (ETE, 1996, 1998). Even though, 
Health-Net has been established in 1994 it did not expand to connect health institutions and health 
professionals to the electronic mail. Eritrea does not have full Internet connectivity. 
Many people are asking what policy on Internet the government of Eritrea has. Some Government officials 
seem unconvinced about the merits of Internet because they see it as a tool only for the urban elite. But 
others think it is very important for the government, researchers, traders to get information on markets, 
industrialists for technology transfer, but the demand side of the equations is believed to be too small to 
make an investment profitable at this time. The signals given were mixed until the recent signing of 
memorandum of understanding with the USA on 6 August 1999. This has ended all the speculations and a 





decision has finally been made to go for Internet, which hopefully will allow Eritrea to be connected to the 
rest of the world by the end of the year. 
In an increasingly knowledge-based economy, information is becoming at least as important as land and 
capital. In the future, the distinction between developed and non-developed countries will be joined by 
distinctions between fast developing countries and slow countries, networked nations and isolated ones. 
The information revolution offers Africa a dramatic opportunity to leapfrog into the future, breaking out 
decades of stagnation or decline. The real challenge in Eritrea is not technical or financial, but 
organisational and political. There are many barriers in the sphere of obsolete or non-existent regulatory 
frameworks that result in constricting barriers to information access and knowledge expansion. Catching-up 
the wave of IT revolution will require visionary leadership in the country. 
To implement a full Internet node would not take more than $250,000-$500,000, with annual operating 
costs on the order of $ 130,000, exclusive of labour costs. Alternative costs given by the World Bank 
(1995): 
1. Internet node with local server: this option can provide all Internet (e-mail, Telnet, FTP, Usenet) 
through a local Internet node. Connectivity to a remote Internet node will be provided through a 
Very Small Aperture Terminal (VSAT, or small satellite earth station). Major advantages that this 
option will provide are development of local services, and local node administration. The price for 
this option is $250,000-$500,000 per country, depending on the level of technical support and 
training to be provided. Monthly operational costs due expected to be around $ 11,000. 
2. Internet node without local server: this option can provide all Internet services (e-mail, Telnet, FTP, 
Usenet) through a remote Internet node. Connectivity between a local service node to be the 
remote Internet node will be provided through a VSAT. Major disadvantages of this option are 
remote node administration, slow new user connect, and slower response. The price for this option 
is $180,000-$350,000 per country, depending on the level of technical support and training to be 
provided. Monthly operational costs are expected to be around $ 11,000. 
3. Virtual Internet node: this option can provide only Internet e-mail service through scheduled mail 
exchanges, Connectivity to a remote Internet node will be through a dialup TCO/IP link. The major 
disadvantages are only basic e-mail service is provided, remote node administration, slow new 
user connect, and no local support. Price range for this option is $65,000-$135,000 per country 
depending on the level of technical support and training to be provided. Monthly operational costs 
are expected to be around $7,000. 
The International Agencies like the World Bank, WHO/AFRO, USAID, NASA, UNDP, UNICEF, UNFPA are 
willing to help Africans to build their National Information Infrastructure (NII). Connectivity to the Global 
Information Infrastructure (GII) seems much easier now than ever before. There is a possibility to move 
rapidly into the information age, there is no reason why Eritrea shouldn't exploit this opportunity properly. 
Already what is being done in the computerisation of the civil services in the country is almost exclusively 
funded by the above mentioned International Agencies. Therefore, it is clearly evident that in Eritrea the 
barrier to Internet connectivity was not a technical or financial issue but only political and organisational 
issue. On the other hand Internet is an inevitable phenomenon, there is no political or organisational force 
that can prevent it for long to happen. The inevitable seem to be happening in Eritrea now for very recently 
its government has decided to move ahead with the development of Internet (Eritrean Profile, vol. 6, No. 
13, June 5, 1999). 





ETE was studying how to convert the current e-mail system into an Internet system connection (ETE, 
1998). One of the aims of this was to make it a good investment to make money for the country, without 
subsidy so that it is sustainable. The other is to make it accessible to almost any Eritrean with access to a 
computer and a modem no matter what their economic level. Finally, it was to make it an optimal balance 
between price and performance for the average user delivering reasonably good service at a low price if 
possible. This idea of ETE should be considered for it may come with a new innovative and cheaper way of 
connecting the country to the world. ETE believes that e-mail user base has almost expanded to the point 
where it could financially sustain full TCP/IP connectivity, if and when a continuous international connection 
is permitted. Now that the government of Eritrea has decided to move ahead with Internet development that 
should not be a problem. 
When we think of Internet development in Eritrea, we cannot help it from thinking of the skill and experience 
acquired by the Eritreans in Diaspora. They have been able to build and run hundreds of websites to serve 
the one million or so of Eritreans scattered all over the world. Dehai Eritrea Online, Asmarino, Eritrea.net, 
and Visafric are the best Eritrean wire networks we find in the Internet. These networks have been used for 
news and debates of various political and economic issues of the country. They have been used to develop 
the social and cultural activities of Eritrean in Diaspora. All these accumulated knowledge can be easily 
transferred to Eritrea now that the country is going to have the Internet. We have already seen that most of 
the computer businesses in the country are established by Eritrean coming back from abroad. They have 
their network with the Eritrean community in Diaspora, therefore, they can jointly establish Internet services 
to exploit the new business in the country. 
11.6.3.7 Information Technology in Other services 
Public utilities such as the electric, water and telecommunications services suppliers are also a growing 
user-group of computer systems. In Eritrea the supply of electricity is in the hand of the EEA which is under 
the Ministry of Energy and Mines as an autonomous entity. The TSE is under the Ministry of Transport and 
Communications. The water supply service is under the municipality. Therefore, they are not private 
companies. In the last six years, these public utilities service givers have been struggling to computerise 
their billing systems. 
The EEA has embarked boldly on the computerisation process (Interviews, A. Woldeghebriel, H. 
Tesfagiorgis, and T. Gebreab, October 27 and 29, 1997). The only minicomputer in the country, an AS/400 
with 10 display stations and two printers was introduced to improve the manually long and boring process 
of billing, in 1994, Some thinking is going on to use the full capacity of the AS/400 by creating a network 
that could serve, besides the billing section at the Head Office at Asmara, the inventory management, 
accounting and payroll, and the sales division (consumers division) in Asmara and in the other towns. A 
CAD system is being introduced in the engineering workshop and three engineers were under training 
under two Swedish consultants. The distributed network system is increasingly becoming relevant to solve 
some basic problems of billing and collections. The company needs to do more with regard to systems 
analysis and design before venturing into any haphazard introduction of new computer systems that can 
drain the meagre resources of the company without gain in efficiency. The power production plant of 
Beleza uses computer production control in the newly commissioned plants. The Hirgigo project, under 
construction, also will have installed computers for production process control. 
The experience of TSE and its computer systems goes back before the independence of the country in 
1983 (Interview, A. Ghebregiorgis, October 16, 1997). At that time TSE was a branch of the Ethiopian 





Telecommunications Services (ETS). In 1983 ETS Head Office at Addis Ababa had introduced Systems 
3400 to computerise its billing processing and Asmara branch was linked to it through the microwave and a 
dump terminal and a printer. This worked till the 1990 after which things went back to the old manual bill 
processing system. Computer processed billing system was slowly reintroduced in 1992. Various attempts 
followed to constantly upgrade the billing system till 1996 when 15 PCs and a server arrived to change it to 
a more acceptable level. The total number of 23 computers in all of the TSE paradoxically makes it one of 
low density because the computer employee ratio is very low, 1:27.3 excluding the contractual workers. 
The joint venture being planned with Daewoo may change this company beyond recognition in the near 
future, if it goes to port. 
Similar to the previous two, the Water Supply Department of Asmara Municipality has introduced the 
computer processed billing system in 1997. In the other departments things seem to go in the old manual 
system. The major problem is lack of necessary funds, of course. 
Various consulting firms have emerged particularly after 1993. These are also among the heavy users of 
computers. When we come to maintenance services, computer maintenance is emerging as very important 
and fast growing business area. 
Publishing is also another growing business, which is increasingly looking for computer technology to 
reduce cost and increase productivity. A good example of this is Sabur Printing Services, a joint venture 
between the PFDJ (Popular Front for Democracy and Justice) and Eritreans in the Diaspora. Its production 
capacity will be more than ten folds from the present capacity with the latest technology of over $20m worth 
of fully computerised equipment (African Business April 1998, p. 24). It is expected to be fully operational in 
1999. From the small private printing presses, Francescana Printing Press has introduced computer 
technology first. 
11.6.4 Information technology in Government Civil Services 
We have already said that the government civil service is the biggest computer purchaser in the country. 
There are some Departments and Agencies that have made relatively considerable progress in the process 
of computerisation and the demand for more computers and networks is increasing by day. The main 
problems are the necessary funds and skilled manpower. Below I will attempt to give some of the 
experiences of the major cases. 
The Ministry of Local Government is trying to build a local network to link all the various sections in the 
head Office (Interview, T. Tekle, 22 October, 1997). There are 33 PCs with 12 printers. The MIS section 
was first established 1n 1994 with four people. In 1996 with help of a consultant from a local computer 
business firm, CTS, the LAN has been built and staff trained to use it. Currently through the LAN people 
can share the server and printers but to exploit fully the capacity of the LAN, all existing manual records 
and files need be changed into a digital form that can be directly accessed by the computer. The Head 
Office is already connected to two remote areas, Massawa and Mendefera through a modem for direct file 
transfer purposes. Soon others will follow. This experimenting with LAN and WAN will prove to be very 
valuable in the near future because the know-how is slowly building up and it will become an asset to the 
Ministry. The training to the staff took 342 hours mainly spent in learning the network administration, access 
and visual basic, and MTX. The support and maintenance services continue with CTS (Computer 
Technology services) and it seems a good work relationship has emerged. 





The Ministry of Trade & Industry started to seriously look into the computerisation process in 1995 
(Interviews, T. Woldeyohannes and B. Tesfay, October 23, 1997). During that year, an evaluation was 
made of the existing situation of computing which consisted only of l2 PCs, and a thorough study or a 
complete systems analysis and design was recommended. Particularly the networked computing 
environment was considered to be the best option for the Ministry to leapfrog in the use of information 
technology. Going from LANs to WANs could be easier later on, particularly getting connected to the world 
through Internet. This could easily enable Eritrea to interact and communicate with COMESA and other 
regional and international organisations and other international markets. One very critical factor noted in the 
evaluation was the lack of computer skills among the employees of the Ministry. Based on the 
recommendation, computer literacy training was given to employees of the ministry and the systems study 
was conducted by two young systems analysts of the Ministry. The study was completed by mid 1997 and 
was submitted for review and approval to EISA. The reply from EISA was long to come but by the 
beginning of 1998 the 'no objection' reply finally came. The plan is to implement the project phase by 
phase. The project was estimated to cost US$360,000, including 10% of contingency costs. Getting the 
money and skilled people are going to be the most critical factors to the success of the project. In fact, by 
mid of 1998 already the two young promising analysts/programmers had left the Ministry to pursue their 
own careers abroad. The continuity of the project may be at risk now. This may be a signal of a serious 
brain drain problem in the country. 
Business License Office (BLO) experience is unique. The office was created from scratch (Interview, T. 
Berhane, November 10, 1997). Getting a business license was a very bureaucratic and long process going 
from one office of a ministry to another that took from a minimum of one week to four months sometimes. 
The Government was determined to cut all the time and the back and forth among different offices to a one 
stop service in the shortest time possible. This was necessary to attract potential investors. The new 
organisation (established by Proclamation) and computer system (12 computers in all) of the Office has 
enabled to achieve the sought objectives and now getting license is only a matter of 30 minutes. How was 
this possible? The job establishing the BLO was given to one of the task force members involved in the 
study of Government restructuring and license system, This person had worked with IBM (Ethiopia) in 1972 
as systems analyst and he was the one to design the new licensing system, which was approved by the 
Government. The same person was appointed as Director of the new BLO with the responsibility to 
implement the project. Eighteen months of hard work with the help of the EISA Director to write a 
programme for the system and funding of computer purchases from the UNDP, the new system could start 
to work. The fact that to write the programme took only three months but to debug it took almost a year is 
by itself is revealing the amount of stress through which the developers passed. The Director of the Macro 
Policy Office (Berhane Abrehe) did play the role of the sponsor at the top Governmental level during the 
entire process. The BLO director says that the involvement of people in the project early on helped a lot. 
When they were first recruited, the director himself gave them training on communication skills, work 
organisation and effectiveness, time management and computer systems for six months. For a year, a two-
hour meeting every Saturday to discuss problems encountered by employees has enabled to develop trust 
and co-operation. The project is considered a success. This office was first established in 1995 and already 
it was looking for better hardware/software to upgrade the system in May-June 1998. A contract has been 
made with a consulting firm from Canada to upgrade the system. The first system worked on database 
programme written on Clipper 5.2 and Novell 3.12 for the network. While the new system is expected to 
work in an Oracle environment and the eight branch offices will be connected to form a network. A 
consultant came to Eritrea to work on the project in June and did some work but was not to the satisfaction 
of the organisation and as a result the project has taken more time than expected. 





Education is lagging behind in the use of computers. Lately, in 1998, some attempts to introduce computing 
at the high school level were being made by the Ministry of Education. Few high schools in Asmara have 
been targeted as experiment ground. It will take time before we could see computer labs in Eritrean high 
schools become a reality. Of course, the problem is mainly lack of funds and skilled teachers in computing. 
The University of Asmara is of course an exception where there is a relatively large concentration of 
computers, about 200 computers, all PCs. There is the e-mail service at the university but local networking 
process has only started. But there is a phased plan to computerise and network all departments of the 
university. The administrative wing of the university, with the help of Dutch Government funding, has 
prepared a plan of computerisation of its accounts, personnel, inventory management and students 
records. The plan has been prepared with help of Dutch experts from Groningen and Delft University of 
Technology. As a ground for training purposes, a small network has been installed in 1996-97 (Information 
Technology plan University of Asmara: planning Information Technology modules 1997-2001, 1997). Now 
an IT-platform is in the process of formation, which will enable access to administrative software. For this 
purpose two new software packages have been selected recently: ARIS (Academic Register Information 
System) for student administration and SCALA for financial administration. ARIS and SCALA require 
Windows-NT. Now a terminal emulation package will be used to enable the Windows 3.11 desktops 
available at UoA to approach the NT system to minimise costs. The system is expected to be ready by July 
1999 (Memo, Final Project Plan ARISAIT Asmara, December 22, 1998). 
The Ministry of Health has three big Departments; l) the Department of General Services under which are 
the hospitals and primaries; 2) the Department of Pharmacy; and 3) the Department of Human Resource 
Development, Information Systems & Research. In the central health information processing, there are 7 
Pentium PCs with 4 printers (1 laser and 3 ink-jet); in the six health zones, there are one PC and a dot 
matrix printer each. Other 23 PCs are distributed to the rest of the ministry offices. Under the Health 
Information Systems Unit there is the Heath-Net. Thanks to the work of an Eritrean who lives in U.S.A. to 
create a Heath-Net was possible. This Eritrean took the initiative of asking for help to make free access to 
the Health-Net possible for Ministry of Health in Eritrea. This system connects the MoH directly to the 
Health-Net services in the U.S.A. via a satellite communication system. It started in 1994. But there are 
only about 15 access points in the Ministry of Health (Interview, Dr. Berhana Haile, November 26, 1997). 
In the future, Health Information Systems Unit has two major objectives to accomplish: 1) to make 
information available for decision makers timely and accurately, 2) to make information available to national 
and international users. At present no linkages exist with others outside the MoH. But in the future there is 
a plan to develop a community based health information system, therefore, a linkage with the Ministry of 
Local Government and the Ministry of Labour & Social Welfare will be necessary. MoH has maintenance 
service contract with Gelatly Hanky Company. Therefore, it has no intention to have own maintenance unit. 
In the Ministry of Health there has always been the practice of record keeping. But it was not designed to 
support decision-making. It was time to have one. First a consultant from the UK made a systems study in 
1995. Since that was limited in scope, a new systems study started in August 1996 with a consultant from 
the U.S.A. and USAID as the agency funding the project. The consultant has worked for 12 months. The 
systems analysis and design is completed. Now the implementation phase has started. It was expected the 
project to undergo the testing period during the first quarter of 1998 to be fully operational by the middle of 
the year. One of the major difficulties was that the consultant left for America after 12 months of working in 
the country. He continued to work on the project from there. But originally the idea was for the local staff to 
learn from the expertise of the consultant on the process of systems analysis and design. Another difficulty 





is that some of the senior people in the MoH found it very difficult to understand that such a system as 
envisaged by the project would ever be possible in the country. They were sceptical and less supportive. 
Therefore, selling the idea to them was very difficult. The next difficulty, of course, is expected to be 
funding. The project will be funded by the USAID till 1999. After that, what will happen to it? Hopefully, the 
Ministry will look to it and allocate the necessary budget to sustain and develop it. 
With regard to human resource development, MoH so far has trained one of its staff in the U.S.A. for a year 
in computer systems who now is back. The same person did also a three months training in dBase 
programming in Eden Computer School in Asmara. Another has been trained in systems networking for 
three months in Asmara. The plan, for 1998, is to train more people. One will be sent abroad to learn 
programming and two other people will undergo short course training in data management within the 
country. This team of five people should constitute the IT professionals to manage and operate the 
information systems of the MoH. 
The National Statistics Office is only emerging now. It is a new institution. Its computerisation process has 
been very slow. It is working with 4 senior and 8 junior statisticians, 2 programmers and 8 computer 
operators, and other 18 office workers. Their first computers were installed in 1994. Now they are working 
with 32 PCs and a server (Interview, B. Abrehe, 10 December, 1997). 
These are the government ministries and departments observed directly. Among those not accounted is the 
Ministry of Finance which has made significant investments in computerisation. Another heavy user is the 
Ministry of Defence. But in all these organisations the common trait is that these computerisation processes 



















This section on 'Science and Technology in Eritrea' shows us that there is a long way to go in establishing 
the infrastructure bases for the support of Eritrean industrial growth through science and technology. S&T 
policy-making body is non-existent. The country has been absorbed by the rehabilitation and reconstruction 
activities. The long-term development phase is only beginning to get some attention. Human resource 
development is getting the attention it deserves by Government of Eritrea as the base of development of 
the country. The country is aggressively trying to build its human resources skills, an example of which is 
the $60 million loan signed with the World Bank for the development of highly skilled manpower project. But 
at this stage there is no a conscious effort to link national economic development plan with national 
technology plan. The latter is missing completely. Research activities in the country are insignificant. It is 
not possible to talk of any kind of relationships between the university, the industrial research and 
development institutes, and the enterprises for an effective transfer of science and technology in the 
country. 
12.1 S&T and economic policies integration 
Eritrea is a new country established in 1993. Its first Macro Policy came out in 1994. This was followed by 
the National Economic Policy Framework and Programme for 1998-2000 recently. The national economic 
development plan exercise is a new experience for the country. But the country has a very rich experience 
acquired during the 30-year war of liberation where the first shape of the present government was being 
formed and some important lessons were learned in the political, military, social and economic spheres. Of 
course, Eritrea has also a very rich industrial experience during the Italian colonial period, particularly 
starting from the 1930s. This continued during the British administration in terms of light industry but the 
first dismantling of infrastructures did happen in this period. During the Federation Period, the Eritrean light 
industries continued to thrive because of the new Ethiopian markets. Afterwards, the beginning of the de-
industrialisation process in Eritrea unfolded. We will use this rich experience to identify the lessons. 
The present-day Eritrea with its political boundaries has been shaped by the Italian colonisation that started 
in 1889. But Italy's ambitions were not confined to Eritrea only. Ethiopia, as the only not colonised part of 
Africa, was also attracting them. Many economic historians have concluded that Ethiopia was a more viable 
option for a real colonisation in the classical sense. Eritrea, therefore, was a springboard for the 
colonisation of Ethiopia. For such endeavour, the Fascist Government of Mussolini was investing in Eritrea 
heavily. Transport and communications infrastructures got most of the investment and Italian entrepreneurs 
were encouraged to invest in light industries. At the base of this transformation was always the Italian 
skilled and semiskilled labour. Eritreans were at the margins of the modern economy. The Italian 
government had nothing to give to the local people except taking the best of their lands and its young for 
their military in the conquest of Libya and Ethiopia. It was not politically sustainable and it failed. 
The twelve years of British administration did not change much of the landscape, except in expanding 
education to Eritreans but at the same time dismantled some of the infrastructure left by the Italians. But 
together with the USA, to suit their strategic interest in the cold war forced the federal arrangement with 
Ethiopia through UN. This is the seed of the next political instability in the whole region of the Horn of Africa 





for a long period. This is at the root of the process of de-industrialisation in Eritrea. The political and 
strategic interest of the superpowers took precedence to the legitimate aspirations of the peoples of Eritrea. 
The Ethiopian government was more interested in gaining access to the sea and to exploit the industrial 
infrastructure existing in Eritrea, Again the Eritrean peoples‟ interest was secondary. Soon instability was to 
follow in the region. Both the peoples of Eritrea and Ethiopia were to suffer social and economic 
destruction. Both emerged poorer than used to be. But at least Eritrea got its independence. 
What we have seen so far is a clear indication that political and or economic colonisation of peoples leads 
to instability and instability leads to economic regress. There are always alternatives to this. To involve the 
very people by gaining their consensus and co-operation and this should come first. There is no poor or 
small or weak country that cannot destabilise even a bigger one. The best solution lies in finding balance of 
interests. Even in the open market system, it is the balance of interest and mutual co-operation that leads 
to a working business relationship. Therefore, political stability is the basis for the economic development 
within a country or in a whole region of countries. 
For the last seven years, Eritrea and Ethiopia had achieved a political stability and as a result the whole 
region had benefited. But recently, the old political game seems to have resurfaced and the border war 
between the countries is again creating a problem for economic progress in the region. 
In the last seven years, Eritrea had made a significant achievement in the infrastructure development. A 
lean government civil service is put in place. A new constitution has been drafted and approved. The legal 
system is being revised. The macroeconomic policy, investment policies, fiscal and monetary policies, and 
industrial policies have been issued. The communications proclamation has been enacted, which will help 
the development of the communications industry. But putting in place a working physical, legal and 
informational infrastructure is not a matter of just few years. It is only the beginning and will take years to 
mature when the dynamics of implementation, learning, feedback and revision of the policies is fully in 
motion. Particularly the infrastructure to build the human capital will take time. To make the whole work in a 
sustainable form is a big challenge that the Eritrean government has to face continually. 
l2.2 Priority given to IT 
IT is not given any particular attention or priority. Eritrea is the only country in Africa without full Internet 
services, only e-mail service is available. But now decision has been taken to develop Internet and by the 
end of the year the country will have a full connectivity. PCs are coming in the country unrestricted and 
generally their utilisation rate is very low, mostly for word-processing only. Networked information systems 
are not yet known in the country. Very few government departments are starting to experiment with 
rudimentary LAN systems. It could explode any time if proper support is given in terms of proper incentives 
to computer busine.ss and the supply of critical IT skills. 
12.3 Institutional capability 
The institutional capability for the development of S&T that could be a real base and support for industrial 
technology development of the country does not exist. The country's administrative, legal, commercial, 
judiciary and regulatory institutions are still in the making. Institutions of higher learning and research are 
not fully developed. 





University of Asmara, the only higher learning institution, is still at the initial stage of its development and it 
has a chronic shortage of local experts. Its new College of Engineering had its first graduates in 3-year 
diploma programme in 1998. The university's research activity is almost non-existent and it is being 
organised recently. Outside the university, there are R&D units in various ministries but at the stage of 
formation. Their main stumbling blocks are lack of funding and lack of experienced and qualified personnel. 
There is still a great poverty of information in the country in general. This is a clear indication that the 
institutional support for generating information and disseminating it is absent. Particularly the culture of 
written information dissemination has not grown to the extent of creating a conducive environment for 
research and learning, whether it is in the civil services or the industrial activities. The government 
macroeconomic analysts find it difficult to come up with the right policies and the management of it simply 
because the data available on national income, fiscal and monetary developments, balance of payments, 
price indexes, demographics and other important social indicators are not fully available. The National 
Statistics Office has been established few years ago but its presence is not yet felt. 
The telecommunications infrastructure is still poor by international standards. There has been a lot of 
incremental improvement in the last five years but it is not yet enough to meet huge demand. With the view 
of future computer network development, the existing telecommunications infrastructure is not reliable and 
sufficient to support its adequate development. As a result a substantial investment is required to really 
leapfrog and create a solid environment for IT development as the new infrastructure on which to base the 
future economic development. Eritrean government's attempt to make a joint venture with Daewoo of South 
Korea seems to have failed because of the recent financial crisis in Asia and/or the Ethio-Eritrean border 
war. 
12.4 Human capital formation 
The industrial development witnessed during the 1930-1960 was based on Italian skilled manpower. But at 
the same a considerable number of skilled Eritreans had emerged, which the country lost during the war of 
liberation. During this time, not only Eritrea lost the cream of its labour force but education in general was 
neglected. Particularly the primary education in the rural areas suffered the most. 
After 1991 a very fast change in the whole education landscape of Eritrea is occurring. Primary schools 
have grown by 251 percent, middle schools by 161 and secondary schools by 190 percent. Technical and 
vocational education has also expanded significantly. Particularly the vocational training centres have 
increased in number providing courses of 6-8 month duration in a variety of skills. 
In Eritrea, a lot of technical training is occurring at the firm level, given the small supply of formally trained 
technically skilled manpower. Particularly the metal and woodwork shops, auto-mechanic garages, various 
types of repair shops, electrical shops, and computer businesses are heavily dependent on their own 
apprentices and in-house training. The construction industry is increasing fast the poof of semiskilled and 
skilled work force through in-house short-term training, This is easily observable in the heavy construction 
machinery operation and maintenance skills and in new construction methods. The textile industry depends 
on the small private schools and some in-house training. The jewellery industry is completely artisan and 
depends exclusively on traditional apprenticeship method of training. The catering industry is totally 
dependent on in-house informal training, which is basically on the job training. But recently the Ministry of 
Tourism has started giving some short-term training. 





The University of Asmara has tremendously expanded in the last five years. The number of departments 
offering degrees and diplomas has doubled from 13 to 26. A new institute, the Eritrean Institute of 
Management (EM) was established and is focusing on giving training to government public service 
employees. Recently, a new Human Resource Development Unit has been established at the university at 
the end of 1997 with the mandate of preparing the national human resource development plan and 
managing the 60 million project for the development of highly skilled manpower development supported by 
the World Bank. 
Eritrea at present is suffering from a chronic shortage of highly skilled manpower to meet its development 
needs. But the country is trying to manage it by recruiting, for the intermediate period, expatriates (mostly 
Indians and Philippinos) to fill the most critical gaps. 
IT skill in Eritrea is in short supply. Luckily enough for the country, some Eritreans from the Diaspora have 
come with the necessary experience and skills to establish a number of private computer schools and 
computing services businesses. This contribution has been a very welcome at a time when the country 
needed it most. But these commercial schools have their own limitations as well. They are limited to 
computer operation and some simple programming skills. Neither the university has taken the appropriate 
measures to tackle the problem. It has been slow to recognise the priority of IT in practice. The Computer 
Science will soon become a department but it will take at least four years from now to have the first 
graduates. 
In Eritrea computers arrived almost without a warning with the end of the war of liberation in 1991. The 
scramble to acquire the basic skills from all types of organisations and from the existing and potential office 
workers was obvious. But as soon was made clear, the basic computer skills are not enough. You need to 
maintain a computer, to expand it, create networks, adapt the packaged software, develop new programs, 
develop databases, and most of all you need to design appropriate systems. The old way of organising 
work changes and a whole new way of thinking is also required. The country needs to be organised to 
produce the necessary IT skills in the future if a real leapfrog is going to happen in the use of IT as an 
infrastructure for all sectors of the economy to benefit and increase their productivity. 
12.5 The Melting Pot: technology management and economic development 
The case of Eritrea is unique in the sense that the country is new and the time needed for the melting pot to 
work is not there, i.e. S&T policies need time to produce change in relation to economic development. But 
at the same time, it has a great opportunity as a late comer. This is a time of IT revolution in the world. The 
whole world is in the process of learning of organising work and leisure in totally different way than it used 
to be. This is where Eritrea needs to jump to join the rest of the world and start organising work and leisure 
in a now way. 
Therefore, the present research focuses on policies and projects undertaken so far in Eritrea or being 
implemented. It is basically a policy analysis on which to base the future development of the country. The 
experience analysed in Part I and II was meant to bridge the missing gap in the case of Eritrea. Now, a 
summary of past and present lessons learned from the experience of Eritrea is given. In the following 
chapter the future S&T in strict relation to economic development of Eritrea will be discussed. 





12.6 Lessons learned 
Eritrea has a very rich experience in what makes or breaks the industrial technology development, starting 
from the Italian colonial period through the years of struggle for independence and the recent post-
liberation period. The major lessons are: 
1. Sustainability 
- The industrialisation observed in Eritrea during the 1930s and 1940s was mainly war related and 
could not be sustained once gone the demand on which it was based. 
- During the 1950s and 1960s a more sustainable industrial development had to be found. New 
markets for the light industries in Eritrea had to be found in North Africa and the Middle East and 
the East Africa in general. But it was again mainly based on the large number of Italian investors 
and skilled manpower. Had it continued, it might have become politically unsustainable for the local 
people would be economically marginalised. But this last statement is purely hypothetical for the 
forced annexation of Eritrea to Ethiopia brought the war of liberation, which slowly drove away the 
Italians from the face of Eritrea. 
- The de-industrialisation and the consequent destruction of the industrial technology of the country 
were the result of political instability. The nationalisation of the industries by the socialist Ethiopian 
regime and the consequent restrictions of private enterprise have also scared away DFI. 
- The Ethiopian policy of deliberately halting investment in Eritrea, led to Eritrean skilled manpower 
exodus to Ethiopia and other neighbouring countries killing off further the industrial technology 
embodied in the know-how of these people. 
- Ethiopian policy of control of highly skilled manpower producing institutions away from Eritrea so 
that newly skilled Eritreans were forced to migrate to Ethiopia for education and work at the 
expense of Eritrean industries and development. 
- On the other side of the story, Eritrean resistance leaders had to make tough decisions of whether 
to find a reliable outside sponsors of their liberation struggle or depend exclusively on Eritrean 
resources. There were no alternatives than to make the Eritrean resistance sustainable on the 
country's resources and people. This opened the door to ingenuity and creativity. To make every 
tool and weapon or machines or trucks captured to last long by establishing in the bush machine 
shops and garages. Mobile hospitals, basic drags manufacturing and few other cottage industries 
to produce the basic items needed by the fighters had to be established and maintained. Skilled 
manpower had to be produced without institutions with sufficient facilities to do the job. These are 
the most telling lessons one can learn on how technology and skills can be used the most. 
- Modifying, adapting and improving (at times paying human price) the available technology was 
relentlessly pursued and proved to be very critical to the military balance of power in the war of 
liberation. 
- The resistance movement has learned that projects that cannot be financially and technically 
sustained are doomed to failure, therefore, not pursued. 
- The greatest lesson of all is the ability to organise and fast mobilise the human resource. This was 
true in the past during the war of liberation, and it is true today in defending the country and in 
economic reconstruction, Examples are the national military service used to rehabilitate the 
infrastructure of the country and the summer reforestation and soil conservation program by the 
high school students. Recently in the bolder war with Ethiopia, these superior organisation and 
mobilisation ability proved again the asset of the country. 





2. Flexibility and transferability 
- Since the EPLF was the fighting force and at the same time administering the liberated areas for 
quite a long time, the boundary between military activities and that of civil administration was 
blurred. People and machinery were moving from the military to civilian works or vice versa as the 
immediate demand dictated. The same can be said of the technical knowhow. 
- Even now, key government people keep moving from ministry to ministry and from department to 
department as needs dictate it. But this introduces also the risk of disruption in effective working 
teams. 
- Government mechanical garages are being used for military and civilian purposes interchangeably 
making the most efficient use of the limited resources. 
- The modern road building know-how, which started at the time of war of liberation, has 
tremendously grown in recent years. Local companies are doing big road construction projects on 
their own using modern heavy construction equipment and machinery. Sustainability is high 
because the work is all done by Eritrean skilled manpower and more are being trained. Support 
services are also growing side by side to it. 
- The rehabilitation of the old railway using only local resources is also another good example of 
sustainable project as younger Eritrean generation is learning from the older ones. 
3. Quality 
- Eritreans have learned from the bitter war of liberation that their survival depended very much on 
the quality of their fighters and their motivation because the numerical and hardware advantage 
was on the other side. The same logic is being successfully used during the present economic 
reconstruction time. 
- After the liberation there is an explosion of in-house training and seminars in all sectors. But more 
needs to be done to develop skilled and highly productive human resource and in particular to raise 
the culture of quality among the labour force. 
- Eritreans have learned that superior organisational capability in mobilising resources and people 
and flexibility in their use can make wonders. It is being applied in the summer reforestation 
programme by high-school students nation-wide and the use of national military conscripts for 
economic reconstruction. 
- Even today, in time of peace and reconstruction, Eritreans have transferred what was learned 
during the resistance time to work with what is available and stop dreaming and waiting for what is 
desirable to have first. 
4. Priority 
- No particular technology is given priority, But priority is given to education and human resource 
development, Top government officials are leading by example by undergoing study in Open 
University distance education in MBA, diploma and certificate programmes. 
5. Result 
- The country has been able to build a defence force very dependable with relatively lower budget. 
- In the last five years the infrastructure of the country has improved visibly. The Lessons learned 
during the years of resistance are being used for the national reconstruction. But a lot remains to 





be done to make the civil services more efficient and transparent and the country more attractive 
for investors, which is the base the future sustainable socio-economic development. 
Particular lessons on IT development 
It seems that an institutional framework to define policy issues and co-ordinate policy implementation is 
slowly emerging when one sees the proclamation No. 53/1994 on which EISA, at least legally, is founded. 
But the reality is different. ITPAC and EISA are not functioning according to the said Proclamation. It was 
supposed to l) develop, implement and review information technology policies; 2) to co-ordinate and 
manage Government information technology and systems; 3) provide technical advice and services. It does 
not have the institutional capability to undertake these functions. It does not have the necessary poof of 
expertise, facilities and budget to carry such a huge responsibility. 
Organisationally, EISA is under the Office of the President. It is rightly recognised its importance by putting 
it at the very top of Government hierarchy. This stresses its importance and strengthens its negotiating 
position with other ministries. But its immaturity as an institution is the biggest hindrance to exercise its 
legitimate power to absolve its responsibilities. 
Human resource problem is common to every Ministry in the country. The thirty-year war of liberation has 
deprived the country of the opportunities to develop its human resources. With regard to information 
technology, professionals and technicians and in particularly highly skilled personnel is almost absent. The 
human resource management is also at its infancy. It has been observed that retaining highly skilled IT 
professionals in government departments and agencies is one of the biggest challenges of the present 
Eritrea. Primarily this is because the private sector is more attractive to such professionals and there are 
very few of them. It is more rewarding to them to establish their own business both in terms of income and 
being boss of your own business. On the other side, the lack of professionalism in the management body of 
civil services obstructs the career development of such professionals. Fortunately for Eritrea, its people 
returning from the Diaspora are contributing a lot in the establishment of the computer industry. They are 
the ones that have come with IT skills and experience not available in the country. This happy coincidence 
should be properly managed to reverse the effect of brain drain by creating an environment conducive for 
highly skilled manpower.  
It is not possible to say that Ministries were getting an appropriate budget to work with. As a result, getting 
funds for computerisation from the government was the last thing to expect, In fact, almost all these 
computerisation projects have been funded by donor countries or agencies. It is not possible to say the 
country is efficiently and effectively using these funding opportunities from international donors because of 
lack of strong institutions. To develop an appropriate IT base to support the development of good 
governance and modern industry, trade, tourism, transport and communications services, the country 
should have to know what it really needs. Projects should be designed accordingly and resources allocated 
to achieve them. Last, it should be able to manage the projects efficiently and effectively to achieve the 
socio-economic development objectives of the country. The country is beginning to learn and it can learn 
fast but the development of an appropriate institution to spearhead such a task must without delay be there. 
There are a number of areas where fast learning is occurring. Business License Office has introduced a 
computer system to cut time spent in long bureaucratic processes that required people to go from office to 
office for weeks. Now it is an exercise of half an hour- NICE's insurance accounting system introduced 
have enabled it to keep it accounts up-to-date and reports are generated in three to four days what used to 
take a month. The treasury Department of the Ministry of Finance and Development has been able to 





establish computerised payroll system for the whole of the civil services. This used to be processed in each 
government department, agency and institute and sent to the Treasury for control and approval, a very time 
consuming exercise. The Ministry of local Government Head Office has developed a 50-user local area 
network with connections to two regional offices (1994). Eritrean Community Development Fund (ECDF) 
has a 50-user LAN with connections to two regional offices, Massawa and Mendefera, and an accounting 
system (1996-97). Ministry of Marine Reserves & Fisheries, Marine Resources Research Department has 
installed 10-user LAN (1994). The Eritrean telecommunications Services, the Eritrean Electric Authority, 
and Asmara Municipality Water Supply Department have all computerised their billing systems. 
We have seen that various ministries are in the process of developing their own systems. Those that are 
developing networked information systems are the National Food Information System, in the Ministry of 
Agriculture; the Health Information system, in the Ministry of Health; Administration Information Systems of 
the University of Asmara; Information Systems of the Ministry of Industry and Trade, completed Systems 
analysis and design. The Bank of Eritrea and the Commercial Bank of Eritrea are working with some 
custom made software to automate some of their departmental functions, islands of applications. But they 
are still in the process of selecting suitable banking software. 
Besides, there are hundreds and hundreds of standalone PCs in Government offices as well as private 
companies. The very concept of networked or distributed information systems is a recent phenomenon. 
Awareness in general seems to be rising. Computer schools and computer services business have 
contributed a lot to raising the general awareness of the public towards information technology, even 
though quality standards in many of them are very low which could be improved through accreditation and 
quality certification mechanism. The openness of the Government to information technology for the sake of 
increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of civil services is commendable. But the actual utilisation rate of 
computing facilities is very low. Some use it only for some word-processing activities. At the same time, it is 
not uncommon to see in government offices computers sitting idle in some places while in other places 
people struggling to complete work in the old manual method. They could greatly improve their productivity 
with the help of a computer. It is very logical to give facilities where it is needed most. For example if in the 
department there is only one computer available, instead of keeping it in the head's office for some word-
processing activities, it could be better to use it for information intensive works such as the work of 
statisticians and information processing activities. 
Nowadays it is possible to start with small number of highly skilled IT professional teams to diffuse the use 
of information technology immediately, if proper human resource plan and management is made. In Eritrea 
there is the possibility of using the already existing nucleus of skilled IT professionals that have come back 
from the Diaspora, for most the private computer services business is made up of them. At present these 
small computer businesses are working individually and a high degree of fragmentation is evident. 
Something should be done to team up these films to undertake major information technology projects. 
There is no doubt they would form a formidable competing force against foreign consultants and computing 
firms. Even computer assembly industry for export could easily flourish. The best way is to start by giving 
the necessary support to the private computing firms, particularly by establishing an efficient Customs 
Office with a tax and duties regime that supports to the developing the computer assembly business. 
Therefore, the various government policies should be designed to help the transfer of information 
technology conscious that this technology is a basic necessary infrastructure to make all sectors of the 
economy internationally competitive in the 21st century. 
 






13. Synthesis and conclusion 
The future of Information Technology in Eritrea 
This chapter is future oriented. It focuses on the second study question: How can Eritrea exploit best the 
opportunities offered by IT for its socio-economic development based on the experience of other 
developing countries? Based on the strategic policy analysis we made in the previous chapters, we will 
determine the best strategic options possible for Eritrea to exploit the opportunity to leapfrog offered by IT 
in its socio-economic development. It deals with the problem by taking II as an integrated part of S&T in 
general. It starts from the trend in S&T in the world and tries to show a possible path for Eritrea to bridge 
the gap in order to catch up in S&T in general and in IT use in particular. 
13.1 Introduction and S&T trends in the world 
In the 20th century the United States of America has dominated in all scientific and technological fields. 
Japan and Western Europe follow it closely. The three blocks basically have total control of the world's 
scientific and technological. The rest of the world is constantly looking unto them to catch up. This wealth of 
knowledge is at the basis of the control of the international trade and global economy. In fact, it is around 
these three blocks that a new global economic order is emerging, while the rest are straggling not to be left 
out as the irrelevant regions, particularly the SSA region. 
Revolutionary innovation is occurring in all scientific and technological fields. Primarily advances in IT drive 
this wave of unprecedented changes, but it is much larger in scope than the information revolution - it is a 
technology revolution. Halal and his colleagues (1998) tell us that a wave of major technological advances 
seems likely to arrive during the next three decades and IT appears to lead this wave of innovation by 
roughly 5 years proving that IT .serves as the principal factor now for driving the technology revolution. 
Development efforts today mainly focus on the information revolution, which in turn drives other fields a few 
years afterwards. The information revolution should mature in the first decade of the 21st century, 
producing major advances in all fields. Multimedia interconnectivity will be dominant with virtual reality and 
large flat panel displays taking place of the computer monitor. Education, entertainment, commerce, and 
tourism will enter a new era of electronic access and sophisticated software will aid consumers and 
professionals by providing intelligent agents to filter news and mail. Moreover, expert systems will be used 
as surrogate doctors, lawyers, and other professionals. These capabilities will operate on ubiquitous 
microprocessors embedded in household products, walls, and automobiles. 
In medical sciences, the medical community will have accepted the validity of holistic methods and 
computerised self-care; and new genetic strains of plants and animals will provide foods and customised 
farming. Alternative forms of energy, environment management, and transportation will also seriously begin 
to after life-styles. The biogenetic engineering revolution will permit curing diseases and their prevention 
through gene therapy, and it may then turn to that controversial frontier of improving the human genetic 
code. Farmers will genetically manipulate plants to improve yields and make them resistant to pests and 
spoilage. The cloning and/or manufacture of organs should help increase life spans. Composite materials, 
nanotechnology, and a variety of other methods will permit the production of almost any physical object, 





whereas Maglev trains, fuel cell powered cars, and intelligent transportation system should allow vastly 
improved mobility. Meanwhile, alternative energy sources, organic farming, aquaculture, and industrial 
ecology will serve to soften the hard edges of this high-tech world. The capabilities of intelligent and self-
assembling materials, fusion power, artificial foods, and other advanced technologies will advance 
dramatically (ibid.). This is assuming that all the ethical and moral issued being raised by these scientific 
and technological developments are successfully overcome. 
Advanced countries are investing huge sums of money in R&D in order to keep and advance their scientific 
and technological lead and by so doing control the new economic order. This is happening while in the 
developing countries, particularly in SSA, are still struggling to recover from the failed attempt made to 
restructure their economy on the basis of manufacturing trade and foreign direct investment in 1970s. The 
heavy borrowing made at that time, with the complicity of the lending-happy international banks, today it 
has become one of the main stumbling blocks of development (Castells, 1996). These were soon followed 
by the international financial institutions' interventions in the forms of 'structural adjustments', which created 
more problems than they solved. If in the past, developing countries sought science and technology 
development and industrialisation as a way of overcoming dependencies, today they have no choice but to 
try and try again to avoid the 'structural irrelevance' (to use the words of Castells, ibid.) posed to them by 
the new global economic order. 
Information technology 
The advanced countries have recognised very early the revolutionary character of IT and have tried to take 
advantage of it as it emerged. OECD (1988) says that IT has already demonstrated very great advantages 
in material-saving, energy-saving and capital-saving applications - for example, in the reduction of the 
number of mechanical and electronic components in engineering products ranging from cash registers to 
machine tools, or in the reduction of inventory. More fundamentally, the emphasis on labour saving process 
automation technology tends to overshadow the development of new products and services associated 
with the new technology. The experience of OECD (1988) countries has shown the main characteristics of 
present-day IT. There is continuing high rate of technical change in electronic-related industries 
themselves, as well as in a wide range of applications. These have led to the development of new types of 
data banks and information services, and have profound consequences for the integration and control of 
production activities. They have the capability to improve the quality of products, processes and services. It 
permits capital saving, labour-saving and energy-saving improvements in production processes since it 
reduces the number of rejects and wasted components for both intermediate and final output. Equally 
important, IT can link producers, wholesalers and retailers for it permits savings in inventories at all levels in 
the system, especially in work-in-progress, and more rapid and sensitive response to daily changes in 
consumer demand. Much greater flexibility in rapid model changes and design has been made possible. 
Some analysts have referred to this phenomenon as "economics of scope', replacing to some extent 
"economies of scale. 
All of this means that IT is affecting not only the structure of the economy in terms of new industries and 
services, but also the internal structure and management of all enterprises and the relationship between 
them. There is a tendency in the more successful firms towards the horizontal integration of R&D, design, 
production and marketing, as opposed to the additional Tayloristic pattern of vertical, hierarchical control, 
People and information move more freely between the various departmental functions, and new channels 
of communication are established within and outside the firm. 





If we let facts and figures speak for themselves, it is clear how important is IT to an economy and one 
cannot fail to see clearly its significance. Since IT is concentrated in the developed world, all the data we 
have is taken mainly from the OECD (1995, p. 60-63) countries. World production of electronic data 
processing and office equipment amounted to almost US$200 billion in 1991. Production was highly 
concentrated. The OECD area (excluding Greece, Iceland, Luxembourg, Mexico, New Zealand, Portugal 
and Turkey) is estimated to have accounted for 85% of this production while Taiwan, South Korea, 
Singapore, Hong Kong, Malaysia, and Thailand accounted for 12%. Only the US and Japan contributed 
75% in 1983 and stood at 71% in 1991. With regard to employment in information technology, while the 
OECD manufacturing employment fell by almost 7 percent, a loss of 5 million jobs between 1980 and 1991, 
the office, computing and accounting machinery sector increased by almost I 5 percent, close to 130,000 
new jobs were created. 
Investment expenditures of the office, computing and accounting machinery sector in OECD Member 
countries amounted to US$10.5 billion in 1991. It was an average annual increase of 8 per cent over 1980 
when they stood at US$4.5 billion, and a growth rate I per cent above that of investment expenditures in the 
overall manufacturing sector (7 per cent) [OECD, ibid. p. 70). The breakdown of revenues by source is not 
homogeneous for the nine countries for which data are available (Australia, Canada, Finland, France, 
Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Sweden, the United States). However, in the early 1990s, data 
entry, processing and tabulation services, heavily weighted toward the latter two, accounted for close to or 
more than a quarter of computer services (France, 22 percent; Sweden, 23 percent; Australia, 25 percent; 
New Zealand, 28 percent; Finland, 29 percent). Revenues arising from various software and programming 
services (systems and user tools software, applications software, custom software development and 
programming services) accounted for close to a third of revenues in several of these countries (Canada, 
Finland, United States) and at least a quarter of revenues in others (France and New Zealand). An 
important part of the revenues is the computer services (between 18 and 26 per cent for France, the 
Netherlands, Finland, Sweden and Canada), the United States being a notable exception (only 4 percent). 
As for expenses, wages and salaries constituted, predictably, the largest single item. They accounted 
between 34 and 39 percent in Japan, Australia, Canada, Finland and France, 28 percent in New Zealand 
and only 22 per cent in Mexico (OECD, ibid. p.73). 
Between 1980 and 1991, R&D expenditures for the office, computing and accounting machinery sector in 
OECD area grew by more than 12 percent annually to approach US$20 billion. For overall manufacturing, 
the corresponding figure was less than 9 percent. However, in t991, R&D expenditures in the OECD area 
fell for the first time, and a further fall occurred in 1992 (p.74).  
In the United states, the number of patents granted annually in the IT field remained relatively stable 
between 1975 and 1985 (at a yearly "output" of around 10,000) and then rose sharply until 1990 (to about 
16,000 per year'), to level off at approximately 20,000 thereafter. The relative importance of the regions 
shifted significantly between 1975 and 1993. Despite its "home advantage", the United States saw its share 
shrink by over 15 percentage points, to just under half of all the IT patents granted in 1993. Europe's share 
also declined over a period, from 19.5 to 12.9 percent In contrast, Japan almost tripled its share, from 12 to 
32 percent, while South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong, Malaysia, and Thailand have seen their 
share expand very rapidly since the late 1980s, even if that share is still a modest 3 percent in 1993 (ibid. p. 
77). 
As a proportion of the total number of patents granted in the United States, those involving IT increased 
from 14 percent in 1975 to nearly 20 percent in 1993. In 1993, for every 100 patents granted within the 





United States to applicants from Japan or South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong, Malaysia, and 
Thailand, over 29 percent were related to IT, whereas in 1975 the corresponding numbers had been 12 and 
19, respectively. This rise in the percentage of IT-related patents for Japanese or South Korea, Taiwan, 
Singapore, Hong Kong, Malaysia, and Thailand applicants is exceptional. In the case of the US and 
European applications, the share of such patents in the total number of patents granted increased by only 3 
and 2.5 points, respectively (p.77). 
According to preliminary estimates of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), world merchandise trade 
expanded strongly in 1994, with growth of 9 percent in volume terms for the largest yearly gain since 1976, 
and a rate twice as high as in 1993. Growth of 12 percent in value terms, to more than US$4,000 billion, 
was boosted in part by a jump of about one fifth in trade in office machines and telecommunications 
equipment, a sector that includes computers, computer parts and semiconductors. The very strong growth 
of this product group raised its share in world merchandise exports to 11 percent in 1994, a figure that 
exceeds the shares of food, automotive products, chemicals and fuels (WTO, 1995). 
All the above facts and figures show us how important is IT as an industry and as an infrastructure in the 
economy. In fact, The OECD countries have long ago recognised the pervasive character of IT and the 
importance of it to their economies. The ever- increasing investment in IT is the most compelling single 
evidence for it. 
The economic importance of IT cannot be fully understood only by looking at it from the role it occupies in 
the economy at the present time but also from the role it will continue to have in the future. Glenn (1993) 
recognises IT sector as one of the fastest growing sectors in industrialised nations by emphasising the 
globalisation of industry. The industry is increasingly characterised by globalisation of technology with 
systems being designed in one part of the world, developed/manufactured in another, assembled in a third 
and marketed into particular locations or globally. Companies are taking advantage of areas of expertise, 
cost effective production locations, location of markets through the effective use of information and 
telecommunication technology. The goals of firms are increasingly directed towards global strategies, which 
find a balance between benefiting from the scale advantages of global markets while exploiting the 
geographically determined diversity of consumers and production factors. The MNCs organisation and 
production technology is and will be, structured to give it the flexibility to take advantage of diversity. 
Globalisation has allowed firms to penetrate and service larger, geographically dispersed markets. Besides 
the "globalisation" of sales with the accompanying services such as marketing, distribution and faster after 
sales services, it now involves: production, including production of components; suppliers; investment, 
including intangible investment; mergers and acquisitions etc. Enterprises have become truly multi-national, 
operating at a global level, while giving importance to decentralisation (ibid.). 
The term 'technoglobalism' was coined to describe the deep interaction between technology and 
globalisation that was inducing firms to bring about radical change both in their own organisational 
structures and in inter-firm relations. As the various corporate functions (R&D, design, production, 
marketing) are being integrated in order to respond to vaster and more demanding markets, new forms of 
transnational inter-firm co-operation are developing (ibid.). As a result, firms are making "networking" 
arrangements, since production for the world market is based in a number of units located around the 
world, each one enjoying a degree of autonomy while retaining its links with others. Greater and greater 
integration of computer and communications technology which will enable companies to offer virtually any 
service required by the public (Parapak, 1988) is what is happening today. Benjamin and Blunt ( I 992), on 
the same vein, said that no company is an island and as a web of networks develops and people begin to 





focus on linkages across and outside organisations, key standards will be developed that will come to 
define "open systems" to support networking. The world is changing very fast and in the developed 
countries. Now we are talking about networked societies (Castells, 1996). As the old management tradition 
gives way to the new, managerial success will be increasingly measured by how effectively IT resources, 
relative to the immediate competitors, are deployed and utilised to best connect with and serve all 
stakeholders: customers, suppliers, workers and shareholders. That is, to position their organisation to 
benefit from the ever changing environment. In fact, IT is powerful tool similar to transportation technology 
in the sense that they both bring different individuals and societies closer in a new and revolutionising way. 
Government agencies and business corporations are under constant pressure to change the structure of 
their organisations, offices and factories to increase efficiency and productivity and the products in 
information societies tends to be superior to those produced in pre-information societies. But, Youichi Ito 
(1990) warns against the threat of loss of cultural identity when foreign influence is overwhelming, beyond 
the control of the receiving country, or when influence is unidirectional for a long period of time, because 
psychologically delicate problems may emerge. This is particularly true for developing countries as they try 
to import new technologies from advanced countries. Youichi Ito tries to make his point by giving an 
example of a discussion he had with a friend, an economist. The position of his friend was that even if a 
country imports information products and exports raw materials and agricultural products. It should not be a 
problem as long as an even balance of trade is maintained and to retain a country's cultural identity is like 
believing in superstition and irrational. And he argued back by saying that people need a "balance of 
influence" apart from a "balance of payment". Therefore, it is very important to remember the impact of new 
technologies on the social and cultural foundations of the society. We cannot do more than agree to this 
important point. To keep the balance of cultural identity is very important. 
Castells (1996) writing about the networked society says that 'networks' constitute the new social 
morphology of these societies, and the diffusion of networking logic substantially modifies the operation and 
outcomes in proces.ses of production, experience, power, and culture. These networks are open 
structures, able to expand without limits, integrating new nodes as long as they are able to communicate 
within the network. A network-based social structure is a highly dynamic, open system, susceptible to 
innovating without threatening its balance. Networks are appropriate instruments for a capitalist economy 
based on innovation, globalisation, and decentralised concentration, It may be good for work, workers, and 
firms based on flexibility, and adaptability. But it is based on a culture of endless deconstruction and 
reconstruction and a polity geared towards the instant processing of new values and public moods and for 
a social organisation aiming at the suppression of space and the annihilation of time. Yet the network 
morphology is also a source of dramatic reorganisation of power relationships. Switches connecting the 
networks are the privileged instruments of power. Thus, the switchers are the power holders. Since 
networks are multiple, the interoperating codes and switches between networks become the fundamental 
sources of shaping, guiding, and misguiding societies. 
Given that advanced countries are the networked societies, the developing countries' hope lies in the 
possibility of developing a node of communication to connect with the networked societies. This can open a 
door to get access to S&T information available in the developed world and use it for their socio-economic 
development and, thus, partake in the new global economy. 
It is very obvious there is a big gap between the advanced and the developing countries in terms of science 
and technology advancement. The level of advance differs from country to country even within the so-
called developing countries. For example the SSA countries are at the very bottom almost excluded from 





the new global economy. The new competitive paradigm is based on technological capacity and 
technological capacity is mainly based on science and innovation, which is very scarce in the developing 
world. In R&D expenditures, while North America accounted for 42.8% of the world total in 1990, Latin 
America and Africa together represented less than 1% of the same total. In 1990 the G-7 countries 
accounted for 90.5% of high-technology manufacturing in the world, and were holding 80.4% of global 
computing power (US National Science board, 1991; UNESCO, 1990; Castells, 1996). The gap is, 
therefore, very huge. 
Specifically coming to IT and its diffusion in developing countries, communications and information 
technology is still practically 100 percent imported (with exception in few technologies in the NIEs) from the 
industrial countries, requiring a considerable amount of scarce foreign exchange. There is, thus, a major 
gap between the need for IT and the capacity to purchase hardware, software and services (Parapack 
(1988). There is a shortage of skilled manpower. Technological and managerial expertise is still in the 
development stage, necessitating technical and management aid from the industrial countries. 
While industrial countries are concentrating on developing and creating fully automatic and high capacity 
systems to exploit fully the economic benefits of the new technology, developing nations are struggling with 
job creation for the millions who are unemployed and with the provision of basic services in rural areas. 
Developing countries are constantly faced with conflicting objectives. Making trade-off decisions among 
objectives is extremely difficult. But to become reasonably self-reliant, every country must invest in S&T. At 
the same time countries must invest in productive activities to generate income and welfare for their people. 
There is also the need to attract foreign capital investment and venture capital to support growth. Yet, local 
entrepreneurs and businesses, which are best guarantee for technological independence, should not be 
placed at a disadvantage in the competition against larger foreign firms in their own markets. Greater co-
ordination at the international level to help the poor developing countries is also necessary. But investing 
additional time and money in economically and politically unstable countries, which already are overloaded 
with foreign debt, is becoming an insurmountable problem. 
Nonetheless, computers, particularly the microcomputers are diffusing in many sectors in the developing 
countries, including the poorest. Some of the NIEs in Asia and Latin America are even participating in the 
world market as producers. Singapore have gone as far as having in place one of the most advanced IT 
infrastructure in the world and it is even counted as one of the ten intelligent cities in the world (Newsweek 
November 9, 1998). In 1995 Brazil had 3% of the world market (WTO, 1995). India is participating in the 
supply of software with Bangalore city (one of the ten high-tech cities in the world) being the centre of its IT 
development, home of 250 high-tech companies, including home grown multinational software and 
networking giants Infosys and Wipro. Of course, if you move down the ladder of development to the least 
developed countries, IT becomes less and less significant. If there is some initial computerisation process, 
it suffers from acute shortage of infrastructure support to be of any significance. Particularly in the SSA 
countries, computers are mostly stand-alone workstations. Computer networking, where the real revolution 
and productivity lies, is still to come. 
Policy analysis in this area will play an important role in understanding the actual opportunities available for 
development. The possible constraints that block such a development could be identified. Needless to say 
that the weaknesses a developing country has such as lack of skilled manpower and supporting institutions 
need be addressed before any worthwhile strategy for development is chosen. In the process of policy 
making, the assumption is that all the main players will be involved. In other words, this is not meant to be a 
dictation by governments. Governments do play a major role, definitely, but mainly as a co-ordinators and 





creators of a conducive environment where different government economic policies are used to give the 
right incentives without disrupting the market rather helping it to function effectively. 
The alternative is to let the market forces shape what technologies to import and use. But in the developing 
countries' environment, where the market forces are not fully grown and mature, it would amount to a 
wishful thinking. For example, such a market is not present in Eritrea, for that matter in all developing 
countries. Particularly in the case of IT, even in the advanced countries, governments do intervene to 
maintain their technological competitive advantage or to have one. If we see Japan is trying to reduce the 
gap in S&T with the USA, while the latter is trying to maintain its world leadership. In both countries their 
respective governments are spending huge sums of money in this endeavour and they do it in cooperation 
with the private sector. But they don't simply sit down and let everything to the market mechanism. The 
same will be required of the governments in developing countries. 
IT is widely recognised and singled out as the centre of the present wave of technological change even in 
the NIEs. They are heavily investing in it because it is considered the basis of future development. Today's 
world is highly informitised. Information is at the centre of economic activities and computers and 
communications are making the process of recording, storing, processing, and disseminating information 
very easy and cheap. One can say that we are coming to closely associate "wealth and power" to the 
control of "information and knowledge". 
The question, therefore, is not whether IT is too advanced for the developing countries to master or 
appropriate technological choice. It is rather a question of whether IT can help the developing countries to 
reduce the S&T gap and enhance their economic survival or not. 
No doubt developing countries are investing in IT. We can have a glimpse of it by looking into the 
international financial institutions' lending. Based on a database on Bank lending for information technology 
components in Bank investment projects, Hanna and Boyson (1993) analyse key regional and sector 
trends. This database contained almost 1,000 projects from fiscal 1986, 1989, 1990, and 1991, a portfolio 
representing about $100 billion in total investment lending. A major finding of the review is that IT lending is 
now an extremely dynamic business area for the Bank. It‟s lending for IT (not including 
telecommunications) rose from $379 million in 1986 to $890 million in 1991, a 235 percent increase - six 
times the 39 percent growth in total Bank leading over the same period. The dynamism of Bank lending in 
IT has been largely the result of escalating demand by borrower countries for computing power that has 
become increasingly flexible, reliable, and lower in cost. 
In the report, it is said that between 1986 and 1991, the Eastern Europe and countries of the former Soviet 
Union went from having the lowest regional share of IT lending to having the highest. Its share grew from 
$66 million to $330 million, even though the number of projects in this region was the lowest among all 
regions. This reflects a major increase in the IT intensity of Bank lending to economies whose financial and 
market institutions are being created or transformed. A spearhead project in this regard is the Hungarian 
Financial Systems Modernisation Project. Eighty percent of the investment in this project - or $112 million – 
is directed at creating a data network linking 240 branches of the 12 largest banks with the National Bank of 
Hungary for inter-bank accounting transactions. 
The Asia region has had the second largest volume of IT lending since 1990. Consistent with the rapid 
pace of industrialisation and urbanisation, IT applications have focused on natural and urban resources 
management and on industrial modernisation and pollution control in projects in China, India, Indonesia, 
the Philippines, and Sri Lanka. 





In Latin America, technology applications have tended to support the recent liberalisation of previously 
inward - oriented middle-income countries, and have been aimed at the modernisation of trade and finance, 
public sector management, and human resource development. Examples include the computerisation of 
customs activities in Mexico, public tax revenue and expenditures tracking activities in Bolivia and Jamaica, 
and education activities in Brazil and the Dominican Republic. 
Finally the African region has had the largest number of projects with IT components of any region since 
1986. The main focus there has been on automating data-intensive tasks in public administration, mostly in 
central ministries. Compared with those in other regions, IT components of Bank-assisted projects in Africa 
tend to be small and less complex.  
According to the survey results of study made by Hanna and Boyson (ibid.) most of the managers had 
information technology components of $1 million or more in their projects, which in many cases 
represented minor components of much larger projects. The managers were extremely positive in their 
perceptions of the impact of IT. Among survey findings, 78 percent of respondents perceived that - to a 
great or very great extent - IT was critical to achieving project objectives. About 85 percent of the 
respondents expected major or transformational improvements from IT applications in their projects. The 
most frequently cited improvements: better financial management and reporting, improved co-ordination 
between organisational activities, and improved organisational response to beneficiary or market needs. 
More need be done to avoid the increasing isolation and marginalisation of developing countries for 
information technology plays a big role in bringing the new global economy (see Porter, 1990; Piore and 
Sabel, 1986). What is new is not so much that international trade is an important part of each nation's 
economy, but that a national economy works as a unit at the world level on real time (Carnoy, 1994). The 
new information and communication technology make it possible for all countries with the technology to 
gather and act on information at breakneck speed, to move products world-wide, and, with the proper 
approach, to gain access to capital and highly skilled labour from a world-wide poof. 
There is more to this, the concept of Third World as such has disappeared (Castells, 1993). According to 
Carnoy (1994) what used to be known as the Third World economies are now different economic groups 
redefined in terms of their relationship to the world economy by their ability to produce goods and services 
related to information. They are broken up among four groups. First, the clear winners are the rapidly 
growing newly industrialising countries of Asia. Second, follow the potential winner countries such as 
Mexico (as part of a North American free trade area), Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Venezuela, 
the recovering relatively highly educated Latin American societies. As a third group come the large 
continental economies of India and China on their way to integration in the new-world economy primarily 
because of their potentially massive markets and large stock of highly skilled human capital. Finally the 
clear losers come, the Fourth World of marginal rural economies on all three continents and of Africa's and 
Latin America's sprawling urban peripheries. 
Potentially there are high payoffs from "successful" IT investments in developing countries. But the severity 
of institutional weaknesses and information gaps in developing countries puts a high premium on setting 
the enabling policy environment, diffusing best practices, investing in complementary inputs, training local 
staff, and developing the infrastructure and support services to realise and sustain such payoffs. In order to 
avoid such pitfalls, a strategic approach to Information Technology lending must be adopted (Hanna and 
Boyson, ibid.). Currently, IT applications are typically incorporated as a component of an investment 
operation in response to specific needs of the project, with little appreciation of information needs within 
and across sectors. As a result, information systems are often disparate and isolated, within little capacity 





for sharing data, and they sometimes provide overlapping of conflicting functionality and incomplete 
coverage, even when concerned with a common function within the public sector, such as financial 
management. Lending to isolated and specific IT applications may not also address the policy, skill, and 
infrastructure factors that are often critical to the sustainability of these components and to the effective 
assimilation and diffusion of the new technology. 
IT can be used to capture and mobilise local knowledge, to disseminate it among institutions and economic 
agents, and to blend it with global knowledge. It is enabling technology, indispensable for competing in an 
increasing number of global industries and services. To exploit the potential of IT, developing countries 
need to overcome various barriers to diffusion. They also need to develop new infrastructure and networks. 
And they need to invest in new skills and learning. Developing the systems, infrastructure, and capabilities 
requires a strategy and no small amount of co-ordination among public, private, local, and foreign actors. 
Perhaps the biggest opportunity IT holds for the public sector is to inform policy analysis and strategic 
management, to improve monitoring and accountability, to facilitate participation and lateral communication, 
and to enhance learning and feedback. 
Particularly in developing countries, improved information and communication systems could enable public 
institutions to respond to rising demands for diversified public services, new modes of delivery, faster 
transactions, and more transparent processes. 
Developing countries and aid agencies need to keep pace with the associated technological, 
organisational, and human resource imperatives. They also need to overcome various-barriers - in the 
adoption and diffusion of new technology and in the investment in new skills, practices, networks, and 
infrastructure. Particularly the enabling technologies such as IT need be singled out and given priority, at 
least to be able to get access to the scientific and technological knowledge that the present world has been 
able to accumulate. It is in this line that Eritrea needs to come up with new and bold initiative in IT 
development. 
13.2 How to bridge the gap? 
We have just being exploring the trend of IT revolution in the world and it is very clear that developing 
countries are running after a moving target. Catching-up in S&T and economic development when 
advanced countries are moving at a faster rate of change in every field of knowledge is a daunting task. 
Even though it looks as an impossible task, Eritrea, as a latecomer, has to study the opportunity of learning 
from the success or failure of others before it. With government clear vision and leadership commitment, a 
careful plan to bridge the gap is a possibility (no matter how long it takes) as demonstrated by the 
experience of the NIEs. But the road is full of caveats, the country need to avoid the common mistakes 
made by SSA countries in the industrialisation process. In the following sections, we will discuss about the 
leapfrogging possibilities available to Eritrea. First, we will discuss about the necessary conditions to set in 
motion a viable development without which any development process cannot take place. Then, we will 
elaborate how the S&T for development can be established in Eritrea - from the general to the specific IT 
related leapfrogging possibilities. 
If we start from the experience of SSA countries, which in general is considered a total failure, the lessons 
are clear for everyone to see. The conclusion we have drawn in Part II, in short, was that a viable solution 
to the African problem has not been found yet. But one thing is clear: SSA countries do not have the 
necessary technological base to effectively compete in the global markets. We have said that there is no 





way out except they need to re-invent themselves. They need to rethink of the way their governments, their 
industries and markets are organised and managed. With regard to the creation of internationally 
competitive industrial capacity, they should be able to create a strong S&T basis. Now using the case of 
Eritrea, we will try to show how to reverse the current situation. Before, let us briefly see what we are going 
to do starting from the creation of an environment conducive for development. The following points show 
what we mean by conducive environment: 
1. Create a conducive environment for development such achieving political stability, creating efficient 
government administration free from corruption and accountable to the people (leadership and 
managerial capability), and develop a network of regional and international co-operation; 
2. Develop realistic and sustainable economic development strategies, have appropriate policies, 
develop the human resources, develop the institutional capability; 
3. Develop science and technology policy to support the socio-economic development and in 
particular to develop the industrial technology base; 
4. Raise required funds for investment and allocate and use these scarce resources efficiently; 
5. Develop proper implementation plans and manage them effectively and efficiently; 
6. Evaluate and follow up the implementation and adjust or upgrade them in line with the changes in 
the political, economic and social environment. 
In this section, we will continue to discuss about the environment conducive for development in Eritrea. In 
the next section we will continue to discuss about policies. If properly used, these can be very effective tool 
to plan and co-ordinate activities at the national, sector and industrial level. It is within this framework that 
we are going to discuss the remaining case of Eritrea. 
The right environment 
To begin with, any country needs the right environment for development to take place. These include peace 
and stability within the country and without. The SSAs experience has shown that its absence has created 
destruction and under-development. Plundering state assets and wealth became common. Ethnicity has 
been used for political power control games with devastating effects. Too many military coupes and 
dictatorships running countries under their grips through corrupt government administrative systems too 
busy enriching themselves to give attention to real issues of development. When accountability is put down 
the drain, anything can happen but development. 
Eritrea was not in the right environment for development in the 30-year war of liberation that ended in 1991. 
The last seven years were a good example of the right environment for development. Unfortunately that is 
again tinted by the recent border conflict with Ethiopia. This needs to end peacefully soon in exactly the 
same way as the border dispute with Yemen was solved. 
Eritrea, on the other hand, is very lucky to have a clean government very committed to development. 
Internally, the country is united and there are not problems of ethnic conflicts that could lead to 
destabilisation. The government administration is not big and administrative bureaucracies are very limited. 
The government has openly debated the formation of a lean and efficient government administration and is 
making progress towards it. But it is obvious professional administrators and managers are in short supply 
in the country. It is a problem the government has recognised and is dealing with it investing heavily in 
highly skilled manpower development. It has also recruited a significant number of foreign professionals 
and academics to limit the critical shortages. But more need to be done to limit brain drain problems. 





Debt mismanagement is one of the causes of underdevelopment. There is a big lesson that Eritrea could 
learn from the SSA countries, the problem of debt. The debate on the debt crisis in Africa is not over yet 
and there are different ways of explaining it. One thing is sure, though, that heavy unscrupulous borrowing 
and the following mismanagement are at the root of the debt crisis. Now that Eritrea is looking for ways to 
get the necessary fund to develop the infrastructure required to attract investment and lay down the basis 
for industrialisation, borrowing will definitely be there. It is inevitable and necessary. What shall Eritrea do? 
It needs to acquire the expertise in debt management and project management so that the funds are 
properly used. But more than anything else a clean and accountable government is the answer. Eritrea 
needs to continue to build a culture of transparency and accountability to keep corruption at bay from its 
environment. Government crisis management retards scientific and technological development. Usually 
when governments overspend and create a considerable public deficit, they start to introduce austerity 
measures which at times result in sudden cuts of budgets across the board. The first to suffer from these 
cuts are the very public institutions that were created to give the structural support for the necessary 
technological capability development (e.g., the experience of Brazil we have seen in chapter 5). As a 
consequence, a chain reaction follows, which ends up in paralysing the development of the whole country 
leading to its stagnation. Therefore, Eritrean government expenditure should be kept under control 
(particularly military expenditure). Any political decision that may lead to such possibilities or extremely fast 
and huge infrastructure investments should be avoided (accelerated development financed through 
substantial external borrowing) because it is the major cause of debt crisis of the 1970s in developing 
countries. Any expenditure should be related to the ability of the country to absorb the know-how and the 
efficient use of the infrastructure developed. 
Government role is determinant as a catalyst in economic development. Governments play determinant 
role in the economic development of developing countries. The case of Singapore shows that clearly. The 
strategic moves made by the Singaporean government were, first, to draw in MNCs, which were searching 
for labour intensive operation bases in the second half of 1960s; second, to establish shipyards and 
defence industry as well as attract oil related companies in late 1960s; third, to make l0-ycar economic 
upgrading plan and rapid expansion of technical tertiary education in late 1970s; fourth, to pull in MNCs in 
new growth industries in early 1980s; finally, since 1985 it is encouraging entrepreneurs, overseas ventures 
and MNCs to use Singapore as regional hub, push for R&D and innovation, and go for economic alliances 
to capitalise on the boom in Asia. It is working. Eritrean government can learn this dynamics and play its 
role as a catalyst in the technological and economic development of the country. 
Most often African countries have failed to bring stability in their environment, to create an accountable and 
efficient government system, and support the right technologies for the development of industry. They are 
most of them deep into the vicious circle of underdevelopment and their people have accepted poverty, 
diseases and illiteracy as a way of life. Each one of these things is very important and a real courage and 
determination is required to act immediately to achieve them. The right state of mind would be to believe in 
oneself. Africans have to believe that they have the capacity of solving their problems with their own 
resources. Many have very negative and very pessimistic view of Africa. Even Africans themselves are 
tempted to believe in some sort of fate, which is mercilessly keeping Africa chained. Africa needs to look at 
figures like Mandela and hope to rise above its current difficulties. Luckily for Eritrea, there is no short 
supply of the right attitude to development and self-reliance because of the long war of liberation 
experience. This country firmly believes in its ability to raise above all odds and win. It believes in education 
as education is at the basis of every change. During the darkest periods of struggle, education and training 
was going on under the trees in the bushes and in the bunkers. There is no need to wait for school 
buildings before we could start teaching and learning. In a world moulded in the capitalist system, only the 





'fittest' can survive. We need to think like the desert plant. Its world is made of scarce water and not of 
plenty. It survives on its ingenuity because it has developed drought-resistant characteristics. Exactly, 
Eritrea has used its ingenuity to come with creative solutions to its problems depending on its people and 
the available scarce resources. That is what it needs to continue to do also in the future because catching-
up is a possibility. 
Which are the right S&T policies for Eritrea? First of all, there are no so called 'best policies of strategies'. 
Second, there are a number of possible right policies for a given country at a given moment in history, and 
Eritrea has a number of possible choices. In short, the S&T policy should be firmly based on the national 
economic development plan of the country, it should be the one the Eritrean leadership believes in and is 
committed to follow consistently for a long-term. This implies that a national consensus of the leaders 
(political leaders, leaders of the business community, leaders in the scientific community, and the opinion 
leaders from the public in general) must first be achieved and then institutionalised through national policies 
and strategies, or legislation, or some other ways to ensure long-term commitment. It implies also that it 
should be consistent with other government policies. In addition, to gain support of the people, it should be 
promoted widely. 
Clear vision, action and learning, consistency, determination and perseverance in action are very central. 
Eritrea should work with the same tenacity and perseverance of its thirty-year war of liberation in this war 
against the worst enemies: poverty, diseases, and illiteracy. There are no quick solutions. Its S&T policies 
should clearly and explicitly aim at the eradication of the above mentioned enemies. Above all it should 
focus on the development of managerial capability building because even the best of the policies and 
intentions fail without it. Learning, learning and continuous learning at the government level, enterprise level 
and individual level are a must. Therefore the culture of learning through experience and education should 
be the foundation blocks of its long-term development programmes. Today IT has invaded the world and 
every aspect of our life is becoming 'informitised'. It is a pervasive technology and a very good tool for 
knowledge creation. Access to information and knowledge is exclusively dependent on it. If the culture of 
change and learning is to be realised, Eritrea should see and invest in IT with interest and care. On the 
other hand, it is not possible to avoid it because the trend is that every human activity is revolutionised by it. 
Eritrea cannot afford to be left out. 
The right people 
Human resource development, use and retention are crucial. Another important lesson from African 
countries is that developing skilled manpower is not enough by itself. It is what you do with your skilled 
people that count most. There is a big problem of 'brain drain' in developing countries. It is very pronounced 
in Africa. Besides the human resource underutilisation in Africa is a big problem, Therefore, Eritrea should 
from the very beginning learn to efficiently manage its human resources. This means that every possible 
incentive should be used to retain the skilled people because the country has invested in them and they are 
a critical factor in the development of technological capability. If you are not able to do so the dependence 
on foreigners will continue at a much higher cost and the vicious circle will never be broken down. Giving 
these highly skilled people the remuneration and chance to fully participate in the political and economic 
sphere of the country could be a good motivator to retain and utilise them properly. 
At the present time in Eritrea, the government is playing a very central economic role and it seems the 
same trend will continue for the foreseeable future. The task is huge and requires highly skilled manpower 
at the top echelons of government. Since the beginning of 1996, the top Eritrean government officials, 
including the president of the country, are undergoing the 





MBA training with the Open University of UK. This attitude toward education shown by the government is 
the future hope of this country. Education and training are in general given priority and are expanding very 
quickly. How far will all of this go? It is to be seen yet. But the Macro Policy (1994) and the National 
Economic Policy Framework and Program (NEPFP) are clear about it. Human capital formation is rightly 
considered the basis of development of the country. Evidence to this is not only the rhetoric of the 
government officials but the US$60 million project for highly skilled manpower development funded by the 
World Bank. There is no doubt the country is in the right direction. 
The right institutions 
Institutional proliferation in the name of developing the institutional capability should be always avoided. 
This is particularly true for countries small and poor like Eritrea. First, the existing institutional capacity 
within the ministries should be fully utilised. To make this happen, an inventory of such capacities should be 
made and their services made available to all. The consequence of this will be the adoption of highly 
flexible and open organisational structures and organisational culture as well. Second, where more of 
institutional capacity is required, all potential users should be involved in the making of them so that the 
possible antagonism and rejection between the established and the new institutions is avoided. In Eritrea 
there is poverty of visible institutions but very flexible mission oriented task forces are continuously formed 
and disbanded at the government level to address many national issues in the meantime the new emerging 
institutions take their place. Important development decisions continue to be taken and infrastructure works 
are moving fast relative to the resources of the country. 
Even though entrepreneurship in Eritrea is not new thing, it is not playing a central role in the economic 
development yet. It should occupy its rightful place as a central agent of innovation and development. In 
fact, what the government should do is to act as a real entrepreneur itself (like Singapore). This would 
stimulate, facilitate and prepare the ground for the growth of entrepreneurs in the country. The privatisation 
programme initiated by the government is moving ahead in the right direction. Nineteen out of the forty-two 
public enterprises (excluding utility services) have been privatised so far (Eritrean Profile, May 15, 1999). 
But appropriate institutions should be established to look after the needs of entrepreneurs such as credit 
facilities, information centres, and consulting services. 
The right technology 
The experience of the Tigers shows that starting with simple technologies in the light industries and go 
integrating backwards into heavy industries as well as the high-tech industries is a more sustainable 
strategy. Similarly, Eritrea can go immediately for the light industries for export, for example, in textile, 
leather, salt, fish, vegetable and fruits, dairy products, glass and marble, and other construction materials 
production industries. The government could play a catalytic role by promoting well-tested technologies and 
see their diffusion. But it is not said that some small high-tech firms cannot be established profitably as 
evidenced by the experience gained in Fred Hollows ILO Laboratory in Asmara. 
Eritrea can leapfrog using IT. Eritrea by investing aggressively in highly skilled manpower can leapfrog into 
the IT use, particularly to support the development of the service industry such as trade, tourism and other 
social services. As IT professionals increase in number, then, the software industry can be considered. 
Once you have created a critical mass of such manpower, it is possible to creatively use it in particular 
segments of that market. On the other side, it could enable you to exploit the full potential of imported IT 
technologies in terms of adaptation to local needs in all sectors of the economy because IT is a pervasive 
technology. 





Eritrea can learn a lot from Singapore in developing IT infrastructure for becoming a trade and service-hub 
in the region. The Eritrean government has made it clear in its macro policy (1994) that the long-term 
strategy is making Eritrea a service-hub in the region. In this respect, Eritrea has a lot to learn from 
Singapore. Singapore has one of the most efficient and modern ports in the world, so Eritrea can learn how 
to transform its ports of Massawa and Assab to make them internationally competitive. Singapore is a 
financial centre in Southeast Asia so can be Eritrea in the region of East Africa. Singapore is a teleport in 
the region so can be Eritrea if it takes all necessary actions to learn quickly the tricks of the trade from 
countries like Singapore. The same can be said of tourism. Eritrea has one of the most beautiful and 
unpolluted beaches in the world with about 360 coral-reef islands in the Red Sea. These can be changed 
into a thriving tourism sector. To exploit to the fullest potential such tourism, Eritrea needs a good 
international airport well integrated in the international air services system. For all these Eritrea needs to 
develop a modern IT infrastructure for the 2lst century in the coming decades. Singapore has a very 
sophisticated IT infrastructure that has been able to build in the last 15-20 years, so it is possible to take 
Singapore as a model for Eritrea. The only qualification we need to make is that any model cannot be a 
perfect match; therefore, whatever Eritrea imitates from other countries should always be adapted to its 
regional scale and local socio-economic situation. 
In the process, the Government of Eritrea should play a catalytic role in the development of IT manpower 
and computerising the public administration. To do so it needs a proper S&T policy-making body to 
determine priorities and co-ordinate activities in the creation of an effective national innovation system. It 
should also support the diffusion of IT application among small and medium-size enterprises, promote 
software and computer services, mobilise local and global information resources, and induce collaboration 
among public, private, academic, and foreign agencies. The remaining part of the chapter is devoted to the 
discussion of how Eritrea can establish S&T policy-making body and an IT board to make sure the 
opportunities offered by this revolutionary technology in order to leapfrog intermediate stages to land on the 
stage where the country can effectively use IT in particular in trade, finance, tourism, transport and 
communications and other social services. 
13.3 S&T Policies 
When we talk of science within the context of the developing countries like Eritrea, the emphasis is going to 
be on the application of science and technology first and foremost. Developing countries, as late comers, 
have one advantage in the sense that they don't need to reinvent the wheel. There is a lot of scientific 
knowledge available to it from which to select and use to solve its problems, though at a price. The same 
can be said of technology. It is very important to remember Kim's model (chapter 2 and as seen in Part I), 
which is based on the experience of South Korea. The model argues that fast catching-up is possible for 
latecomers by starting from importing and assimilating mature technologies. Therefore, Eritrea can choose 
the right technologies and effectively use them to solve its problems. But even the so-called available 
knowledge at times seems to be very inaccessible to those who need it most. This is because to be able to 
choose you need to know. If you don't know how can you choose what you need? That means knowledge 
is at the basis of every change. 
The advances made in S&T in this century is tremendous. Particularly the pace of change seen in second 
half of this century has no parallel in the human history of development. But unfortunately these advances 
are not evenly distributed among the countries. The previous chapters showed that clearly. The diagnosis 
in our research focused on the NIEs, the Sub-Saharan African region, and of course Eritrea. At the 
beginning of this chapter, we have seen the trend of development in S&T occurring at the world frontier. 





Finally in this last part, we are exploring the possible solution for Eritrea to develop its S&T base for socio-
economic development in the future. 
Our point of departure will be the policy-making activity, in terms of its process and content. While we touch 
the broad S&T spectrum, we will continue to focus on IT as the pervasive technology that need be given 
priority as an infrastructure for the whole economy and in particular the services sector, which is of strategic 
interest to Eritrea. First, the study will identify the unique characteristics and situations of the country that 
help or hinder the building of S&T for a sound socio-economic development and prepare a plan of action 
commensurate with the capability of the country to absorb and diffuse it. To enable a least developed 
country like Eritrea to be fully integrated into the global economy, it is a long time process. What is 
important is to keep the country connected immediately, first, and progressively integrated fully, later. 
Vision and objectives 
We had seen that the Lagos Plan of Action defined the long-run objectives of SSA countries as is 
'sustainable economic growth combined with social justice'. We have seen also in Part II how the SSA 
countries have failed to integrate S&T to the long-term development objectives. How could Eritrea achieve 
these? 
First of all, let us divide into more convenient and implementable socio-economic development objectives 
and try to link them with S&T objectives. Stewart, Lall and Wangwe (1992) divided the so-called 
'sustainable economic growth‟ combined with social justice' in four vital sub-objectives. Below, we give an 
example of how Eritrea could integrate these four possible major economic and social objectives to S&T 
policies that can support their achievement: 
1. The attainment of a viable balance of payments. To help achieve this, S&T could be designed to help: 
- increase labour productivity through education and technical training; 
- increase industry's productivity by supporting technology transfer negotiation and implementation; 
- increase the knowledge base of industries by providing databases of markets and new technology 
development information; 
- industrial research work in co-ordination with manufacturing firms to produce and commercialise 
new exportable products; 
- Improve management and office-work productivity using IT, and allow a real-time business 
networking with suppliers and customers. 
2. The achievement of sustained growth in agricultural and industrial production. S&T can contribute in 
the achievement of this objective by: 
- Agricultural research: seed improvement, cattle breeding, pest control etc.; 
- Environment conservation, combat expansion of deserts, accelerate forests growth water 
resources management, etc.; 
- Developing environment friendly agro-industry and fisheries technologies; 
- Guiding a balanced growth of the economy with the wild life and nature conservation. 
3. Full participation of the labour force in productive activities, at adequate remuneration. This can be 
helped if S&T policies of the country focus on the human capital formation of: 
- Giving continuous training to employees to make them employable; 
- Minimising brain drain of highly skilled manpower by increasing the technological base of industries 
and creating conducive environment for innovation and work in particular that of scientists and 
engineers; 
- Protecting the rights of innovators. 





4. Comprehensive access of the population as a whole to basic needs including basic health care, basic 
education, food, water and sanitation. This has to do with the equity side of the equation, and S&T can 
contribute a lot by: 
- Designing a preventive health system and efficient and effective health services; 
- Promoting relevant research on health problems peculiar to the country (like eradication of malaria 
and other tropical diseases); 
- Designing relevant curricula for education system and regularly update them; 
- Developing a higher education system more relevant and linked to the country's economy (pushing 
the scientific frontier should not be the main aim or avoid creating scientists and technologist more 
in tune with the advanced countries' needs rather than their country); 
- Developing a scientific body capable to give consulting services in all scientific, technological, 
social, economic and political areas; 
- Improving city (town) planning and housing in line with access to safe water and hygienic 
dwellings. 
Of course, this is a sketch of how we could proceed to do it. Otherwise, each economic sector needs to 
commission a study on how best to link S&T policies to support the socio-economic development objectives 
of the country.  
Getting access to the scientific knowledge it does not make one capable of producing things based on that 
knowledge. You need to master the technology. To master technology you need money to buy it and time 
to learn it. On the other hand, in a free market system, only the fittest can survive. In a world dominated by 
the developed countries, the least developed countries are most vulnerable and weak and are even non-
existent as players in the world market. If we can use the analogy of the firm, a firm that cannot compete 
loses its market and is bankrupt. It ceases to exist. It is almost the same with the least developed countries 
with the only exception that you cannot wipe them out of the map as in the case of a bankrupt firm. 
Particularly if you see those heavily indebted countries, it seems they are given periodic debt restructuring 
and some additional financial loan from the Bank or the IMF to keep them alive to continue to pay their 
debt. All experts agree that these countries cannot break down the vicious circle but this is what a free 
market system means. There is no room for emotions. Every new born child in these countries has a debt 
burden on his shoulders which in the future make impossible for him to be educated, become a scientist or 
an engineer to solve his peoples' problems. It seems that the world has accepted the fact the child pay for 
the mistakes of his parents for heavily borrowing in the past. What about those who have given loans on 
risky projects? Fortunately, Eritrea does not have any heavy burden debt, as is the case in many SSA 
countries. This means that it has a better chance to build its S&T infrastructure based on the experience of 
others. 
But Eritrea does not have an explicit S&T policy, nor does it have a separate policy-making body. The 
Macro Policy (1994) makes some broad statements, which we will sec later. With regard to IT policy, an 
attempt had been made to establish an Agency, EISA, to advise on policy matters to the Office of the 
President but no national IT plan has been produced. The Agency does not have the required institutional 
maturity to undertake such a task. 
Who is directing the scientific and technological development of the country, indirectly or multiplicity, are the 
investment policy and the export-led free market policy that the country has embraced. The investment 
policy is trying to attract foreign direct investments to the country, looking particularly to the transfer of 
modern technologies that can make the country more competitive in the international market. Joint ventures 





with the Government are encouraged. The Government is aggressively promoting partnership rather than 
aid as a reliable base for long-term socio-economic development. 
One of the attractions given to potential investors by the Government is low tax and free movement of 
capital and profits. Export tax is eliminated. This is designed to increase private investment, local or foreign, 
to come forward with new technology and efficient and effective management to be able to produce goods 
and services for export market. Therefore, these policies are expected to create an environment conducive 
for the market to select the right technology, possibly advanced technology if it is to be able to compete in 
the international markets. 
Scientific research in the country is only beginning. With the new structure in the civil services, research 
and training departments have been established in every Ministry and, at least in theory, have been given 
the autonomy to undertake research activities. But they are all at the rudimentary stage. It is very difficult to 
expect much from them in the near future before they could get appropriate staff for the job and the 
necessary budget, the most difficult hurdle in the process. Budget making requires institutional maturity if it 
is going to serve effectively the country. And no institution can survive without the necessary budget. In 
Eritrea, to build a national innovation system, S&T need be institutionalised and the policymaking body 
need be established to decide in national priorities and given the required budget to implement them. This 
will be our next discussion. 
Institutions are very central to the development of S&T. It is known that there are 'market institutions' and 
'non-market institutions'. Market institutions are established to give services at profit. If profits decrease or 
are long to come, these institutions are not attracted. For example, in Eritrea the private enterprises are all 
small sized. Long-term investment is less attractive to them. Investment in research is out of their sight (the 
same has been observed in NIEs in Part I). Therefore, a non-market institution is required to fill the gap and 
undertake some research activities to adapt or innovate, if successful competition in the world market is to 
be realised. This is where the intervention of government becomes a necessity. 
Governments in South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore did it when the private sector was not in a position to 
do it (see Part I). Providing skilled manpower and expertise to support the rise of, the small private 
businesses to international competition is a public good. The government needs to invest in it. In fact, every 
government in SSA countries is doing something already. But it needs to be more consistent and 
systematic and based on own resources, though with the assistance of the international community. But it 
cannot be based on the whims of donors or NGOs. It is an infrastructure the country itself need invest first. 
An institutionalised body is required to build this infrastructure progressively and systematically. Eritrea 
needs to act immediately to lay the founding grounds. 
Policy-making bodies direct and co-ordinate all S&T activities. In Eritrea, even though separate S&T policy-
making bodies are not created, it does not mean S&T policies are not made in the country. These explicit or 
implicit policies are made somewhere. A Ministerial Committee, a Ministry, or a Commission (or the 
industry itself) may initiate it' or it may be the result of the interaction of all of them. In the case of implicit 
policies, different Ministries policies and activities do create a conducive or less so environment for S&T 
development in the country, which slowly emerge as a norm. Now what is required in Eritrea is to recognise 
the strategic importance of S&T and make sure someone takes the responsibility of it. 
Generic statements, such as those given in the Macro Policy, are not enough. Saying 'research and 
development efforts in selected sectors' is vague till somebody tells us which are these selected sectors or 
priority areas. We need to know how it is going to be done, who is going to do it, when it is going to be 





done, how much is going to cost us and what are the expected results. Similarly saying 'keep Eritrea 
abreast of developments in production' tra6sport and service technologies in order to assure an upgraded 
and modern economic system that is competitive in the world' is vague. It is too general to have any 
directional value to the country. Somebody needs to interpret it and give direction to all partners in the 
national innovation system. Each R&D department at ministry level cannot, on their own' undertake this 
responsibility. 
Therefore, the role of the policy-making body, which we will call it Ministerial Committee for Science and 
Technology (MCST), would be to give a clear direction through its S&T policies. Everybody should know 
which particular technologies are selected as the target group to develop the industrial technological base 
of the country. For example, in each sector of the economy there are many available alternative 
technologies, which ones do we give priority and promote? In agriculture drip-irrigation is very important for 
an arid zone like Eritrea. Desalination technology is another alternative very important to supply water for 
drinking and agriculture because the country has more than 1000kms of arid coastal lines potentially fertile. 
It could be animal husbandry technology for the country is rich in animals. Further, it could be modern port 
facilities and transport technology, like containerisation technology; sustainable fishing technologies; 
modern construction technologies and methods; and IT as a basic infrastructure for the financial sector, 
trade, tourism and other services if the country wants to be financial and services hub in the region etc. 














The place of the MCST in the government structure could be as shown in Figure 13.1 above. The 
committee members should be taken not only from the government side but also from the private sector 
and the scientific community at large. The suggestion is to include Office of the President, Ministry of 
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Tourism, Ministry of Local Government and from the scientific community (University of Asmara, 
representatives from research institutes, and representatives from Scientists and Scholars in Diaspora). 
The number should not be more than 15 to make it more versatile and less cumbersome. The 
chairmanship could be that of the Office of the President and the secretary of the committee could be the 
Director of Research of the University of Asmara. 
Figure 13.2 does give a general framework of how the Ministerial Committee could develop its policies and 
strategies to help in the accelerated economic development. This is to avoid one of the major problems 
observed in the SSA countries, the absence of clear S&T policies that are integrated to socio-economic 
development. Each economic sector identifies critical technologies, which later are integrated into a 
national science and technology priority list. Then, the MCST will make sure that any research undertaken 
in the country with own money or with international funding is of the priority list and has a particular mission 
toward the achievement of the national development objective. 
With regard to industrial technology, at least to begin with, a unit within the University of Asmara College of 
Engineering or a new autonomous technology institute need be established. This should be done in 
partnership with the private sector where ideas of product adaptation and innovation of industrial 
technology could be tested, improved and diffused quickly. The country has to go a long way to build a 
national innovation system where the university, technical institutions, R&D institutes, industrial technology 
research institutes, and companies' R&D work co-operatively and in a complementary way to produce and 
diffuse technology to help build an internationally competitive economy. MCST should immediately try to lay 
the groundwork for such a development. 















































Similarly, one other institution that need be established is the 'national academy of science and arts'. As 
shown in Figure 13.3, Eritrean scholars and professionals in the Diaspora could play a very important role 
and could get a channel through which they could contribute in the development of S&T of the country. It is 
possible to start with existing small number of institutes and progressively builds it as a full-fledged science 
and arts academy. This is something that NIEs of Asia in particular have effectively used. 
Clear S&T policies where the national priorities are set are very important. Particularly the place of IT need 
be spelled out. This is a job the MCST could do. Therefore, ITPAC could become the ministerial committee 
with broader mandate to include all S&T policies and not only IT policies, as is it is today. A national policy 
is required to ensure the harmonious implementation and operation of information resources, services and 
systems throughout the society. Co-ordination and compatibility of the overall national information system is 
very important. Better complementary and compatible legislation concerning the provision of information is 
very desirable. Better responsiveness to the implications of the IT and more effective participation in 
regional and international information systems and services is extremely desirable (Montvilloff, 1990). It is 
what MCST should aim to achieve through ECB. 















The point we have tried to make is that Eritrea need to establish S&T policy-making body to direct and co-
ordinate the development of science and technology for a sound industrial technology base. We have 
called this body MCST and have suggested its place and in the government structure and its composition. 
In the next section, we will discuss computer board to be established under the MCST. 
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13.4 The future of IT in Eritrea 
There is no question that IT in Eritrea is at its infancy. But there is an encouraging sign of relatively quick 
learning in the field thanks to a small number of computing and communications business firms, mostly 
from the Eritreans coming back from abroad. On the side of the Government the learning is also there 
because office computerisation is encouraged but it needs to be more systematic than has been in the 
past. The regulatory body is also moving slowly. Recently a new Proclamation No. 102/1998 has been 
enacted on March 1998 to invest the power of regulating the industry of communications to the Department 
of Communications. The private sector is ahead of the government and is pushing for such regulations to 
be introduced as soon as possible for they want to be in Internet services business. Some e-mail services 
are already introduced in the country but full Internet services are not there. Only very recently, in August 
1999, the go ahead for internet development was given. 
Taking for granted that Eritrea will be connected to Internet by the end of the year, the debate should focus 
more on how best to exploit the opportunities offered by this revolutionising tool. Eritrea is becoming a 
market driven economy. The joint venture attempt in the field of telecommunications between Daewoo and 
the Government of Eritrea is taken as a clear indication of fast progress sought in communications 
infrastructure development. This knowhow and capital injection could accelerate the development of the 
country by laying down a modern digital information and communication infrastructure for the country. 
A good Information and communications infrastructure could be used as the basis for development of many 
'valued added services' such as Internet. Here, it is very important to mention, for reasons of sustainability, 
which the private sector must be given the necessary incentives to push it to invest and to grow nationally 
and to compete in the region as well. Wasting more time would only mean killing the opportunity to become 
regional players. To do so goes perfectly in line with current policies of Eritrea: to become a service hub in 
the region. It is very important to recall at this juncture that there are already a number of Internet services 
giving organisations operating in USA or Europe to cater for the Eritrean communities in Diaspora (like 
Dehai, Asmarino, Visafric and Eritrea.net). These can be encouraged to establish nodes in Eritrea and by 
so doing we could have a smooth transfer of technology. Or they can join hands with computer businesses 
already operating in Eritrea such as Tfanus, Ewan Technology Solutions, ETS etc. to work in partnership. 
Once this point is reached, the country will be connected to the Global Information Infrastructure. But these 
are more than a technical issue. It is political, social, cultural, and legal issue as well. It is political because 
IT requires new structures and these may lead to change in power structure of organisations. Different 
interest groups will fight some to defend old power structures while others will fight to control more power. 
This possible conflict of interest should be carefully managed. Appropriate policies and strategies should 
ensure the development of national information and communications infrastructure that is reliable and 
accessible to all sections of the society must be developed. 
We have said that the process is a social and cultural issue as well because people will be required to 
change their beliefs and attitudes to go in line with the change brought by the new technologies. Cultural 
changes take time to happen. A great care must be paid to possible stress of rapid changes in the Eritrean 
society and the risk of losing one's identity. The wrong conception of western culture adoption as a 
prerequisite to development should be fought vigorously. Similarly in the legal arena preparations need to 
be made to create a legal system adequate for an information society. This is because a lot of new legal 
issues are surfacing as a result of computer crimes and illegalities, and of copyright and patent right issues. 
Furthermore, the problem of pornography, the issue of subversive materials dissemination, racial hatred 





and evasion of taxation in the electronic commerce have been among the common problems of information 
societies and Eritrea from the very beginning need to recognise them and address them properly in the 
future. 
Still another issue is that of information management challenge. Having an information system by itself is 
not a guarantee of success. The ability to analyse one's specific needs, design and build information 
systems will become a critical function. The management of information is also critical for to select pertinent 
information from the flood of information in real time to exploit available opportunities is a competitive 
advantage. Eritrean firms should develop this capability of getting and giving information to be able to 
compete internationally. This can be achieved only through education and continuous training. Given the 
weak technological basis, from which the country is departing, particularly in terms of human resources 
development, this will be one of the greatest challenges it must face. Highly skilled human resource cannot 
be produced in short time, Formal education is not enough. People need exposure to practical work before 
they could accumulate experience and become really productive. Therefore, from the outset education and 
training should go hand in hand with practical experience. That is, organisations should be encouraged to 
work with computers and allow their employees to experience working with them, particularly in a 
networked environment like Internet. 
All of what we have just said shows that developing IT infrastructure does not occur over night or 
spontaneously. Particularly in IT, there are so many competing technologies that one needs to take care 
such as the issues of compatibility, modularity, future technical support, maintenance and upgrading costs, 
support services and system security. Experience shows that investment in IT is increasing but returns are 
at times questioned; a good example of these is the IT 'productivity paradox'. These are the various issues 
that are forcing countries and organisations to look into better strategies and policies to exploit best this 
revolutionary and pervasive technology. Particularly from a developing country's point of view like Eritrea 
where money, skilled manpower, institutional capability, and professional management supply is very 
scarce. A good national policy would enable force one to look deeply into what is available and what is not 
and chart the way how the available scarce resources be used optimally to develop a good IT infrastructure 
and facilitate the achievement of the country's economic and social objectives. Priorities would be set and 
objectives determined, sometimes making trade-offs among competing national objectives instead of 
wanting to be everything to everybody which amounts to nothing. 
The existing reality in Eritrea, where the private sector is still small and the government plays a big role in 
every segment of life, leaves no choice but to allow the government to play a catalytic role at the forefront in 
the diffusion of information technology. 
Now, our attention will go to show how the government of Eritrea can play this catalytic role. One way of 
doing that is by establishing appropriate agencies and institutes to spearhead such development. The 
National IT Plan would be used as co-ordination tool, but all stakeholders should play an active role in the 
development of the National IT PIan. Here the example of Singapore can be seen. Singapore, first, 
established a Ministerial Committee, the Committee on National Computerisation (CNC) which in its turn 
created a National Computer Board (NCB) as an executive agency to accomplish specific objectives (see 
chapter 4) and Singapore has emerged as an 'intelligent city'. 
The government of Eritrea had made a move towards establishing an agency to spearhead the 
development of IT in the civil services, EISA (which we have discussed and evaluated in chapter 11.4). It is 
obvious that EISA is limited to the small services it gives here and there which are mostly technical services 
in nature like writing some programmes, developing networking systems and giving limited advises to 





requesting government departments. Departments had to wait for such consulting services, at times, for 
months before they could get help. Examples of projects in which EISA was involved are the 
computerisation of BE, CBE, Business License Office all involving systems design consulting services or 
specific programming activities. Evidently this kind of involvement does not leave room for the preparation 
of National IT Plan by the two most senior of its staff. To redress this situation we have preferred to 
restructure EISA starting from the very structure of the government. 
We have already suggested earlier that MCST is the policy-making body of S&T (Figure 13.1). In other 
ways it is replacing ITPAC with wider responsibility while Eritrean Computer Board (ECB) is replacing EISA 
and becomes a wing of MCST in national IT policies and implementation like the Computer Board of 
Singapore. MCST could start by commissioning a study in S&T development in Eritrea. IT Strategies and IT 
Plan could become one of its corner stones. The study could be used as the point of departure. A national 
conference could be organised where all stakeholders the Ministries, agencies, research institutes, public 
enterprises, private enterprises and knowledgeable personalities are invited to contribute. MCST could use 
the recommendations of the conference as the basis of its strategies and plans. It should be able to give 
clear objectives to ECB to be accomplished within a given timetable. ECB would direct the technical 
training institutes, higher learning institutes, and the private computer training institutes to share and work 
co-operatively to develop the required manpower skills in IT. All should complement each other to achieve 
the IT national human resource development objectives. The private sector should be allowed to participate 
and should be given the necessary incentives to develop national and international network in the valued 
added services like Internet, which is the only sustainable long-term option. 
We have a very good example of such co-operation in Singapore. The Singapore Telecom is responsible 
for building and operating the telecommunication infrastructure to make it an international 
telecommunications node. The Economic Development Board has a mission to develop the country as a 
global city with a total business orientation. The University of Singapore is responsible for the development 
of IT professional manpower (see chapter 5). All of these key players work together. Similarly in Eritrea, the 
Telecommunications Services of Eritrea should work for the development of modern national 
telecommunications infrastructure. The Macro Policy Office & the Finance and Development Ministry 
should work for the development of the National Economic Development Plan. The University of Asmara 
and other public and private institutes should contribute in supplying IT professionals, and the MCST and 
ECB for the development of the Science and Technology Policies and National IT Plan and Strategies, in 
line with National Development Plan.  
ECB would confine itself to the development of IT in Eritrea. The computerisation of civil service and the 
promotion and diffusion of IT in the country would fall in its mandate. It may have a unit to make systems 
analysis and design, and implement projects of computerisation for the civil service only. This in turn can, of 
course, sub-contract parts of computerisation projects to the private firms, depending on cost-benefit 
analysis, if private firms can provide better service at a lower cost. The ECB should never be allowed to use 
its authority to obstruct the development of the private computer services but, on the contrary, should help 
and assist them to grow and become regional players. The regulation of the IT industry could be jointly 
done by the Department of Communications in consultation with MCST. 
Singapore's experience shows us that within the first five years of its establishment (1980) the NCB was 
able to establish 23 computer installations with 370 information system professionals. In the country there 
were already 5,500 IT professionals and four IT education institutions were producing 800 software 
professionals annually. The industry has grown 10 fold in revenue. But EISA was not equipped to make 





such kind of transformations, even though, one of the objectives of EISA was 'general manpower 
development' (Proclamation No. 53/1994, article 6:1, d). First, the very statement of 'general manpower 
development' is not clear as stated in this document. Does it mean EISA establishing IT training or 
educational institutes? Or does it mean short term training to upgrade IT professionals? It cannot be the 
first because that is the mandate of Ministry of Education, in particular that of the higher learning institutes. 
It could be the second but where are the IT professionals? It is not possible to talk of upgrading of IT 
professionals when you don't have them. This shows that an important link was missing. IT 
training/education institutes need first be established. 
Developing institutional capability is not equivalent to establishing institutes. For example EISA has been 
established four years ago but it did not yet develop institutional capability. The ability of delivering quality 
service, for which a specific organisation was established, as efficiently and effectively as possible, should 
be at the base of measuring the institutional maturity. Because this is absent in the case of EISA, the 
conclusion made is that the institution envisioned by the Government, as put in the Proclamation No. 
53/1994, did not materialise. It remained a paper work. This could be more visible the moment you take out 
the private computer business services from the equation of the emerging .small IT industry in the country. 
Ministries and government agencies are increasingly looking for outside private consultants from within and 
without the country to get computing services for EISA does not have the capability to satisfy their needs. 
The Eritrean IT policies need to define yet what the Internet policy of the government is. There are no 
guideline how to develop national databases and where should be located. IT in areas with highest socio-
economic impact to the country has not been identified. Policies and strategies to increase access to 
information and communications technologies have not been adopted in particular in education. Policies on 
IT human resources development have not been developed. For a country that wants to cut all the corners 
for a quick development and be able to exploit leapfrogging opportunities, it needs quickly a good IT policy 
and a national IT Plan. The implication of this is to establish ECB (the present EISA) quickly and strengthen 
in terms of sufficient skilled manpower and funds commensurate to its responsibilities. Another important 
lesson to be learned is that institutional capability cannot mature only by enacting decrees and laws. This is 
a continuous learning effort in policy making and implementation; of course, nothing can be accomplished 
without the resources necessary for it. Given Eritrea have had an ample opportunity of learning from other 
developing countries it has to do much better. 
SSA countries have gone through political and economic changes designed to radically alter the operations 
of their economics (chapter 8). Many of the countries have adopted economic structural adjustment 
programmes, which have opened their economics to external and internal competitive market forces. These 
adjustment programmes have been characterised by a relaxation of the foreign exchange regime making it 
possible for users of IT to import such technology with few, if any, restrictions. The implications of these 
changes are that overnight, policies to regulate the procurement of computers and other IT products have 
become redundant. Such regulatory practices are contrary to the spirit of a liberalised economic 
environment. In Eritrea this was not the case. As a new country established in 1993, Eritrea does not fit this 
description. From the very beginning it has followed a liberal economic policy. There are not as such 
foreign exchange restrictions and people are allowed to freely buy and sell hard currencies openly in the 
market. This liberal policies account for a significant proportion of IT diffusion in the country. The major 
problems are the inefficient management and operation of the customs office, and the lack of a critical 
mass of IT professionals. 





Therefore, the establishment of MCST and ECB would be a great step forward in the development of a 
National IT Plan. This would then give the country the desired clear direction in order to exploit the 
opportunities offered by this revolutionary technology. It helps in making Eritrea a service-hub in the region. 
In the next section, we will expand the idea of how Eritrea could leapfrog using IT as a tool for socio-
economic development. 
Computer networks and possibilities of leapfrogging 
Computers are coming to Eritrea but they are mainly used as standalone workstations and not as 
integrated and networked systems. We know that there are opportunities for technology blending offered 
particularly for developing countries, which often have small-scale production by small firms in traditional 
'low-tech' industries (Antonelli, 1991). Eritrea does have this opportunity. It can develop advanced 
telecommunications infrastructure, which induces organisational innovations and acts as a powerful factor 
in economic growth particularly in service industry. In this section we will argue that significant leapfrogging 
is possible for Eritrea to achieve in service sector in particular. 
The national development objectives of Eritrea wants, in short, to make the country "modern, 
technologically advanced and internationally competitive economy within the next two decades" (Macro 
Policy, p.l0). This national objective seems to be over ambitious in terms of time frame it has proposed. We 
read also, among the objectives, that the national development effort will be directed to the realisation of 
"Developed capital and knowledge intensive and export-oriented industries and services...a competitive 
international financial centre...." And under the S&T Policy, the objective is said to be "to keep Eritrea 
abreast of developments in production, transport and service technologies in order to assure an upgraded 
and modern economic system that is competitive in the world." (p. 37).To achieve all of these national 
objectives a real leapfrogging is required. 
In the Eritrean situation, what does leapfrogging mean? Can it mean the leapfrogging of technological 
leaders as suppliers of advanced technologies? That is not realistic. Therefore, it is correct to use the word 
in the right context of IT use as a basic infrastructure of economic development of the country. That is, if 
Eritrea is able to develop a modern telecommunications and information infrastructure and this is used as 
the basis for its economic development to create an internationally competitive industry that is considered 
enough as a real leapfrogging. Particularly, if we see this with the possibility of enabling the country to 
become competitive in the market of the Horn Region, it is a great leap forward. But Eritrea should go 
beyond the data processing to reduce clerical costs. It is a time of the second era of information 
technology: the rise of a new open, networked enterprise, which is a new paradigm shift in information 
technology (Tapscott and Caston, 1993). Therefore, Eritrea has the opportunity to directly bypass the old 
technology of isolated systems based on outmoded host computers, to the microprocessor-based open, 
networked and integrated systems. To do this, a number of possible leapfrogging can be suggested as 
follows: 
1. There is the possibility of building from scratch the telecommunication infrastructure of the country 
based on the digital switching system. In fact, what is already available is mostly digital. 
2. There is possibility of building a computer networked trade (TradeNet) parallel with a national 
network of warehousing and depots in the six regions of the country. This to work efficiently needs 
the transport industry integrated with it. A smooth flow of goods and services could be possible, 
Electronic data interchange (EDI) would be an enabling technology whereby a broad array of 
business and trade documents employing strictly defined industry standards, purchase orders, 





shipping notices, bill of lading, import/export approval documents, and other invoices could be 
exchanged electronically improving the overall industry' s productivity. 
3. There is a possibility of building a health network (HealthNet) that works across the nation where 
the main nodes are the six regional health service centres. This could enable the remote clinics 
and health .service stations to get expert support from the Referral Hospitals and Health Research 
Institutions and in their turn could feed the central databases of information at the local level. This 
could make a real time co-operation and it would mean a great leap forward in rural health 
services. The management of Health Services of the country would also benefit greatly from it in 
their policy decision making. 
4. There is the possibility of building a national education and research network (EduNet). This could 
qualitatively enhance the education system of the country and the scientists could share ideas and 
join hands in multidisciplinary research activities. Distance education could develop easily. 
5. There is the possibility of building a network for the tourism industry (TourNet) by linking all hotels 
and restaurants and tour companies, car rentals, and travel agencies across the country. 
These networks assume a great change in the structure of the industry for which they are meant. If we take 
the case of a national trade network, the stakeholders would be the financial institutions, the shipping and 
forwarding companies, import and export firms, transport companies, and the government departments 
such as the land transport, maritime transport, civil aviation, customs office, commercial banks, insurance 
companies and the Bank of Eritrea. All of these should work together to make possible the TradeNet to 
work. Physical changes required could be the building of warehousing facilities in the six regions with sub-
region ramifications, customs offices, bank branches, shipping and forwarding offices, and others in close 
proximity so that the customers are served in a kind of one shopping stop. This entails a new way of 
organising and managing business and public services as well. The command-and-control hierarchy 
system of organising has to be replaced by a multi-layered hierarchy to flatter networks or relatively 
autonomous entities with self-managed, responsive and entrepreneurial work teams as key organisational 
entity all working in the environment of expanded network that includes suppliers and customers (Tapscott 
and Caston, ibid). 
Information could be organised in a way that incoming imported goods are packaged/unpackaged by 
regional depots from where they originate (or destined). Then, they could be directly loaded from ships to 
trucks (or vice versa) at the ports to destination without any need of wasting time to unload and unpack 
them for reasons of customs office, which could be carried out at the final destination depot. This could 
tremendously improve the flow of goods. Parallel to these physical flows of goods, the flow of information 
and documentation could take place through the TradeNet. The government department responsible for 
approval of import/export of goods would receive applications electronically and processes and forwards 
them on a real time basis. The same could take place about financial transactions of payment of duties and 
taxes and other service charges among business people. If these physical and informational flow are well 
synchronised, the leapfrogging we were talking about could happen. 
The same can be done for the HealthNet, EduNet and TourNet. This entails that a national information and 
communications infrastructure is a priority where the significant investment in telecommunications and 
computer networking is required. If this is done, the country will have done a lot of leapfrogging to get it 
connected to the global economy. Again, this could be only an enabling environment. Political, economic 
and social stability is very basic ingredients for such scientific and technological advances. 





If this is to occur in the coming two decades, then, government policies, explicit or implicit policy decision 
on S&T issues in Eritrea, should be consistent. By 'consistency', we refer to whether the policy is consistent 
with the long-term socio-economic development objectives of the country or whether it is consistent with 
existing policies as well as consistent over time. Similarly, it means whether it is consistent with the 'export-
oriented open and free market-led economic system', or whether it is consistent with the country-specific 
social and cultural environment. It should also be adaptable. 'Adaptability' refers to the possibilities of the 
policy to evolve and change in response to changes in domestic and international factors. At last, good 
policies are easy to implement. 'implementable' policies are those realistic to put into action given the 
resources available to the country at a given time. 
Eritrea wants to be part of the new global economic order. The dominant players in this new global 
economic order are the 'networked societies'. Eritrea needs to develop an ability to connect with this new 
order. That means, it has to leapfrog to become a networked society itself. Hence, it is consistent with its 
long-tem socio-economic development objectives. Besides, it is consistent with the needs of an export-
oriented open market led by the private sector, which Eritrea wants to become. This desire to connect with 
the new economic order shows that the country is adapting to new changes in the world. But is it not over 
ambitious? 
Global connectivity 
From where will the investment come to implement these radical changes that this leapfrogging requires? 
This is not a year or two-year journey. But in coming few decades it is possible. The entire plan should be 
implemented in phases where the initial stage will be dominated by know-how development. Since learning 
by doing/using is central to the transfer of IT, small units can be immediately established in all sectors 
knowing exactly where they are headed. For example the joint venture with an international 
telecommunications carrier is a good start. The World Bank and other international agencies can provide 
funds for specific projects, and the Eritrean government should allocate a budget for the development of 
S&T in general and IT in particular to sustain its development (it is consistent with self-reliance philosophy 
of the country). May be the most challenging factor is going to be the development of a management cadre 
to lead this change. 
One of the cornerstones of technological capability development is skilled manpower. The Eritrean skilled 
manpower resources will be assessed against the demand that each policy on S&T does make. The 
difference between demand and supply of skills gives us the gap that exists between them. The current 
assessment of the number and experience of skilled professionals and scientists in the country is poor. The 
bold initiative of the government in partnership with the World Bank, a US$60 million project for highly 
skilled manpower development, is a good start. But it needs a very good national human resource 
development plan. 
Developing industrial technological capability requires a lot of institutional support. The institutional 
capability in Eritrea is poor and there is institutional gap critical for the industrial technology development. 
That is, educational and training institutions, research institutes, the university, funding institutions, and the 
private sector and their interrelationships and cooperation gives a picture of a poor institutional 
infrastructure, though rapidly changing. The degree of trust and co-operation among government and 
private institutions, and the industrial networking has to grow considerably. IT is diffusing quite rapidly in all 
sectors but the manufacturing industry is lagging behind. The private computer business is the backbone of 
the diffusion of IT by providing the support and the government civil services are the biggest users of 
computing which are deployed in the old fashion of data processing and office automation. Therefore, IT 





should be carefully designed and implemented to improve the institutional capabilities of the country by 
increasing networking and information flow among them. 
Developing countries can always learn from each other's experience. This is a research on IT development 
in a special country, a new country in the African continent created in the early 1990s. It is a unique 
experience from different angles. This country has emerged in the post cold war and the time of 
globalisation as well as time of the emergence of the three trading blocks in the world. The leadership of 
the country has emerged from a long war of liberation schooled in the socialist philosophy and an 
experience of self-reliance in the real sense. This leadership has a very strong belief in the country's own 
resources for development. There is a st1'ong sense of self-confidence which are quite unique in the 
continent, an apparent contradiction given the country is small in size and one of the least developed 
countries in the world. The motto is "we want to be the masters of our own destiny!" "No to aid, yes to 
partnership!" "Help is welcome as long as it does help to build our own capabilities to manage our own 
socio-economic system!" This is why Eritrea is shunning getting large loans from international community 
and trying to mobilise its own resources as much as possible. Too much of NGO are not considered help 
but a hindrance to the real development of a country's capabilities. 
It is within this socio-economic and political environment, described above, that S&T policies are to be 
considered. The last four years were very hectic years to get the government's institutional capabilities 
established and reorganised. The Macro Policy of the country, where the vision and the strategies of the 
country were defined, was framed in 1994. The National Economic Policy Framework and Program 
(NEPFP) was framed in 1998, and the National Human Resources Development Plan is in the process of 
making. It is time to give due attention to S&T policies. The present policy of having S&T research and 
development decentralised to the ministries, who have been empowered to take the responsibilities of 
conducting research and training in the respective sectors, does have long-term side effects of possible 
fragmentation and the pulling in different directions. On the other hand, these research departments for 
obvious reasons of lack of funds and skilled manpower are not yet functional in many ministries. 
Some glimpse of hope is there. The computing and communications industry is emerging and growing. 
Many small private companies are emerging. This are mostly owned and managed by Eritreans coming 
back from Diaspora with acquired new skills which has been the blessing to this emerging new industry. 
Already there is keen competition for the small emerging market. Some of them are even looking forward to 
becoming regional players as training institutes or services givers. Others are also thinking of establishing 
computer assembly plants if the Customs Office stops its bias against computer component parts import as 
import tax for a whole computer is smaller than the tax for its parts, really discouraging to the emergence of 
the assembly industry. Eritrea can use these new trends to start build its IT infrastructure on which to base 
its future socio-economic development but the government should be quick in identifying and eliminating 
regulatory and administrative inefficiencies stumbling blocks. 
Therefore, the Government should proactively provide policies to guide the progressive integration of all 
networks to create a national information network. This proactive thinking and planning should be used to 
improve productivity, quality of products and/or services, efficiency in the work place, and competitiveness 
in the international market place. The links between IT and the different sectors of the economy must be 
analysed and understood at the planning process. This is why IT Plan should be an integral part of the 
National Economic Development Plan. In Eritrea this means to develop an IT infrastructure capable of 
enabling the country in becoming a service-hub in the region as planned in its Macro Policy. The MCST 
and ECB suggested earlier are exactly mean[ to achieve that. 





13.5 Institutional capability 
This Government has inherited not much in terms of political and public administration institutions from the 
Ethiopian government. The only thing found in the country after Liberation was some 42 nationalised ailing 
public enterprises plus the public utilities and some provincial administrative offices. From the governmental 
institutional capacity point of view, the country had to start from scratch. After 7 years, in a recent interview 
with African Business, the Minister of Finance and Development replying to a question that 'Eritrea has no 
national account as yet, and no national budget' said: "We have been working on that for some time. The 
transparency issue does not worry us, because we have always stressed that all institutions, not just the 
public sector, must produce audited accounts. We have not achieved the position of annual budget, but all 
expenditure are approved and have ceilings" (African Business, April 1998, p.20). A sign the country is still 
struggling to develop its Government institutions. It is possible to say that the Bank of Eritrea as a real 
institution, as a national bank, has emerged in November 1997 when the Eritrean currency 'Nakfa' was 
launched to replace the Ethiopian currency 'Birr'. All the Ministries and Agencies are only beginning to take 
their institutional shape slowly. The country has to learn a lot and it is learning quickly to build its 
institutional capabilities. 
From the perspective of the present research, S&T institutions are the main focus. These are very central 
to the development and diffusion of relevant S&T for the development of the country. The Eritrean Macro 
Policy, under S&T policy, talks about the 'establishment of a national institution to gather information about 
existing and emergent technologies worldwide, evaluate their appropriateness for Eritrean conditions, and 
make this fund of knowledge available to the public and private sectors' (p. 37). Now after four years, where 
is such an institution? How do we to establish it? May be, this are questions the country has forgotten to 
ask itself. In the same place, it is possible to read that 'research and development efforts in selected 
sectors' will be promoted. Who is the institution that determines the sectors to be given priority and selects 
the research projects, gives the needed fund, and makes sure that the funds are properly utilised? The 
present situation of establishing Research & Training units in every Ministry by itself cannot ensure that 
appropriate, relevant and timely research are conducted and effectively managed. A country that wants 'to 
keep abreast of developments in production, transport and service technologies in order to assure an 
upgraded and modern economic system that is competitive in the world' (p.37) cannot afford to relegate to 
the periphery the development of such institutions. There could be no excuses of lack of funds and skilled 
manpower for their embryonic structures should be there, to start with, and be allowed to organically grow, 
if the political will is really there. For example, the ECB we have proposed will start as a cell. But it should 
be allowed to organically grow with the demand of its services to become a mature institution to guide the 
development of IT industry and services in the country. 
Similarly the legal institutions, economic institutions, and the social and cultural institutions should have at 
least a cell like of soundly grounded units that can grow into mature institutions. Only if such political, legal, 
economic, social and cultural, and technological environment is conducive sound S&T policies, appropriate 
National IT Plan and a good human resource management can thrive. This macro level picture should be 
complemented by micro environment where the Government institutions, public enterprises, private 
enterprises and the social and cultural institutions in the country are able to create a network and develop a 
work-culture of co-operation and mutual assistance. The activities at macro and micro-level together should 
put the country in the position of learning and mastering the use and adaptation of new technologies and 
their fast diffusion in the country. National information and communication network is a key factor in 
keeping all institutions together like glue. Computer networks and Internet would be the gate to global 





integration and could play a central role of the development of S&T and the gate through which information 
on national and international markets are acquired. 
13.6 Human capital formation 
Human resource is a very critical resource in the development of countries. The Government needs to 
address quickly policy issues related to human resource. The objective of producing 'a population equipped 
with the necessary skills, knowledge and culture for a self-reliant modern economy' (Macro Policy, 1994) 
does require a lot of additional technical/vocational and higher learning institutions than presently available 
in Eritrea. 
When Singapore decided that IT was strategic technology for the country in 1980, the country had only 850 
IT professionals. Then, the National IT Plan was adopted and by the end of 1990 the poof increased to over 
10,000. By the close of the century, the number is expected to be more than 25,000 IT professionals. Now 
in Eritrea, the researcher estimate is about 300 IT professionals, excluding the computer operators. This 
poof is made up of Eritreans coming from the Diaspora and establishing small computer/communications 
business services, some 30 of them, and those young people produced in the private computer schools in 
the last five years. If Eritrea is to reach at the level Singapore is now in 20 years from now, it should be able 
to produce not less than 1500 IT professionals a year. This may look like an impossible target to achieve 
given that the University of Asmara annual total production is about 400 graduates in all fields, none of 
which is in IT. Very few are being sent to train abroad. It is not possible to say that IT is a priority list in the 
human resource development of the country. 
The vision of the country is to become a truly modern and competitive country in the coming 20 years, but 
specifically IT, as a pervasive technology and as a necessary infrastructure of the future, is not getting 
adequate attention. It is here that an adequate policy of human resource development is of paramount 
importance. The University of Asmara should give priority to IT education and training at degree level and a 
selected private computer schools could be given by the government incentives to open diploma level 
training programmes in programming, computer networking, hardware and software maintenance. 
All the different MIS departments in every organisation in the country play a major role since they are 
responsible for the day to day operation and management of all computing resources. The quality and 
experience of IT managers is important factor. Because of lack of skilled IT manpower in the country, in 
general the IT management in the country is poor with very few exceptions. A good example to the 
inefficiency existing in the country can be observed from how poorly computers are utilised. Most 
organisations are still using them mainly for word-processing. It is possible to see computers idle in the 
offices of the managers while employees in information intensive activities are still working manually such 
statistics or accounting departments. 
Therefore, a great deal of investment is required for IT skills development particularly that of systems 
analysts and designers, programmers, database administrators, computer network experts, and computer 
hardware technicians. Motivated people are very productive. Having skilled and motivated people is at the 
heart of good IT management. Given that the 2lst century is for the networked society, the country need to 
address the critical shortage of IT skills and should be able to create a small critical mass at least in the 
coming 5 years. 





13.7 Concluding remarks 
Eritrea, to put its socio-economic development on a sound basis, needs to embark immediately on building 
its S&T infrastructure. It needs to determine the technologies most pertinent to its own needs that at the 
same time enable it to get connected to the new global economic order. If different technologies are not 
evaluated in relation of likely contributions to the socio-economic development of the country, proper 
resource allocation will become very difficult. Thus, an institutional body to determine technological 
development priorities is required for a capable S&T policy-making body would not be difficult to identify the 
centrality of IT to the development of a modern economy. IT human resource development would get its 
right place. One thing is for sure, the Eritrean service industry would greatly benefit from IT and trade, 
tourism, financial sector, civil services, health services and education would really leapfrog if proper 
networking is developed, which requires radical changes in management and organisation resource. It is 
time to look at the national infrastructure development in an integrated way where transport and 
communications are designed together with trade, tourism, the financial sector and civil services so that the 
flow of goods and services moves parallel with the flow of information in a real time. This is definitely the 
way to greater regional and international competitiveness. 
The advantage for Eritrea is that it is starting afresh with zero debt. It can use aid money and loans to build 
its national infrastructure and for the human capital formation. Eritrea can acquire and assimilate mature 




















14. General Conclusions 
This research was meant to study two questions; (1) What is the state of S&T policy and management in 
developing countries including Eritrea? What is the state of IT in these countries? (2) How can Eritrea 
exploit best the opportunity offered by IT for its socioeconomic development based on the experience of 
other developing countries? It did so by making a comprehensive literature search to answer the first 
question related to NIEs and SSA countries (chapters 4-9). With regard to the case of Eritrea, it used 
primary data collection methods like surveys and in-depth interviews. It dealt with the first question on 
Eritrea in chapters 10-12 and the second study question is dealt with in chapter 13. Now, the major findings 
are summarised below: 
14.1 Newly Industrialised Economies 
In this research, the NIEs included in the sample are South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Hong Kong in 
the Southeast Asia and Brazil and India from Latin America and South Asia. The most important lessons on 
S&T development are summarised below.  
Answers to study question number 1: the NIE  
The conclusion we have reached is that there is not a single best strategy for quick development of science 
and technology. Protection against imports and selective exclusion of foreign investment, accompanied by 
upgrading of skills, huge investments in R&D and sponsoring of giant corporations to internalise various 
markets to cope with international competition, was the experience of South Korea. Singapore relied 
entirely on imported technology but intervened selectively to induce investors to move up the technological 
scale and provided educated and trained work force. Brazil has set up large public enterprises and 
restricted foreign entry in certain sectors to protect indigenous learning. India excluded MNCs in much of 
manufacturing, but suffered technological lags and inefficiency as a result of its trade and industrial policies. 
It is very important to keep in mind that these countries have not always followed the same policies in every 
sector consistently over time. Particularly during the 1990s, the trend in globalisation has pushed Brazil and 
India to open up and liberalise their economies.  
One important lesson in the industrial technology development of the developing countries is to reverse the 
usual sequence of developing technological capability, which is emergence consolidation-maturity to 
acquisition-assimilation-improvement (or innovation-investment production to production-investment-
innovation). The benefit from transfer of foreign technology depends less on the method of transfer, but 
more on how the method is implemented. NIEs, with some exceptions, have used the acquisition-
assimilation improvement approach in the development of their S&T. In particular the industrial technology 
development of the East Asian Tigers is considered a great success. These countries have demonstrated 
that appropriate technology assessment and choice are very crucial for some technologies open more 
possibilities than others are do. For example, the experience of the four Tigers in focusing on electronics 
industry and IT infrastructure development proved to be successful. IT is a pervasive technology and is a 
necessary infrastructure for the development of all the economic sectors. Countries like Singapore have 





made it one of the backbones of their economies and have enjoyed a great leap forward in joining the 
global information society. 
Governments do play a very important role in the technological development by inducing choices of 
techniques that are socially more appropriate, fostering imports on the best possible terms, and stimulating 
the development of specialised technological agents such as industrial parks, science parks and scientific 
and technological information centres. The high priority given to human capital formation in East Asian 
countries is considered to be one of the pillars of their economic success story. That proves that highly 
skilled human power is the basis of any scientific and technological development. Therefore, appropriate 
national human resource management and investment in human capital formation are priority issues for 
socio-economic development to take place. It is the most important infrastructure for future socio-economic 
and technological development of any country. 
Governments can make sure their policies do not militate one against the other. While the Tigers showed 
greater integration of their S&T policies with their national development plans, the Indian S&T development, 
and to a lesser degree that of Brazil, were not well integrated to their economic development plan, which 
explains their relative poor performance. The 'light-industry' as opposed to the 'heavy-industry' approach 
followed by the East Asian Tigers has proved to be more sustainable" While the emphasis on heavy 
industry by India was less successful and less sustainable. It is not possible to say that India and Brazil 
were more interventionists than the Tigers, In fact, The East Asian countries (less so Hong Kong) all 
showed strong governments very active in the guiding of their economies. But the import-substitution 
policies and emphasis on public enterprises of India and Brazil were less effective than the export-oriented 
and private enterprise led policies of the Tigers, which always were steered by strong government hands. 
The most plausible explanation of the difference in the degree of success lies in the quality of policy 
intervention and political commitment to implement it. 
14.2 SSA countries 
Answers to study question number 1: the SSA countries 
Almost four decades have passed since most of SSA countries got independence but yet no much have 
been achieved in the field of S&T. These countries are more dependent than ever from the developed 
countries for their capital goods needs. This does not mean that African countries have not tried to follow 
the footsteps of the developed countries by trying to copy and implant industrial complexes but failed 
dismally. Still SSA countries depend on primary goods for their foreign exchange. The development-related 
debt of industrial development of the 1960s and 1970s were not successful but led to heavy debt as a 
result. Their industrial policies have failed. The colonial legacies, the making of colonies the source of 
primary goods and markets of manufactured goods, were difficult to remove. On the other hand, the 
developed world is interested in keeping the advantage by making access to finance and technology very 
difficult through various price mechanisms and conditions. 
A strong political will and determination to succeed in the process of socio-economic development is a clear 
advantage. The belief in one's own resources, self-reliance, as the most significant determinant of 
development, is what seems to be missing most in SSA countries. This component is very important 
because it pushes the country to learn and learn quickly to avoid from being left at the margin and get 
quickly connected to the global economy. But at every turn, SSA countries are facing very costly political 
instabilities. There are too many wars, some internal others with neighbours. The whole continent is also 





very susceptible to external interference. Peace is the only foundation on which all development activities 
can take place but, so far, this continent has not been fortunate to have. Of course, all of this has also to do 
with the quality of leadership these countries have. There are too many dictators and corrupt government 
institutions. The continent needs more 'Mandela‟s' to free itself from corruption and injustice. 
SSA countries S&T policies were not effective because of lack of resources, institutional problems, and 
mismanagement. Corrupt politicians' only interest was keeping their power base at any cost where the 
development issue was not a priority, intellectuals felt less safe and brain drain was a constant problem. 
The cold war situation also had an impact because for reasons of strategic interests of the superpowers. 
The Western and Eastern blocks were helping otherwise corrupt governments to keep their power. This 
was continually denying the legitimate aspirations of people to get rid of corruption and mismanagement, 
thus delaying the chance to focus on real development issues. 
In SSA countries skilled manpower and institutional capability have been found to be the most critical 
factors but in short supply. But these are required at every step in the development of S&T and in particular 
of information technology. Policy making itself was hampered by the absence of those two critical factors. 
Therefore, any developing country embarking towards S&T development in general and IT in particular, 
should first focus on required human resources development and the creation of appropriate institutions to 
support and sustain such development. 
IT policy or National IT Plans in Sub-Saharan countries of Africa is at its initial stage. The globalisation 
trend is pushing every country, including the less developed countries, to get connected to the international 
information and communications infrastructure. There is a growing awareness of the importance and 
necessity of information technology for socioeconomic development of SSA countries. As always, African 
countries are disadvantaged from the lack of capital investment, skilled manpower and institutional 
capabilities. Some countries are making significant progress in the development of telecommunications 
infrastructure development. But even though the industry has potential to grow it is at its infancy. A strong 
political will and a good dose of financial injection coupled with the right human resources development 
could accelerate the development of the industry and things could be changed in the coming years. 
14.3 Eritrea 
Answers to study question number 1: What is the state of S&T in Eritrea?  
Eritrea is the youngest country in Africa, which got independence in 1993. It has experienced rapid 
industrialisation during 1940-1960, which was destroyed during the 30-years war of liberation that ended in 
l99l. But the war of liberation did not bring only destruction but also developed self-reliance practice, which 
has become deeply ingrained in the Eritrean life. Now the country is trying to build its infrastructures and 
create an open market economy structure and measures are taken to attract FDI through better policy 
environment, a stable political and social environment with corruption-free and efficient government 
institutions. 
Eritrea is determined to leapfrog many intermediary stages of technological development to catch up in the 
process of development. Heavy investment is being made in new machinery and technologies, particularly 
in the construction industry and the energy sector. For example, local public and private companies are 
making the road construction activities, i.e. by internal resources. It is a very good example of self-reliance 
and learning of new techniques and work methods which is building the technological capability of 
construction industry. There are also foreign construction companies in the country such as the Keangnam 





Enterprises from South Korea (the biggest). There are also Italian and American firms. This is helping in the 
transfer of new technology and skills. 
Drip-irrigation system, a new technology for the country, is being introduced, in the agricultural sector. The 
seaports are being modernised to make them more competitive in the legion. Importance of research for 
future development is recognised but S&T policies are not yet fully developed. Mature scientific and 
technological institutions are absent. The Research & Training departments established in all ministries 
lack financial resources and particularly suffer from skilled manpower shortage. The only national 
university, University of Asmara, does not have a research base nor identified research priorities. It was a 
teaching oriented university but now it is taking the first steps to develop its research wing. 
There are opportunities for the country if it uses IT, which this research is all about, to enhance its learning 
and its capability to manage the national resources through the effective use and diffusion of this 
technology. The country's ability to gain regional and international competitiveness as an international 
player integrated in the global economy in the coming 20-30 years can only be achieved if Eritrea 
immediately embarks on human capital formation and IT infrastructure development. But the capability of 
effectively selecting, introducing and using of IT in some key sectors such as public administration, 
education and training, health, finance, transport, tourism, and trade in general are of immediate necessity. 
In Eritrea, the private sector is not, at this stage, capable of undertaking research activities or responsibility. 
The government is responsible for education and training and the private sector has an insignificant role so 
far. Even the few "big" enterprises are in the hands of the government. So far all the banks and insurance 
firms are of the government, even though, deregulation will permit foreign banks and insurance companies 
to operate in Eritrea. Moreover, the development of the necessary infrastructures is in the hand of the 
government. The construction and maintenance of highways and roads is under the Ministry of Public 
Works. The seaport administration, the airports are all in the hands of the government. Public utility 
production like the electricity and water supply are also in the hands of the government and municipalities. 
The private .sector is mainly in the retail, wholesale, catering, transport, leather, furniture and household 
appliances, construction, mechanical services, bakeries, and small agri-businesses and other services. All 
of these are small family business type; of course, there is also the "informal sector". 
Therefore, the role of the Eritrean government, at this juncture of history, is very big and cannot delegate it 
to any other body. Till the time a critical mass of bigger and capable private sector is created, the 
government has to assume a big direct involvement in the economy. Therefore, policies can be of great 
help to determine where the country wants to go and how to do it. The government is the only one at this 
time that can create an environment for the right technology choices, transfer and management. But these 
policies should spell out clearly the present and future roles of both the government and the private sector 
with regard to technology choice and diffusion. The government should be there not to replace the private 
sector but to help it grow and assume its full role in the economy and the society as a whole. 
14.3.1 IT in Eritrea 
Answers to study question 2: How Eritrea can best exploit-leapfrogging opportunities offered by IT? 
IT industry, in the last five years, has made considerable progress and is catching up fast relative to the 
region. Private investment in computing services is increasing because Eritreans from the Diaspora are 
coming back and establishing their own companies. And the Telecommunications Services of Eritrea (TSE) 
has given clear indication of willing to modernise and transform itself through joint venture agreement with 





foreign carriers. The expectation is that telecommunications infrastructure in the country is going to grow 
fast in the coming few years. The government seems to have rightly recognised the strategic importance for 
economic development of this sector. The Department of Communications has been mandated with 
regulatory authority over the communications industry and is moving in the right direction in the promotion 
and development of telecommunications. 
The Government has established an information agency, EISA, to develop, advise and implement IT 
policies and strategies, particularly for the civil services and the public enterprises. But this agency does not 
have the required human and financial resources commensurate to its mandate, therefore, did not 
contribute much in the development of IT use and diffusion in the country. 
The major stumbling block for the technological development of the country, without doubt, is the lack of 
skilled human resources. The Government has recognised the human capital formation as a priority area. It 
has recently got a loan from the World Bank, $60 million, for the development of highly skilled manpower. 
Eritrea did not yet develop the information and communication infrastructure plan to really exploit it for its 
economic development. Given the country's short number of years of existence, it is not reasonable to 
expect more. But there are opportunities to leapfrogging in IT industry, particularly in the use of it as an 
infrastructure for greater economic development as well as becoming a major economic player as a trade 





















 S&T policy-making body should be established as a MCST (ministerial committee for science and 
technology) to plan and co-ordinate all S&T research effort of the country. 
 S & T policies should be specific enough to guide each economic sector for the right technology 
choice and transfer and operation to enable to create competitive goods and services for local and 
international markets. 
 IT should be recognised as a critical technology in the economic development of the country by 
transforming EISA as computer board under the MCST. But it should be given all the required 
attention to develop its institutional capability to really make felt its presence in the country and 
make the difference. 
 National IT Plan should be produced without delay. It would enable the country to build its national 
information and communications infrastructures for an effective socioeconomic development. It 
would help the country in exploiting the opportunities offered by its strategic location as a gateway 
for Europe, Middle East, Asia, as well as to East, Central and Southern Africa in the development 
of regional information and communications infrastructures. These opportunities are there if the 
country takes immediate action before others do. 
 S&T policies and IT Plan should be linked to the National Economic Development of the country 
otherwise technological capabilities that do not make major contribution to the national economic 
and social development may take considerable resources at the expense of those that really 
matter. 
 Policies should be the product of participation of all stakeholders and not a dictation from some 
government offices to be of great benefit to the development of the whole country. The 
Government should always make sure that policies are used as a means of mobilising and 
effective resource utilisation and not as an undesirable interference and hindrance to the private 
sector development.  
 IT policies should be specific about the priority areas of development within the IT industry. For 
example, computer assembly lines should be allowed to flourish and lay the groundwork for 
software industry to develop.  
 S&T policies should strengthen the ability to select, acquire and adapt industrial technology to 
economic and social conditions in Eritrea, including evaluating the technical, economic, commercial 
and legal aspects of industrial technology-transfer agreements and contracts: 
15.2 Sector specific policies 
 MCST would need to include all sectors in the S&T policies and plans and give an integrated vision 
of the whole and what is expected from each sector at the same time. The various ministries are 
currently doing or on the process of organising themselves to do it. These need be brought in line 
with the national priorities. To mention some of priority areas:  





 Introduce selective environmental friendly technologies in agriculture (modern irrigation 
technologies, water conservation technologies, desalination technologies, animal husbandry, pest 
control, desertification control, etc);  
 Improve specific crop-storage, transport and handling to avoid big post-harvest losses;  
 Introduce improved technologies for food processing, preservation, storage and packaging; 
 Support the manufacture, repair and maintenance of equipment in the fisheries sector, including 
helping to set up facilities for fish-processing, preservation and storage and to develop and 
promote economical designs and construction techniques and materials for making, repairing and 
maintaining fishing boats;  
 Introduce new technologies in marine resources sustainable exploitation and management;  
 Introduce new construction techniques and methods;  
 Modernise the electro-mechanical industry;  
 Introduce and diffuse the information and communications technologies;  
 Expand technical and vocational training;  
 Expand selectively tertiary education;  
 Establish selectively S&T institutions (mission oriented) to nurture researchers and engineering 
consultants and improve technical capabilities (particularly in generating local technology) of the 
Eritrean manufacturing industry;  
 Manage through appropriate policies the coexistence of modern and traditional productive sectors 
and big- and small-scale production;  
 Develop an information technology industry capable of supporting the needs of regionally 
competitive financial institutions, trading companies, transport and communications industry, and 
tourism industry;  
 Invest in and promote the development of various kinds of national networks such as TradeNet, 
EduNet, TourNet, HealthNet, etc. 
15.3  IT skills development 
 Immediate concerted action should be taken to develop critical IT skills necessary to support the IT 
industry in the country. Eritreans from the Diaspora are making great contributions by establishing 
computer services companies and training but it is inadequate to address the highly skilled 
manpower development. Particularly the development of systems analysts and designers and 
programmers should be addressed by tertiary institutions like the University of Asmara.  
 Private training institutes should be allowed and encouraged to grow to meet all the IT technical 
skills required by the computer and communications industry. The Government's role should be to 
create an environment conducive for such development without wanting to do everything by itself. 
It should also provide standardisation and accreditation services in order to keep high the quality of 
training given by private institutions.  
 Comprehensive and fully integrated programs for preparing industrial trainers and developing local 
technological and entrepreneurial capacities should be started immediately.  
 Multi-purpose and specialised institutions to train people for core industries should be strengthened 
or established.  
 The links for industrial training between the university and factories should be established.  
 Local companies to produce teaching and training materials, training videos, kits and manuals 
should be established to strengthen the human capital formation of the country.  





 Training at the national, sub-regional and regional levels in the development, acquisition, 
adaptation and transfer of technology, including evaluation and negotiation of technology contracts 
should be established.  
 Eritrea should promote co-operation between enterprises, for example, in production, technical and 
industrial training, information, investment, and research and development. 
15.4 Institutional capability development 
 ECB as a catalyst of IT development could play a major role in the diffusion of IT in the civil 
services in particular and in the country in general, if its institutional capability is fully developed. It 
needs highly skilled manpower, adequate facilities, and adequate budget. It should be able to work 
in partnership with the private sector and not in competition. They are not mutually exclusive 
elements in the IT development equation.  
 The Department of Communications, as a regulator body of the communications industry, should 
develop its institutional capabilities to be able to do the job entrusted to it adequately. A critical 
shortage of highly skilled manpower is visible and need be addressed quickly. The regulator 
possibly should be always ahead of the industry that it regulates. Of course, the Department needs 
also adequate budget to run properly its activities.  
 Privatisation process of the Telecommunications Services of Eritrea is encouraging. The joint 
venture with a foreign experienced company should be carefully managed. Its long-term objectives 
should remain that of developing and efficiently operating an internationally competitive information 
and communication infrastructure to support the economic development of the country. 
1.5.5 Networking and proper work culture 
 The weak S&T institutional capability of the country can be said is at the basis of the non-existing 
network among the S&T policy making and implementing bodies such as the government, the 
university, and the industry in general. Particularly, the university does not have any connection 
with the private sector in the process of S&T development in the country. Therefore, a culture of 
co-operation among these various government, non-government and private organisations should 
be established. A good network among these institutions is very critical and need be quickly 
addressed.  
 A work-culture of co-operation should be promoted to diffuse quickly new technologies. This should 
be allowed to mature to the extent of creating a tacit norm whereby government departments and 
agencies (government institutions), public enterprises, private enterprises, NGOs and other social 
institutions work together in a recognisable pattern of how things get done. In Eritrea the 
government should play a leading role in the development of an environment where such small and 
medium sized private enterprises could grow and play their role as agents of scientific and 
technological diffusion. The various policy instruments could be used to create such an 
environment. 
15.6 Regional and International co-operations 
 Eritrea is a member of IGAD, COMESA, and now COMESSA. These three regional institutions are 
trying to forge a new political and economic relationship among them. A good communications and 
information infrastructure would greatly strengthen these emerging institutions. Communications 





networks among these countries is very poor and need be developed and Eritrea should play a 
constructive role by creating adequate databases for various economic sectors from where its 
regional partners could get information to strengthen their ties. At the same time it should develop 
all the necessary expertise to exploit such regional information services that already exist or will 
emerge in the future.  
 There are countless regional and international institutions working in co-operation with each other 
in various fields of human endeavour such as economy, environment, health, population, 
culture...etc. Therefore, Eritrea needs to get connected to the international network of information 
and communications infrastructure soon in order 'to make most of available scientific and 
technological information for the betterment of its own population. But it should not limit itself at the 
receiving end. It should quickly develop its own national information databases, as said above, to 
make it a real partnership in a 'give and take' relationship for many could gain from the unique 
Eritrean experiences as Eritrea could gain from that of others.  
 International, including intra-African, co-operation in industrial training should be promoted. Eritrea 
should try to make full use of the existing ones.  
 Eritrea should work closely with other African countries in the development of technological 
information base, including setting up national, sub-regional and regional information centres linked 
to centres outside Africa via the Industrial and Technological Information Bank.  
 Eritrea should immediately get linked to technological co-operation within Africa and between 
Africa and the rest of the world and it should do its part to promote it. 
15.7 Future research 
 Eritrea should immediately systematically study S&T needs in various sectors, including the best 
way of transfer of technology in a way that can support the achievement of the national socio-
economic development objectives.  
 Research is required to establish a better way of organising industrial technology development and 
diffusion in Eritrea including the development of support services.  
 More research is required in Eritrea to document cases of technology adaptation and improvement 
in the various sectors. This would be of great help to policy makers to design appropriate 
incentives for in innovators.  
 Cases of IT implementation need be documented continuously in Eritrea to help policy analysts to 
proactively design appropriate strategies in order to fully exploit opportunities offered by IT.  
 Eritrea needs to make detailed research to determine the new skills required for its scientific and 
technological development. This should be one of the bases of the national human resource plan.  
 More empirical research in S&T transfer need be conducted in SSA countries in general to improve 












Appendix 1: Labour and capital productivity as influenced by microelectronics 
 
1. The sectors with the highest rates of growth in the labour productivity are the electronic Industries, 
and especially the computer industry and the electronic component industry. These are the 
industries, which make the greatest use of their own technology for design, production, stock 
control, marketing and management. They are also the only industrial sectors, which show a 
substantial rise in capital productivity. They are the sectors, which demonstrated the advantages of 
the new technologies for everyone else and may be described as the 'carrier' and  'motive' 
branches of the new paradigm. 
2. In those sectors, which have been heavily penetrated by microelectronics, both in their product and 
process technology, there is also evidence of a considerable rise in labour productivity and even 
some advance in capital productivity in the most recent periods. This applies, for example, to the 
scientific instruments industry, to the telecommunications industry and to the watch industry. These 
sectors have now virtually become part of the electronic industry. 
3. ln sectors where microelectronics has been used on an increasing scale over the past 10 years, 
but where older technologies still predominate in product and process technology, there is a very 
uneven picture. Some firms have achieved a very high productivity increases, some have 
stagnated, while others actually show a decline in productivity. This is the case, for example, in the 
printing industry, in the machine building industries, and in the clothing industry. This uneven 
picture is completely consistent with Solter's 1960 vision of the spread of new technologies within 
established industries through new capital investment. In many cases, information technology is 
introduced in a piecemeal fashion in one department or for one activity and not as part of an 
integrated system. For example, one of a few CNC machine tools are introduced or a few robots or 
word Processors. These are small 'islands' of automation. This is not yet a computer-integrated 
manufacturing or office system and does not yet achieve anything approaching the full potential 
productivity gains. There may even be a temporary fall in productivity, because of the lack of the 
necessary skills in design, in software, in production engineering, in maintenance and in 
management in general. Problems of institutional and social adaptation are extremely important, 
and flexibility in social response is very varied between countries, as well as between enterprises. 
Among OECD countries, Japan and Sweden appear to have been particularly successful in making 
progress in the area of 'mechatronics'. But the US, which has been rather successful in achieving 
productivity gains in the microelectronics area (although much less so than Japan), has been 
rather unsuccessful in the mechatronics area, with the partial exception of defence-based 
industries. 
4. Sectors producing standardised homogeneous commodities on a flow production basis in large 
plants have made considerable use of information technology in their process control systems and 
in various management applications. They were indeed among the earliest users of computers for 
these purposes. This applies, for example, to the petrochemical, oil, steel and cement industries. 
This has helped them to achieve considerable improvements in their use of energy and materials, 
but the gains in labour productivity have often been less than in the 1950s and 1960s. Capital 
productivity in these firms usually shows a marked decline. To understand this phenomenon; it is 
essential to recognise that these industries are among those most heavily affected by the shift from 
an energy-intensive and materials-intensive mass production technological paradigm to an 





information-intensive paradigm. At the height of the consumer durable and vehicle consumption 
boom of the 1950s and 1960s, they were achieving strong labour productivity gains based on big 
plant economies of scale. But with the change in the technological paradigm, the slow-down in the 
world economy, and the rise in energy prices in the 1970s, they now often face problems of surplus 
capacity and high unit costs based on below-capacity production levels.  
5. Service sectors which are completely based on information technology - software services, data 
banks, computerised information services, design services, etc. - are among the fastest growing 
and, for individual firms, the most profitable activities in the leading industrial countries. But also 
their growth potential is enormous, they so far account for only a small proportion of total services 
output and employment. Productivity statistics are extremely difficult to generate, but inferential 
evidence suggests high rates of growth.  
6. Some other service sectors have been considerably affected by information technology, such as 
banking, insurance and distribution, in these sectors, although the diffusion of new technology is 
extremely uneven, both by firms and country, there is evidence of significant gains in labour 
productivity. This phenomenon is rather important because hitherto it has often been observed that 
the service sector of the economy was not capable of achieving the type of labour productivity 
gains achieved in manufacturing. Information technology now offers the potential (and in some 
cases already the reality) of achieving such gains outside the manufacturing. However, the 
progress of technology depends on institutional and structural changes.  
7. In most service sectors, information technology still has diffused only to a small extent, and these 
areas are still characterised by very slow labour productivity gains or none at all. The stagnation in 
labour productivity in these sectors may be attributed to the lack of information technology, but it 
certainly cannot be attributed to the impact of information technology. These account for by far the 
larger part of the tertiary sector.  
8. Finally, in many industrialised economies there are sectors, which have shown labour productivity 
gains over the past 10 years, which are due far more to structural rationalisation than to the direct 
impact of new technology. Examples are the textile and food industries and also the oil, steel, 
cement and petrochemical industries, where plant closures and rationalisation have been 
implemented. Since in any industry there is always a 'tail' of low productivity plants, a significant 
rise in average labour productivity can always be achieved simply as a result of scrapping the older 
generations of plants. It is possible even without any further technical improvements in the recent 
plants, which can now work closer to lull capacity. This may be described as the 'Verdun' effect in 
contrast to 'Verdoorn' effect of the high boom period.' 
 
  





Appendix 2: Explicit innovation policies in Latin America (Correa, 1995) 
 
The set of 'explicit' measures adopted to promote innovation, especially for industrial activities, in 
various Latin American countries have included: 
 
(a) Tax incentives: These incentives were established for a short period (1971-73) in Argentina, with 
very meagre results. A limited deduction of R&D expenditures has been permitted under Brazilian 
tax law, as well as in other countries (e.9. Peru, Venezuela). The 'New Industrial Policy' of Brazil 
has contemplated the establishment of Programs of industrial technological development in the 
framework of which a set of fiscal incentives may be granted. They include lax exemptions for the 
import of equipment, reductions in income tax, and other measures (still largely non-implemented). 
In general terms, and due to a multiplicity of factors, the fiscal instruments seem to have had a 
quite marginal impact on the effective creation of innovative capabilities in the region. 
(b) Financial support: The number, scope and sophistication of the instruments available in the region 
to finance innovation at the enterprise level increased during the 1980s. In addition to some 
unsuccessful attempts of the Banco, Brazil has developed different lines to support local 
innovation, including almost all stages from product development to the setting up of quality control 
systems, the adaptation and acquisition of foreign technologies etc. lt also supports national 
consultancy firms, currently experiencing a serious crisis resulting from the drastic reduction in 
international financing and in the investment and maintenance programs of public enterprises. The 
risk sharing mechanism of CONACYT of Mexico and the activities of the Fondo de Fomento de la 
InnovacionTecnologica (FINTEC) of Venezuela are other examples worthy of mention, although 
the budgets they have available for innovative activities have been small. 
(c) Linkages between research institutions and enterprises: A range of instruments has also been 
established in order to strengthen the traditionally weak linkages between research institutions 
(particularly in universities) and the productive sector. They have included a special contribution 
(2% of net income) of industrial enterprises in Peru, the creation of innovation' centres in Mexico 
(sponsored by the Universidad Autonoma de Mexico) and in Colombia (supported by 
COLCIENCIAS), and the establishment of a vast number of foundations and other entities, 
including enterprises such as GODETEC in Campinas associated to universities in Brazil. Another 
interesting development in Brazil is the establishment of 'technology parks' or 'poles', often with 
significant support of the local states, aimed at creating scientific and industrial complexes. 
BlORlO, for instance, foresees the installation of about 70 biotechnological firms and a total 
investment of around US$100 million. 
(d) Information services: Finally, and in part taking advantage of the potential of information 
technologies, some efforts have been made in the region to facilitate the diffusion of scientific and 
technological information. One example is the database on patents operated by the Instituto 
Nacional de Propriedade Industrial, which supplied almost 300,000 copies of documents in 1988, 
mainly through the 'Program of Automatic Supply of Technological Information'. 
  





Appendix 3: Acquisition of foreign technology (Dahlman, Bruce Ross-
Larson, and Westphal, 1987). 
 
Dahlman and Westphal say that much discussion about the acquisition of foreign technology focuses on 
how the technology is transferred rather than on what technological elements are being transferred and 
why they are being acquired overseas. Their major conclusions are summarised below: 
 
- Direct foreign investment, whether in a wholly owned subsidiary or in a joint venture with minority 
or majority local participation, is likely to be the only way to obtain the latest information from 
abroad. Such arrangements can ensure a rapid transfer of technology to a developing country - 
that is, a rapid transfer of technological information and means, but not necessarily understanding. 
The lack of local control in such investments can nevertheless have several deleterious outcomes 
for local technological development. 
- Licensing can also enable the rapid acquisition of product or process know-how. lt can permit more 
local control over adaptations and modifications, especially after the license expires. And it can 
broaden the variety of sources tor technological and other inputs far beyond what is possible under 
direct foreign investment. The main problems with licensing are in absorbing the foreign technology 
and in keeping current with advances in that technology. 
- Turnkey projects, like direct foreign investment and licensing, can bring technology to a developing 
country quickly. Because outsiders are responsible for all aspects of construction and start-up, the 
turnkey project is the quintessential black box, unless special efforts are made to take part in the 
design of the project and to understand what it makes it work. 
- Purchases of capital goods provide another way of acquiring the means of production without the 
transactional baggage of licenses and direct foreign investment - and a cheap way, if they can be 
used as models tor reverse engineering to produce the machines locally. But many times the new 
operating environment for a machine requires changes that the instructions do not cover because 
they pertain to the original environment. 
- Purchases of technical assistance can fill gaps in technological information and understanding to 
complement the country's capabilities in production, investment, and innovation. The advantage of 
such purchases is that it may be easier, cheaper, and quicker to rely on foreigners than to take the 
time and effort to do it locally, possibly making costly mistakes in the process. The disadvantage of 
technical services is the tendency towards persistent reliance on such services, toward doing little 
to build up domestic capabilities in providing those services easily, cheaply, and in ways that more 
fully consider local requirements. 
  





Appendix 4: Dakar Declaration 
 
It has to be remembered that the Dakar Declaration advised two major directions for African countries: 
 
1. To make choice of development strategy suitable to the objective situation of a given country 
without forgetting the balanced growth in all the major sectors; without separating development 
from the social process of full employment, income distribution, and the solution of the problems of 
health, nutrition, housing and education; and with the democratic participation of the masses. 
2. To redress the weakness of African scientific and technological capacity by developing schools, 
colleges and universities and a policy aimed at democratisation and reorganisation of instruction, 
especially the upgrading of scientific and technical education at all levels. This is because human 
resources are a country's main wealth.  
 
With regard to resource allocations the Dakar Declaration recommended the following: 
 
1. Financial Resources for R&D: Each country should at least allocate 1% of its GNP to scientific and 
technological activities by 1980. (Lagos Conference had recommended 0.5% of GNP to R&D). 
2. Special Fund for R&A UNESCO should establish a special fund for Africa for strengthening and 
launching of R&D activities including training at the appropriate level of R&D manpower. 
3. Human Resources: For countries with GNP $200 and above, 2000 scientists and engineers per 
million inhabitants of which 200 (10%) should be engaged in R&D; for countries with GNP between 
$100- $200, 1400 scientists and engineers per million inhabitants of which 140 must be engaged in 
R&D; for countries with a GNP below $100, 1000 scientists and engineers, with 100 engaged in 
R&D. lt was also agreed that the member states will continue to provide two technicians for each 
scientist or engineer engaged in R&D activities as recommended in the Lagos Conference. 
 
  





Appendix 5: AISI vision of sustainable information society in Africa 
 
AISl came with suggestions on priority strategies, programmes and projects, which can assist in the 
sustainable, build up of an information society in African countries. This is in accordance with the regional 
integration goals of the treaty establishing the African Economic Community, which foresaw the necessity 
of information networks and regional databases, information sources and skills capacities. This has come 
at a time when there is a growing concern, within the international community, that the continent might 
become marginalised from the global connectivity and global economy. AISI vision, strategic objectives and 
what it expects from member countries is given below. 
 
By the year 2010, the AISI is intending to realise a sustainable information society in Africa where: 
 
- Information and decision support systems are used to support decision making in all the major 
sectors of the economy in line with each country's national development priorities; 
- Every man and woman, school child, village, government office and business can access 
information and knowledge resources through computers and telecommunications. - Access is 
available to international, regional and national 'information highway'', providing "off-ramps" in the 
villages and in the information area catering specifically to grass-roots society;  
- A vibrant business sector exhibits strong leadership capable of forging the build up of the 
information society.  
- African information resources are available which reflect the needs of government, business, 
culture, education, tourism, energy, health, transport, and natural resources management; 
- Information and knowledge are disseminated and used by business, the public at large and 
disenfranchised groups, such as women and the poor. In particular it wants to make rational 
choices in the economy (free market) and for all groups to exercise democratic and human rights 
(freedom of speech and freedom of cultural and religious expression).  
 
Being this the vision AISI has of Africa's future, it makes it clear that each member-State will need to 
follow the following strategic objectives: 
 
- Ensure the continuous flow of information within the society by supporting initiatives to improve and 
create new information and communication services in different sectors of the society - education, 
health, employment, culture, environment, trade, finance, tourism, transport and commerce; 
- Create a continent-wide information and telecommunication network that allows low-cost and 
reliable communication with other users in Africa and across the globe. 
- Achieve maximum benefits from available information by encouraging the development of systems 
that allow wide dissemination to individuals, business communities, non-government organisation 
(NGOs) and the public sector; 
- Foster a new generation of men and women in Africa that uses information and communication 
technologies to leverage the development of their nations. 
- Link Africa with the rest of the world by improving the flow of new technologies in both directions 
and exporting intellectual products and services to the rest of the world. What the AlSl is trying to 
do is give a broad guideline framework to serve for each African country as a checklist for things 
that need to be done to get connected and avoid the risk of being left out in a world increasingly 
being informatised. It is up to each country, therefore, to take policy measures to reverse the 





unfavourable situation in which the continent is found. Many international donor agencies have 
shown willingness to help fund such projects that can help Africans get connected to the world. 
 
AISI has proposed the following actions as an integral part of national plans and programmes that 
each member-State should consider: 
 
1. Develop a master plan for building national information and telecommunication infrastructures and 
a two-to-five-year plan for the implementation of the basic infrastructure. 
2. Establish a strong regulatory body, independent from telecommunications operators and their 
ministries, to stimulate and regulate public/private sector partnerships, with a view to safeguarding 
the goal of "universal service" and to review fiscal policies (such as tariffs, duties and license fees). 
3. Eliminate or drastically reduce import tariffs, taxes and other legal barriers to the use of information 
and communication technologies. 
4. Establish an enabling environment to foster the development of information and communications in 
society, including measures which energise the private sector to play a leading market role in the 
provision of services and in the human resources development needed to use them effectively; 
5. Implement a policy for using information and communication technology in government services 
and develop national databases in all key sectors of the economy and national administration; 
6. Conduct needs analysis to determine requirements and set up information and communication 
services in key sectors of national priority, especially education, health, employment, culture, 
environment, trade, finance, tourism and transport; 
7. identify and develop information technology applications in areas with highest impact on socio-
economic development at the national level. 
8. Take immediate steps to facilitate the establishment of locally based, low-cost and widely 
accessible Internet services and indigenous African information content. 
9. Prepare and adopt plans to develop human resources in information and communication 
technologies. 
10. Adopt policies and strategies to increase access to information and communications facilities, with 
priorities in serving the rural areas, grass-root society and other disenfranchised groups, in 
particular, women and youth; 
11. Make special efforts to create awareness among those unfamiliar with the potential benefits of the 
African information infrastructure with particular attention to gender equity. 
12. Together, member States will need to develop a co-ordinating mechanism to ensure successful 
implementation of the AlSl to maximise complementarities; share lessons learned and reduce 
duplication of activities. 
 
  





Appendix 6: Major international agencies and organisations involved in Internet 
initiatives in Africa 
 
- Association for Progressive Communication (APC), 
- Bellanet. 
- Canadian International Development agency (CIDA), 
- Consultative Group for International Agricultural Research (CGIAR), 
- ECA's Africa's Information Society Initiative (AlSl), 
- Information Centre for Low-External-Input and Sustainable Agriculture (lLElA), 
- InfoDev, 
- International Development Research Centre (IDRC), 
- International Telecommunications Union (lTU), 
- International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), 
- Inter Press Service Third World News Agency (lPS), 
- NASA, 
- Organisation of American States (OAS), 
- Technical Centre for Agricultural and Rural Cupertino (CTA), 
- United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 
- United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), 
- UNESCO, 
- UN Secretary General's Special Initiative on Africa, 
- USAID, 
- World Bank, World Bank's Electronic Media Centre (EMC), 
- International Institute for Communications and Development, and others. 
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Appendix 8: Other software used in the country 
 
1. Ms-Outlook & Scheduler 
2. Harvard Graphics 
3. MAS 90 Accounting software 
4. EPINF 
5. Page Maker 
6. Central & Jacard for Sweater Designing 
7. GIS (Geographic information Systems) 
8. Accounting Packages such as Quick 
Books and Money 
9. Pascal 
10. C language 
11. DBase 
12. Power Point(Ms) 
13. Geez Gate 
14. Path Finder: Surveying Software 
15. Quattro-Pro 
16. Geosciences Software 
17. Geochemical Software 
18. Map Production Software 
19. UNIX 
20. SPSS 
21. Adobe Illustrator. R 6 
22. Adobe Photoshop, TM 2.5 
23. Adobe Streamline, TM 3 
24. Quick Express, R 3.3.1. 
25. Ex-Accounting 
26. EPt-50 
27. Aldus Page Maker 
28. Yada 
29. ProMS (Program manager system) 
30. Priceman 
31. CONCORD (accounting software) 
32. DlAL UP Networking 
33. MS Messaging 
34. MS Power Point 97 
35. WordPerfect 5.1, and 6. 
36. 36.Excel 5.0 
37. Claris file maker Pro.(data base) 
38. MS Works 
39. IBPS, ReDATUM Plus, ISSA, Port Pac 
(statistical software) 
40. Operating System 5400 
41. BPG2 (COBOL, FORTFTAN for minis) 
42. Winsome (accounting) 
43. AmiPro 
44. MC Afee 
45. Lotus Smart Suite 
46. Print Shop 
47. TINET (Trade Information Network of 




51. Floor Plan Plus 3D 
52. Winfax LIR 
53. I Photo Plus 
54. Perceive 
55. MS Project 
56. First Aid 
57. PC Copier 
58. Mustek 
59. Novel 3.1 2 
60. Oracle 
61. Designer 2000 
62. OPAC (Libris) 
63. CC-Mail 
64. Developers Kit 
65. Compilers 
66. Quick Link 









Appendix 9: List of organisations surveyed 
 
1. Eritrean Information Services Agency (EISA) 
2. Central Personnel Administration (CPA) 
3. National Statistics 
4. Head Office of the Ministry of Local 
Government  
5. Eritrean Police Commissioner Office 
6. Prisons Administration 
7. Head Office Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
8. Emigration Office 
9. Budget Office 
10. Department of Inland Revenue 
11. Department of Treasury 
12. Procurement and Government Property 
Control 
13. Customs and Finance Guard 
14. Bank of Eritrea 
15. Commercial Bank of Eritrea 
16. Government Garage 
17. Office of Auditor General 
18. License Office 
19. Investment Centre 
20. Grain Board 
21. Eritrean Standards 
22. Department of Trade 
23. Department of industry 
24. Research and Training, MTI 
25. Department of Labour 
26. Department of Social Welfare 
27. Administration and Finance. MLHW 
28. Department of Research and Development, 
MLHW 
29. ERBEC 
30. Department of Land Transport 
31. Department of Communications 
32. Department of Maritime Transport 
33. Post Office. Head Office 
34. Department of radio and TV 
35. Department of Press and News Agency 
36. Department of Engineering, Mol 
37. Department of Mines 
38. Department of Energy 
39. Department of Environment 
40. Housing commission 
41. Land Commission 
42. National Food Information Systems, MoA 
43. Ministry of Justice, Head off ice 
44. Department of Road construction 
45. Ministry of Education, Head Office 
46. University of Asmara 
47. Ministry of Health, Head Office 
48. Ministry of Tourism, Head Office 
49. Department of Research, MoF 
50. National Agency for Supervision and Privatisation 
of Public Enterprises 
51. National Confederation of Eritrean 
Workers(NCEW) 
52. National Union of Eritrean Youth and Students 
(NUEYS) 
53. National Union of Eritrean Women (NUEW)  
54. Teachers Association  
55. National Association of the Blind 
56. Dahlak Shoe Factory 
57. Sembel Household Utensils Factory 
58. Asmara soap Factory 
59. Halay Sweet Factory 
60. Asmara Meat & Milk Factory 
61. Lalemba sack Factory 
62. Africa Matches & Paper Factory 
63. Deluxe Shoe Factory 
64. National Edible Oil Factory 
65. Asmara Ceramics 
66. Eritrea Cackles Factory 
67. Eritrea Textile Factory 
68. Asmara Textile Factory 
69. Asmara Pickling Factory 
70. Red Sea Tannery 
71. Orota Metal Works 
72. Asmara Brewery 
73. Selam Hotel 
74. Ambasoyra Hotel 
75. NICE 
76. ERI-SOC 
77. Orota No.1 Metal Work 
78. Transhorn Transport Co. 
79. Garage Fenkel 
80. Seghen construction 
81. Red Sea Trading Co. 
82. Housing and Saving Bank 
83. Foreign Exchange Bureau 
84. Eritrea Shipping Lines 
85. Eritrean Tour Service 
86. As.Be.Co. 
87. Ghirmay Berhane Semereab(GEM lnformation 
Management) 
88. Maaza Hailemichael Misghina(TFanus) 
89. Ermias Solomon Yosief 





90. Mustafa Abdel-Aziz Seid-Abadr (JMC Computer 
Centre) 
91. The Elma Computer Centre 
92. Amanuel Tesfai 
93. Tekle Abraha Bahta (Professional Computer 
Services) 
94. Abacus Computer Services 
95. Bruke Habtemichael Solomun (SBM) 
 
96. Abdelrahman Saleh Shagaray 
97. Infotec Engineering P.l.c. 
98. institute of Computer Services 
99. Berhane Asfeha Dagnew (Africa Computer 
Technology) 
100. Kibrom Berhane Gebreselassie &Sons P.l.c. 
101. Mohammed Ali Jaffer (Asmara Computer Centre) 
102. Mnasie Tekie Mehreteab 
103. Tesfayohanes Kesete Teklemichael 
104. Eyob Habtemariam Tesfa 
105. Teslay Girmay Gilagiorgis 
106. Eden Computer Services 
107. Misgina Sium Gebregiorgis 
108. Robel Weldemichael Abraha (Ericom 2000) 
109. Alem Tekeste Zemuy 
110. Sewit International P.l.c. 
111. Computer Technology Services 
112. Yohannes Negash Bokre (Tesat IBM) 
113. Habte Tsegai 
114. Natural Resources Consultant Engin. 
115. Seifemichael Berhe 
116. Drilling and Geotechnical Services 
117. Estifanos Okbazghi 
118. Girmay Sengal 
119. Josef Tzegai Tekie 
120. Ghebremedhin Haile 
121. Abu-Husein 
122. Studio Michael Tedros Arch.& Urb. 
123. Kaltec Consulting Arch.& Eng. 
124. Gebremeskel Teare Constr. Arc. Eng. & P.l.c 
125. Tsegai Elias 
126. FASTEC Electrical Engineering Consultancy 
127. Photo Zula 
128. Selam Photo Studio 
129. Photo Bini 
130. Sahil Photo studio 
131. Photo Cathedral 
132. Photo Soark 
133. Photo red Sea 
134. Photo Eritrea 
135. Photo city 
136. Sunshine Hotel 
137. Legesse Hotel 
138. Ambasador Hotel 
139. Gash Garment Factory 
140. Harambe Sweater Factory 
141. Tsehaye Mogos Sweater factory 
142. Red Sea Bottlers 
143. Gash Cigarette Factory (Rothmans) 
144. Red Sea Soap Factory 
145. Chipollini Shoe Factory 
146. LlALF Sh.Co. 
147. Prima Eritrea Oil Company 
148. Anadarco 
149. Space 2001 
150. Keangnam Enterprises 
151. CMC 
152. East African Construction 
153. Eritrean Korean Furniture Manufacturing Co. 
154. Eritrean Painting Factory 
155. Aluminium Extrusion Plant 
156. Nakfa Corporation 
157. Mereb corporation 
158. MBY(Printing Press) 
159. Universal Trading Graphics 
160. Sabur Printing Press 
161. Selam Ultra-sound Clinic 
162. Dr. Efrem Zeweldi Clinic 
163. Polyclinic (near Betemengisti) 
164. Asisa Travel agency P.l.c. 
165. Hassen Mohammed-Ali Hassen 
166. Heron Travel Agency 
167. Solomon International Trading 






174. British Council Library 
175. Public Library 





Appendix 10: List of persons interviewed 
1. Teklemariam Ghebreselassie, Fainance and Administration Manager of NICE, October 8, 1997. 
2. Dr. Ghirmay Abrham, Economic Advisor to BE, and KiflomTekleab , Systems Manager of BE, October 10, 1997. 
3. Tewelde Ghebreab, Director of EritreanInformations Systems Agency, October13, 1997. 
4. Yemane Ghebremariam, IT Manager of Commercial Bank of Eritrea, October 14, 1997. 
5. Andemariam Ghebregiorgis, Head of Data Processing of TSE, October 16, 1997. 
6. Berhane Demoz, Research Section of RHRD of ministry of Education, October 19, 1997. 
7. Tsigereda Tekle, Head MIS of Ministry of Local Government Head office, October 22, 1997. 
8. Solomon Habtom, Maintenance Branch Head TSE, October 22, 1997. 
9. Tadesse Weldeyohannes, Head of Research & Development of the Ministry of Trade & Industry, October 23, 
1997. 
10. Biniam Tesfay, Progaram Analyst of Ministry of Trade & Industry, October 23, 1997. 
11. Abraham Tekle, Head of Human Resource Development of the Ministry of Education, October 27, 1997. 
12. Samuel Baire, Director General of the Ministry of Energy, October 27, 1997.    
13. Abraham Weldemichael, Eritrean Electric Authority Manager, October 27, 1997.    
14. Petros Tesfagiorgios, Planning & Human Resource Development Head of the CBE,   October 28, 1997.    
15. Haddish Tesfagiorgis and Tesfaldet Gebreab, Programmers of Data Processing Office of EEA, October 29, 
1997.   
16.  Zerai Abraham, Deputy Director of EISA,  October 29, 1997.    
17. Vittorio Giovanni, Planning Head of TSE, November 1, 1997.   
18. Tesfaselassie Berhane, Director of License Office, November 10, 1997.  
19. Weldeghebriel Beraki, Owner Manager of Alem Computer Centre,  November 11, 1997.  
20. Dr. Berhane Haile, Head of Health Information Systems Unit of the Ministry of Health, November 26, 1997.    
21. Berhane Abrehe, Director of Macro Policy Office, December 3, 1997. 
22. Mr Norman Piccioni, FAO Consultant of the Ministry of Agriculture, December 8, 1997.     
23. Ghirmay Kidane, Head Air Traffic Services of the Civil aviation, December 9, 1997. 
24. Menghisteab Habtegiorgis, Technical Head of Meteorology, December 9, 1997. 
25. Ainom Berhane, Director of National Statistics office, December 10, 1997. 
26. Alemseged Mesfin, BIT Computer School Owner-Manager, December 10, 1997. 
27. Teweldeberhan Mehari, Manager-owner of IBM Tesat, December 12, 1997. 
28. Mengis Samuel, Managing Director, and Yohannes Ghebrehiwet, operation Manager of EWAN Technology 
Solutions, December 17, 1997. 
29. Tewelde Estifanos, Technical Director of TFanus, December 18, 1997. 
30. Alazar H/Michael, Director CTS, December 23, 1997. 
31. Habte Gherenet, K.M. Computers Manager, December 23, 1997. 
32. Robel Weldemichael, Ericom 2000Manager, December 23, 1997. 
33. Dawit Tekie, Shewit International Deputy Manager, December 30, 1997. 
34. Dr. Abraha Ghebremeskel, Manager of ETSS, January 5, 1998.. 
35. Ahmed Negash, Academic Director of Asmara Computer Centre, January 5, 1998. 
36. Mussie Dawit, Technical Director ECET, January 10, 1998.. 
37. Isaias Fessehaie, General Manager Fred Hollows IOL Manufacturing Plant, February 24, 1998. 
38. Kidane Abraha, Production Manager of Fred Hollows IOL Manufacturing Plant, February 24, 1998. 
39. Teweldeberhan Dessu, Outside Plant Section Head of TSE, March 23, 1998. 
40. Tesfay Moges, International Exchange Head of TSE, March 23, 1998. 
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